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Preface
For many years, the Jus Post Bellum Project has updated and further enlightened prac-
titioners and researchers on the theoretical framework and practical consequences of 
jus post bellum and its link to sustainable peace. Within the context of this discourse, 
the environment and the exploitation of natural resources have not been the centre of 
attention.
In this volume, Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson and Jennifer S. Easterday have chosen 
to focus on environmental protection as a more visible part of jus post bellum. This is 
an important and welcome choice. Not only is post bellum environmental protection 
a conditio sine qua non for the rebuilding of a war- torn society, it is still an overlooked 
matter, only occasionally dealt with by the international community on a case- by- case 
basis. UN Environment (formerly UNEP) is doing crucial work through its Disasters 
and Conflicts programme, but as a UN program, it needs a mandate from States when 
choosing which steps to take — and those steps need to be financed. That said, we see 
a light on the horizon. In the recently proposed Global Pact for the Environment, the 
proposed Article 19 provides that “States shall take pursuant to their obligations under 
international law all feasible measures to protect the environment in relation to armed 
conflicts.”1
In an attempt to corroborate that post- war environmental protection is not solely 
a policy matter but also a legal matter, a seminar was arranged by the Jus Post Bellum 
Project in the Hague in 2014. I was privileged to attend that seminar and listen to the 
interesting and pioneering research presented. This volume is in part a further elabora-
tion of some of the research presented there. But it also contains more recent research 
that assists us to deepen our understanding of this complex issue.
The result is a comprehensive and impressive volume that presents up- to- date 
research and comments on environmental protection of jus post bellum. It is fair to say 
that this volume is the first of its kind. It is needed and welcome.
Following an excellent and helpful introduction, the volume is divided into four 
parts:  Foundations, Legal Norms and Frameworks, Tension and Dilemmas and 
Remedying and Preventive Damage and Harm. It contains valuable tables of legal cases, 
treaties and other documents as well as a list of abbreviations. It is a proper piece of aca-
demic work. But it is more than that. It fills a gap.
When the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) decided to place 
the topic Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts on its agenda, 
it did so as a result of a growing environmental apprehension among States, interna-
tional organizations, such as the ICRC and civil society, the latter represented for exam-
ple by the Environmental Law Institute. It was out of concern “that the environment 
1 Presented by Laurent Fabius, President of the Conseil constitutionnel, Former President of the COP21, 
and President of the Pact Experts Group, to President Macron in Paris 24 June 2017. Available at http:// 
pactenvironment.org, last accessed 31 July 2017.
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continues to be the silent victim of modern warfare” that UNEP and the Environmental 
Law Institute “undertook a joint assessment of the state of the existing legal framework 
protecting natural resources and the environment during armed conflict” in 2009. The 
result was the UNEP’s report, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict – An 
Inventory and Analysis of International Law (2009). The report suggested that the ILC 
“examine the existing international law for protecting the environment during armed 
conflict and recommend how it can be clarified, codified and expanded”.2
Although the title of the UNEP Report indicates that the focus of the report is envi-
ronmental protection “during” armed conflict, the innovative approach of the report 
was to look at other areas than international humanitarian law, namely environmental 
law, human rights and international criminal law. While the report does not refer to jus 
post bellum, the references to the post- war consequences for the environment and natu-
ral resources were plentiful. The jus post bellum was ever- present.
When the ILC takes up a new topic, it does so on the basis of its mandate. The focus 
must be on progressive development of international law or its codification. At the same 
time the Commission should not restrict itself to traditional topics, but should also 
consider those that reflect new developments in international law and pressing con-
cerns of the international community as a whole. It was on this basis the Commission 
took up the topic of Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict.
When I was appointed Special Rapporteur for the topic I suggested that the work 
should focus on three temporal phases: before, during and after armed conflict. It 
seemed to be the only practical way to move the topic forward. At the same time it was 
evident that the temporal phases could not be entirely separated from each other. The 
pre- conflict phase and the post- conflict phase had much in common if viewed through 
a legal lens. The “during armed conflict phase” was already regulated through the law of 
armed conflict. Even if the existing environmental protection was not strong enough, 
there was little prospect of modifying that particular body of law.
Concurrently the Commission had recognised that [t] he existence of an armed con-
flict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties as between States 
parties to the conflict or as between a State party to the conflict and a State that is not.3 
The Commission had presented an indicative list of treaties that involves an implica-
tion that they continue in operation, in whole or in part, during armed conflict.4 This 
list included treaties for the international protection of human rights, international 
protection of the environment, international watercourses and related installations and 
facilities, and treaties relating to aquifers and related installations and facilities among 
others. It was clear that the law applicable during armed conflict was wider than merely 
the lex specialis on the law of armed conflict. Legal principles and rules are often inter-
linked throughout all phases of a conflict.
2 UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict – An Inventory and Analysis of International 
Law (2009), Recommendation 3, p. 53.
3 ILC, Draft articles on the effect of armed conflict on treaties, Article 3. Available at http:// legal.un.org/ 
docs/ ?path=../ ilc/ texts/ instruments/ english/ draft_ articles/ 1_ 10_ 2011.pdf&lang=EF, last accessed 31 July 
2017.
4 Article 7 (Continued operation of treaties resulting from their subject- matter).
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From a more practical perspective every topic the ILC places on its agenda needs to 
be confined. It cannot cover all angles or all aspects. The ILC decided not to address 
root causes of armed conflict, natural resources, protection of cultural property per se, 
or peacebuilding, to give but a few examples. Many of these issues are dealt with by 
other UN bodies, such as the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. It 
is still an open question whether the Commission will proceed to define “environment” 
or to address in more detail issues of liability and responsibility.
In addressing environmental protection in relation to armed conflicts, the pre- and 
post- armed conflict phases are of crucial importance. A post- war situation is legally 
complex: matters such as establishing the critical time and dates of conduct, clarifying 
applicable legal subjects, liability, responsibility, compensation, remediation, statutes of 
limitation — these are but a few matters that need to be addressed. At the same time 
it is obvious that the environment will not be repaired through a lengthy court proce-
dure — as important as that may be. Innovative jus post bellum is required.
Sustainable peace cannot be achieved if environmental consequences are disre-
garded. In this context, women play a crucial role and need to be actively involved. 
This is a matter of law and justice. This comprehensive volume will add to the debate, 
and provide a space for further discussions on approaches in transitions from conflict 
to peace. The contributions show that jus post bellum clearly links into the pre- conflict 
and during armed conflict phases. I envy those who have not yet read the book, but will 
shortly be enlightened by it.
Ambassador Marie G. Jacobsson
Former Member of the United Nations International Law Commission 
and Special Rapporteur for the topic: Protection of the environment in 
relation to armed conflicts 2013–2016
July 2017
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Introduction
Protection of the Environment and Jus Post Bellum:  
Some Preliminary Reflections
Carsten Stahn*, Jens Iverson**, and Jennifer S. Easterday***
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.1
I.1 State- of- the- Art
Protection of the environment and natural resources is a key element in the transi-
tion from armed conflict to peace. Most academic studies have focused on classical 
peacetime or conflict situations.2 The United Nations Environmental Programme 
(‘UNEP’) qualified the environment as a ‘silent casualty’ of armed conflict.3 
* Professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice, Leiden University, Programme Director, 
Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, Leiden 
University.
*** Ph.D. Researcher at Leiden Law School, Leiden University.
1 Aldo Leopold, ‘The Land Ethic’ in A Sand County Almanac (New  York:  Oxford University Press, 
1949), 262.
2 See, for example, Karen Hulme, War- Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold (Leiden: Brill, 
2004); Carl Bruch and Jay Austin, The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Scientific and Economic 
Perspectives (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000); Rosemary Rayfuse (ed.), War and the 
Environment – New Approaches to Protecting the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict (Leiden: Brill, 
2014); Michael Bothe, Carl Bruch, Jordan Diamond, and David Jensen, ‘International Law Protecting the 
Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red 
Cross 576; Cordula Droege and Marie- Louise Togas, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed 
Conflict: Existing Rules and the Need for Further Legal Protection’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International 
Law 21; Erik Koppe, ‘The Principle of Ambiguity and the Prohibition Against Excessive Collateral Damage 
to the Environment During Armed Conflict’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 53– 82; Daniella 
Dam, ‘From Engines for Conflict into Engines for Sustainable Development: The Potential of International 
Law to Address Predatory Exploitation of Natural Resources in Situations of Internal Armed Conflict’ 
(2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 155.
3 UNEP, Press Release, ‘Environment is the “silent casualty” of armed conflict’, 6 November 2016, at 
<http:// reliefweb.int/ sites/ reliefweb.int/ files/ resources/ Environment%20is%20the%20%27silent%20
casualty%27of%20armed%20conflict_ EN.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017.
 
 
2 Introduction: Some Preliminary Reflections
Exploring the protection of the environment in the aftermath of armed conflict4 
and its relationship to sustainable peace is a relatively novel perspective.5
The environmental devastation caused by armed conflict has prompted an expan-
sion in the international legal framework governing environmental protection. For 
instance, the damage caused by the Vietnam War encouraged the adoption of the 
Environmental Modification Convention (‘ENMOD’) and Additional Protocol I  to 
the Geneva Conventions which strengthened the protection of the environment from 
widespread destruction during conflict.6 ENMOD restricted the modification of nature 
as a weapon of war.7 Additional Protocol I protected the environment itself (Art. 35(3)), 
as well as the human population (Art. 54), and banned attacks against the natural envi-
ronment by way of reprisals (Art. 55(2)). The 1991 Iraq War led to unprecedented oil 
spills in the Persian Gulf. It prompted the adoption of Security Council Resolution 687 
(1991),8 as well as the establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission 
which dealt inter alia with environmental damage. Since the 1990s, the UNEP, other 
UN agencies, and numerous NGOs have taken a control role in assessing and docu-
menting environmental damage caused by conflict.9 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (‘ICRC’) has developed guidelines for the protection of the environment 
during armed conflict10 which were endorsed by the General Assembly.11 Principle 
24 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development specifies expressly that 
states shall provide ‘protection for the environment in armed conflict’ since ‘[w] arfare 
is inherently destructive of sustainable development’.12 Several disarmament instru-
ments contain duties to remove remnants of war or to destroy weapons after conflict in 
conditions that do not result in significant damage to the environment.13 Efforts have 
4 In Tadić, the ICTY defined armed conflict as ‘a situation in which there is resort to armed force between 
States or protracted resort to armed force between governmental authorities and organized armed groups’. 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. 
IT- 94- I- AR72, 2 October 1995, para 70.
5 See Toxic Remnants of War Project, Environmental Mechanics: Re- Imaging Post- Conflict Environmental 
Assistance (Toxic Remnants of War Project, 2015), at <http:// www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ wp- content/ 
uploads/ 2015/ 11/ TRWP_ Environmental_ Mechanics.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017.
6 Under Art. 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Technique (‘ENMOD’), parties undertake ‘not to engage in military or any 
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long- lasting or severe effects 
as a means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State party’. See Convention on the Prohibition of 
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 18 May 1977, 16 I.L.M. 90. 
On its limited scope of application, see Michael Schmitt, ‘Humanitarian Law and the Environment’ (2000) 
28 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 265.
7 See also Rule 45 of the ICRC Customary Law Study.
8 Resolution 687 specified that Iraq is ‘liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, includ-
ing environmental damage . . . as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait’.
9 UNEP has traced the effects of conflicts on the environment in more than twenty reports. See UNEP, 
Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law (2009), 
at <http:// www.un.org/ zh/ events/ environmentconflictday/ pdfs/ int_ law.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017.
10 ICRC, Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in 
Times of Armed Conflict, at <https:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ resources/ documents/ article/ other/ 57jn38.htm> 
accessed 15 August 2017.
11 See UN GA Res. 49/ 50 (1994).
12 See also the reference by the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, para 30.
13 According to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, states parties hold responsibility for chemical weapons 
that they abandon on the territory of another state party. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction does not contain 
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been made to inventory existing protections of the environment during armed con-
flict.14 But overall, responses remain fragmented and partial.
In humanitarian responses, protection of the natural environment is often at the 
periphery. Responsive action is at the core of humanitarian response— immediate 
action that aims to stop, prevent, or alleviate the worst and effects of abuse.15 Remedial 
action is less immediate, and is aimed at helping people recover and live with subse-
quent effects.16 Finally, environment- building action focuses on long- term efforts to 
rebuild societal structures and norms in order to prevent or limit current and future 
violations and abuses.17 Humanitarian action is predominantly focused on thematic 
issues, such as protection of civilians, sexual and gender- based violence, protection 
of children or cultural property. Environmental protection is generally not part of the 
immediate response (i.e. action to stop or alleviate violations), but at best part of long- 
term efforts to rebuild structures or prevent or limit future damage.
The role of non- state armed groups remains a bone of contention in legal discussions 
on conflict and environment.18 Incidents, such as the burning of oil wells by ISIS in 
Libya, Iraq, or Syria, highlight the risks that non- state actors may pose to the environ-
ment and health of civilians. But international law still lacks effective mechanisms and 
structures to deal with such types of destruction, due to ambiguity of environmental 
rules relating to non- international armed conflicts and lack of compliance systems.19 In 
addition, major powers have remained reluctant to accept environmental obligations 
or duties to prevent or remedy conflict- related harm.20
Existing legal frameworks differ in their approach towards environmental challenges. 
International humanitarian law is often the starting point. The existing regime has been 
criticized for its high threshold for environmental damage under Articles 35 and 55 of 
Additional Protocol I, (i.e. the requirement of ‘widespread, long- term and severe dam-
age’ to the environment under Additional Protocol I). As Karen Hulme has pointed 
out, these notions are considerably vague, and open to conflicting understandings by 
an express environmental impact assessment, but requires states parties to clear all mines in areas under 
their jurisdiction or control. Article 10 of the 1996 Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Mines, Booby- Traps and Other Devices (annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or Have Indiscriminate Effects) obliges states to clear, remove, or destroy minefields under their 
control. The Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War obliges a party to a conflict to assume responsibility for 
remnants of war in territory under their control and to provide assistance in relation to clearance, removal, 
or destruction, even in the absence of control.
14 Elizabeth Mrema, Carl E. Bruch, and Jordan Diamond, Protecting the Environment During Armed 
Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law (UNEP/ Earthprint, 2009).
15 Hugo Slim and Andrew Bonwick, Protection:  An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005), 42.
16 ibid. 17 ibid.
18 See generally Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Engaging Non- state Armed Actors in State 
and Peace- Building: Options and Strategies’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 603.
19 Only a limited number of non- state armed groups have agreed to specific environmental protections 
in their doctrines. See Jonathan Somer, ‘Environmental Protection and Non- State Armed Groups: Setting 
a Place at the Table for the Elephant in the Room’, at <http:// www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ environmen-
tal- protection- and- non- state- armed- groups- setting- a- place- at- the- table- for- the- elephant- in- the- room/ > 
accessed 15 August 2017.
20 For instance, the US has called into question the customary nature of Rule 45 of the ICRC Customary 
Law Study which prohibits causing ‘serious damage to the natural environment’. See John B. Bellinger and 
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interpreters. Taken to its extreme, the term ‘widespread’ might be read to cover only 
damage that stretches over thousands of kilometres. The notion of ‘long term’ could 
imply a period of several decades, rather than months or years. The requirement of 
severity might require significant impact on human life.21
Protection of the environment per se remains an exception. While certain multilat-
eral environment agreements (e.g. the Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage) protect the environment per se (e.g. biodiver-
sity), international humanitarian law and international criminal law continue to treat 
environmental protection largely from an anthropocentric perspective. They address 
environmental protection mostly through the lens of property protection (e.g. owner-
ship of natural resources), and precautions in attack or pursuit of military objectives 
(principles of necessity and proportionality). Different approaches to the environment 
can be found within the same document. Article 35 of the 1977 Additional Protocol 
I22 is more ecocentric, while Article 55 is more anthropocentric— valuing the natural 
environment not necessarily for its own sake but because damage to the natural envi-
ronment may ‘prejudice the health or survival of the population’. This anthropocentric 
framework is the norm in the law of armed conflict. Like Aldo Leopold, contributors to 
this volume emphasize environmental integrity and stability as fundamental criteria to 
evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to preserve the environment and stabilize the peace.
The acceptance of specific ecological obligations and procedures in post- conflict 
environments continues to encounter resistance. It is only gradually recognized that a 
comprehensive understanding of the nexus between environment and conflict requires 
not only efforts to protect the environment as such, but a deeper engagement with the 
origins of conflicts and a better connection with peacebuilding strategies.23
Traditional approaches face particular challenges in transitions. There is a high degree 
of norm diffusion. Protection of the environment and natural resources needs to be 
William J. Haynes, ‘A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study 
Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 443, 455– 60.
21 See Hulme (n 2) 92– 6.
22 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. The relevant articles are:
Article 35. BASIC RULES.
1.  In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited.
2.  It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature 
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
3.  It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, 
to cause widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environment.
Article 55. PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT.
1.  Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long- term 
and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of 
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environ-
ment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.
23 See David Jensen and Stephen Lonergan (eds.), Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources In Post- 
Conflict Peacebuilding (New  York:  Routledge, 2012); Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra Nichols, 
Governance, Natural Resources and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (New York: Routledge, 2015).
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considered in tandem with a broad range of simultaneously applicable frameworks, such 
as (i)  human rights, (ii) transitional justice,24 (iii) arms control/ disarmament, (iv) UN 
law and practice (sanctions, protection of natural resources, law of peace operations), 
(v) development, and (vi) domestic law. These bodies provide different perspectives on 
environmental protection. Environmental concerns may be protected through different 
lenses:  property protection, health, and environmental norms and principles.25 These 
frameworks complement each other and require coordination.26 The weight given to these 
rationales may shift according to the nature and intensity of the conflict and the progres-
sion towards the consolidation of peace, that is moves from the absence of violence to 
thicker versions of societal peace.27
Existing frameworks contain gaps and ambiguities in key areas, such as non- 
international armed conflict, the allocation of responsibility (e.g. ‘shared responsibility’,28 
or the responsibility of non- state actors such as private military contractors), and enforce-
ment. Many human rights instruments contain environmental protections.29 But there are 
often conflicting priorities in post- conflict settings that may require deviation from classi-
cal peacetime standards. A balance needs to be struck between strict liability approaches, 
supportive compliance mechanisms, and punitive approaches. Addressing immediate and 
long- term consequences of environmental damage in and after conflict raises novel ques-
tions about reparations.
I.2 Jus Post Bellum and Environmental Protection
The role of jus post bellum in relation to environmental protection has thus far gained 
limited attention in scholarship.30 The concept of jus post bellum has roots in just war 
24 Transitional justice is a contested term, but can be thought of as a ‘conception of justice associated 
with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive 
predecessor regimes’. See Ruti G. Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2006) 16 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 69, 69.
25 See Karen Hulme, ‘The ILC’s Work Stream on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflict’ (2016) 34 Questions in International Law 27, 33.
26 Each of them offers prospects to strengthen specific aspects of environmental protection (e.g. a ‘rights’- 
based approach to protection, standard- setting, environmental clean- up, remedies, and reparations), but 
also contains its inherent limitations.
27 On jus post bellum and peace, see Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan Peace (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2016); Mark Evans, ‘Just Peace: An Elusive Ideal’ in Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics Beyond War’s End 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 197.
28 On ‘shared responsibility, see Andre Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in 
International Law: A Conceptual Framework’ (2013) 34 Michigan Journal of International Law 359.
29 For instance, Art. 24 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights states that ‘[a] ll peoples shall 
have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development’. See African Charter of 
Human and People’s Rights, (1982) 21 I.L.M. 58. The 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights reaffirms the ‘right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public 
services’. Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, OASTS No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 161.
30 For an exception, see Douglas Lackey, ‘Postwar Environmental Damage: A Study in Jus Post Bellum’ in 
Larry May and Zachary Hoskins (eds.), International Criminal Law and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 141. In her Third Report, ILC Special Rapporteur Marie Jacobsson ‘has decided not 
to address the ongoing academic discussions on the concept of jus post bellum’ since the ‘legal- political dis-
cussion on this concept is wider than positive law and has a clear connection to just war theories’. See Marie 
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theory.31 It was traditionally linked to the assessment of the morality of war and inter-
vention in international society.32 But it is gaining increasing importance as a legal con-
cept through practice and law- making in different areas, such as peace treaties, peace 
operations, (post- )occupation law, international criminal justice, or statebuilding prac-
tice.33 Jus post bellum differs from jus contra bellum and the jus in bello.34 It is not 
only restrictive, but also permissive in nature, that is geared at facilitating and guiding 
‘choices’ in transitions. Like other fields, it has been primarily concerned with atrocity 
violence and human harm.35 It has traditionally neglected the environment or treated 
it as a low priority. This limited focus is open to critical scrutiny.
Environmental exploitation and harm is often not just a result of armed conflict, 
but one of its major causes. Studies about the interactions of human and natural sys-
tems show that environmental impact can have serious consequences for peacebuild-
ing.36 For instance, environmental damage caused by weapons, oil spills and destroyed 
landscapes, or killing of wildlife may impede health, return of internally displaced per-
sons, sustainable development, or social peace among societies affected conflict. Cymie 
Payne has thus convincingly argued in our first jus post bellum volume that environ-
mental integrity is an essential part of breaking cycles of conflict, restoring societies, 
and re- establishing the rule of law.37
G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, ILC Doc. A/ CN.4/ 700, 3 June 2016, para 10.
31 See, for example, Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004); 
Brian Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 
2000), 57; Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Buffalo, New York: Broadview Press, 2006), 160– 90; Alex 
Bellamy, ‘The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War’ (2008) 34 Review of International 
Studies 601; Mark Allman and Tobias Winright, After the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post 
War Justice (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2010); Michael Walzer, ‘The Aftermath of War. Reflections on Jus 
Post Bellum’ in Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics Beyond War’s End (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2012), 35.
32 On jus post bellum and judgment, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Post Bellum Aspects of the Laws of Armed 
Conflict’ (2009) 31 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 31, 45– 55.
33 See Inger Österdahl and Esther van Zadel, ‘What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean: Of New Wine and Old 
Bottles’ (2009) 14 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 175; Adam Roberts, ‘Transformative Military 
Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights’ (2006) 100 American Journal of International 
Law 580; Kristen Boon, ‘Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of Jus Post Bellum’ (2009) 31 Loyola 
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 57; Christine Bell, ‘Post- conflict Accountability 
and the Reshaping of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ in Orna Ben- Naftali (ed.), International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), 328, 369. See 
also the contributions in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
34 On critiques of jus post bellum, see Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Law After War’ (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 233; Eric De Brabandere, ‘The Responsibility for Post- Conflict Reforms: A Critical 
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept’ (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 119; 
Ruti Teitel, ‘Rethinking Jus Post Bellum in an Age of Global Transitional Justice’ (2013) 24 European Journal 
of International Law 335.
35 For a critique of the crisis narrative of international law, see Hilary Charlesworth, ‘International 
Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 377.
36 UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (United 
Nations Environment Programme, 2009), at <http:// postconflict.unep.ch/ publications/ pcdmb_ policy_ 
01.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017.
37 See Cymie Payne, ‘The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict- Legal Regimes’ in Stahn, 
Easterday, and Iverson (n 33) 502.
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I.2.1 Notions of jus post bellum
This volume seeks to make the case that jus post bellum can have a useful role in relation 
to environmental protection. A  fundamental premise is that environmental damage 
needs to be considered independently from respect of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.38 
As we have set out in our previous research, the concept is inherently linked to the idea 
of sustainable peace.39 Some view it in a narrow sense, namely as a concept relating to 
the transition phase out of armed conflict, that is a phase that is separate from a com-
plete end to hostilities.40 We have understood it in a wider sense, namely not only as 
exit from conflict, but as a concept inherently connected to the establishment of peace. 
It pursues different macro purposes:
(i)  it may have a certain preventive function, by requiring actors to look into the 
consequences of action before, rather than ‘in’ and ‘after’ armed conflict;
(ii) it may serve as a constraint on violence in armed conflict; and
(iii) it may facilitate a succession to peace, rather than ‘exit’ from conflict.
In legal terms, the concept may be understood in at least three different ways. Jus post 
bellum may be said to form a system of norms and principles applicable to transitions 
from conflict to peace.41 This view is the most ambitious conception. Many jus post 
bellum norms are adaptations from existing bodies of law, or are derived from them. 
Process- related norms, flexible principles, and ‘soft law’ have particular importance, in 
light of the particular tensions raised in post- conflict settings.
A second and more ‘modest’ understanding of jus post bellum is its qualification as a 
‘framework’.42 This conception emphasizes the functionality of jus post bellum. Jus post 
bellum might be understood as an ‘ordering framework’, namely as an instrument to 
identify what rules and principles apply in post- conflict situations, to coordinate the 
application of laws, or to solve conflicts of norms or balance conflicting interests.
Thirdly, jus post bellum may constitute an interpretative device.43 The concept might 
inform a context- specific interpretation of certain normative concepts, such as ‘mil-
itary necessity’ or the principle of proportionality. For instance, the nexus between 
38 See also  chapter 16 in this volume. On the independence of jus post bellum from jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello, see Carsten Stahn,  “Jus ad bellum”, “jus in bello” . . . “jus post bellum?” – Rethinking the Conception 
of the Law of Armed Force’ (2007) 17 European Journal of International Law 921, 936; Carsten Stahn, ‘Das 
Ringen um den Frieden: Jus Ad Bellum, Jus Contra Bellum, Jus Post Bellum?’ in Andreas von Arnauld (ed.), 
Völkerrechtsgeschichte(n):  Historische Narrative und Konzepte im Wandel (Berlin:  Duncker & Humblot, 
2017), 147, 156– 7.
39 Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus 
Post Bellum: An Introduction’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 33) 1, 11.
40 On jus ex bello, see Darrel Mollendorf, ‘Jus ex Bello’ (2008) 16 Political Philosophy 123; Darrel 
Mollendorf, ‘Two Doctrines of Jus ex Bello’ (2015) 125 Ethics 653; David Rodin, ‘Two Emerging Issues 
of Jus Post Bellum:  War Termination and the Liability of Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression’ in Carsten 
Stahn and Jann Kleffner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace (The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2008), 53.
41 On this understanding see Carsten Stahn, ‘The Future of Jus Post Bellum’ in Stahn and Kleffner (n 40), 
231, 236– 7.
42 See Easterday, Iverson, and Stahn (n 39) 1, 2– 4.
43 See James Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 
33) 58.
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environmental protection and peace might support a ‘green’ interpretation of concepts, 
such as proportionality, necessity, or distinction.
I.2.2 Implications in relation to environmental protection
As Larry May and others have shown, jus post bellum demands moderation, which 
derives from the need to end conflict in a sustainable way. 44 This may require conces-
sions, compromises, and a certain degree of renouncement, that is an openness by par-
ties to conflict to accept not only what is ‘owed’, but what can be reasonably demanded. 
This conception has a certain grounding in the principle of equity,45 which plays a 
prominent role in general international law and international environmental law.
These tensions, and in particular the need for moderation, communitarian 
approaches, and balancing of conflicting interests, are evident in the field of environ-
mental protection. The ‘optimal goal’ is, as the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) 
put it, to leave ‘no environmental footprints at all’.46 While optimal, this goal is nor-
mally not only impossible— even assessment of the extent of environmental harm can 
be difficult. During and after armed conflict, it is often hard to obtain reliable informa-
tion on the condition of the environment. Assessment of environmental harm is mostly 
only one among competing priorities. Contributions to the harm are often shared or 
clouded by scientific uncertainty. Certain forms of damage may unfold in slow motion 
and materialize only long after cessation of hostilities. Other forms of damage may be 
irreversible. It will often be impossible to restore the status quo ante.
The only remedy may be forward- looking, that is to strengthen system resilience.47 
Repair of harm may require a broader distribution of burden- sharing. For instance, 
environmental harm is often caused by cumulative effects. The principle ‘if you break it, 
you own it’48 is not necessarily most conducive to effective environmental protection. 
International environmental law is governed by the ‘polluter pays’ principle.49 This 
approach causes particular difficulty in civil wars or fragile states. Countries affected 
by armed violence or parties involved in non- international armed conflict may lack 
44 See Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius and Meionexia’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 33), 15, 
21– 2. Steven J. Barela and Alexis Keller, ‘Justice, Peace and Jus Post Bellum’ (2015) 7 Amsterdam Law Forum 
98, 107, arguing that peacemaking requires recognition and certain degree of concession and compromise 
from parties involved (principle of renouncement).
45 On equity in international environmental law, see Dinah Shelton, ‘Equity’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta 
Brunnée, and Ellen Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 639; Philippe 
Cullet, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David. M. Ong, and Panos 
Merkouris (eds.), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2010), 161. 
On equity and jus post bellum in international investment law, see Jure Zrilič, ‘International Investment Law 
in the Context of Jus Post Bellum: Are Investment Treaties Likely to Facilitate or Hinder the Transition to 
Peace?’ (2015) 16 Journal of World Investment & Trade 604.
46 Jacobsson, Third Report (n 30) para 170.   47 See Payne,  chapter 2 in this volume.
48 See Dinah Shelton, ‘If You Break It, Do You Own It? Legal Consequences of Environmental Harm from 
Military Activities’ (2015) 6 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 201; George Clifford, ‘Jus 
Post Bellum: Foundational Principles and a Proposed Model’ (2012) 11 Journal of Military Ethics 42, 44; 
James Pattison, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the Responsibility to Rebuild’ (2015) 45 British Journal of Political 
Science 635, 638– 41.
49 The ‘polluter pays’ principle may be traced back to the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. See PCIJ, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, PCIJ Series A, No. 9, 26 July 
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capacity to remedy harm caused, even if they are formally responsible for its causation. 
There is a risk that no one is effectively held liable for cumulative action.
Jus post bellum provides a potential framework to accommodate these tensions. It is 
in many ways an instrument to understand the functioning of norms, principles, and 
policies in a new way. It has essentially four different functions.
It offers, first of all, a lens to view environmental protection as continuum through-
out cycles of conflict or conflict transformations. Environmental concerns are relevant 
through all phases of conflict, ranging from pre- conflict stages to different phases of 
armed conflict, post- conflict transitions, and their aftermath. The perspective through 
which they are approached in these periods differ, depending on the underlying bodies 
of law. Jus post bellum provides a means to understand better how principles operate in 
these distinct phases. It allows a better distinction between different categories of prin-
ciples, and their interplay, such as (i) environment- related principles (e.g. sustainable 
development,50 intergenerational equity51), (ii) conflict or transition- related practices, 
(iii) organizing principles (e.g. rules of conflict, prioritization), and (iv) process- related 
principles (e.g. cooperation, sequencing).
Second, jus post bellum provides a fresh look at the operation of the principles of 
prevention52 and precaution.53 In traditional discourse, prevention and precaution are 
mostly related to classical peacetime or armed conflict. These two scenarios are often 
seen in isolation of each other. Jus post bellum provides an incentive to regard preven-
tion and precaution in more holistic way, namely as a prerogative in pre- conflict plan-
ning, ongoing conflict, periods of transition, and peacetime. These different phases are 
inherently connected. Jus post bellum strengthens, in particular, the argument that con-
cerns of environmental protection are not set aside by armed conflict54 but relevant 
throughout conflict and its aftermath— a finding supported by the jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in the Nuclear Weapons Opinion55 and the prac-
tice of the ILC.56
Third, jus post bellum strengthens the case for due diligence of actors beyond armed 
conflict. Due diligence duties are inherent in international environmental law and 
1927. See generally Priscilla Schwartz, ‘The Polluter- Pays Principle’ in Fitzmaurice, Ong, and Merkouris 
(n 44) 243.
50 See Duncan French, ‘Sustainable Development’, in Fitzmaurice, Ong, and Merkouris (n 45) 51.
51 See Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Implementing intergenerational equity’, in Fitzmaurice, Ong, and Merkouris 
(n 45) 100.
52 The principle of prevention is related to the avoidance of harm that is known or foreseeable. See Arie 
Trouwhurst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002), 36– 7.
53 The precautionary principle includes risks arising from scientific uncertainty. ibid.
54 On the relationship between jus post bellum and jus in bello, see Inger Österdahl, ‘The Gentle 
Modernizer of Armed Conflict?’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 33) 207.
55 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 12) para 33 (‘The Court thus finds that while the 
existing international law relating to the protection and safeguarding of the environment does not specifi-
cally prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it indicates important environmental factors that are properly to 
be taken into account in the context of the implementation of the principles and rules of the law applicable 
in armed conflict’).
56 See ILC, Preliminary Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, 
ILC Doc. A.CN.4/ 674, 30 May 2014, para 2 (‘This work takes, at its starting point, the presumption that the 
existence of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties’).
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international humanitarian law. Jus post bellum broadens the spectrum. It might involve 
a mandate to minimize harm that makes a peaceful post- conflict settlement impossi-
ble. Scholars have derived this imperative from the need to facilitate peace between 
warring factions.57 This argument applies with equal force to environmental considera-
tions, which constitute an impediment to sustainable peace. The mandate to protect the 
environment during and after conflict is inherently linked to the needs of future gen-
erations (‘intergenerational approach’). Legally, this due diligence under jus post bellum 
is best understood as an ‘obligation of conduct’, that is a duty to take reasonable steps 
towards this outcome, rather than an obligation of result.
Fourth, jus post bellum allows a differentiated look at the treatment of harm and 
remedies. In existing discourse on the morality of war, jus post bellum has been 
associated with a principle of rebuilding.58 The imperative to rebuild after conflict 
is mostly understood as a moral principle.59 It is clear that environmental damage 
must ‘be assessed against whomever caused it, regardless of who won or lost’.60 But 
the legal regime governing post- conflict liability and responsibility is more complex. 
States may bear responsibility for lawful and unlawful acts. Non- state actors may 
be held accountable under customary international law or domestic laws. Several 
conventions limit damage caused by armed conflict.61 It remains contested to what 
extent violations trigger strict liability.62 Contributions to the harm may originate 
from a wide of actors. One of the most difficult questions is to provide effective rem-
edies. Parties to a conflict, including non- state actors, may lack the means and know- 
how to restore environmental damage. Remedial action may have to be spread more 
widely than parties to a conflict. It relies on collective action, solidarity, and coopera-
tion, involving affected states, international organizations, NGOs, and local actors.63 
Reparation or compensation claims for harm may need to be organized through spe-
cialized procedures.
This special approach towards responsibility is sometimes referred to as ‘reme-
dial responsibility’.64 It distinguishes the responsibility of the agent for a specific out-
come from the responsibility to remedy harm through remedial action (‘remedial 
57 Larry May relates this to the principle of reconciliation, namely the ‘obligation to initiate and conduct 
war in such a way that one does not unduly antagonize the people with whom on will eventually have to 
reach a peaceful accord’. See Larry May, After War Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 21.
58 Alexandra Gheciu and Jennifer Welsh, ‘The Imperative to Rebuild: Assessing the Normative Case for 
Postconflict Reconstruction’ (2009) 23 Ethics & International Affairs 121; Lonneke Peperkamp, ‘On the 
Duty to Reconstruct After War: Who is Responsible for Jus Post Bellum?’ (2016) XXIX Canadian Journal of 
Law & Jurisprudence 403.
59 See generally Larry May and Andrew Forcehimes (eds.), Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
60 Lackey (n 30) 141, 148. 61 See Jacobsson, Third Report (n 30) para 110 et seq.
62 See Toxic Remnants of War Project (n 5) 41 (‘It could be argued that as conflict and military activities 
are inherently risky for the environment, parties to a conflict should also bear some responsibility for dam-
age, whether intentional or not’). Strict liability approaches have been applied in relation to oil transporta-
tion and nuclear industries.
63 See also Peperkamp (n 58) 429 (‘The “belligerents rebuilt thesis” must therefore be understood in a 
more nuanced way than it initially appeared: belligerents are not solely responsible. If they cannot bear the 
duty to reconstruct themselves, other actors are remedially responsible instead’).
64 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007), 
15– 16; David Miller, ‘Distributing Responsibilities’ (2001) 9 Journal of Political Philosophy 453.
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responsibility’). It is reflected in certain recent disarmament instruments. Both, the 
Anti- Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
decouple clearance obligations from user responsibility. For instance, Article 4(4) of 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions ‘strongly encourage[s] ’ states parties that used 
weapons to support host states in the destruction and clearance of cluster munitions.65 
But ultimately, the host state is bound to ensure clearance, irrespective of who used 
the weapons on its territory.66 Responsibility is thus tied to jurisdiction and control. 
This approach is deemed to strengthen the protection of civilians after the cessation of 
hostilities.
I.3 The ILC Draft Principles on the Protection of  
the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts
Some fundamental aspects of the regime governing environmental protection in tran-
sitions from conflict to peace have been addressed by the ILC in its study on the ‘pro-
tection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts’, guided by Special Rapporteur 
Marie Jacobsson.67
The 2016 ILC draft principles break new ground since they extend the scope of consid-
eration of environmental protection beyond armed conflict. The ILC decided early on to 
adopt a holistic approach which includes not only protection during peacetime and armed 
conflict, but also the aftermath of conflict, and certain general principles covering all phases. 
The third report examines principles applying in the post- conflict phase.68 The ILC draft 
principles thus venture in post bellum terrain which differs partly from classical peacetime. 
This is an achievement in itself, because it signals that environmental damage should not 
simply be accepted as a ‘silent casualty’ of conflict in the aftermath of hostilities.69
The draft principles suggested by the ILC are in many ways marked by compromise, 
and in no way complete in coverage. But they reflect important trends and new insights. 
The ILC takes a dynamic approach towards the understanding of the environment and 
its ecosystems. It acknowledges that ‘environmental considerations cannot remain static 
over time, they should develop as human understanding of the environment develops’.70
The notion of principles as such triggered a rich debate.71 Some members expressed 
a preference for draft articles, which would lend themselves to codification. But 
65 Art. 4(4) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
66 Art. 4(1) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
67 See Michael Bothe, ‘The ILC’s Special Rapporteur’s Preliminary Report on the Protection of the 
‘Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict: An Important Step in the Right Direction’ in Pia Acconci 
et al., (eds), International Law and the Protection of Humanity. Essays in Honor of Flavia Latanzi (Leiden/ 
Boston: Brill, 2017), 213– 24.
68 Jacobsson, Third Report (n 30) para 17.
69 See in this sense, Guilio Bartolini and Marco Pertile, ‘The Work of the ILC on the Environment 
and Armed Conflicts: Enhancing Protection for the “Silent Victims of Warfare”?’ (2016) 34 Question of 
International Law 1, 4.
70 See Report of the ILC, Sixty- eighth session (2 May– 10 June and 4 July– 12 August 2016), A/ 71/ 10, 336.
71 See Report of the ILC, Sixty- seventh session (4 May– 5 June and 6 July– 7 August 2015), A/ 70/ 10, 108, 
para 146.
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ultimately, the more flexible concept of principles was retained. The principles are 
important from a jus post bellum perspective in several ways.
A first important contribution is the desire to strengthen environmental protection 
in the planning and legal framework of military and peace operations. Jus post bellum 
contains a nucleus of norms and principles in UN law and the law of military opera-
tions.72 Many contemporary operations, such Iraq, Afghanistan, or Libya have been 
criticized for a lack of appropriate mandating or planning. Jus post bellum scholars have 
argued that existing frameworks should contain a clearer pre- commitment to assess 
consequences of the use of force on post- conflict situations.73 Some have called for a 
jus ante bellum.74 The 2016 ILC draft principles strengthen prevention in military and 
peace operations before the operation. For instance, draft principle 7 encourages states 
and international organizations to include provisions concerning environmental pro-
tection, including ‘preventive measures, impact assessments, restoration and clean- up 
measures’ in agreements concerning the presence of military forces.75 Draft principle 
8 mandates (‘shall’) states and international organizations involved in peace operations 
to ‘consider the impact of such operations on the environment and take appropriate 
measures to prevent, mitigate and remediate the negative environmental consequences 
thereof ’. These principles are complemented by a general clause which highlights the 
aim to enhance the protection of the environment not only in pre- conflict phase, but 
also during armed conflict and after armed conflict.76 Although the ILC draft princi-
ples are framed in ‘soft language’ (‘should, as appropriate’; ‘shall consider’), they serve 
as an important check for practices.
Second, the ILC draft principles clarify duties in armed conflict. The work of ILC is 
guided by the objective to strengthen the protection of the environment during armed 
conflict, rather than merely re- stating existing rules under international humanitarian 
law. This is reflected in draft principle 2.77 One of the most important developments 
lies in the approach towards the protection of the environment during armed conflict. 
The draft principles do not expressly differentiate between the legal regime governing 
72 See Dieter Fleck, ‘Jus Post Bellum as a Partly Independent Legal Framework’ in Stahn, Easterday, and 
Iverson (n 33) 43, 48, 50.
73 See Brian Orend, Michael Walzer on War and Justice (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), 137– 9, 
190; Analisa Koeman, ‘A Realistic and Effective Constraint on the Resort to Force? Pre- commitment to 
Jus in Bello and Jus Post Bellum as Part of the Criterion of Right Intention’ (2007) 6 Journal of Military 
Ethics 198.
74 Garrett Wallace Brown and Alexandra Bohm, ‘Introducing Jus ante Bellum as a Cosmopolitan 
Approach to Humanitarian Intervention’ (2016) 22 European Journal of International Relations 897– 919.
75 It reads: ‘States and international organizations should, as appropriate, include provisions on environ-
mental protection in agreements concerning the presence of military forces in relation to armed conflict. 
Such provisions may include preventive measures, impact assessments, restoration and clean- up measures.’
76 Principle 4 (Measures to enhance the protection of the environment) reads:  ‘1. States shall, pursu-
ant to their obligations under international law, take effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other 
measures to enhance the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict. 2. In addition, States 
should take further measures, as appropriate, to enhance the protection of the environment in relation to 
armed conflict.’
77 It reads: ‘The present draft principles are aimed at enhancing the protection of the environment in rela-
tion to armed conflict, including through preventive measures for minimizing damage to the environment 
during armed conflict an through remedial measures.’
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international and non- international armed conflict.78 They follow thus, to some extent, 
the famous critique of the distinction, formulated in Tadić:  ‘What is inhumane, and 
consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmis-
sible in civil strife’.79 As highlighted in several contributions in this volume, they treat 
the environment largely as a civilian object on warfare80 and expand protection, by cat-
egorically excluding reprisals against the natural environment under all circumstances, 
including non- international armed conflict.81
As argued by UNEP, distinction, necessity, and proportionality under international 
humanitarian law ‘may not be sufficient to limit damage to the environment’.82 The ILC 
draft principles reflect this consideration. Draft principle 9 contains a general duty to 
respect and protect the natural environment in accordance with both, ‘applicable inter-
national law’, and ‘in particular the law of armed conflict’.83 Draft principle 10 specifies 
that the rules and principles governing ‘distinction, proportionality, military necessity 
and precautions in attack’ shall be ‘applied to the natural environment, with a view to its 
protection’.84 The ILC also recognized a general duty of care to ‘protect the natural envi-
ronment against widespread, long- term and severe damage’85 and a duty not to attack 
any part of it, ‘unless it has become a military objective’.86 The duty of care is derived 
from Article 55 of Additional Protocol I. It clarifies that the environment is protected 
per se, even in the absence of human harm. According to the explanation of the ILC, it 
involves a ‘duty on the parties to an armed conflict to be vigilant of the potential impact 
that military activities can have on the natural environment’.87 The draft principles also 
enhance protection, by requiring states to ‘designate, by agreement or otherwise, areas 
of major environmental and cultural importance as protected zones’.88 The term ‘major 
environmental importance’ was discussed at previous occasions, but it is novel in the 
context of the law of armed conflict. The wording closes an important gap left in the 
negotiation of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.89
Third, the ILC draft principles reinforce post- conflict protection. They acknowledge 
that post- conflict construction requires a communitarian effort that goes beyond the 
parties to a conflict. Draft principle 14 goes to the heart of jus post bellum.90 It states 
that ‘[p] arties to an armed conflict should, as part of the peace process, including where 
appropriate in peace agreements, address matters relating to the restoration and pro-
tection of the environment damaged by the conflict’. This principle recognizes the car-
dinal importance of the link between peacebuilding and environmental protection. It 
bears some synergies with Immanuel Kant’s famous dictum in Perpetual Peace accord-
ing to which peace agreements should avoid clauses that carry the seeds for the out-
break of further wars.91
78 See also Stavros- Evdokomos Pantazopoulos, ‘Protection of the Environment During Armed 
Conflicts: An Appraisal of the ILC’s Work’ (2016) 43 Questions in International Law 7, 9.
79 Prosecutor v. Tadić (n 3) para 119. 80 See  chapters 10 and 17 in this volume.
81 See ILC draft principle 12. 82 See UNEP (n 9) 52. 83 ILC draft principle 9(1).
84 Emphasis added. 85 ILC draft principle 9(2). 86 ILC draft principle 9(3).
87 Jacobsson (n 30) 329.   88 ILC draft principle 5, as well as draft principle 13.
89 Jacobsson (n 30) 324.
90 On jus post bellum and law of peace, see Christine Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria: What’s 
in a Name?’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 33) 181.
91 Immanuel Kant, Traktat zum Ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf, 1795, Erster Präliminarartikel.
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The principle reflects a trend to address environmental protection in peace agree-
ments. The language encompasses both international armed conflicts and non- 
international armed conflicts. Moreover, the generic use of the term ‘parties’ suggests 
that the principle applies not only to states but also to non- state actors.92 This formula-
tion marks an important acknowledgment of the obligations of non- state actors under 
international law. But it triggered considerable debate. Some members felt the scope of 
the provision should be limited to international armed conflicts, since the recognition 
the obligations of non- state actors ‘similar to those of States’ might legitimize their sta-
tus.93 Others stated that such a limitation would be at odds which the realities of armed 
conflicts which are predominantly non- international in nature.94
Draft principle 14 specifies that ‘[r] elevant international organizations should, where 
appropriate, play a facilitating role in this regard’. Such a role is key in light of the real-
ities of conflict which may impede cooperation between former belligerents. Some 
scholars have even gone a step further and argued that the ‘collective, international 
duty to rebuild’ should be assigned primarily according to ‘the agent’s ability to rebuild’, 
rather than the legal duties of parties involved in conflict.95 This vision would require 
significant investment in institutions and protection mechanisms, in cases where par-
ties are unwilling or unable to take action. Draft principle 15 seeks to strengthen resto-
ration, remediation, and recovery. It encourages international cooperation in order to 
carry out environmental damage assessments and remedy harm.96
Fourth, the ILC principles promote ‘sustainable exit’ from conflict. They contain a 
range of provisions to deal with the removal of harm. The most prominent one is the 
treatment of toxic and hazardous remnants of war. Draft principle 16 provides that 
‘[a] fter an armed conflict, parties to the conflict shall seek to remove or render harmless 
toxic and hazardous remnants of war under their jurisdiction or control that are causing 
or risk causing damage to the environment’. The wording (‘shall seek to’) makes it clear 
that it is an obligation of conduct. It complements existing ‘obligations under interna-
tional law to clear, remove, destroy or maintain minefields, mined areas, mines, booby- 
traps, explosive ordnance and other devices’.97 The terms ‘party to a conflict’ includes 
non- state actors. The draft principle goes thus further than traditional approaches, 
which would rely primarily on state obligations under human rights or international 
environmental law.98 The Commentary of the ILC suggests that this covers areas within 
de jure and de facto control.99 This approach was partly criticized as being overambi-
tious in its endeavour to include non- state actors in removal activities.100 The principle 
is phrased in a progressive way since it links the obligation expressly to environmental 
harm as such, rather than harm to humans and property alone.
92 See Hulme (n 25) 37– 8.   93 Jacobsson (n 30) 313, para 167.   94 ibid.
95 See Pattison (n 48) 635.
96 It reads:  ‘Cooperation among relevant actors, including international organizations, is encouraged 
with respect to post- armed conflict environmental assessments and remedial measures’. ON UNEP’s role, 
see ILC, Third Report (n 30) paras. 174– 84.
97 See Jacobsson draft principle 16(3).   98 Hulme (n 25) 37.
99 See Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts Statement of the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee, Mr. Pavel Šturma, 9 August 2016, 14.
100 See Jacobsson (n 30) 315, para 171 (‘some members expressed the view that such responsibility should 
remain with the State having effective jurisdiction and relevant international organizations; it would be 
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The ILC’s notes of cautious optimism are worth reiterating:
[T] here exists a substantive collection of legal rules that enhances environmental pro-
tection in relation to armed conflict. However, if taken as a whole, this collection of laws 
is a blunt tool, since its various parts sometimes seem to work in parallel streams. . . .
[T] he law that is relevant for the protection of the environment in relation to armed 
conflict has continued to grow and mature through practice, opinio juris, case law and 
treaties. The role of international organizations such as the United Nations, UNEP and 
UNESCO in this context is considerable. Environmental considerations have become 
part of the mainstream, and this is particularly notable when one looks at how differ-
ent the situation was a decade or more ago.101
This cautious optimism regarding the development of the law in this area is well 
founded. Traditional legal approaches to protection face particular challenges during 
and after conflict. The overall aim of this volume is to help move environmental con-
siderations from the periphery of to the core of the effort to respond to armed conflict 
and build a just and sustainable peace.
I.4 Content of the Book
This book is partly more narrow, and partly broader than the ILC study. It investigates 
how a jus post bellum approach to environmental protection can improve peacebuild-
ing practices. It draws on multiple bodies of law to examine environmental protection 
in transitions from conflict to peace, including UN law, human rights, the law of occu-
pation, and disarmament. It approaches environmental damage through the lens of 
multiple perspectives: property considerations (e.g. ownership over natural resources), 
health, and environmental concerns. Each of these lenses raises distinct dilemmas in 
relation to the sustainability and justice of peace.
I.4.1 Context
The opening chapter by Carl Bruch places developments challenges into context. 
Bruch shows that existing law is characterized by a patchwork of provisions and mech-
anisms.102 He argues that jus post bellum can and should put protection of the natural 
environment at its core in instances where such protection is critical to the creation of a 
just and sustainable transition to peace. The ILC draft principles largely avoided dealing 
with the environment as a cause of conflict. Bruch illustrates that natural resources can 
be critical for positive contributions to the economy and food security, or for financ-
ing further conflict. He therefore supports a broader jus post bellum approach which 
includes considerations of the root causes of conflict. Bruch argues that practice is an 
unrealistic to expect non- State actors involved in the armed conflict to carry out the measures envisaged in 
the draft principle’).
101 Jacobsson (n 30) paras. 266, 268.
102 See also generally Carl Bruch, Marion Boulicault, Shuchi Talati, and David Jensen, ‘International Law, 
Natural Resources and Post‐conflict Peacebuilding: From Rio to Rio+20 and Beyond’ (2012) 21 Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law 44.
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essential touchstone for any analysis of jus post bellum and the environment. Ultimately, 
the law governing the transition to peace may often be more facilitative than restrictive, 
leaving a space for a politics of environmental peacebuilding.
Cymie Payne addresses the fundamental question of the definition of ‘the environ-
ment’. In the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ 
stated that ‘the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the 
quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn’.103 
None of the major in bello regulations of the natural environment, such as ENMOD, 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), Articles 35(3), 55, 
or the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 8(2)(b)(iv)) define the 
environment as such. Provisions in the law of armed conflict are mostly anthropocen-
tric104 or refer to the ‘natural environment’, in distinction to the ‘human environment’. 
The ILC offered a broader approach in its principles on the allocation of loss in the 
case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities. It formulated a ‘work-
ing definition’ of the environment which ‘includes natural resources, both abiotic and 
biotic, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora and the interaction between the same fac-
tors, and the characteristic of their landscape’.105 In her contribution, Payne suggests to 
adopt an ‘integrity’ driven approach, which takes into account the collective interest, 
the context, the role of change, and interactivity of the environment during and after 
varied armed conflicts. She claims that jus post bellum should be aimed at improving 
system resilience, biodiversity, and evolutionary potential in situations where historical 
condition may not be recoverable.
I.4.2 Normative frameworks
The second part of the book analyses the legal and normative frameworks that govern 
the protection of the environment and natural resources in the transition from armed 
conflict to peace. They include international environmental law (‘IEL’) and multilateral 
environmental treaties, specific areas of public international law such as UN law, state 
responsibility, international humanitarian law and human rights law, as well as domes-
tic law. Contributions discuss not only positive law and lex lata, but also policies and 
practices.
A healthy environment is a pre- condition for sustainable peacebuilding. Chapters 3 
and 4 explore how international treaty law and environmental law come into play in 
situations from conflict to peace. Britta Sjöstedt argues that environmental treaties have 
the ability to fill an institutional and a normative gap in a post- conflict context, which 
103 ICJ (n 12) para 29. 104 See above (n 22).
105 ILC, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of 
Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries, 2006, draft principle 2(b), at <http:// legal.un.org/ ilc/ texts/ instru-
ments/ english/ commentaries/ 9_ 10_ 2006.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017. The ILC notes: ‘Environment 
could be defined in a restricted way, limiting it exclusively to natural resources, such as air, soil, water, 
fauna and flora, and their interaction. A broader definition could embrace environmental values also. The 
Commission has opted to include in the definition the latter encompassing non- service values such as aes-
thetic aspects of the landscape also. This includes the enjoyment of nature because of its natural beauty and 
its recreational attributes and opportunities associated with it.’ ibid. 133.
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is often characterized by institutional collapse and low priority of environmental pro-
tection work. Many environmental treaties have treaty bodies that can ensure that the 
treaties apply to protect the environment. Sjöstedt claims that such bodies fill impor-
tant functions in post- conflict settings. She illustrates this argument by the application 
of the World Heritage Convention in relation to the armed conflicts taking place in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’).106 She shows that the treaty bodies estab-
lished under the World Heritage Convention have provided various means to protect 
the natural World Heritage Sites in the case of the DRC.
Kirsten Stefanik examines the role of general principles in conflict and post- conflict 
settings, and in particular the function of environmental principles,107 such as inter-
generational equity and the precautionary principle. She argues that principles of inter-
national environmental law provide necessary nuance to military decision- makers in 
the application of existing jus in bello protections for civilians and the environment. 
Stefanik shows that environmental destruction and degradation during conflict can 
and must be minimized, but that there must be equal recognition of the significant 
adverse impacts of environmental insecurity and the need for the ongoing application 
of principles of international environmental law in the transition to peace. She claims 
that peace arrangements and truth and reconciliation processes can provide a mecha-
nism for continuing attention to environmental remediation and protection.
Chapter 6 addresses the role of human rights and transitional justice in the post- war 
environmental context.108 Karen Hulme explores to what extent the human right to a 
healthy environment and other economic, social, and cultural rights might require the 
remedying and management of environmental resources, water resources, and agri-
cultural areas. It clearly recognized that human rights law includes obligations relating 
to the environment.109 But states often sideline human rights during peacebuilding, 
emphasizing instead ‘rule of law’ as a less contentious approach.110 Hulme argues that 
the potential of human rights mechanisms to improve environmental protections in 
post- conflict settings remains partly unexplored. She draws upon practice of transi-
tional justice, which has had a mixed history of upholding such survival rights. She 
claims that a combined human rights and environmental approach to peacebuilding 
could strengthen obligations to undertake environmental clean- up and restoration, 
provide mechanisms to review state actions and ensure environmental remediation, 
106 See also Britta Sjöstedt, ‘The Role of Multilateral Environmental Agreements in Armed Conflict: 
“Green- keeping” in Virunga National Park: Applying the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in the 
Armed Conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 
129.
107 On general principles, see Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edn, 2012).
108 On the environment and human rights, see Linda Hajjar Leib, Human Rights and the 
Environment: Philosophical, Theoretical and Legal Perspectives (Leiden: Brill/ Martinus Nijhoff, 2010).
109 Human rights law fosters public availability of environmental information, public participation in 
environmental decision- making, and access to legal remedies. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environ-
ment, A/ HRC/ 31/ 53, 28 December 2015.
110 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘Invoking The Rule Of Law In Post- Conflict Rebuilding:  A  Critical 
Examination’ (2007– 2008) 49 William & Mary Law Review 1345, 1357.
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and highlight broader ‘structural violence’ issues of environmental justice in the allo-
cation and use of natural resources. She cautions at the same time against some of 
the tensions inherent in a predominantly human- rights- oriented approach, such as its 
inevitably anthropocentric nature and its risks of politicizing discourse.
Olivia Radics and Carl Bruch focus on two of the most direct impacts of armed 
conflict on the environment: pillage and conflict resources.111 They argue that ‘preda-
tory natural resource exploitation’ can destroy the chances for a successful transition 
to peace, both in conflict and its immediate aftermath, and also make a peace unjust, 
as unbalanced resource contracts creating ‘booty futures’ can lead to the continuation 
of exploitative practices in the post- conflict period. Drawing on international criminal 
law and occupation law, they show that the law of pillage presents an as- yet underuti-
lized tool for addressing conflict resources. They claim that classical trials need to be 
combined with alternative avenues for accountability and prevention, including sanc-
tions, in order to enhance just and responsible resource management.
Daniëlla Dam- de Jong builds on Radics’ and Bruch’s focus on pillage to develop a 
broader analysis of the standards developed by the United Nations Security Council 
for the management of natural resources and the application of those standards to the 
transition to peace.112 She examines whether such standards are mandatory or merely 
hortatory, drawing out where the standards are voluntary and the particular instances 
where they are tied to sanctions and are thus mandatory. She also addresses key issues 
such as the preference for particular systems set up not by states but by third par-
ties such as the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds. More 
fundamentally, Dam- de Jong questions whether the United Nations Security Council 
is the appropriate body to bind states in this area, particularly given the Principle of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, which provides that states have the 
right to freely dispose of their natural resources.
Ayṣe- Martina Böhringer and Thilo Marauhn investigate the underexplored rela-
tionship between arms control law and environmental law in post- conflict environ-
ments. They argue that the regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention113 and 
bilateral agreements need to be complemented by general principles of international 
environmental law, in order to deal with the environmental implications of chemi-
cal disarmament, such as transport of weapons and war material for the purpose of 
destruction, elimination, and conversion. One example is the prohibition to cause 
significant transboundary environmental harm (‘no harm’ principle).114 It includes 
111 On pillaging, see also Larissa van den Herik and Daniella Dam- de Jong, ‘Revitalizing the Antique 
War Crime of Pillage: The Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal Law to Address Illegal 
Resource Exploitation During Armed Conflict’ (2011) 22 Criminal Law Forum 237.
112 See generally Daniella Dam- de Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in 
Conflict and Post- Conflict Situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
113 See generally Thilo Marauhn, ‘The Prohibition to Use Chemical Weapons’ (2014) 17 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 25.
114 The principle of ‘no harm’ goes back to the Trail Smelter case and is widely recognized as customary 
international law. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration states:  ‘States have, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
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procedural aspects,115 such as the duty of consultation, exchange of information, early 
warning, and the assessment of potential transboundary impacts of projects at the 
domestic level. Drawing on insights from the situation in Syria, the authors claim that 
environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons becomes complex in con-
flict and post- conflict situations, since it is often compromised by ongoing violence or 
resurgence of civil war.
Dieter Fleck examines the particular challenge of protecting the environment in the 
aftermath of a non- international armed conflict. He starts with an admission of the 
limitations in the law to limit environmental damage in relation to armed conflict. In 
Rule 44 of its Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, the ICRC stated 
that ‘[m] ethods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the protec-
tion and preservation of the natural environment’.116 The ICRC study found that Rule 
44 ‘arguably’ applies also during non- international armed conflicts, ‘if there are effects 
in another State’.117 Fleck argues that this ‘due regard’ standard should be understood 
as an obligation of conduct, namely an obligation to show concern for environmen-
tal effects of their military operations, and to minimize such effects not only in view 
of transboundary damage, but also within the territory of operations. This requires 
responsible planning and precautions in attack, taking in account the technical, eco-
nomic, and financial capacities available at the time. Fleck also shows that reparation 
issues deserve more attention. The obligation to repair losses and damage caused by 
breaches of the jus in bello includes damage caused by breaches of environmental obli-
gations. But liability may be limited or excluded during armed conflicts for injurious 
consequences of acts not prohibited by international law. Measures towards a sustain-
able recovery of the natural environment may thus depend on approaches under jus 
post bellum, including cooperation and assistance by third parties.
Matthew Gillett examines to what extent norms under international criminal law 
protect the environment during and after conflict.118 He identifies discrepancies 
between protections in international armed conflict and non- international armed con-
flict. For example, the Rome Statute prohibits ‘[i] ntentionally launching an attack in the 
knowledge that such attack will cause . . . widespread, long- term and severe damage to 
the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’
115 See generally Phoebe N. Okowa, ‘Procedural Obligations in International Environmental Agreements’ 
(1996) 67 British Yearbook of International Law 275.
116 See ICRC, Rule 44, at <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule44> 
accessed 15 August 2017.
117 In its explanation, the ICRC notes: ‘This argument is based on the recognition by the International 
Court of Justice that safeguarding a State’s ecological balance was an “essential interest” and its finding that 
States’ obligation to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of 
other States or areas beyond national control were part of customary international law.’ ibid.
118 See generally Fréderic Mégret, ‘The Problem of an International Criminal Law of the Environment’ 
(2011) Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 195; Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Waging War against the World: The 
Need to Move from War Crimes to Environmental Crimes’ in Austin and Bruch (n 2)  620– 46; Tara 
Weinstein, ‘Prosecuting Attacks That Destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes or Humanitarian 
Atrocities?’ (2004– 2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 697– 722. On ecocide, 
see Lynn Berat, ‘Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime of Geocide in International 
Law’ (1993) 11 Boston University International Law Journal 327.
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and direct overall military advantage anticipated’119 during an international armed 
conflict, but not during a non- international armed conflict.120 Gillett argues that this 
gap calls for redress. He questions whether customary international law already con-
tains a full- fledged criminal prohibition of disproportionate environmental harm in 
non- international armed conflict. He claims existing norms provide a space to pros-
ecute environmental damage indirectly under anthropocentric provisions. But such 
convictions may be of limited expressive effect in relation to environmental values. He 
argues that the adoption of a prohibition against environmental harm in the context of 
non- international armed conflict would provide a valuable provision of jus post bellum.
I.4.3 Particular dilemmas and sites of contestation
The third part of the book addresses specific dilemmas that require further attention. 
Environmental harm is typically caused by a diversity of different actors, ranging from 
foreign interveners, to government forces, armed groups, or private actors. This raises 
complex issues in relation to responsibility and liability. For example, environmental 
damage in armed conflict poses complex problems in relation to the determination of 
shared responsibility. Corporate activities are under- regulated and can contribute to 
severe environmental degradation, even while promoted for the sake of development. 
Contributions assembled in the third part of the book identify gaps and blind spots in 
contemporary laws and policies, and potential practices to address them.
As Dieter Fleck has argued earlier, jus post bellum requires pragmatic limitation, con-
ciliation, and participation.121 This poses challenges for reparation of environmental 
damage. Ilias Plakokefalos discusses legal problems arising in the sharing of responsi-
bility for violations with a nexus to armed conflict.122 He identifies numerous limita-
tions in this area connected with the nature of multilateral environmental agreements. 
Multilateral environmental agreements occasionally explicitly exclude the possibility of 
being applied in times of armed conflict, although most are silent on the subject. More 
fundamentally, such agreements do not pose obligations to non- state actors. In the case 
where environmental damage is caused by multiple states during armed conflict, the 
basic approach (as observed by the ILC) is independent responsibility for the entire 
damage when the injury is not causally divisible. Only when an injury caused by multi-
ple states is causally divisible may compensation be proportionally reduced. Given the 
interconnected nature of environmental damage, complex or long- lasting armed con-
flict involving multiple states may carry with it broad and weighty claims of reparation. 
Plakokefalos shows that in its practice, the United Nations Compensation Commission 
(‘UNCC’) took a ‘middle ground’ between the principle of full reparation supported by 
the ILC and the exception according to which reparation may be adjusted.
119 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute.
120 See on this also Carl Bruch, ‘All’s Not Fair in (Civil) War:  Criminal Liability for Environmental 
Damage in Internal Armed Conflict’ (2001) 25 Vermont Law Review 695.
121 Dieter Fleck, ‘Jus Post Bellum as a Partly Independent Legal Framework’ in Stahn, Easterday, and 
Iverson (n 33) 43, 56– 7.
122 See generally André Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (eds.), The Principles of Shared Responsibility 
in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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Jennifer S. Easterday and Hana Ivanhoe focus on the threat environmental degrad-
ation poses to a sustainable peace in the aftermath of armed conflict. They argue that 
environmental safeguards need to be a core part of an economic recovery plan, espe-
cially when related to the use of natural resources. They propose an expansion of the 
Ruggie Framework on Business and Human Rights123 to explicitly refer to peacebuild-
ing environments. Key tenets of corporate social responsibility, as articulated in the 
Ruggie Framework and elsewhere, such as human rights due diligence and non- judicial 
grievance mechanisms, are important in reducing the threat environmental degrad-
ation poses to a fragile peace. Easterday and Ivanhoe emphasize that peacebuilders 
need to take the opportunity to work with private corporations to ensure environmen-
tal and social safeguards in development projects that could otherwise lead to a resur-
gence of the conflict. This may be done through domestic government regulation as 
well as external pathways, such as soft law norms and corporate social responsibility 
standards in loan and financing agreements.
Private security companies, private military security contractors, and private secu-
rity service providers (‘PSCs’)124 have played an increasing role in conflict situations, 
not only during armed conflict, but also in the withdrawal phase of troops and the 
disposal of military waste and conflict debris. Aneaka Kellay and Onita Das argue 
that the use of PSCs particularly during the peacebuilding stage poses significant 
challenges to transparency, oversight, and accountability. They focus on the exam-
ples of Iraq (2003– 2011) and Afghanistan (2001– 2014) to highlight the inadequate 
regulation of these entities. Of particular note is the issue of toxic pollution, increas-
ingly identified as the toxic remnants of war, sometimes created during operations.125 
Kellay and Das claim that there is a lack of clear regulations relating to obligations 
and misconduct of PSCs, including the responsibility of states and other hiring non- 
state parties. They propose the establishment of a ‘PSC compensation fund’ that is 
used for reparation of damage to the environment and compensation for victims 
harmed by PSC actions.
I.4.4 Remedying and preventing harm
The final part of the book focuses specifically on preventing and remedying environ-
mental damage and harm to victims. It analyses how liability, responsibility, damage, 
and harm can be measured, allocated, and enforced in specific areas, such as de- mining 
and removal of toxic and hazardous remnants of war, and how preventive measures can 
be improved (e.g. in relation to review of new weapons).
123 UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 8/ 5, 7 April 2008 (prepared by 
John Ruggie). For more on the Ruggie Framework, see Larissa van den Herik and Jernej Letnar Černič, 
‘Regulating Corporations under International Law From Human Rights to International Criminal Law and 
Back Again’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 725.
124 See generally Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), War by Contract:  Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
125 See also  chapter 18 in this volume.
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Cymie Payne examines lessons from the practice of the environmental programme 
of the UNCC.126 The UNCC provided a unique liability regime for compensation of 
environmental damage. The Government of the Republic of Iraq faced claims regarding 
the breach of its responsibility to other states. Individuals could make claims for their 
direct losses, but only through a government or an international organization. Payne 
claims that the UNCC’s reparations programme ‘was an example of jus post bellum in 
the most literal sense’. She argues that the UNCC showed moderation in its determi-
nation of claims and valuation of remediation techniques. Iraq was, in sum, required 
to pay less than the total cost of environmental damage that it caused. Environmental 
integrity was prioritized. The Commission acknowledged the precautionary need to 
identify potential risks in order to plan future action. Its work triggered a willingness 
of affected states in the region to cooperate for the improvement of environmental con-
ditions. It might thus have implicitly applied jus post bellum principles (moderation, 
conciliation, participation), without saying so expressly.127 Payne goes further to sug-
gest that generally, environmental reparations provide unique opportunities for coop-
eration at the end of conflict. Jus post bellum can bring legal disciplines together under 
a common rubric, and allows a more constructive approach to their application to pre-
serving environmental integrity in the transition to peace. Ultimately, she asserts that 
waiting until conflict ends to provide for environmental protection is short- sighted.
Merryl Lawry- White provides a broader perspective on reparative practices, draw-
ing on multiple fields (e.g. environmental law, human rights, humanitarian law, tran-
sitional justice). She claims that is unfeasible to establish a ‘general model’ to deal with 
environmental harm in post- conflict settings (e.g. civil, administrative, or criminal). 
Rather, the strategy must be tailored to the context.128 Lawry- White shows that there is 
limited empirical evidence indicating how reparative mechanisms respond to the needs 
and desires of environmental victims. She argues that reparations should not only serve 
the retrospective purpose of (to the degree possible) redressing the damage done, but 
also the prospective goal of reinforcing the rule of law and creating the foundations 
for a sustainable and just peace.129 She cautions that normal judicial mechanisms may 
be both overwhelmed and poorly constructed for providing reparation for the type of 
massive, widespread environmental harm that frequently results from armed conflict.
Ursign Hofmann and Pascal Rapillard address a deadly and enduring threat to and 
within the environment after certain armed conflicts: mines. Mine action, particularly 
126 See generally Christopher S. Gibson, Trevor M. Rajah, and Timothy J. Feighery (eds.), War 
Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Cymie Payne 
and Peter Sand (eds.), Gulf War Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2011).
127 On jus post bellum considerations in the work of the Eritrea- Ethiopia Claims Commission, see 
Markus. Krajewski, ‘Schadensersatz wegen Verletzungen des Gewaltverbots als ius post bellum am Beispiel 
der Eritrea- Ethiopia Claims Commission’ (2012) 72 ZaöRV 147.
128 See in this sense Report of the Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post- conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/ 2004/ 616, 23 August 2004, Summary (‘We must learn as well to 
eschew one- size- fits- all formulas and the importation of foreign models, and, instead, base our support on 
national assessments, national participation and national needs and aspirations’).
129 On environmental reparation, see Michael Bowman and Alan Boyle, Environmental Damage in 
International and Comparative Law:  Problems of Definition and Valuation (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2002).
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clearance, fosters peacebuilding not only through the restoration of a safe environment 
but through employing former combatants as deminers and allowing the repatriation 
of refugees and internally displaced persons.130 But clearance of remnants of conflict 
can affect ecosystems and have a negative impact on vegetation or the composition 
and fertility of soil. The Anti- Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions131 are silent in relation to the environmental impact of contamina-
tion and do not expressly regulate liability for such types of damage. Hoffmann and 
Rapillard argue that mine action organizations, like all humanitarian actors, need to 
consider the possible negative impacts of their operations to ensure they ‘do no harm’ 
and do not lead to further degradation of the environment, longer- term vulnerability, 
and threats to livelihoods. They discuss ways to address liability for environmental deg-
radation from remnants of conflict and in particular for their removal. They provide 
particular attention to the responsibility of armed non- state actors. They argue that 
obligations of such non- state actors should be approached through the lens of duties 
of care.
Anne Dienelt focuses on preventative measures under international humanitar-
ian law and their role in protecting the natural environment. Procedures, such as 
the marking of protected sites and zones132 as well as the duty to review new weap-
ons, means, or method of warfare under Article 36(1) of Additional Protocol I133 
can contribute to protect the environment in relation to armed conflict. Dienelt 
shows that review procedures under Article 36 were mainly meant to guide peace-
time conduct, rather than post- conflict peacebuilding. But she argues that post- 
conflict assessments are useful and states are required to learn lessons from past 
conflicts when it comes to environmental protection, since ‘after the war’ is often 
‘before the war’.
The last contribution by Doug Weir deals with the removal of toxic and hazardous 
remnants of war.134 Weir traces major steps taken over past decades to address rem-
nants of war. He shows that treatment of conflict pollution involves environmental and 
humanitarian considerations. Weir discusses in particular, the new draft principles of 
the ILC regarding remnants of war, which relate clearance duties specifically to envi-
ronmental damage. He criticizes that draft principle 16 merely obliges states to ‘seek to 
remove’ remnants.135 But he concludes that the principles seem to be moving in a posi-
tive direction.
130 Kristian Berg Harpviken and Rebecca Roberts, ‘Conclusions’ in Kristian Berg Harpviken, and 
Rebecca Roberts (eds.), Preparing the Ground for Peace. Mine Action in Support of Peacebuilding (Oslo: PRIO, 
2004), 55.
131 See generally Karen Hulme, ‘The 2008 Cluster Munitions Convention: Stepping Outside the CCW 
Framework (Again)’(2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 23.
132 See Arts. 59 and 60 of Additional Protocol I, and Art. 15 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
133 See Justin McClelland, ‘The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol 
I’ (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 397.
134 On the Toxic Remnants of War Project, see <http:// www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ > accessed 15 
August 2015.
135 See also Hulme (n 25) 38.
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I.5 Not a Conclusion
The chapters in the book clearly indicate the path towards greater protection of the 
environment before, during, and after conflict is still at its beginning. It remains a chal-
lenge to align protection with the political interest of states, and the increasing involve-
ment of non- state actors in armed conflict.
There is growing consensus that it is prohibited to use the environment as a weapon 
in warfare. This is reflected in international humanitarian law, and to some extent inter-
national criminal law. Works such as the ILC principles make it clear that the environ-
ment is not only protected indirectly, namely as civilian object or resource, but directly 
as a system. It is increasingly recognized that environmental protection must be ana-
lysed through the interplay of different law or legal regimes, such as human rights law, 
humanitarian law, environmental law, or disarmament. Institutions such as UNEP, 
the ICRC, or the ILC, and NGOs have a pioneering role in this regard. The Office of 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has encouraged the prosecution 
of ‘crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction 
of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispos-
session of land’.136 This has a strong expressive and signalling effect as to the gravity of 
environmental crimes.
The realities of contemporary warfare show that pre- conflict, conflict, post- conflict, 
and peacetime cannot be neatly separated, or put into clearly defined ‘boxes’. They 
must rather be seen as a continuum. Duties of prevention, precaution, due diligence, 
or repair of harm run through all of these phases, although they might differ in scope 
and content. Concepts, such as the progressive realization of rights, play a useful role in 
steering transitions as a process.
Specific rules and principles governing transitions from conflict to peace are still 
in development. These are often more fluid than conventional ‘hard law’, derived 
from other bodies of law, or framed as principles, guidelines, or practices. Some of 
them, such as the principle of moderation, have been applied implicitly by post- 
war institutions. Others become clear or explicit through general practice, such as 
peace treaties, UN resolutions, manuals, or the work of expert bodies, such as the 
ILC. In light of the specificities of post- conflict environments, opinio juris might 
have greater value in the formation of customary rules or principles than state 
practice.137
The volume indicates that there are strong links between the peace- orientation of jus 
post bellum and environmental principles, such as intergenerational equity and precau-
tion. Many of the draft principles of the ILC may not be formally labelled as post bellum 
principles, but reflect arguments that have been made in jus post bellum scholarship. Jus 
136 ICC, OTP Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, para 42, at <https:// 
www.icc- cpi.int/ itemsDocuments/ 20160915_ OTP- Policy_ Case- Selection_ Eng.pdf> accessed 15 August 
2017.
137 In relation to international humanitarian law, see the famous statement by the ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Kupreškić, 14 January 2000, IT- 95- 16- T, para 527 (‘This is however an area where opinio iuris sive neces-
sitatis may play a much greater role than usus, as a result of the aforementioned Martens Clause’).
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post bellum scholars have argued that responsible planning, pragmatic limitation, con-
ciliation, and burden- sharing are fundamental elements of post- conflict peacebuilding. 
These elements are reflected in the ILC draft principles. There is emerging agreement 
that prevention and precaution, due diligence, and a collective approach to remediation 
of harm are buildings blocks of a post- conflict law that takes into account environmen-
tal protection.
Moreover, from a macro perspective, there might be a shifting of the lens regarding 
the treatment of responsibility. Traditional legal theories are agent- based. They look at 
individual contribution of actors to the harm, and their responsibility. In the field of 
environmental harm, this perspective is unsatisfactory. From a perspective of protec-
tion, the focus should not be exclusively on the wrongdoing of the agent, but mostly on 
the environment as object of care.138 It is thus feasible to apply a care- driven approach 
towards responsibility, which is grounded in cooperation, solidarity, and capacity to 
remedy harm (remedial responsibility). Suggestions to improve the status quo include 
better monitoring of environmental harm, enhancing assistance models in environ-
mental and disarmament agreements, closing gaps in relation to non- international 
armed conflict and non- state actors, strengthening of trust funds, and preventive 
mechanisms.
Of course, many challenges remain. The list is long. But the volume marks a start-
ing point for states, international organizations, and civil society to discuss, debate, and 
engage on conflict and the environment. Such dialogue is urgently needed. It will need 
to be continued in future decades.
138 For an assessment of duties of care under international humanitarian law, see Karen Hulme, ‘Taking 
Care to Protect the Environment: A Meaningless Obligation?’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red 
Cross 675. On jus post bellum, see Sigal Ben- Porath, ‘Care Ethics and Dependence— Rethinking Jus Post 
Bellum’ (2008) 23 Hypatia 61; Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the Ethics of Care’, at <http://opiniojuris.
org/2014/05/09/jus-post-bellum-symposium-jus-post-bellum-ethics-care/> accessed 15 August 2017 .
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 Considerations in Framing the Environmental 
Dimensions of Jus Post Bellum
Carl Bruch*
1.1 Introduction
International law governing protection of the environment in relation to armed con-
flict has evolved substantially since the late 1960s. In response to the widespread use 
of herbicides and reported efforts to seed clouds during the Vietnam War, the interna-
tional community adopted environmental provisions in Additional Protocol I  to the 
Geneva Conventions and the Environmental Modification Convention.1 The wanton 
environmental devastation of the 1990– 1 Gulf War— including setting fire to more 
than 600 oil wells and the deliberate release of millions of barrels of oil into the Persian 
Gulf— shocked the international community into establishing the United Nations 
Compensation Commission to adjudicate environmental and other claims against Iraq, 
with Iraq’s liability arising from illegally engaging in aggressive warfare in contraven-
tion of the UN Charter.2 In the 1990s, there was also growing awareness of the role that 
competition over scarce natural resources and over valuable natural resources can play 
in the onset of conflict (termed ‘environmental security’).3
With the end of the Cold War, the 1990s also saw the growth of international efforts 
to support post- conflict peacebuilding. In 1992, the UN Secretary- General announced 
the Agenda for Peace, which provided a conceptual and policy framework for post- 
conflict peacebuilding that went far beyond the UN’s peacekeeping efforts.4 In 2005, 
the UN Security Council established the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding 
* Director, International Programs, Environmental Law Institute.
1 Michael Bothe, Carl Bruch, Jordan Diamond, and David Jensen, ‘International Law Protecting the 
Environment during Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red 
Cross 569.
2 See Peter H. Sand and Cymie Payne (eds.), Gulf War Reparations and the UN Compensation 
Commission: Environmental Liability (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Cymie R. Payne, ‘Legal 
Liability for Environmental Damage: The United Nations Compensation Commission and the 1990– 1991 
Gulf War’ in Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols (eds.), Governance, Natural Resources, and 
Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016).
3 See Thomas F. Homer- Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases’ 
(1994) 19(1) International Security 5; Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique 
of the Literature’ (1998) 35(3) Journal of Peace Research 381; Rita Floyd and Richard Matthew, Environmental 
Security: Approaches and Issues (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013).
4 UN Security Council, An Agenda for Peace:  Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace- 
Keeping— Report of the Secretary- General,, A/ 47/ 277- S/ 24111, 17 June 1992.
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Fund, and the Peacebuilding Support Office to assist countries making the transition 
from armed conflict to an enduring peace.5 In dozens of countries affected by armed 
conflict, it quickly became apparent that natural resource governance was essential to 
the wide range of post- conflict peacebuilding priorities, including demobilization, dis-
armament, and reintegration of ex- combatants, return of refugees and displaced per-
sons, economic growth, livelihoods and food security, cooperation and reconciliation, 
and improving inclusive governance.6
Recognizing the value in thinking about the role of environment across the con-
flict lifecycle— from the causes of conflict, to actions during conflict, to post- conflict 
recovery— researchers have started to weave together diverse threads of intellectual 
inquiry into a new field of environmental peacebuilding. Environmental peacebuild-
ing is ‘the process of governing and managing natural resources and the environment 
to support durable peace’.7 Environmental peacebuilding comprises a broad array of 
efforts across the conflict lifecycle that seek to prevent, mitigate, resolve, and recover 
from violent conflict. It draws upon renewable natural resources, non- renewable natu-
ral resources, and ecosystems and their services.8 While environmental peacebuild-
ing focuses on governance and management, it extends beyond international law to 
include national law, institutional arrangements, private sector policies, and a wide 
range of practices.
At the same time, the international legal community has started to consolidate the 
emerging body of international law governing actions in the wake of armed conflict— 
jus post bellum.9 This includes international law governing natural resources and the 
environment— the focus of this book— as well as other dimensions touching on human 
rights, sovereignty, peace and security, and humanitarian efforts, among others.
1.2 Jus Post Bellum and Environmental Peacebuilding
This chapter seeks to place the environmental provisions of jus post bellum in the 
broader context of environmental peacebuilding. In considering the efforts to articu-
late a new body of jus post bellum, particularly as it relates to natural resources and the 
environment, it presents three key observations. In the process, I pose two questions 
that may inform the further development of jus post bellum.
The first observation is that there is a large and diverse body of experience related 
to environmental peacebuilding that can inform the development and framing of jus 
5 See Matti Lehtonen, ‘Peacebuilding through Natural Resource Management: The UN Peacebuilding 
Commission’s First Five Years’ in Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols (n 2).
6 Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S.  Nichols, ‘Natural Resources and Post- Conflict 
Governance: Building a Sustainable Peace’ in Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols (n 2).
7 ibid.
8 These include, for example, efforts to share benefits from natural resources in a transparent and equi-
table manner, bringing people together to address shared environmental threats, and developing natural 
resources in a conflict- sensitive manner. See, for example, Carl Bruch, David Jensen, and Amanda Kron, 
‘Environmental Peacebuilding’ in Understand to Prevent:  Guidance on the Military Contribution to the 
Prevention of Violent Conflict (Multinational Capability Development Campaign) (2016).
9 See, for example, Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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post bellum, including through state practice and customary international law. Natural 
resources underpin or affect practically every peacebuilding activity.10 Most post- 
conflict economies depend on natural resources to rebuild and to provide government 
revenues. For example, in Sierra Leone, 72 per cent of the growth in the country’s gross 
domestic product (‘GDP’) came from two new (post- war) iron ore mines.11 Typically 
50– 80 per cent of a post- conflict country’s exports come from natural resources,12 and 
oil revenues represent 98 per cent of South Sudan’s government budget.13 The mag-
nitude of oil revenues in particular can overwhelm other sources of revenue. For 
example, in 2010, Nigerian oil revenue was US$ 59 billion;14 that same year bilateral 
official development assistance (‘ODA’) to Africa was US$ 29 billion.15 In other words, 
Nigerian oil revenues were more than twice all bilateral ODA to Africa. Capturing nat-
ural resource revenues is both critically important to long- term development and sta-
bility, and it is a challenge. The Africa Progress Panel estimates that the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’) lost US$ 1.355 billion in five major cut- rate mining 
concessions since 2010.16
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (‘DDR’) of former combatants is 
one of the most important factors influencing whether a conflict will recur.17 In most 
post- conflict countries, though, 60– 80 per cent of livelihoods are agrarian.18 In these 
situations, typically 50– 80 per cent of ex- combatants elect to return to agriculture- 
based livelihoods, but often there is insufficient arable land available; and in arid and 
semi- arid countries, land may be available, but not the water rights to successfully farm 
the land.19 Other resource- dependent activities include addressing return of internally 
displaced persons (‘IDPs’) and refugees, providing basic services, restoring local live-
lihoods, and addressing corruption.20 This leads to my first key question: what is the 
appropriate scope of environmental issues that should be considered when discussing 
jus post bellum?
There is the classic issue of remediating and seeking penalties for widespread and 
severe environmental damage resulting from deliberate targeting of the environ-
ment. However, this is relatively rare: for example, in the Vietnam War and the 1990– 1 
10 Carl Bruch, David Jensen, Mikiyasu Nakayama, and Jon Unruh, Post- Conflict Peacebuilding and 
Natural Resources: The Promise and the Peril (Washington, DC: ELI Press, forthcoming 2018).
11 Umaru Fofana, ‘Mining Spurs Sierra Leone to 20 pct GDP Growth in 2013— IMF’ Reuters, 3 April 2014, 
at <http:// www.reuters.com/ article/ 2014/ 04/ 03/ leone- imf- gdp- idUSL5N0MV37J20140403> accessed 7 
June 2017.
12 Bruch, Jensen, Nakayama, and Unruh (n 10).
13 Alex de Waal, ‘Sizzling South Sudan: Why Oil Is Not the Whole Story’ Foreign Affairs, 7 February 2013.
14 Elisha Bala- Gbogbo, ‘Nigeria’s Oil Revenue Rose 46% to $59 Billion in 2010’ Bloomberg, 14 April 2011.
15 OECD, ‘Development Aid Reaches an Historic High in 2010’, at <http:// www.oecd.org/ dac/ stats/ devel-
opmentaidreachesanhistorichighin2010.htm> accessed 7 June 2017.
16 Africa Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s Natural Resources for All (2013), 101.
17 Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko (eds.), Reintegrating Armed Groups after Conflict: Politics, Violence and 
Transition (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009). For a review of the literature on DDR and conflict recur-
rence, see Jonah Schulhofer- Wohl and Nicholas Sambanis, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
Programs: An Assessment (Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2010) at <https:// fba.se/ contentassets/ 
7da0c74e1d22462db487955f2e373567/ ddr_ programs_ - an- assessment.pdf.> accessed 7 June 2017.
18 Bruch, Jensen, Nakayama, and Unruh (n 10). 19 ibid. 20 ibid.
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Gulf War. More often, the environmental harm from conflicts is either more local-
ized in environmental hot spots (as in the 1999 Kosovo Conflict21) or less acute (most 
conflicts).
Based on 150 case studies and analyses in a series of six books on post- conflict 
peacebuilding and natural resource management22— as well as the broader literature— 
environmental considerations after conflict most often relate to one of five key areas:
(1) Regaining control of illicit and illegal exploitation of natural resources. This is 
especially the case for conflict resources— natural resources that can finance 
rebel groups or peace spoilers. For example, since 1990, at least thirty- five con-
flicts have been financed in part by natural resources ranging from diamonds 
and gold to coffee and bananas.23 Some of these resources— such as narcotics— 
are illegal or illicit, and generally outside the realm of taxation.
(2) Using natural resources (and particularly high- value natural resources) to 
jump- start the economy.24 Economic dimensions of post- conflict environ-
mental recovery include transparency of natural resource contracts, payments, 
expenditures of resource revenues, and social and environmental impacts; shar-
ing of benefits, including through natural resource trust funds; and smoothing 
the national budget in light of volatile commodity prices, for example through 
stabilization funds.
(3) Supporting livelihoods and food security, especially through agriculture.25 
Often, addressing land tenure issues is a central governance consideration, 
including for returning refugees and internally displaced persons (with rights 
of return and restitution), addressing underlying causes of conflict, and ensur-
ing recognition of land held under customary tenure even in light of priorities 
to develop (and addressing challenges associated with large- scale land acquisi-
tions).26 Another key dimension is restoring the productive capacity of natural 
resources degraded by conflict, refugees and IDPs, and neglect.27 This includes 
measures such as replanting orchards, rebuilding irrigation infrastructure, and 
21 UNEP and UN Centre for Human Settlements, The Kosovo Conflict:  Consequences for the 
Environment and Human Settlements (1999), at <http:// postconflict.unep.ch/ publications/ finalreport.pdf> 
accessed 7 June 2017.
22 Paivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad (eds.), High- Value Natural Resources and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding 
(London:  Routledge, 2012); David Jensen and Steve Lonergan (eds.), Assessing and Restoring Natural 
Resources in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (London: Routledge, 2012); Jon Unruh and Rhodri C. Williams 
(eds.), Land and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (London:  Routledge, 2013); Erika Weinthal, Jessica Troell, 
and Mikiyasu Nakayama (eds.), Water and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (London:  Routledge, 2014); 
Helen Young and Lisa Goldman (eds.), Livelihoods, Natural Resources, and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding 
(London: Routledge, 2015); Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols (n 2).
23 Bruch, Jensen, Nakayama, and Unruh (n 10).
24 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (2011).
25 Young and Goldman (n 22).
26 Jon Unruh and Rhodri C. Williams, ‘Lesson Learned in Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management 
in Post- Conflict Societies’ in Unruh and Williams (n 22); Peter Van der Auweraert, ‘Institutional Aspects of 
Resolving Land Disputes in Post- Conflict Societies’ in Unruh and Williams (n 22).
27 David Jensen and Steve Lonergan, ‘Natural Resources and Post- Conflict Assessment, Remediation, 
Restoration, and Reconstruction: Lessons and Emerging Issues’ in Jensen and Lonergan (n 22).
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removing land mines, unexploded ordnance, and in a few instances depleted 
uranium.
(4) Providing basic services, including access to water and sanitation.28 Priorities in 
addressing this need include mobilizing finance and engaging the informal sector.
(5) Using natural resources and the environment to facilitate cooperation, dialogue, 
and reconciliation.29
The tension between the historic focus on environmental damage arising from armed 
conflict and the broader range of environmental priorities actually faced by post- 
conflict countries raises an important consideration for defining the scope of envi-
ronmental inquiry related to jus post bellum. We can focus narrowly on intentional 
targeting of the environment and ask how jus post bellum can address the wrongful 
targeting of the environment during armed conflict. This is a worthwhile endeavour. 
However, based on the breadth of needs in post- conflict natural resource management, 
jus post bellum can have a much broader and much more significant role in laying the 
normative, institutional, and procedural foundations for a lasting transition to peace. 
To do that, though, it is necessary to take a broad view of the environment in jus post 
bellum.
The second observation is that notwithstanding the importance of the environment to 
post- conflict peacebuilding, most programming in conflict- affected countries pays little 
thought to law— and even less to international law. To the extent that people are think-
ing about the law, it is usually domestic legislation. There are frequently efforts to reform 
a country’s Land Law, the Mining Law, the Forestry Law, and other sectoral legislation.30 
International treaty law rarely influences these reforms. There is consideration of interna-
tional processes and soft- law principles, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative, the Pinheiro Principles, the Sphere Principles, and the Non- Binding Forest 
Principles.31 The Peacebuilding and State building Goals (PSGs) of the Busan New Deal32 
28 Jessica Troell and Erika Weinthal, ‘Harnessing Water Management for More Effective 
Peacebuilding: Lessons Learned,’ in Weinthal, Troell, and Nakayama (n 22).
29 Bruch, Jensen, Nakayama, and Unruh (n 10); Munqeth Mehyar, Nader Al Khateeb, Gidon Bromberg, 
and Elizabeth Koch- Ya’ari, ‘Transboundary Cooperation in the Lower Jordan River Basin’in Weinthal, 
Troell, and Nakayama (n 22); Todd Walters, ‘A Peace Park in the Balkans: Cross- Border Cooperation and 
Livelihood Creation through Coordinated Environmental Conservation’ in Young and Goldman (n 22); 
Matthew Wilburn King, Marco Antonio González Pastora, Mauricio Castro Salazar, and Carlos Manuel 
Rodriguez, ‘Environmental Governance and Peacebuilding in Post- Conflict Central America:  Lessons 
from the Central American Commission for Environment and Development’ in Bruch, Muffett, and 
Nichols (n 2).
30 Sandra S.  Nichols and Mishkat Al Moumin, ‘The Role of Environmental Law in Post- Conflict 
Peacebuilding’ in Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols (n 2).
31 See, for example, Jill Shankleman, ‘Mitigating Risks and Realizing Opportunities:  Environmental 
and Social Standards for Foreign Direct Investment in High- Value Natural Resources’ in Lujala and Aas 
Rustad (n 22); Eddie Rich and T. Negbalee Warner, ‘Addressing the Roots of Liberia‘s Conflict through the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’ in Lujala and Rustad (n 22); Barbara McCallin, ‘The Role of 
Restitution in Post- Conflict Situations’ in Unruh and Williams (n 22).
32 International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile 
States (2011).
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increasingly guide post- conflict interventions; and while none of the PSGs relate specifi-
cally to natural resources, natural resources underpin them.
To the extent that international law is considered, it tends to be around human rights, 
especially related to gender and indigenous rights.33 Commentators have also called for 
recognition of the right to a healthy environment and to the right to water.34 This is 
not to say that international environmental law is irrelevant. Multilateral environmen-
tal agreements (‘MEAs’) are often invoked in efforts to develop or revise framework 
environmental laws and environmental ministries. Moreover, the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (‘DPKO’) / United Nations Department of Field Support 
(‘DFS’) Environmental Policy explicitly applies MEA norms and approaches to UN 
peacekeeping operations.35 In practice, though, there is too little coordination and 
cross- talk between the environmental ministries and the sectoral ministries.
International law plays a critical role in shaping the peacebuilding landscape of a 
post- conflict country, but it is not the international treaties, protocols, and case law that 
international lawyers so often focus on. The key corpus of international law is the body 
of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.36 Security Council resolutions are bind-
ing on member states and international organizations alike. They have three key func-
tions. They establish and empower Groups of Experts to investigate the role of natural 
resources in conflict (as in Liberia, DRC, and elsewhere).37 They impose sanctions on 
targeted conflict resources (e.g. diamonds from Sierra Leone and diamonds and timber 
from Liberia).38 And they provide mandates to peacekeeping forces to address conflict 
resources (e.g. in DRC, Sierra Leone, and Liberia), protect critical infrastructure (e.g. 
oil infrastructure in the Abyei area), and consider their own environmental bootprint 
(e.g. in Mali).39
For specific conflict- affected countries, there often are a series of UN Security Council 
resolutions, as the Security Council reviews the status of security and the effectiveness 
of actions to date. Moreover, there often are a series of resolutions on particular issues 
(such as sanctions to curb specific instances of conflict resources). However, despite 
the efforts of Global Witness and other advocates to adopt more universal approaches 
33 See, for example, UNEP, UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, UN 
Peacebuilding Support Office and United Nations Development Programme, Women and Natural 
Resources: Unlocking the Peacebuilding Potential (6 November 2013).
34 See, for example, Mara Tignino, ‘The Right to Water and Sanitation in Post- Conflict Legal 
Mechanisms: An Emerging Regime?’ in Weinthal, Troell, and Nakayama (n 22); Michael Painter, ‘Rights- 
Based Conservation and the Quality of Life of Indigenous People in the Bolivian Chaco’ in Jessica Campese, 
Terry Sunderland, Thomas Greiber, and Gonzalo Oviedo (eds.), Rights- Based Approaches: Exploring Issues 
and Opportunities for Conservation (Bogor Barat, Indonesia: Centre for International Forestry Research/ 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2009).
35 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Department of Field Support, Environmental 
Policy for UN Field Missions (31 May 2009); Sophie Ravier, Anne- Cecile Vialle, Russ Doran, and John 
Stokes, ‘Environmental Experiences and Developments in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ in 
Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols (n 2).
36 Peter Aldinger, Carl Bruch, and Sofia Yazykova, ‘Revisiting Securitization:  An Empirical Analysis 
of Environment and Natural Resource Provisions in UN Security Council Resolutions, 1946– 2016’ 
in Ashok Swain and Joakim Öjendal (eds.), Handbook of Environmental Conflict and Peacebuilding 
(London: Routledge, forthcoming 2017).
37 Mark B.  Taylor and Mike Davis, ‘Taking the Gun out of Extraction:  UN Responses to the Role of 
Natural Resources in Conflicts’ in Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols (n 2).
38 ibid. 39 ibid.
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(such as a clear definition of what constitutes a conflict resource and what actions fol-
low), the Security Council has yet to adopt a consistent definition or approach to these 
various issues.40
This has yielded a patchwork of more than 200 ad hoc Security Council resolutions 
addressing different linkages between the environment and security.41 This patchwork 
is reinforced by the patchwork of administrative instruments governing the United 
Nations Environment Programme (‘UNEP’), the Food and Agriculture Organizations 
of the United Nations (‘FAO’), the United Nations Development Programme (‘UNDP’), 
and other UN agencies. These instruments include UN Environment Assembly deci-
sions (and before those, UNEP Governing Council decisions), UN General Assembly 
resolutions, UN policies,42 and institutional guidance. In short, there is an overwhelm-
ing body of ad hoc and targeted institutional decisions (which is essentially interna-
tional administrative law) and— as yet— little codified hard law.
The ongoing effort to articulate and elaborate jus post bellum is essential to codify-
ing practice and collecting the disparate legal norms, principles, mandates, and pro-
cedures to provide more clear direction for post- conflict peacebuilding. Towards this 
end, I offer a challenge and my second key question: to the extent that we are able to 
articulate a body of norms, principles, and practices related to the environment and 
jus post bellum, what effect will this have on the ground in conflict- affected countries?
A couple years ago, I had the pleasure of working on an article with Professor Michael 
Bothe— who co- chairs the Specialist Group on Armed Conflict and the Environment 
with me.43 We discussed at length whether and under what circumstances peacetime 
international environmental law continued to apply during armed conflict. We ulti-
mately agreed that it did, to the extent that it did not contradict any specific provisions 
of international humanitarian law— a position consistent with the approach adopted by 
the International Law Commission on the effect of armed conflict on treaties.44 Then, 
Michael asked ‘So, what provisions might apply?’ Even if we agreed in principle that the 
full body of international environmental law continued to apply during armed conflict, 
relatively little was sufficiently specific or relevant to preventing the sort of wartime 
environmental harms that we were considering.
In that vein, it is essential that articulation of the scope of jus post bellum bears in 
mind the practical question: ‘So what?’ How and to what extent would the provisions 
of jus post bellum actually influence, constrain, or guide someone working in a post- 
conflict country?
To be clear, the effort to articulate and elaborate jus post bellum is valuable and nec-
essary. It is still early in the process. There is such a large body of practice— state prac-
tice and otherwise— that there are underlying provisions of international law from a 
wide range of fields: international criminal law, international humanitarian law, inter-
national human rights law, international environmental law, and public international 
40 ibid. 41 Aldinger, Bruch, and Yazykova (n 36).
42 In this context, the UN- wide guidance on natural resources on post- conflict peacebuilding (endorsed 
by thirty- eight UN entities) is particularly relevant.
43 Bothe, Bruch, Diamond, and Jensen (n 1).
44 See ILC, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties with Commentaries (2011), at 
<http:// legal.un.org/ ilc/ texts/ instruments/ english/ commentaries/ 1_ 10_ 2011.pdf> accessed 7 June 2017.
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law broadly. In many cases, this international law is still emerging; in others, provisions 
may be said to be established.
As a brief aside, it is worth mentioning one area that is intriguing, controversial, and 
important: shared sovereignty. This may be a controversial topic, but the fact remains that 
many conflict- affected countries are not able to maintain peace and security, control the 
illicit and illegal flow of conflict resources, or govern. Under these circumstances, the UN 
Security Council has time and again adopted resolutions that intrude— temporarily— on 
national sovereignty through sanctions on trade in natural resources, by mandating groups 
of experts to investigate trade in conflict resources, and by empowering peacekeeping mis-
sions to help governments in addressing conflict resources and other natural resources. In an 
extreme example, the Liberia Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program 
(‘GEMAP’) provided that for every government expenditure and contract (including those 
related to natural resources), two signatures were necessary: one by the relevant govern-
ment official, and one by a World Bank staff person.45 Gradually the various government 
agencies ‘graduated’ and regained independent budgetary and procurement authority, but 
for an extended period the Government of Liberia shared one of the most basic responsi-
bilities that a sovereign country has with an international organization.
It is essential to use practice as a touchstone. To what extent does a particular provi-
sion reflect state practice in post- conflict countries? To what extent will the provision 
affect practice?
The third observation is that the space for political dialogue on environmental peace-
building has expanded dramatically. When the Environmental Law Institute (ELI), 
UNEP, the University of Tokyo, and McGill University started examining the role of 
natural resources and the environment in post- conflict peacebuilding, we faced both 
indifference and hostility. Aside from like- minded individuals, most funders and agen-
cies thought that this was not a priority. The project was viewed as an ‘environmental’ 
effort, and not particularly relevant to peacebuilding. A number of states were openly 
hostile— they were nervous that the UN Security Council might become more actively 
involved in how countries manage their natural resources, and they actively sought to 
redefine the issue as one of national sovereignty over natural resources.
Over the past few years, there has been a growing recognition of the relevance of nat-
ural resources to peacebuilding. It helped that Liberia, Sierra Leone, and other conflict- 
affected countries clearly stated that natural resource management has presented 
challenges and opportunities to ultimately ending conflict in those countries. Objective, 
peer- reviewed documentation of experiences also helped. Now, there is much more lee-
way to talk about the linkages between natural resources and peacebuilding. The discus-
sions are lively, and can be contentious, but they are now on the merits.
Jus post bellum fills a critical gap in this space. Over the past fifty years, coun-
tries have adopted international treaties protecting the environment during 
armed conflict (jus in bello)46 and applied jus ad bellum to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of 
45 See K.  W. James Rochow, ‘Concession Reviews:  Liberian Experience and Prospects for Effective 
Internationalized Solutions’ in Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols (n 2).
46 UNEP, Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International 
Law (UNEP, 2009).
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Kuwait.47 While more than fifty countries have experienced major armed conflict48 
since the end of the Cold War, the body of norms, state practice, and requirements 
from various sources of international law (highlighted above) are only starting to be 
collected and codified.
The work of the International Law Commission’s (‘ILC’) and its Special Rapporteur 
on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts (Marie Jacobsson) 
is an important step towards addressing international law protecting the environment 
after armed conflict.49 As important as this work is, it is unclear whether ILC’s focus 
on protection of the environment is the appropriate scope. Does ‘protection of the envi-
ronment’ include sound management and governance of the environment that is nec-
essary for delivery of water, sanitation, and other resource- dependent basic services 
(some of which are human rights)? Does it include the economic aspects of natural 
resource governance, for example related to conflict resources? Does it include coop-
eration around shared environmental threats, such as flooding and drought?
The Special Rapporteur has prepared three reports on international legal rules 
applicable to the environment before, during and after armed conflict, and a set of 
eighteen principles on the topic were drafted. The ILC has provisionally adopted 
principles relating to protection of the environment during armed conflict, and 
is considering the other principles relating to preventive and post- conflict mea-
sures. While the principles aim to reflect existing international law, some question 
whether the principles— for example, those relating to non- international armed 
conflict and reprisals— go beyond lex lata. Of note, the reports and draft princi-
ples integrate relevant provisions of not only international humanitarian law, but 
also international environmental law, international human rights law, and inter-
national criminal law.
With respect to jus post bellum, the reports and draft principles constitute a critical 
first step in codifying existing international law. Elements of environmental jus post 
bellum address environmental assessments, remedial measures, addressing the toxic 
remnants of war (on land and at sea), indigenous peoples, and information sharing. 
The three- year mandate for the Special Rapporteur provided a tight window in which 
to examine protection of the environment before, during, and after conflict; and so it 
not surprising that conflict resources and some other environmental dimensions of jus 
post bellum need further elaboration. Nevertheless, the work of the Special Rapporteur 
and the ILC represents one of the most important advances in the field in decades, and 
it is striking how quickly the international legal community has recognized that inter-
national law does protect the environment after armed conflict.
47 Sand and Payne (n 2).
48 Major armed conflict is defined as one that has more than 1,000 battle- related deaths. See Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, n.d. UCDP Database, at <http:// www.ucdp.uu.se/ > accessed 7 June 2017; Bruch, 
Jensen, Nakayama, and Unruh (n 10).
49 See Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on the Protection of the Environment 
in Relation to Armed Conflicts International Law Commission, Sixty- sixth session, ILC Doc. A/ CN.4/ 674, 
30 May 2014; Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on the Protection of the Environment 
in Relation to Armed Conflicts, International Law Commission, Sixty- seventh session, ILC Doc. A/ CN.4/ 
685, 28 May 2015.
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1.3 Challenges Ahead
Moving forward, there are two broad ways that the international community can 
strengthen the environmental dimensions of jus post bellum: (1) through the codifica-
tion, clarification, and development of norms; and (2) through the implementation and 
operationalization of those norms.
The ILC should continue its groundbreaking work on protection of the environment 
in relation to armed conflict. As noted, the work done under the first three- year man-
date provided a framework that addressed the post- conflict period (directly related 
to jus post bellum), but it focused primarily on environmental damage, and did not 
squarely address natural resources, including conflict resources or the role of natu-
ral resource- related grievances as a contributing cause of conflict. Future work should 
explore the natural resource dimensions of conflict and jus post bellum, including 
resource allocation, benefit- sharing mechanisms, autonomous governance of certain 
regions, and conflict resources (including the application, e.g. international law pro-
hibiting pillage). Second, it should also explore further the relevant international law 
applicable to countries affected by and recovering from non- international armed con-
flict. A third area that warrants further examination is international law governing the 
post- conflict review and renegotiation of natural resource concessions that may have 
been issued illegally. Fourth, there is a need to clarify the legal authorities, powers, 
and limitations of international actors (including the UN, World Bank, regional insti-
tutions, and bilateral agencies) that may serve as a de facto or even de jure interim 
government— what authority and obligations do these institutions have over manage-
ment of natural resources, their concessions, and their revenues? Over environmental 
protection?
Second, there is a need to support countries, international organizations, and others 
in implementing and operationalizing the draft ILC principles and the environmental 
dimensions of jus post bellum more broadly. Implementation will reinforce the norma-
tive nature of the principles and build awareness of the environmental dimensions of 
jus post bellum. It will also help to make the principles more widely accepted and lay 
the foundation for the potential expansion of the relevant body of norms governing the 
environment (including natural resources) after conflict— and more generally in rela-
tion to armed conflict.
There are many avenues and contexts for supporting implementation of the envi-
ronmental dimensions of jus post bellum. The UN Security Council should more con-
sistently provide a mandate and dedicated staff for peacekeeping missions to prevent 
environmental issues from destabilizing the post- conflict recovery. These mandates 
should:  (1)  address environmental dimensions of the causes of conflict; (2)  address 
conflict resources (including secure extraction sites and trade routes, and monitor-
ing trade through UN Groups of Experts); (3) prevent new conflicts that may arise, for 
example around refugees and IDPs seeking to return to lands they once occupied; and 
(4)  help the government rebuild its governance capacity and practices (through the 
civilian side of peacekeeping missions).
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Another avenue is to focus resources on prosecuting cases relating to violations 
of jus post bellum, so that legal provisions are more than just words on paper. On 15 
September 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court 
announced— via a Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation— that it would 
prioritize cases with environmental and natural resource dimensions.50 This was an 
important step forward both for its own docket and for countries, as it committed to 
assisting countries in domestic prosecution of cases, even if the underlying act was not 
a violation of the Rome Statute. Prosecution of these cases may require new approaches 
and expertise, for example, bringing in expertise in financial crimes (e.g. in money 
laundering) to help prosecute cases involving conflict resources. Similarly, there may be 
opportunities for utilizing different tribunals than historically used for prosecuting war 
crimes and crimes against humanity; for example, human rights tribunals can apply 
international human rights law in support of jus post bellum.
This book is an important step in a fuller exploration of international law govern-
ing environmental considerations after conflict. The effort to articulate the environ-
mental dimensions of jus post bellum is likely to take many years. In many instances, 
there is existing international law, mechanisms, and procedures. In others, there is still 
the need for development. The expanded political space around various dimensions of 
environmental peacebuilding provides cause for cautious optimism— both for identify-
ing existing law and for filling the environmental gaps in jus post bellum.
50 OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, para. 41 (‘The Office will 
give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of, or that 
result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the 
illegal dispossession of land’).
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2.1 Introduction
A primary motivation for including protection of environment and natural resources 
in the law of armed conflict (‘LOAC’) and post- conflict legal regimes (jus post bellum) 
is to establish productive, peaceful societies. Natural resources and environmental con-
ditions influence a country’s ability to provide security, deliver basic services, restore 
its economy and livelihoods, and rebuild governance— four peacebuilding objectives.1 
US Rear Admiral LeGrand reasoned that legal protection of the environment is needed 
during conflict, because:
There’s a growing recognition that environmental devastation produces additional 
security concerns by depleting natural resources, by causing competition for scarce 
resources, and by displacing entire populations from devastated areas.2
As a conflict draws to a close, a whole suite of institutions and processes engage with 
environmental remediation, reconstruction, and reparations, when they are authorized 
and compelled to do so by law.
Defining what we mean by ‘the environment’ as an object of protection in the post- 
conflict period (e.g. in reparations proceedings)3 is a starting point for a discussion of 
what this law is and how it should develop. There is no commonly agreed definition of 
‘environment’ in international law, or in the sub- field of the LOAC.4 The International 
Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) gave this eloquent, but non- binding, description of environ-
ment in its Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion:  ‘the 
* Associate Professor at Rutgers University, New Jersey.
1 David Jensen, and Steve Lonergan, ‘Placing Environment and Natural Resource Risks, Impacts, and 
Opportunities on the Post‐Conflict Peacebuilding Agenda’ in David Jensen and Steve Lonergan (eds.), 
Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post‐Conflict Peacebuilding (London: Earthscan, 2012), 2, 7.
2 Carlston N. Le Grand, ‘‘Framing the Issues’ in Richard J. Grunawalt, John E. King, and Ronald S. 
McClain (eds.), Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict (Newport, Rhode Island:  Naval 
War College Press, 1996). See also, UN General Assembly, Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed 
Conflict: Report of the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/ 60/ 891, 18 July 2006.
3 See  chapter 14 in this volume.
4 Alexandre Timoshenko (ed.), Conclusions by the Working Group of Experts on Liability and 
Compensation for Environmental Damage Arising from Military Activities, in Liability and Compensation for 
Environmental Damage, Compilation of Documents (Nairobi: UNEP, 1998), para. 30.
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environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and 
the very health of human beings, including generations unborn’.5
More precise definitions of the scope of ‘environment’ are in some respects contro-
versial, as they may include public and private property; different media (water, soil, 
air); natural resources traded in the marketplace; ‘pure’ environment such as wild-
life and ecosystem dynamics; common concerns such as the conservation of biodi-
versity; and cultural elements.6 A United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Experts Group suggested a broad definition: ‘“environment” includes abiotic and biotic 
components, including air, water, soil, flora, fauna and the ecosystem formed by their 
interaction’ and might even include ‘cultural heritage, features of the landscape and 
environmental amenity’, but it excluded private property.7 Different aspects of the envi-
ronment may be treated differently during various phases of armed conflict. Mollard- 
Bannelier suggested that perhaps states have not defined ‘environment’ in the many 
declarations, treaties, and resolutions where they might have done so in recognition of 
the fact that new and changing definitions would be needed as greater scientific knowl-
edge changes our understanding;8 a view that is also reflected in the International Law 
Commission’s (‘ILC’) work on the topic.9 This kind of new information is regularly 
incorporated in international environmental treaty systems through mechanisms such 
as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice and its use of regular reporting on new information by the 
states parties.10 International humanitarian law (IHL) treaties have opted instead for 
vague terms undefined in the text, perhaps because of the sensitivity and difficulty of 
negotiating security agreements and a desire for stability in the legal regime.
If, on investigation, a precise definition of ‘environment’ is, as Mollard- Bennelier 
suggests, difficult, dangerous, and ultimately unhelpful, a guiding principle would be 
useful. The current treaty regime does not adequately address the scope or magnitude 
of the environment which concerns the international community. Legal protection of 
the environment in relation to armed conflict has expanded— to a limited degree— 
from protecting property and core necessities of human life like drinking water to a 
more inclusive scope that acknowledges the importance of the environment itself.
The unresolved challenge for international lawyers is whether treaties and custom-
ary international law can be made effective through interpretation or whether a new 
5 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Judgment of 8 July 1996, 
ICJ Reports 226, para. 29.
6 See Cymie R. Payne, ‘Protection of the Natural Environment’ in Dapo Akande and Ben Saul (eds.), 
Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2017).
7 Timoshenko (n 4) para. 31. This phrasing is notably similar to, but more inclusive than, the Institut de 
Droit International’s definition of environment: ‘For the purposes of this Resolution, the concept of “envi-
ronment” includes abiotic and biotic natural resources, in particular air, water, soil, fauna and flora, as well 
as the interaction between these factors. It also includes the characteristic features of the landscape.’ Institut 
de Droit International, Resolution: Environment, Art. 1 (1997) (the resolution addresses international law 
for the management of the environment).
8 Karine Mollard- Bannelier, La Protection de L’Environment en Temps de Conflit Armé (Paris: Pedone, 
2001), 20– 2.
9 See Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty- eighth session (2 May– 10 June and 4 July– 12 
August 2016), A/ 71/ 10, 336.
10 UNFCCC, Arts. 5 and 9.
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agreement is needed. After the spectacular oil well fires and oil spills of the 1991 Gulf 
War, there was an unsuccessful push for a new treaty.11 Koppe suggested, more recently, 
the addition of an environmental principle12 to the four fundamental principles of 
LOAC (military necessity, humanity, proportionality, and distinction).13 An alterna-
tive to a new instrument is a new interpretive approach that evaluates damage to the 
environment in terms of ‘environmental integrity’ rather than in the narrow terms con-
sidered sufficient in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The principle of ‘envi-
ronmental integrity’ expresses a complex set of concepts that describe a healthy natural 
system that can support essential processes.14
The image that most of us have when we think of environmental integrity is likely 
some Edenic vision of pristine nature— quiet forests, sparkling rivers, silvery deserts. If 
we knew a city before it was bombed, we will think of it as we knew it. This is also the 
image that is conjured for many victims by the touchstone standard for reparations, 
stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Case Concerning 
the Factory at Chorzów:  ‘reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the conse-
quences of the illegal act and re- establish the situation which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that act had not been committed’.15
More realistically, experts in the relatively new field of natural resource damages— 
legal compensation for damage to the environment under statute and common law— 
understand the Chorzów Factory reparations standard to reflect the changing baseline 
conditions discussed in this chapter, not an intention to return things to the way they 
were pre- incident. From the perspective of ecology, a perfect restoration to the moment 
of loss is an impossible image, as artificial as the restoration of Warsaw.16
However, appreciation of the lessons of ecology and related disciplines still has not 
fully penetrated jus post bellum. Legal traditions persist into the present, defining harms 
11 See Glen Plant (ed.), Environmental Protection and the Law of War: A ‘Fifth Geneva’ Convention on the 
Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict (London: Belhaven Press, 1992).
12 Koppe suggested calling it the principle of ambituity, Erik V. Koppe, ‘The Principle of Ambituity’ 
in Rosemary Rayfuse (ed.), War and the Environment: New Approaches to Protecting the Environment in 
Relation to Armed Conflict (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014), 67; See also Erik V. Koppe, The Use of Nuclear 
Weapons and the Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict (Oxford: Hart, 2008).
13 The US Department of Defense adds a fifth principle, honour, which it says ‘may be understood to 
provide a foundation for obligations that help enforce and implement the law of war or special agreements 
between belligerents during armed conflict. For example, honor may be understood to provide the founda-
tion for the requirement for persons to comply with the law of war in good faith.’ See US Department of 
Defense, Law of War Manual 50, 66- 9 (2015) (citations omitted).
14 Aspects of integrity that others have described include ‘wild, untrammeled nature and the self- creative 
capacities of life to organize, regenerate, reproduce, sustain, adapt, develop, and evolve itself ’; as signifying 
that ‘the combined functions and components of whole natural systems are valuable for their own sake; their 
life support functions; their psychospiritual, scientific, and cultural significance; and the goods and services 
they provide’; and as ‘a system’s vigor, organization and resilience’. See Peter Miller and William E. Rees, 
‘Introduction’ in David Pimentel, Laura Westra, and Reed F. Noss (eds.), Ecological Integrity:  Integrating 
Environment, Conservation, and Health (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000) 11, 12.
15 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) Merits, Claim for Indemnity, Judgment, 
PCIJ Reports (Series A No. 17, 47) 13 September 1928.
16 UNESCO, World Heritage List:  ‘During the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944, more than 85% of 
Warsaw’s historic centre was destroyed by Nazi troops. After the war, a five- year reconstruction campaign 
by its citizens resulted in today’s meticulous restoration of the Old Town, with its churches, palaces and 
market- place. It is an outstanding example of a near- total reconstruction of a span of history covering the 
13th to the 20th century’, at <http:// whc.unesco.org/ en/ list/ 30> accessed 10 June 2017.
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in terms of private property, infrastructure, or iconic landscape elements, overlooking 
ecosystem services provided by such humble life forms as organisms that keep soil 
fertile. This is also how policy- makers tend to perceive the environment and natural 
resources. For example, on the rare occasions when reparations are sought, claims are 
more likely to resemble Ethiopia’s claim seeking compensation for loss of commercially 
valuable gum Arabic and resin plants before the Eritrea- Ethiopia Claims Commission17 
than Jordan’s claim to the United Nations Compensation Commission (‘UNCC’) for 
‘remediation of its rangelands, loss of forage production in its rangelands, damage to 
rangeland wildlife habitats, loss of wildlife, and disruption of a captive- breeding pro-
gramme for two endangered species (the Arabian oryx and the sand gazelle)’ resulting 
from Iraq’s 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait.18 That is, states still perceive their 
environmental damage in terms of market- priced resources like crops and overlook 
pure environmental damage, such as a damaged ecosystem, which is likely to be more 
crucial to their long- term recovery from the conflict.19
Although this is a more dynamic concept of the environment than that found in much 
of the LOAC, it does also reflect norms with deep roots in the law of war, post- conflict 
reparations processes, and current state practice.20 Those norms have been develop-
ing from changing social attitudes, as military personnel and civilians have adopted an 
environmental protection ethic.21 The operational law under which the military works 
incorporates environmental law.22 They are also influenced by changes in domestic law, 
17 Sean D. Murphy, Won Kidane, and Thomas R. Snider, Litigating War: Arbitration of Civil Injury by the 
Eritrea- Ethiopia Claims Commission (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 146 (rejected for insuffi-
cient evidence). Murphy, Kidane, and Snider report that Ethiopia had also claimed for the loss of wild ani-
mals but withdrew that portion of the claim. ibid. 228 (Ethiopia claimed in the alternative that the damage 
to plants and wildlife was the result of Eritrea’s breaches of jus ad bellum and jus in bello).
18 Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fifth Instalment 
of ‘F4’ claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2005/ 10, 30 June 2005, para. 353.
19 In domestic legal regimes, reparations for environmental damage are often resolved by reducing the 
harm to a monetary value, which can then be paid to the public trustee for the damaged resource. This is 
practical, but misleading if the international community comes to define environmental value in financial 
terms. A team of economists, whose work recently attempted to value all ecosystem services provided by 
the planet, argue that ‘[m] any ecosystem services are public goods or the product of common assets that 
cannot (or should not) be privatized . . . [their] value in monetary units is an estimate of their benefits to 
society expressed in units that communicate with a broad audience.’ See Robert Costanza, Rudolf de Groot, 
Paul Sutton, Sander van der Ploeg, Sharolyn J. Anderson, Ida Kubiszewski, Stephen Farber, and R. Kerry 
Turner, ‘Changes in the Global Value of Ecosystem Services’ (2014) 26 Global Environmental Change 152, 
157 (‘the estimate for the total global ecosystem services in 2011 is $125 trillion/ yr (assuming updated unit 
values and changes to biome areas) and $145 trillion/ yr (assuming only unit values changed), both in 2007 
$US. From this we estimated the loss of eco- services from 1997 to 2011 due to land use change at $4.3– 20.2 
trillion/ yr, depending on which unit values are used.’) Miller and Rees observe that, ‘Most economic analy-
ses are money- and market- based and are thus thoroughly abstracted from nature. Conventional analyses 
ignore biophysical conditions and the behavioral dynamics of ecosystems. . . . Ecology does little better. . . . 
ecologists focus almost exclusively on other species, expending little effort on humans as ecological entities 
in their own right.’ See Peter Miller and William E. Rees (n 14) 6– 7.
20 Cymie R. Payne, ‘The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict Legal Regimes’ in Carsten 
Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
21 Ronald A.  DeMarco and John P.  Quinn, ‘The Impact of War and Military Operations other than 
War on the Marine Environment: Policy Making on the Frontiers of Knowledge’ in Grunawalt, King, and 
McClain (n 2).
22 See, for example, US Department of Defense (n 13)  20, footnote 80; ILC, Second Report on the 
Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, A/ CN.4/ 685, 28 May 2015 (‘ILC Second 
PERAC Report’), paras. 63, 64 (summaries of statements by states that operational law for their armed 
forces incorporates environmental rules).
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which impose environmental accountability on the military for its activities whether or 
not related to armed conflict.23 These changes in both social attitudes and in domestic 
environmental law result from human experience of a degraded environment and from 
better knowledge of the relevant science.
Section 2.2 of this chapter looks at the development over time of the ability for mili-
tary actors to apply ecological and earth systems knowledge to their activities and the 
halting development of the legal regime that sets standards for their conduct. Reports 
from three 1970s conferences where negotiations led to treaty articles for environmen-
tal protection during armed conflict are suggestive. It appears that negotiators debated 
the feasibility of incorporating an ecological standard, decided it could not be opera-
tionalized, and opted for terms that they felt were consistent with the capability of the 
military.
Thus, Section 2.3 of this chapter aims to put the concept of environmental integrity 
into context with some important developments in ecology, conservation biology, and 
natural resource management to advance the project of articulating legal principles 
that can be applied by military actors, reparations bodies, governments, and others 
engaged in peacebuilding. These ideas apply as well to transitional justice measures, 
international criminal law proceedings, investment and development aid (particularly 
major infrastructure projects and development of high- value natural resources), peace-
keeping deployments, and managing the toxic remnants of war.24
To clarify the analysis of environment and natural resources in jus post bellum, two 
concepts are worthy of attention: first, coupled human and natural systems and second, 
change in the environment. These are fundamental to understanding the effects of per-
turbations on natural systems and management interventions to restore pre- existing 
conditions. Ultimately, we return to the question of what concepts like ‘natural’, ‘pris-
tine’, ‘pre- existing conditions’, and ‘integrity’ mean and consider fundamental empir-
ical concepts that are relevant to peacebuilding and environmental damage in jus post 
bellum.
2.2 The Classic Approach in International Law
There is no legal definition of ‘environment’ grounded in a jus post bellum legal 
framework. Legal definitions of ‘environment’ during all phases of armed conflict are 
relevant: transitional justice activities are concerned with accountability and compen-
sation for illegal damage to the environment during the conflict; peace agreements 
contain terms that address environment and natural resources; occupying forces are 
subject to legal rules that balance military considerations with private and public 
rights; domestic and international environmental law resume if they were suspended 
during conflict.
23 DeMarco and Quinn (n 21)  (‘under all circumstances the environmental consequences of military 
operations remain a legal, moral and public relations concern of the military commander’).
24 Although my references are to US parks, these scientists and managers participate in an international 
community of protected area managers. According to the International Union for Conservation of Nature, 
‘roughly a tenth of the world’s land surface is under some form of protected area’. See Nigel Dudley (ed.), 
Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 2008).
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However, sources for international law definitions that apply explicitly to the envir-
onment in relation to armed conflict are limited to the three in bello treaties:
• Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (‘ENMOD’),25
• Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (‘AP I’), Articles 
35(3), 55,26 and
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8(2)(b)(iv).27
None of these define environment. Other sources of legal definitions of environment 
include the practice of international tribunals and the views of highly respected jurists, 
such as the ILC.28 The relative novelty of environmental damage as a subject of concern 
means that these sources are few in number, but here the awards of the UNCC can be 
helpful as can the ILC’s work on the topic ‘Protection of the environment in relation to 
armed conflicts (‘PERAC’)’.29
The classic international law approach defines damage to the environment from 
armed conflict in two dimensions: scope and magnitude. Whether an impact on the 
environment is ‘adverse’ is not a point of great concern— there are few impacts of 
armed conflict that will benefit the environment— though a requirement to prove net 
adverse impacts is sometimes argued by litigants.30 The scope of what is protected has 
expanded from property and marketable natural resources to include ecosystems. As 
the definition grows more encompassing, a central challenge is where to draw a line 
between what is protected specially as ‘environment’. By the broadest view, any mani-
festation can be considered ‘environment’, while narrower views are represented in the 
legal measures described below. Whether there should be a threshold of magnitude for 
environmental damage to be considered legally material is a disputed question. The 
three twentieth- century treaties use similar language in this regard, but their interpre-
tations were never consistent and they are now challenged as unrealistically narrow 
and vague.
A more traditional approach— based on the Hague Regulations and the Fourth 
Geneva Convention (protection of civilians)— is still the basis for legal analysis 
25 Adopted 10 December 1976, entered into force 5 October 1978, 1108 UNTS 151.
26 Adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 609.
27 Adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, UN Doc. A/ Conf.183/ 9 as corrected by the 
procès- verbaux of 10 November 1998 and 12 July 1999 in PCNICC/ 1999/ INF/ 3.
28 ICJ, Statute, Article 38. See also, Timoshenko (n 4) para. 30 (sources of a definition can be found in 
state practice, international agreements, and the practice of international organizations).
29 ILC, Sixty- Third Session, A/ 66/ 10, Annex E, paras. 365– 7 (2011); ILC, Preliminary Report on the 
Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, A/ CN.4/ 674 (2014), (‘ILC Preliminary 
PERAC Report’); ILC Second PERAC Report (n 22); ILC, Third Report on the Protection of the Environment 
in Relation to Armed Conflicts, A/ CN.4/ 700, 3 June 2016 (‘ILC Third PERAC Report’).
30 It has been observed that activities related to armed conflict sometimes keep humans out of particular 
areas, effectively providing protected areas for flora and fauna. See Mollard- Bannelier (n 8) 14– 15; Gary E. 
Machlis and Thor Hanson, ‘Warfare Ecology’ (2008) 58(8) BioScience 729, 731 (reviewing accounts of such 
benefits and of harmful effects).
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of PERAC obligations by many states. For example, the United States specifically 
objects to the environmental provisions in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (deeming them ‘too broad and too ambiguous for effective use in mili-
tary operations’) and applies instead customary international law and these earlier 
agreements.31
Developing environmental awareness in the late twentieth century led to the inclu-
sion of specific provisions protecting the ‘natural environment’32 in new LOAC instru-
ments (ENMOD, AP I, and later the Rome Statute), which have not become fully 
incorporated into LOAC for all states. Indeed, in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ reported that although some 
states argued that ‘any use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful by reference to exist-
ing norms relating to the safeguarding and protection of the environment’,33
Other States questioned the binding legal quality of these precepts of environ-
mental law; or, in the context of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, denied that it 
was concerned at all with the use of nuclear weapons in hostilities; or, in the case 
of Additional Protocol I, denied that they were generally bound by its terms, or 
recalled that they had reserved their position in respect of Article 35, paragraph 3, 
thereof.34
Moreover, the current treaty regime leaves gaps. The legal regime is still evolving 
through state practice that is yet to be codified into rules acknowledged as binding 
international law.
The rules that apply in a given situation will vary with the circumstances, and defini-
tions will as well. The scope and threshold of the definition of ‘environment’ also vary 
with respect to the temporal aspect of the context: going to war (ad bellum), during war 
(in bello), or right after war (post bellum).35 The definition of ‘environment’ may depend 
on whether the conflict is international or internal,36 whether the law of occupation or 
31 Michael J. Matheson, ‘The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to 
the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions’ (1987) 2 American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 419, 436; US Department of Defense (n 13) 20. See also, US Army, 86th Law 
of War Course, B- 6 (2006); and Walter G. Sharp, ‘The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage dur-
ing Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War’ 137 Military Law Review 1, 14 (1992) (‘This 
convention also is considered declaratory of customary international law’).
32 The ILC has explicitly left open the question of whether ‘environment’ or ‘natural environment’ is the 
preferred term. Both appear in the ILC documents; the Draft Principles prepared at the 2016 session refer to 
‘natural environment.’ A decision on this point will thus benefit from further analysis and discussion by the 
Commission in the future. ILC, Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Statement 
of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr. Pavel Šturma, (5 August 2016) 2.
33 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Judgment of 8 July 1996, ICJ 
Reports 226, para. 27.
34 ibid. para. 28.
35 Jens Iverson, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Epilogue: Jus Post Bellum— Strategic Analysis 
and Future Directions’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 20) (quoting Immanuel Kant) 545.
36 Marie Jacobsson, the Special Rapporteur for the ILC PERAC topic, proposed defining ‘armed conflict’ 
as ‘a situation in which there is resort to armed force between States or protracted resort to armed force 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.’ See 
ILC Preliminary PERAC Report (n 29) para. 78. She distinguished the ILC’s restricted definition of armed 
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a Status of Forces Agreement (‘SOFA’) is in effect, whether state responsibility or inter-
national criminal law is used, whether war and emergency conditions have suspended 
environmental treaties or domestic law, and so on.
There is also a distinction between the environment to be protected, such as a river, 
and environmental manipulations, such as causing fires and breaching dams. The lat-
ter are age- old tools of war37 subject to jus in bello as weapons (‘dangerous forces’).38 
Dams themselves might be considered part of the ‘environment’ for jus post bellum pur-
poses such as reparations to provide flood protection or drinking water supply. Other 
aspects of the natural world are less multifaceted: we do not ordinarily protect radioac-
tive materials, chemical agents, or disease vectors as part of the environment; they are 
addressed as weapons under the law of war. Considering the environment as a victim 
of war, rather than as a weapon, there may be a distinction between targeting the envi-
ronment (as Iraq did in mining the Kuwaiti oil wells)39 and causing collateral damage 
to it (as the tracked vehicles of all belligerents caused to the desert in the Gulf War).40
Finally, as Richard Falk wrote in 1992, ‘issues of relative authoritativeness [of legal 
norms] are of surprisingly great importance for the description and evaluation of exist-
ing international law; if general norms are treated as authoritative, then almost all envi-
ronmentally harmful belligerent practices are illegal; if general norms are ignored, then 
almost nothing is prohibited’.41 The situation is not materially improved today.
conflict as between states from the International Criminal Court’s wider jurisdiction over conflicts between 
states or between organized armed groups and others; the definition proposed by the ICRC; the defini-
tion used in the Tadić case, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (IT- 94- 1- A, 2 October 1995), para. 70; and others. ILC 
Preliminary PERAC Report, para. 71.
37 LeGrand (n 2) 25. The Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, Art. 23, provides a general limitation on 
unnecessary destruction of property not justified by military necessity; see also its Regulations, Arts. 22 and 
23. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Art. 56, prohibits targeting dams as ‘dangerous 
forces’ in certain circumstances. The ENMOD Convention prohibits using the environment as a weapon 
during armed conflict, but it has been said that ‘Diversion of a river, destruction of a dam, release of mil-
lions of barrels of oil, and destruction of water supplies do not violate ENMOD.’ David E. Mosher, Beth E. 
Lachman, Michael D. Greenberg, Tiffany Nichols, Brian Rosen, and Henry H. Willis, Green Warriors: Army 
Environmental Considerations for Contingency Operations from Planning Through Post- conflict [prepared for 
the United States Army] (Volume 632, Rand Corporation, 2008), 161. Karine Mollard- Bannelier described 
occasions when nations breached their own dams— causing severe flood damage— to delay foreign mili-
tary invasions:  the Dutch to stop the French in 1672; the Chinese against Japanese troops in 1937; the 
Soviets fighting Germany in 1941. She recounts aggressive use of dam breaches when Germany flooded 
Dutch lands with saltwater to slow the Allies in 1944 and the Allies bombed dams on two rivers, depriving 
Germany of potable water and 75 per cent of the hydroelectric generation used in its industrial region; and 
US bombing of Korea and Vietnam. In each of these cases she identifies resulting damage to agricultural 
land, cultural objects, and life. See Mollard- Bannelier (n 8) 2– 5.
38 Additional Protocol I, Art. 56 (dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating 
stations). The United States specifically objects to inclusion of this article in customary international law. 
See US Department of Defense (n 13).
39 UNCC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the First 
Instalment of ‘F4’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2001/ 16, 22 June 2001, para. 363 (‘First ‘F4’ Report’).
40 ibid. paras. 365; Samira Omar, N.R. Bhat, S.A. Shahid, and A. Asem, ‘Land and Vegetation Degradation 
Caused by Military Activities: A Case Study of the Sabah Al- Ahmad Nature Reserve of Kuwait’ (2006) 14(1) 
European Journal of Scientific Research 146.
41 See Richard Falk, ‘The Environmental Law of War: An Introduction’ in Plant (n 11).
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2.2.1  Scope
No treaty defines ‘environment’ in this context, as noted above. Case law applying the doc-
trine of state responsibility to a breach of jus ad bellum rules is more helpful and therefore 
will be discussed first. A review of the treaty regime follows.
A partial definition of environment for jus post bellum can be inferred from the envi-
ronmental compensation awards made by the UNCC. By invading Kuwait in 1990, Iraq 
breached its obligations regarding the use of force under the UN Charter. The UN Security 
Council established the UNCC for the purpose of awarding reparations as a remedy for 
the breach, consistent with the doctrine of state responsibility. Iraq was held responsible 
for direct losses that resulted from its invasion and occupation of Kuwait, including ‘envi-
ronmental damage and the depletion of natural resources’.42 Those terms were left unde-
fined by the resolution.
The UNCC compensation awards allowed the broadest possible scope for the defini-
tion of ‘environment’ in the context of reparations for harm caused as a result of a breach 
of the jus ad bellum, with the proviso that all claims characterized as ‘environmental’ (i.e. 
in the ‘F4’ category) were brought by governments. The Commission was not asked to rule 
on the issue of private property versus public environment, but the environmental claims 
were handled as public claims where the government was in the role of trustee.43 David 
Caron put this in terms of a government acting ‘as an agent for the environment, for a 
community’s interest in that environment’.44
The UNCC commissioners for the environmental claims category found that the 
Security Council and the UNCC policy- making body, its Governing Council, estab-
lished a sufficient scope that no claims received in the category needed to be excluded 
as beyond its scope.45 Consistent with the turn towards a modern, science- based 
approach, the commissioners stated, ‘there is no justification for the contention that 
general international law precludes compensation for pure environmental damage’.46 
The UNCC made awards to assess ecological function of damaged areas, to restore eco-
system services, and for ‘pure’ environmental damage (i.e. non- market) as well as more 
42 UN Security Council Resolution 687 (3 April 1991), para. 16, International Legal Materials 30 
(1991) 846.
43 See Peter H. Sand, ‘Environmental Principles Applied’ in Cymie R. Payne and Peter Sand (eds.), 
Gulf War Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission: Environmental Liability (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 174– 90. See also David D. Caron, ‘The Place of the Environment in International 
Tribunals’ in Jay Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds.), The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic 
and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), 253, 256.
44 David D. Caron, ‘The Profound Significance of the UNCC for the Environment’ in Payne and Sand 
(n 43). Caron ties this shift in perspective to an equivalent change from a government owning the claims 
of its citizens (and residents) to the UNCC approach where the government acted as an agent for the indi-
vidual claimants. Reflecting the earlier practice, a British court found that the British government properly 
declined to pay a citizen money that it had received from the Chinese government ‘on account of debts due 
to British subjects’, stating that the relationship was not ‘the duty of an agent to a principal, or of a trustee 
to a cestui que trust’. Rustomjee v The Queen, II QBD 74 quoted in Marjorie M. Whiteman, Damages in 
International Law, Vol. III 2051– 2 (Washington: US Government Printing Office 1943).
45 José Allen, ‘Points of Law’ in Payne and Sand (n 43) 152– 5. Allen notes that the claimant states often 
used the terms ‘environmental damage’ and ‘depletion of natural resources’ interchangeably.
46 Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 18) paras. 57– 8.
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traditional compensation for lost crops, de- mining, and oil- spill cleanup.47 To indi-
cate the range that this covered, the UNCC made awards for the cost to remediate oil- 
damaged ecosystems in the desert, coastal zones, and ocean floor; soils compacted by 
refugees and their livestock; desert soil ecosystems damaged by tracked military vehi-
cles; and groundwater polluted by oil. An award was made to replace a disrupted wild-
life restoration programme; and awards for (human) public health damage included 
long- term health studies and clinical monitoring.48 Other claims that were considered 
within the environmental loss claim category but which were not awarded compensa-
tion included decreases in fisheries catches and oil- spill damage to fishing nets.49
With respect to the traditional scope of LOAC, the 1907 Hague and 1949 Geneva 
Conventions provide protection to public and private property, much of which we 
might today consider to be ‘environment’. The Hague Regulations, which establish that 
there are some limitations on the means of warfare, denote various forms of public and 
private property as protected objects.50 Article 25 of the Hague Regulations prohib-
its, if unqualified by military necessity, attacks and bombardments of towns, villages, 
dwellings, and buildings. It further states, in relevant part, that in sieges and bombard-
ments buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes and historic 
monuments should be spared if possible, provided they are not being used at the time 
for military purposes; and Article 28 prohibits pillage. During an occupation, the occu-
pying state has a usufructuary obligation to safeguard ‘public buildings, real estate, for-
ests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile state’ under Article 55, and Article 
56 provides for legal proceedings for any seizure, destruction, or wilful damage to such 
institutions.51 The Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 53, prohibits occupying pow-
ers from destroying property of individuals, public or private, except when ‘rendered 
absolutely necessary by military operations’. Article 33 of Geneva Convention IV also 
prohibits pillage.
47 See, for example, First ‘F4’ Report (n 39) paras. 146, 456, 473, 629; Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 18) paras. 71– 82. 
For an explanation of ecosystem services in the context of pollution regulation, James Salzman, ‘A Field of 
Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services’ (2006) 21(2) Journal of Land Use 133.
48 Freeland excluded ‘an anthropocentric element— for example, a concrete endangerment to human 
health or life’ from his attempt to define a crime against the environment. See Steven Freeland, Addressing 
the Intentional Destruction of the Environment During Warfare Under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2015), 242.
49 Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Second 
Instalment of ‘F4’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2002/ 26, 3 October 2002 (‘Second ‘F4’ Report’), paras. 73– 4 
(claim failed due to insufficient evidence).
50 1907 Hague Regulations, Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (the ‘1907 Hague Regulations’) (Art. 22 states 
the ‘right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited’) and Art. 23 states destroy-
ing or seizing property is allowed only when ‘imperatively demanded by the necessities of war’). Other 
measures similarly identify property as a specially protected category, for example the Hague Rules of Aerial 
Warfare 1923.
51 1899/ 1907 Hague Regulations, Art. 55: ‘The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator 
and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile 
State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer 
them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.’ Compensation for ‘the value of the felled trees and of the 
wood carried away’ was awarded in the First World War cases, Héritiers Gény and Alfred et Pierre Gény, by 
the Franco- German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal established under the Treaty of Versailles where the trees were 
unnecessarily felled. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Damages in International Law, Vol. II 1458 (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1943).
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Additional Protocol I was negotiated at the time when awakening environmen-
tal consciousness intersected with awareness of US attacks on the environment dur-
ing the United States war with Vietnam. By the time of the ENMOD negotiations at 
the Conference on Disarmament, environmental issues had drawn the attention of 
the United Nations and its states parties, and the Additional Protocol I and ENMOD 
negotiations ran on parallel tracks for some time.52 The 1972 UN Conference on the 
Human Environment had issued the Stockholm Declaration, which included a call for 
states to ‘reach prompt agreement’ on the elimination of nuclear weapons and other 
means of mass destruction.53 Also in 1972, the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention for the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage was adopted in Paris. The states parties to the World 
Heritage Convention agreed that to protect ‘natural heritage’ (also referred to as ‘nat-
ural property . . . to whatever people it may belong’), they would not ‘take any deliberate 
measures which might damage [property listed as world heritage] directly or indirectly’ 
in Article 6(3). Armed conflict is referenced as one of the threats that might lead to pla-
cing a site on the List of World Heritage in Danger.54 The convention defines natural 
heritage in Article 2 as:
Natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such 
formations, which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific 
point of view;
Geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which 
constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding uni-
versal value from the point of view of science or conservation;
Natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value 
from the point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty.55
Where the World Heritage Convention, Article 2, defines ‘cultural heritage’, it does so 
in a manner that overlaps with perceptions of the environment, particularly the phrase 
‘combined works of nature and man’.
Against this background, the 1977 Additional Protocol I56 (and 1998 Rome Statute) 
use the term ‘natural environment,’ but without providing a definition in the text. 
Additional Protocol I, Article 35, focuses on methods and means of warfare and 
52 Off. Rec. of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974– 1977) Vol 14, 142, at <https:// www.loc.
gov/ rr/ frd/ Military_ Law/ RC- dipl- conference- records.html> accessed 9 June 2017 (referring to the Soviet 
Union’s introduction a year earlier of ‘a draft Convention on the prohibition of action to influence the envi-
ronment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international 
security, human wellbeing and health (United Nations General Assembly resolution 3264 (XXIX), annex)’.
53 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 26 (1972).
54 Robert L. Meyer, ‘Travaux Preparatoires for the UNESCO World Heritage Convention’ (1976), 2 Earth 
Law Journal 52– 3 (reprinted in Peter H. Sand, The History and the Origin of International Environmental 
Law (Cheltenham:  Elgar, 2015)). Meyer discusses the various approaches to referencing armed conflict 
during the negotiations.
55 However, note that the marine environment is not mentioned. Meyer suggested that this was intended 
to avoid conflict with the Law of the Sea Convention, negotiated during the same period. Meyer (n 54) 50.
56 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. The relevant articles are:
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establishes the general rule that they are not unlimited; it specifically prohibits those 
that ‘cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’ and ‘methods or means of war-
fare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long- term and severe 
damage to the natural environment’. It may be considered more ecocentric, whereas 
part of Article 55 is more anthropocentric.57 Article 55 falls under the rules for pro-
tection of civilian objects. The first sentences of paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 address 
the natural environment alone, creating an obligation to take care ‘to protect the natu-
ral environment against widespread, long- term and severe damage’ and prohibiting 
reprisals against the natural environment. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, the 
object of prohibition is damage to the natural environment that prejudices the health 
and survival of the civilian population. This provision serves to emphasize the human 
need for the environment, without excluding pure environmental damage.
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’) commentary, 
Additional Protocol I, Article 55, was intended to be very broad in scope:
The concept of the natural environment should be understood in the widest sense 
to cover the biological environment in which a population is living. It does not con-
sist merely of the objects indispensable to survival mentioned in Article 54 . . . food-
stuffs, agricultural areas, drinking water, livestock— but also includes forests and 
other vegetation mentioned in the Convention of 10 October 1980 on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, (3) as well as fauna, flora 
and other biological or climatic elements.58
That at least some states were aware of environmental complexity is borne out by dis-
cussions at the time. The delegate for Vietnam observed, for example, that the chemi-
cals, bombs, and Roman plows used to destroy vegetation during the Vietnam War 
resulted in the ‘destruction of the soil and the micro- organisms of rivers and forests’59 
Article 35. BASIC RULES
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature 
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, 
to cause widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environment.
Article 55. PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT.
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long- 
term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means 
of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural envi-
ronment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.
57 Michael Bothe, Karl Partsch, and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: 
Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions 1949 (Den Haag: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2nd edn, 2013) 387. See also, Koppe, (n 12) 116– 46 (both articles ‘seem to be derived 
from the fundamental principle of environmental protection’).
58 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 (Dordrecht: ICRC/ Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 662.
59 Off. Rec. of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974– 77) Vol. 14, 143, at <https:// www.loc.gov/ 
rr/ frd/ Military_ Law/ RC- dipl- conference- records.html>.
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and Hans Blix, of the Swedish delegation, recommended that ‘[A] reference to the eco-
logical balance would be preferable to placing a ban on the impairment of the natural 
environment.’60 The decision to choose the simpler, vaguer language of ‘natural envi-
ronment’ was close: the vote to remove the words ‘to such a degree as to disturb the 
stability of the ecosystem’ was decided by twenty- six votes to twenty- five with nine 
abstentions.61 Some explanation is given by the representative of the Soviet Union, who 
voted against the ecosystem language ‘to strengthen the defence and protection of the 
environment and to prohibit all acts that disturbed its stability and were prejudicial to 
the health of the civilian population’.62
The marine environment is not mentioned and there is extensive debate whether it 
can be included in the ambit of Additional Protocol I.63 The US delegate to the nego-
tiation expressed concern that ‘Although the article applied to attacks on land from the 
sea or air, the law of sea warfare was too complex to be dealt with at the Conference 
[and] might inadvertently modify the Law of the Sea.’64 Koppe, after analysing the texts 
and the views of commentators, argued, ‘the conclusion seems justified that both arti-
cles [35(3) and 55] do not only protect the “natural environment” on land, but also the 
marine environment and the atmosphere’.65 If this is correct, it means that areas beyond 
national jurisdiction are included.
Under the Rome Statute,66 Article 8(2)(b)(iv), an attack will only be a war crime if 
it is intentionally launched in the knowledge that it will cause ‘widespread, long- term 
and severe damage to the natural environment’ and that the damage is clearly exces-
sive in relation to the military advantage. In its work preparing a draft of the Rome 
Statute, the ILC, deciding that ‘the concept of vital human asset had been considered to 
be vague and likely to cause difficulties of interpretation, had limited the scope of the 
60 Off. Rec. of the Diplomatic Conference Vol. 14, 146; See also ibid. 173– 4, 310. The Biotope Group, an 
informal subcommittee of Working Group III, was established to work on protection of the environment. 
Off. Rec. of the Diplomatic Conference Vol. 15, 268.
61 Off. Rec. of the Diplomatic Conference Vol. 14, 405; Off. Rec. of the Diplomatic Conference Vol. 
15, 268.
62 Off. Rec. of the Diplomatic Conference Vol. 14, 410. 63 Koppe (n 12) 130– 7.
64 Off. Rec. of the Diplomatic Conference Vol. 14, 17. 65 Koppe (n 12) 136.
66 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (123 parties). The relevant article is:
Article 8 - War crimes
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as 
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large- scale commission of such crimes.
2. For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the follow-
ing acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva 
Convention:
 . . . 
(iv)  Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly
 . . . 
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, 
within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
 . . . 
(iv)  Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, 
long- term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated . . .
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article to the “natural environment”, which . . . borrowed from article 55 of Additional 
Protocol I’.67
The ENMOD convention is so sui generis and its criteria are so contested by its par-
ties that it is a poor guide to a definition for protection of the environment in relation to 
armed conflict more generally— although it does count the major military powers as par-
ties. ENMOD provides rules for conduct during armed conflict, so jus post bellum would 
address accountability for a breach of ENMOD. The convention regulates hostile (though 
not necessarily military) manipulations of ‘natural processes’ in a way that changes ‘the 
dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including [but not exclusively] its biota, 
lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space’ (Article 2) and are thereby 
the ‘means of destruction, damage or injury’ to other states parties (Article 1).
Thus, ENMOD addresses the environment as a weapon and as a target. ENMOD 
does not define the scope of environment as a target. The summary of the negotia-
tions reported that the US delegation understood the object of ‘destruction, damage 
or injury’ to be, in its broad sense, ‘the military forces and civilian population of a 
State party [sic] to its cities, industries, agriculture, transportation and communica-
tions system and its natural resources and assets’.68 In other words, the United States 
interpreted ENMOD to protect a wide range of vulnerable targets, not solely the natu-
ral environment.
The examples illustrating prohibited environmental modifications referred to in 
ENMOD, Article 2— environment as a weapon— offered during the negotiations 
included:  ‘earthquakes; tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; 
changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types, and tor-
nadic storms); changes in climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the 
state of the ozone layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere’.69 The ENMOD 
states parties have continued to argue whether the convention deals only with exotic, 
futuristic technologies capable of producing this kind of effect, a question that was par-
tially resolved at the Second (and last) Review Conference of the Parties to ENMOD in 
1992 by agreement that herbicides that upset the ecological balance of a region can be 
such instruments of environmental modification within the scope of Article 2.70
67 ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, A/ CN.4/ L.459 [and corr.1] and Add.1, (1991), para. 62.
68 UN General Assembly, Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:  Official 
Records:  Thirty- First Session, Supplement No. 27, 92, UN Doc. A/ 31/ 27 (Vol. I) (1976), para. 333 (h 
‘Disarmament Conference Report’). The ENMOD Convention was negotiated as one small part of the 
much larger discussions of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, security of non- nuclear- weapon states and 
chemical weapons; one delegate suggested that its value might be that it ‘offered a possibility to unfreeze 
the current situation with regard to the Committee’s work’, while another observed that ‘for reasons difficult 
to understand, the Committee had concentrated its attention on the question of environmental warfare 
while totally ignoring the highest priority items on its agenda’. ibid. paras. 280, 288. See also, Cyrus Vance, 
Letter of Submittal, 31 August 1978, ‘Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the 
Convention on the prohibitions of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental modification Techniques’ 
Signed at Geneva on 18 May 1977, Executive K 4 (22 September 1978).
69 Disarmament Conference Report (n 68) 93.
70 ENMOD/ CONF.II/ 12, Part II (Final Declaration), 12 (22 September 1992). The United States used 
herbicides extensively against the North Vietnamese from 1962 until 1971; an account of US reluctance to 
give up herbicide use can be found in Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange/ Dioxin et al. v. Dow 
54 Defining the Environment
Protection of cultural sites and objects has a long tradition;71 but whether there is 
a basis to link cultural heritage to environment in this context is contested.72 Marie 
Jacobsson, the ILC Special Rapporteur for the topic, observed that,
There exists an intricate relationship between environment and cultural heritage, in 
particular, when speaking of the aesthetic or characteristic aspects of the landscape. 
This relates also to the indigenous people’s rights to their environment as a cultural as 
well as natural resource.73
In 2015, the ILC adopted a PERAC draft principle calling on states to designate pro-
tected zones, including ‘areas of major environmental and cultural importance’.74 
Previous ILC reports had highlighted the challenges of including cultural heritage as 
part of the PERAC topic, given the special regime of conventions specifically devoted 
to it and the inconsistency in definitions between the relevant treaties.75 The inclusion 
of culture as an element of the environment is supported by such diverse organiza-
tions as the US Army (‘environmental considerations, to include the protection and 
the conservation of natural and cultural resources’)76 and the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature in its definition of a protected area (‘an area of land and/ or sea 
especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of 
natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective 
means’).77 The ILC, in the different context of principles on the allocation of loss in the 
case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities, used a working defini-
tion that included ‘non- service values such as aesthetic aspects of the landscape’.78
Chemical Co. et al., 517 F.3d 76 (2d Circuit, 2008) (stating ‘to date, the United States never has agreed that 
it has a legal duty to provide funds or assistance to remediate harms allegedly caused by Agent Orange’).
71 Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Arts. 34– 6 
(1863) (Lieber Code).
72 ILC, Second PERAC Report (n 22), para. 24 (whether protection of cultural and natural heritage 
should be addressed as part of the PERAC topic was raised by ten states in the discussion of the ILC Second 
Report at the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee (Legal) session in 2014); ibid. para. 224 (‘In 2014, 
some members of the Commission suggested that cultural heritage should be included in the present report 
because to do otherwise would lead to inconsistencies. Most speakers, however, remained of the view that 
cultural heritage should be excluded.’). See also, Julio Barboza, ‘Environmental Damage’ in Alexandre 
Timoshenko (ed.), Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage (UNEP, 1998).
73 ILC, Second PERAC Report (n 22)  para. 224. For information about UNESCO‘s implementa-
tion: <www.unesco.org/ new/ en/ culture/ themes/ armed- conflict- and- heritage> accessed 9 June 2017.
74 ILC, Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict— Text of the Draft Introductory 
Provisions and Draft Principles Provisionally Adopted So Far by the Drafting Committee, A/ CN.4/ L.870/ 
Rev.1.
75 ILC Preliminary PERAC Report (n 29) para. 65; ILC, Second PERAC Report (n 22) para. 224. Cultural 
property is protected under the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954 and cultural objects— ‘historic monuments, works of art or places of wor-
ship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples’— under Additional Protocol I, Art. 53. 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 
1954, and its Protocol I (1954) and Protocol II (1999).
76 Department of the Army, Environmental Considerations, FM 3- 34.5/ MCRP 4- 11B (2010), 1– 1.
77 International Union for the Conservation of Nature, 2008. Guidelines for Applying Protected Area 
Management Categories. (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 2008).
78 ILC, Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazard-
ous activities, with commentaries, A/ 61/ 10 (2006), 133.
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Although the UNCC reviewed cultural heritage claims by Syria and Iran within the 
environmental category, that could as easily be understood as a procedural conveni-
ence (particularly as the claims included cultural objects in museums as well as outdoor 
sites).79 Sjöstedt argued that including natural heritage could be a means to mobilize 
multilateral agreements like the World Heritage Convention to provide protection 
for environmental ‘hot spots’ of international importance.80 The point that Special 
Rapporteur Jacobsson makes is perhaps the one to focus on: the special meaning of a 
landscape or other aspect of an environment for a community that is not captured by 
the other measures we have discussed— its market value, its ecosystem services, or its 
ecological function. The cultural value of the environment is under- studied and not 
well represented in present law.
From this review, two points can be highlighted:  the problematic of human/ not- 
human persists; and our collective interest in ‘environment’ makes it distinct from 
environmental features of private property. The dividing line between the human and 
other environment is a source of some confusion, evinced in the treatment of injury to 
humans (in Additional Protocol I, human health is the raison d’être of Article 55; the 
UNCC reviewed public health claims) and in the grey area where cultural heritage and 
natural heritage become difficult to distinguish.
The nature of environment as a public interest versus private property is addressed 
obliquely, but it highlights an important characteristic of the environment to be pro-
tected: that it is a common concern that ‘entails obligations towards the international 
community and future generations’.81
As we have seen, private property, real and personal, is explicitly protected under the 
Geneva Conventions. Elements of the environment that are traditionally not owned 
privately— wildlife, the sea, habitat, and other commons resources— are among those 
that are left out of the traditional LOAC regimes. In the UNCC’s practice, the govern-
ment takes on the role of a public trustee, responsible for ‘a community interest in full 
remediation of the damage’.82 Two compensation bodies— the UNCC and the United 
Nations Register of Damage (‘UNRoD’)— established categories exclusively for govern-
ment claimants. The UNCC provided a sub- category for environmental clams (UNCC- 
F4), while UNRoD’s Public Resources category (UNRoD- F) is a general government 
claims category.83 The logic of this approach was carried out through the UNCC’s 
79 The UNCC awards for cultural heritage claims included awards to Iran in the amount of US$ 1.4 mil-
lion for assessment of damage from oil fire emissions to ‘stone relics in Persepolis; tilework in Esfahan and 
Kermân; wall paintings in Eşfahan, Fârs and Yazd; construction materials at the Tchoga Zanbil Ziggurat in 
Khûzestân; and construction materials, archaeological sites and artefacts in Susa’. First ‘F4’ Report, para. 
90; UNCC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fifth 
Instalment of ‘F4’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2005/ 10, 30 June 2005, para. 33.
80 See  chapter 10 in this volume.
81 Third ‘F4’ Report, para. 42 (43 ILM 713); Fourth ‘F4’ Report, part 2 para. 38; and Fifth ‘F4’ Report, 
para. 40.
82 Sand (n 43) 173. See also David D. Caron, ‘Finding Out What the Oceans Claim: The 1991 Gulf War, 
the Marine Environment, and the United Nations Compensation Commission’ in David D. Caron and 
Harry N. Scheiber, Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (Brill, 2004), 393, 394 Caron (n 44).
83 UN Register of Damage, Rules And Regulations Governing the Registration of Claims, Art. 11(1) (19 
June 2009).
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Follow- Up Programme, which was established to ensure that (unlike compensation for 
private property, which is simply money paid to the owner) awards for environmental 
damage were used to restore the damaged resource.84
By analysing environment in terms of the government as agent and the environ-
ment as the principal, Caron makes it possible to evaluate a particular element of the 
environment as either property or as environment in terms of a collective or public 
interest— at least in the context of a reparations proceeding. Imagine, he says, that rhi-
noceroses are nearly wiped out by a war. The government of the state where the rhi-
noceroses live, acting as the principal, may make a claim for loss of tourism. But if the 
government is acting as agent for the environment— the rhinoceroses (and the ecosys-
tem they participate in)— it may make a claim for a rhinoceros species recovery pro-
gramme.85 By this logic, the limitation on public entities as claimants for this type of 
harm seems unnecessary: the claimant’s identity should not matter if it is acting as an 
agent for the environment and is bound to act in the interests of its principal.
Because they use approaches similar to that taken by the UNCC, it is useful to look 
briefly at environmental liability in US and EU law, which extend special protection to 
certain public environmental resources.86 The US oil- spill law (Oil Pollution Act)87 and 
the US hazardous waste cleanup law (‘CERCLA’)88 require compensation for injury to, 
destruction of, or loss of natural resources. Under CERCLA, these include,
land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other 
such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or other-
wise controlled by the United States (including the resources of the exclusive economic 
zone), any State or local government or Indian tribe, or any foreign government.89
The Oil Pollution Act is intended to address ‘injuries to natural resources and ser-
vices’ pertaining to navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone. The EU’s Environmental Liability Directive covers damage 
to protected species and natural habitats, the ecological, chemical and/ or quantitative 
status and/ or ecological potential of protected waters, and land; it expressly does not 
apply to damage to private property.90
84 Cymie R. Payne, ‘Oversight of Environmental Awards and Regional Environmental Cooperation’ 
in Cymie R. Payne and Peter H. Sand (eds.), Gulf War Reparations and the UN Compensation 
Commission: Environmental Liability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
85 Caron (n 44) 270.
86 A  comprehensive explanation of the US practice and international frameworks, including the 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds and the UNCC approach, is given in Michael T. Huguenin, 
Michael C. Donlan, Alexandra E. van Geel, Robert W. Paterson, ‘Assessment and Valuation of Damage to the 
Environment’ in Cymie R. Payne and Peter H. Sand (eds.), Gulf War Reparations and the UN Compensation 
Commission: Environmental Liability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
87 US Code Annotated, Title 33, Section 2701 et seq.
88 US Code Annotated, Title 42, Section 9601 et seq.
89 US Code Annotated, Title 33, Section 2701(20) (2010).
90 Council Directive 2004/ 35/ EC of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the preven-
tion and remedying of environmental damage (Environmental Liability Directive), OJ L143/ 56 (2004), as 
amended by Council Directive 2006/ 21/ EC, OJ L102 (2006), Council Directive 2009/ 31/ EC, OJ L140, and 
Council Directive 2013/ 30/ EU, OJ L170, Preamble (14).
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Meyer, reviewing the travaux préparatoires for the World Heritage Convention, 
described ‘the general sentiment and concern on the part of the peoples of the world 
that certain cultural sites and natural areas “of outstanding universal value” belong to 
mankind as a whole, and are important to his [sic] psychological, moral, spiritual, edu-
cational and recreational well- being’, places such as the Pyramids, the Grand Canyon, 
and Mt. Kilimanjaro;91 the property status of the site seems unimportant. Meyer fur-
ther observed, ‘the threat of armed conflict or a transnational environmental catastro-
phe affecting the world heritage has made this area one of international concern’.92
2.2.2  Magnitude
Treaty law takes notice of harm to the environment only when it reaches a certain 
threshold. The apparent reasons for requiring a minimum amount of harm are, first, 
to limit state liability in recognition that some harms occur and should be tolerated 
rather than attempt an absolute prohibition. Second, to provide a management device 
to limit enforcement of liability to really meaningful cases and to exclude those where 
the claimant is not materially injured. It is almost instinctive for lawyers to seek a lim-
iting principle to a theoretical standard. States seek limitations for practical reasons 
and many are likely to reject a principle of unlimited liability. Of course, in this con-
text the threshold of harm provides a critical limitation on liability that is secondary to 
the more important question of responsibility. If law makes a state responsible for any 
harm it causes to the environment, regardless of the wrongfulness of its conduct, the 
state will seek a limitation on the magnitude of the harm that triggers reparations or 
other consequences. The British delegate to the AP I negotiations was reported as find-
ing that the agreed text was fair,
since it struck the necessary balance by providing protection of the environment 
against deliberate and serious damage, while not making, for instance a tank com-
mander who flattened a clump of trees liable as a war criminal.93
The magnitude of this threshold of ‘harm’ is defined in the three treaties— ENMOD, 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, and Treaty of Rome— by the terms 
widespread, long- term (or long- lasting), and/ or severe. For liability under Additional 
Protocol I and the Rome Statute, all three criteria must be breached. Additional Protocol 
I was negotiated first. An earlier draft proposed the wording ‘to such a degree as to dis-
turb the stability of the ecosystem’, demonstrating that at that time a systems under-
standing of the environment existed; it was rejected.94 The only guidance to interpret 
the three elements is found in the report of Working Group III on its negotiation, with 
regard to Article 35(3):
91 Meyer (n 54) 46. 92 ibid. 46.
93 Off. Rec. of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974– 1977) Vol. 14, 410, at <https:// www.loc.
gov/ rr/ frd/ Military_ Law/ RC- dipl- conference- records.html> accessed 7 June 2017.
94 ICRC (n 58) 663.
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The time or duration required (i.e., long- term) was considered by some to be measured 
in decades. References to twenty or thirty years were made by some representatives as 
being a minimum. Others referred to battlefield destruction in France in the First World 
War as being outside the scope of the prohibition. The Biotope report states that ‘Acts 
of warfare which cause short- term damage to the natural environment, such as artillery 
bombardment, are not intended to be prohibited by the article,’ and continues by stating 
that the period might be perhaps for ten years or more. However, it is impossible to say 
with certainty what period of time might be involved. It appeared to be a widely shared 
assumption that battlefield damage incidental to conventional warfare would not nor-
mally be proscribed by this provision. What the article is primarily directed to is thus 
such damage as would be likely to prejudice, over a long term, the continued survival of 
the civilian population or would risk causing it major health problems.95
And with regard to Article 55:
It was recognized in the Working Group that environmental change or disturbances of 
the ecosystem might be on a very low scale. Trees may be cut down or destroyed as the 
result of normal artillery fire. Artillery fire also causes cratering. As the Group Biotope 
put it, ‘Acts of warfare which cause short- term damage to the natural environment, 
such as artillery bombardment, are not intended to be prohibited by the Article.’ That 
thought lies behind both proposed texts.
It was pointed out that there are a number of ecosystems in the natural environment, 
and the precise meaning attached to ‘the ecosystem’ was left somewhat unclear.96
The word ‘population’ was used without its usual qualifier of ‘civilian’ because the 
future survival or health of the population in general, whether or not combatants, 
might be at stake. The population might be that of today or that of tomorrow, in the 
sense that both short- term and long- term survival was contemplated. The bracketed 
term ‘health’ reflected the consideration that it would not be enough that the civilian 
population survived; impairment of the health of the civilian population in general 
could not be tolerated.97
. . . the first sentence enjoining the taking of care lays down a general norm, which is 
then particularized in the second sentence. Care must be taken to protect the natu-
ral environment against the sort of harm specified even if the health or survival of 
the population is not prejudiced. An instance would be environmental harm which is 
widespread, long- term and severe but in an unpopulated area.98
There was no objection to the suggestion by one delegation which was specifically 
agreed to by others, that this report should reflect that widespread, long- term and 
severe damage to the natural environment would constitute such damage as to jeop-
ardize the survival of the civilian population.99
For the Rome Statute, as with the term ‘natural environment’ discussed above, the 
three- part standard is ‘a form of wording borrowed from article 55 of Additional 
95 Off. Rec. of the Diplomatic Conference Vol. 15, 268– 9.
96 ibid. 359. 97 ibid. 360. 98 ibid. 360.
99 ibid. 366.
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Protocol I’,100 according to the ILC’s report on its draft (upon which the Rome Statute 
is based). Several members of the ILC expressed concerns with the standard, for exam-
ple that ‘a lengthy investigation would be necessary before it was possible to determine 
accurately whether or not the harm caused to the natural environment was widespread, 
long- term and severe, and that might divest the article of its substance’.101
As criteria for thresholds of material harm, widespread, long- term, and/ or severe are 
generally recognized as problematic. Falk considered that they lack authority, are inco-
herent, lack sufficient specificity to be operationalized, are overly subjective, and have 
too many qualifications.102 A review by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(‘UNEP’) criticized them as both too stringent and too imprecise;103 the ICRC finds 
a less restrictive standard in its commentary on customary international law.104 The 
magnitude of harm required to be recognized as a legal breach is the point of great-
est weakness in the present regime. Although both the NATO bombing of the Former 
Yugoslavia and Iraq’s invasion, occupation, and retreat from Kuwait caused acknowl-
edged environmental damage, legal experts advised that neither reached the threshold 
of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court.
ENMOD applies to a different context: using the environment itself as a weapon. 
Under its Article 1, parties undertake:
not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification tech-
niques having widespread, long- lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, 
damage or injury to any other State Party.
Note that exceeding any one of the three parameters (called ‘the troika’) triggers the 
obligation, in contrast to Additional Protocol I and the Rome Statute, where they all 
must be exceeded.
The co- chairs of the ENMOD negotiation, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
provided interpretations of the three criteria.105 The meaning of the terms when used in 
the ENMOD Convention is defined as follows in ‘Understandings’ that were included 
in the final report of the negotiating committee to the UN General Assembly:
(a) ‘widespread’:  encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square 
kilometres;
(b) ‘long- lasting’: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season;
(c) ‘severe’: involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natu-
ral and economic resources or other assets.
100 ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, A/ CN.4/ L.459 [and corr.1] and Add.1, para. 60 (1991).
101 ibid. paras. 67, 60– 93. 102 Falk (n 41) 93– 4.
103 Elizabeth M. Mrema, Carl Bruch, and Jordan Diamond, Protecting the Environment during Armed 
Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law (Nairobi: UNEP, 2009), 4.
104 ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 43. Application of General Principles on the Conduct of 
Hostilities to the Natural Environment, available at <https:// ihl- databases.icrc.org/ customary- ihl/ eng/ docs/ 
home.> accessed 7 June 2017.
105 Disarmament Conference Report (n 68) 91.
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The purpose of these restrictive interpretations was explained:
Referring to suggestions at the previous year’s session and at the General Assembly 
that the phrase ‘having widespread, long- lasting or severe effects’ be eliminated, the 
delegation of the United States held that the phrase was necessary to ensure that the 
ban could be implemented successfully and would not give rise to friction over trivial 
issues: the phrase served to avoid the risk of unprovable claims of violation while elim-
inating the use of techniques with significant effects.106
The United States considers that earthquakes, tsunamis, and cyclones would likely fit 
these criteria, while ‘dispelling fog to facilitate military or combat operations’ likely 
would not.107
During the ENMOD negotiation, one state delegation explained its dissent: ‘[i] t was 
alarming that the use of such monstrous techniques could be legitimized provided 
their effects were not “widespread” . . . or “long- lasting” . . . especially since in the assess-
ment of such effects there would always be a large subjective element.’108 At the First 
Review Conference of the Parties to ENMOD, another state argued that these inter-
pretations should be eliminated or modified, arguing that ‘There were, however, States 
whose total area was smaller than that; could they reasonably be asked to adhere to the 
Convention when, under that provision, an aggressor could resort with impunity to 
the use of environmental modification techniques on their territory?’109 At the Second 
Review Conference of the Parties to ENMOD, the states parties concluded that in light 
of the diverse views expressed, there was a ‘need to keep its provisions under continu-
ing review and examination in order to ensure their global effectiveness’.110
The Understandings are not part of the ENMOD treaty nor are they included in the 
UN General Assembly resolution requesting that it be opened for signature, and in 
light of both the negotiating history and the Review Conferences, they should not be 
applied restrictively in enforcing the convention nor taken as a model for interpreting 
other treaty or customary rules.
The UNCC addressed the issue of magnitude in the context of reparations for a 
breach of state responsibility with respect to the use of force.111 Iraq, in defending itself 
against those reparations claims, argued that there was a threshold that must reached 
for environmental harm to be compensable. It said that the threshold had evolved from 
‘serious’ to ‘significant’ and should be based on case- by- case factual assessment.112 The 
UN Compensation Commission, operating under Security Council Resolution 687 
106 ibid. para. 298. 107 US Department of Defense (n 13) 353.
108 Disarmament Conference Report (n 68) (including summary of ENMOD negotiations), para. 288.
109 ENMOD/ CONF.I/ SR.7, 2. Only one more Review Conference was held; when the UN Secretary- 
General, as treaty depositary, solicited interest in a Third Review Conference in 2013, fewer than the ten 
parties required to convene a conference replied affirmatively. UN Secretary General, ODA/ 63- 2013/ 
ENMOD (2014).
110 ENMOD/ CONF.II/ 12, Part II (Final Declaration), 11 (22 September 1992).
111 Iraq did cause massive oil well fires and a tremendous oil spill in the Persian Gulf, which it claimed 
were defensive measures against the Allied Coalition; both would seem to fall under ENMOD. ENMOD 
was not tested in relation to the 1991 Gulf War because neither Iraq nor several other affected states in the 
region were party to the treaty at the time.
112 Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Third Instalment 
of ‘F4’ claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2003/ 31 (2003).
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and in a context where the respondent was not a party to the IHL treaties, declined to 
apply either ‘significant’ or ‘widespread, long- term and/ or severe’ as a threshold in its 
claims review.
The UNCC rejected the need to identify a minimum level of harm in its review of 
war reparations claims. It found that the Security Council resolution and decisions of 
its Governing Council, which provided the applicable law, did not require a minimum 
threshold for environmental claims. The UNCC report also states, with respect to mag-
nitude of environmental harm:
In considering the reasonableness of remediation measures, it is appropriate to have 
regard to the extent of the damage involved. However, in the view of the Panel, this is 
not the only factor to be considered. Other factors, such as the location and nature of 
the damage and its actual or potential effects on the environment may also be relevant. 
Thus, for example, where damage that might otherwise be characterized as ‘insignifi-
cant’ is caused to an area of special ecological sensitivity, or where the damage, in 
conjunction with other factors, poses a risk of further or more serious environmental 
harm, it may not be unreasonable to take remediation measures in order to prevent or 
minimize potential additional damage.113
Attempts to identify a customary international law threshold of harm that would be 
necessary for state responsibility to be invoked are likely doomed. The law of state 
responsibility provides secondary rules that determine consequences when a state has 
breached a primary rule of international law, so a treaty or customary international law 
is where one would find a threshold requirement. Sachariew attempted to find a com-
mon rule, but found little consistency other than frequent reference to vague general 
terms— serious, appreciable, significant, considerable, and so on.114
2.2.3  Non- international armed conflict
Finally, a caveat is called for. Internal, or non- international armed conflict (‘NIAC’), the 
most common form of war today, is not subject to most of the international humanitar-
ian law described above.115 The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 each include ‘com-
mon Article 3’ which purports to extend some of the core constraints on all parties 
to an internal conflict. It makes no reference that directly applies to the environment. 
113 ibid. para. 36. See also Allen (n 45) 156.
114 Kamen Sachariew, ‘The Definition of Thresholds of Tolerance for Transboundary Environmental 
Injury under International Law: Development and Present Status’ (1990) 38 Netherlands International Law 
Review 193– 206. Sachariew traced the use of these terms in state practice for breaches of ‘rules of a general 
character’ resulting in state responsibility. He observed that they did not have a clear meaning or even a 
hierarchy, referencing notable international cases that included Trail Smelter and Lac Lanoux. Sachariew at 
193– 5 (observing that ‘currently the use of this and other related terms like ‘substantial’ or ‘appreciable’ in 
doctrinal works and within different international bodies is often inconsistent and confusing’). While he 
found that some treaty regimes identified specific, quantitative levels of harm as ‘significant’, he concluded 
that more commonly ‘significant’ was intended to mean just that the harm must be more than trivial, minor, 
barely detectable or inconsequential. ibid. 198.
115 See Kristen E. Boon, ‘The Application of Jus Post Bellum in Non- International Armed Conflicts’ in 
Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 20). See also  chapter 10 in this volume.
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Other international instruments also state that some of their terms apply to NIAC,116 
and the ILC Special Rapporteur has written ‘it is clear that fundamental principles, 
such as the principle of distinction and the principle of humanity (the dictates of public 
conscience), reflect customary law and are applicable in all types of armed conflict’.117 
While it seems unlikely that belligerents in many cases will respect these legal rules,118 
the existence of the rules provides the basis for sanctions to be imposed eventually and 
a standard of behaviour for would- be leaders to observe if they wish to be admitted to 
the community of nations.
2.2.4  Summary
Use of the very general term ‘natural environment’ in the LOAC treaties allows the legal 
rules to be interpreted according the capacity of the actors. However, subsequent efforts 
to provide greater clarity misguided this area of law with narrow definitions imposed 
through ‘understandings’ and selective readings of the travaux préparatoires. Reading the 
text in light of current scientific and technical information and modern military capabil-
ity can cure that.
A more difficult issue is the imposition of treaty terms setting minimum scope, extent, 
and duration of the environmental damage. Here again, a better result can be obtained by 
rejecting the interpretations offered in the 1970s in favour of the best information avail-
able from the scientific and military communities. The way forward is to recognize that 
contextual interpretation, in light of the best information, is legitimate and necessary. 
‘Environment’ is a dynamic system, not merely a collection of objects to be protected. 
Moreover, the system is already under pressure by climate destabilization and other forces 
of global change. Therefore, a principle of environmental integrity is needed at the heart 
of this subject.
2.3 Environmental Integrity
We have just seen that in this area of international law, concern for the environment 
is framed almost entirely in anthropocentric terms.119 For example, remediation of 
116 For example, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (‘CCW’), and 
its Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (1980) UNEP at 12, 15.
117 ILC Second PERAC Report (n 22), para. 6. The Special Rapporteur notes that it is difficult to obtain 
information on practice in NIAC and that such practice tends not to be considered state practice that would 
form a rule of customary international law. ibid. para. 8.
118 Geneva Call, a non- governmental organization, has compiled a collection of humanitarian commit-
ments made by armed non- state actors (ANSAs), <theirwords.org> accessed 7 June 2017.
119 For example, Anne Peters argues, with regard to UN Security Council resolutions sanctioning wild-
life poachers in two conflict zones, ‘if human needs and interests were not in the foreground, the Security 
Council would not have taken any robust action at all. . . . In the long run, however, an ecocentric approach 
to peace and security seems more appropriate to guarantee a sustainable peace for all living beings on 
earth.’ Anne Peters, ‘Novel practice of the Security Council: Wildlife poaching and trafficking as a threat 
to the peace’ (12 February 2014) EJIL Talk! at<https:// www.ejiltalk.org/ novel- practice- of- the- security- 
council- wildlife- poaching- and- trafficking- as- a- threat- to- the- peace/ > accessed 19 June 2017. See also, 
Boelaert- Suominen, Sonja Ann Jozef, ‘International environmental law and naval war: The effect of marine 
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conflict- related pollution protects public health; demining allows safe public access to 
agricultural land; and restoration of natural resources and ecosystems can be essen-
tial to recovery of resource- based livelihoods.120 The necessities of life figure centrally 
in humanitarian law: water and food, freedom from toxics (‘poisons’). These are fol-
lowed closely in terms of priority by access to means of economic activity and cultural 
objects and places. Yet this narrow focus on immediate human needs may compro-
mise the resilience of natural systems that supply essential services— and that may have 
inherent value.
The Working Group for Additional Protocol I recognized this and had proposed that the 
threshold of harm should be ‘to such a degree as to disturb the stability of the ecosystem’, lan-
guage that was later replaced.121 A proposal to develop an interdisciplinary new research field 
of ‘warfare ecology’ calls attention to the ‘complex relationships between warfare and natural 
systems’ that require treatment of ‘biophysical and socioeconomic systems as highly coupled 
systems’.122 Restating this in terms used by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,123 pro-
visioning services such as food, water, timber, and fibre are already protected under interna-
tional humanitarian law; however other equally important services are not:
• regulating services that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality;
• cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and
• supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling.
The jus post bellum framework is intended to restore human society after traumatic 
events.124 Included in the conditions for human society to thrive are nature and culture. 
The extent to which humans have historically managed the peacetime environment 
and the challenge of providing stable, familiar conditions provide important insights 
into the vulnerabilities that law must protect. This section describes the current scien-
tific understanding of change, the coupled human and natural system, and manage-
ment guidelines that incorporate these concepts in a way that may be integrated into 
jus post bellum.125
safety and pollution conventions during international armed conflict’ (1998) PhD thesis, London School of 
Economics and Political Science (United Kingdom), 32– 7, (providing an excellent historical discussion of 
various approaches to defining ‘environment’ for international law, and concluding that restrictive defini-
tions should be avoided and that a precise definition is ‘neither possible nor advisable’) at <http:// etheses.lse.
ac.uk/ view/ creators/ Boelaert- Suominen=3ASonja_ Ann_ Jozef=3A=3A.html> accessed 7 June 2017.
120 Jensen and Lonergan (n 1) 8. 121 ICRC Commentary (n 58) comment 2131.
122 Gary E. Machlis and Thor Hanson, ‘Warfare Ecology’ (2008) 58(8) BioScience 729, 730.
123 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment was an effort under the auspices of the UN involving more 
than 2000 scientists in a process similar to the IPCC that undertook a ‘massive synthesis of scientific knowl-
edge about global ecosystems and their capacity to support human well- being.’
124 See, for example, Gary J. Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum Philosophy and Public Affairs’ (2004) 32 Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 384– 412.
125 Gregory Aplet has addressed this from multiple perspectives. See Gregory H. Aplet and David 
N. Cole, ‘The Trouble with Naturalness:  Rethinking Park and Wilderness Goals’ in David N. Cole and 
Laurie Yung (eds.), Beyond Naturalness: Rethinking Park and Wilderness Stewardship in an Era of Rapid 
Change (Covelo, CA: Island Press, 2010); Gregory H. Aplet and John Gallo, ‘Applying Climate Adaptation 
Concepts to the Landscape Scale: Examples from the Sierra and Stanislaus National Forests’ (Washington, 
DC: The Wilderness Society, 2012), at <http:// ecoadapt.org/ data/ documents/ Aplet_ Gallo_ 2012_ Climate_ 
Adaptation_ Portfolio_ Sierra_ Stanislaus- Low- Res_ Version.pdf> accessed; Gary Aplet, ‘On the Nature of 
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2.3.1  Change in baseline conditions
Ecological systems were previously believed to be relatively stable, and to tend towards 
static ‘climax’ states, a belief that subsequent research shattered. The author of a classic 
study wrote, ‘the climax forest . . . is the final and permanent vegetation stage, toward 
the establishment of which all other plant societies are successive steps’.126 However, 
since at least the 1960s, scientists have observed that particular ecosystems change 
over time with and without human intervention.127 For example, fire and drought are 
natural perturbations that occur with varying frequency, and long- term pre- industrial 
changes in climate have caused observable longer- term shifts in ecosystems.128
In a static world, concepts of preservation and conservation would have objec-
tive meaning and legal standards could be defined to maintain those conditions. The 
example of national parks illustrates the tension between the image of a natural world 
and the reality of the modern world. Parks, after all, represent the most prized places 
identified by nations around the world.129 An advisory document prepared for the US 
National Park Service (NPS), the Leopold Report, recommended that,
As a primary goal . . . the biotic associations within each park be maintained, or where 
necessary recreated, as nearly as possible in the condition that prevailed when the area 
was first visited by the white man [sic]. A national park should represent a vignette of 
primitive America.130
The Leopold Report proposed active management techniques to reestablish and then to 
maintain that static view of the ecosystems that were perceived to be original, or ‘natu-
ral’, unaffected by humans.
In sharp contrast, a review commissioned a half- century after the Leopold Report 
reflects a very different view of the world, one which includes stewardship for ‘continu-
ous change that is not yet fully understood, in order to preserve ecological integrity 
and cultural and historical authenticity’.131 While weather and ecological functions are 
only partially understood, the more recent report also records a host of new anthropo-
genic changes added to the conditions that shaped the park lands over hundreds and 
thousands of years: ‘biodiversity loss, climate change, habitat fragmentation, land use 
Wildness: Exploring what Wilderness Really Protects’ (1999) 76 University of Denver Law Review 347– 67. 
Other authors who have considered this question include Ulrich Heink, Robert Bartz, and Ingo Kowarik, 
‘How Useful are the Concepts of Familiarity, Biological Integrity, and Ecosystem Health for Evaluating 
Damages by GM Crops?’ (2012) 25(3) Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 17.
126 Cooper (1913), quoted in Daniel B. Botkin and Matthew J. Sobel, Stability in ‘Time- Varying 
Ecosystems, The American Naturalist’ (Nov– Dec 1975) Vol. 109, No. 970. 625– 46. [W. S. Cooper, ‘The 
Climax Forest of Isle Royale, Lake Superior, and its Development’ (1913) 55 Bot. Gaz. 1– 44, 115– 40, 
189– 234.]
127 Botkin and Sobel (n 126) 628– 9. 128 ibid. 626– 9.
129 The 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage recog-
nizes some sites as ‘parts of the cultural or natural heritage [that] are of outstanding interest and therefore 
need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole’.
130 Advisory Board on Wildlife Management appointed by Secretary of the Interior Udall, ‘Wildlife 
Management in the National Parks: The Leopold Report’ (4 March 1963), at <https:// www.nps.gov/ parkhis-
tory/ online_ books/ leopold/ leopold.htm> accessed June 2017.
131 Rita Colwell et al., ‘Revisiting Leopold: Resource Stewardship in the National Parks’ (Washington, 
DC: National Park System Advisory Board Science Committee, 2012) (‘NPS 2012’).
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change, groundwater removal, invasive species, overdevelopment and air, noise, and 
light pollution’, and cultural and socioeconomic changes in the people who interact 
with the land.132 These are changes that are predicted to affect the environment eve-
rywhere, sometimes to levels that risk passing a tipping point into system collapse.133
The concept that ecosystems are inherently changing alters the approach to man-
agement and puts in question traditional management techniques. Drought is a 
classic unplanned- for change that impacted the Iraqi Marshes restoration project 
discussed below.
2.3.2  Coupled human and natural systems and the ‘pristine myth’
The 2012 National Park Service report conceptualized humans as participants in 
ecosystems— a very different vision from the pre- contact conditions imagined by the 
Leopold Report. The 2012 report advised that cultural and natural resources cannot be 
separated and must be managed together; it used the American Bison as an example of 
a resource that is both ecologically important in maintaining grassland ecosystems and 
culturally significant.134 The report defines ecological integrity as ‘the quality of ecosys-
tems that are largely self- sustaining and self- regulating. Such ecosystems may possess 
complete food webs, a full complement of native animal and plant species maintain-
ing their populations, and naturally functioning ecological processes such as preda-
tion, nutrient cycling, disturbance and recovery, succession, and energy flow.’135 This 
image of the human- nature relationship resulted from decades of research that revealed 
human influences on what had appeared to be a virtually untouched continent.
It will be obvious that in Europe the human imprint is everywhere and ‘pristine’ envi-
ronments are essentially nonexistent; it is less obvious but equally true in places like the 
132 ibid. 4– 5.
133 Jonathon Rockström, Will Steffen, Kevin Noone, Åsa Persson, F. Stuart III Chapin, Eric Lambin, 
Timothy M. Lenton, Martin Scheffer, Carl Folke, Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Björn Nykvist, Cynthia A. De 
Wit, Terry Hughes, Sander van der Leeuw, Henning Rodhe, Sverker Sörlin, Peter K. Snyder, Robert Costanza, 
Uno Svedin, Malin Falkenmark, Louise Karlberg, Robert. W. Corell, Victoria. J. Fabry, James Hansen, Brian 
Walker, Diana Liverman, Katherine Richardson, Paul Crutzen, and Jonathon Foley, ‘Planetary Boundaries: 
Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity,’ (2009) 14(2) Ecology and Society 32, at <http:// www.
ecologyandsociety.org/ vol14/ iss2/ art32/ > accessed June 2017. The boundaries are: climate change (CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere <350 ppm and/ or a maximum change of +1 W m- 2 in radiative forcing); 
ocean acidification (mean surface seawater saturation state with respect to aragonite ≥ 80% of pre- industrial 
levels); stratospheric ozone (<5% reduction in O3 concentration from pre- industrial level of 290 Dobson 
Units); biogeochemical nitrogen (N) cycle (limit industrial and agricultural fixation of N2 to 35 Tg N yr- 1) 
and phosphorus (P) cycle (annual P inflow to oceans not to exceed 10 times the natural background weath-
ering of P); global freshwater use (<4000 km3 yr- 1 of consumptive use of runoff resources); land system 
change (<15% of the ice- free land surface under cropland); the rate at which biological diversity is lost 
(annual rate of <10 extinctions per million species); chemical pollution (no boundary determined yet) and 
atmospheric aerosol loading (no boundary determined yet).
134 NPS 2012 (n 131) 9. Anderson and Barbour argue that ‘many of the classic landscapes of our national 
parks  . . . were shaped by the unremitting labor of generations of indigenous peoples’, that they are now 
changing because the cultural and natural processes that shaped them are missing, and that restoration 
will not work unless indigenous practices are reintroduced. See M. Kat Anderson and Michael G. Barbour, 
‘Simulated Indigenous Management: A New Model for Ecological Restoration in National Parks’ (2003) 
21(4) Ecological Restoration 269, 270.
135 NPS 2012 (n 131) 12.
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pre- contact Americas.136 Just as idealized images of climax ecosystems reflected lim-
ited knowledge and short- term observations, the ‘pristine myth’ has been refuted by 
evidence that Native Americans altered their environments to enrich the species, loca-
tion, and life- stage of plants and animals that they used for food, shelter, and goods.137 
There is evidence that fire and cultural practices have shaped Amazonian forests, the 
Great Plains, and the Pantanal to suit the human inhabitants to such an extent that 
Denevan says ‘There are no virgin tropical forests today, nor were there in 1492.’138 
Human impact is so significant that serious people propose identifying a new geologic 
epoch as the ‘Anthropocene’; they debate whether the boundary line should be at the 
point when dams blocked sedimentation transport to continental shelves; when CO2 
added to the atmosphere lowered the pH of the ocean; when radiation was released to 
the atmosphere from the first atomic tests; or when genes were first modified.139
Coupled human and natural systems, like those observed in these examples, are now 
studied in different settings, including cities, rural areas, developed and developing 
countries.140 They can be defined as ‘integrated systems in which people interact with 
natural components’.141 A synthesis study of six case studies observed several common 
features:  ‘nonlinear dynamics with thresholds, reciprocal feedback loops, time lags, 
resilience, heterogeneity, and surprises . . . past couplings have legacy effects on present 
conditions and future possibilities’.142
This realization led land managers to the conclusion that desirable ecological con-
ditions that seemed to characterize the Americas have to be actively managed,143 an 
enterprise which has its own problems when applied to natural or cultural landscapes. 
To explain the problem, the ecologist David Ehrenfeld invoked von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s theorem demonstrating the mathematical impossibility of maximiz-
ing more than one variable at a time in an interlinked system.144 In other words, it 
might be possible to manage a forest to maximize the deer population, but the results 
(empirically demonstrated) are likely to reduce or extirpate populations of other spe-
cies. There is no general rule to solve the paradox that this creates:  that there is no 
136 ‘Pre- contact’ refers to the period before Europeans contacted the peoples of the Americas.
137 M. Kat Anderson, ‘The Fire, Pruning, and Coppice Management of Temperate Ecosystems for 
Basketry Material by California Indian Tribes’ (1999) 27(1) Human Ecology 79– 113; William M. Denevan, 
‘The Pristine Myth:  The Landscape of the Americas in 1492’ (1992) 82(3) Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 369– 85.
138 Denevan (n 137) 375.
139 Davor Vidas, ‘The Anthropocene and the International Law of the Sea’ (2011) Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society 369, 909– 25.
140 Jianguo Liu, Thomas Dietz, Stephen R. Carpenter, Marina Alberti, Carl Folke, Emilio Moran, Alice N. 
Pell, Peter Deadman, Timothy Kratz, Jane Lubchenco, Elinor Ostrom, Zhiyun Ouyang, William Provencher, 
Charles L. Redman, Stephen H. Schneider, William W. Taylor, ‘Complexity of Coupled Human and Natural 
Systems’ (2007) 317 Science 1513– 17.
141 ibid. 1513. 142 ibid. 1513.
143 M. Kat Anderson and Michael G. Barbour, ‘Simulated Indigenous Management: A New Model for 
Ecological Restoration in National Parks’ (2003) 21(4) Ecological Restoration 269– 77.
144 David Ehrenfeld, ‘The Management of Diversity’ in F. Herbert Bormann and Stephen R. Kellert 
(eds.), Ecology, Economics Ethics: The Broken Circle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) 26– 39, 30.
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‘natural’ condition; that there are preferable conditions; that management is necessary 
to maintain them; and that managing complex natural systems145 is prone to failure.
The proponents of warfare ecology as a new discipline are intensely aware of these 
dynamics. They argue that the ‘distinctive characteristics of warfare ecology emerge 
from the deliberateness (often to deprive enemies of advantage), destructiveness, and 
intensity of ecological and socioeconomic perturbations brought on by warfare’ and 
that coupled systems frameworks adapted to these particular conditions are needed.146 
They call attention to cascading effects of reconstruction. In a typical post- conflict situ-
ation, humanitarian efforts to provide potable water and fuel for human survivors may 
have widespread negative consequences for key components of the ecosystems they 
will rely on in the future— fisheries, agricultural land, forests, soil, climate, and so on. 
As the factual connections between coupled biophysical and socioeconomic systems 
become clear, the gaps and incongruities in a legal regime that does not fully recognize 
them become clear.
2.3.3  Goals
The pristine myth dissipates in light of the knowledge that environmental conditions 
are and have been shaped by natural forces and human intention. The 2012 National 
Park Service report argued that essential characteristics and processes of healthy eco-
systems are equally important management goals as ‘observable features of iconic spe-
cies and grand land- and seascapes’.147 One of these is system resilience.
System resilience can be analysed in terms of ‘animal movements, gene flow, and 
response to cycles of natural disturbance’148 or other features like watersheds and air-
sheds. For seasonally mobile migratory species and other species that move in response 
to short- and long- term system changes (including armed conflict), life- cycle steward-
ship and collaborative resource management are needed to achieve system resilience.
Lonergan made this point in his analysis of the stop and start restoration of the 
Iraqi Marshes (perhaps the original Garden of Eden).149 The marshes were drained 
by Saddam Hussein to quash political dissidents in the region. After the 2003 inva-
sion forced Hussein from power, an international coalition contributed funds, tech-
nical support, and political assistance to restore the marshes. Fed by the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers, the marshes’ ultimate health would depend on cooperation with the 
upper riparians— Syria and Turkey— and with neighbouring Iran. Natural drought 
conditions, exacerbated by the failure of collaborative management efforts with Turkey 
and Iran, have led to inadequate water supply. Lonergan predicted that climate change 
will worsen this situation. He also found that in some areas the marshes had lost so 
145 Note that ‘complex system’ is a term of art in systems theory. Systems may be simple, complicated, 
complex, or chaotic. In complex systems, ‘there is no immediately apparent relationship between cause and 
effect, and the way forward is determined based on emerging patterns’. David Snowden and Mary E. Boone, 
‘A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making’ (2007) Harvard Business Review 69– 76, 72. See also, Cymie 
R. Payne, ‘Balancing the Risks: Choosing Climate Alternatives’ (2009), 8 IOP Conference Series: Earth and 
Environmental Science 53– 7.
146 Machlis and Hanson (n 122) 733. 147 NPS 2012 (n 131) 10. 148 ibid. 9.
149 Steve Lonergan, ‘Ecological Restoration and Peacebuilding: The Case of the Iraqi Marshes in 
Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding’ in Jensen and Lonergan (n 1).
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much ecosystem function that ‘the marshes’ resiliency might be exhausted’, although 
other areas began to recover naturally once water was restored. In his view, though the 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (the Ramsar Convention) could 
have provided a useful institutional structure for the riparian states to cooperate, it 
lacked incentives to force them to work together. He believed that the Iraqi Marsh res-
toration was not a peacebuilding success.
2.4 Lessons for Jus Post Bellum
It is evident that relevant legal interpretations of ‘environment’ for a jus post bellum 
regime cannot rely on the scant treaty regime established at the end of the twenti-
eth century. As discussed, ENMOD states parties have explicitly agreed to disagree on 
its key definitions of what constitutes the environment as a weapon and its threshold 
for the magnitude of damage to trigger the convention’s obligations, and it does not 
address the scope of the environment as a target.
The existing legal rules do not provide sufficient clarity to satisfy the needs of post- 
conflict interventions and legal regimes:  accountability, deterrence, reparations, or 
guidance for progressive legal development. The failure to properly characterize the 
‘environment’ erodes the normative influence that law could exert to stigmatize behav-
iour. Confusion about what aspects of environment are legally protected and how to 
characterize them in a legal claim may explain the failure to bring environmental dam-
age claims in post- conflict legal proceedings, including the Ethiopia- Eritrea Claims 
Commission and the UN Register of Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.150 Drumbl has commented on the failure to use 
international criminal courts to charge environmental crimes, for similar reasons.151 
The military practices of many states do ‘take environmental considerations into 
account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legiti-
mate military objectives’ in the words of the ICJ,152 but these measures do not exercise 
the broader normative and positive effects of law.
These five proposals could help the jus post bellum framework fill these gaps:
1. Define ‘environment’ recognizing the collective interest in its integrity.
Belligerents and peace- time governments alike owe obligations to protect and 
restore environmental resources in which the international community has an 
interest. The special interests of local and national communities should also be 
recognized.
150 UN General Assembly resolution, UN Doc. A/ RES/ ES- 10/ 17, para. 3 (establishing the Register). 
The damage categories established by the Register are: ‘A: Agriculture, category B: Commercial, category 
C: Residential, category D: Employment, category E: Access to Services, and category F: Public Resources 
and Other. Category F claims may not be submitted by individuals.’ UNRoD Rules and Regulations 
Governing the Registration of Claims, Art. 11. No Category F (Public Resources and Other) claims— where 
environmental claims might be expected to be filed— are recorded in the annual progress reports of the 
UNRoD board to the UN General Assembly, UN Docs. A/ ES- 10/ 498 (2010); A/ ES- 10/ 455 (2011); A/ ES- 10/ 
598 (2012); A/ ES- 10/ 599 (2013); A/ ES- 10/ 658 (2014); A/ ES- 10/ 683 (2015).
151 Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Waging War Against the World:  The Need to Move from War Crimes to 
Environmental Crimes’ (1998) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 122, 145– 6.
152 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 5), para. 30.
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2. Define ‘environment’ in context and in light of the best information available.
Post- conflict legal regimes can broaden their scope to recognize all of the elements 
required for environmental integrity, not just provisioning services. That means that 
the less glamorous regulating services and supporting services of the environment 
will be identified, protected during armed conflict, and given priority for restoration 
post- conflict. Cultural services provided by the environment should be considered 
important elements in rebuilding post- conflict societies. Multidisciplinary scientific 
teams can be used for assessment. Reparations programmes would do well to recog-
nize all these services as compensable heads of damage.
3. Account for change.
The role of change seems most relevant to future- oriented post- conflict activi-
ties, such as remedies for environmental harms, economic development projects, 
and environmental restoration efforts. The lessons from studies of ecosystem 
management suggest that change at multiple scales, resulting from both natural 
and human causes, means that active management of ecosystem characteristics 
replaces fixed management of a historic condition. This might lead to difficult 
choices, which will require thoughtful analysis of normative and empirical ques-
tions. For example, if sea level rise and storm surge are predicted to inundate 
a conflict- damaged wetland in the next ten years, how should a legal right to 
restoration be implemented? How should local community interests in restoring 
preexisting conditions be weighed in such a scenario? How can the environmen-
tal integrity of that area be recovered?
4. Consider how human activities and environment function as an interactive sys-
tem and do not focus exclusively on one element.
The implication for judicial processes, civil or criminal, is to take account of the 
coupled human and natural system. Measures would include: at the outset, when 
soliciting claims, to inform potential claimants that systemic harmful impacts are 
compensable; to define liability and causation in terms that account for interac-
tions within the system; to obtain expert assistance to evaluate complex claims 
in light of current scientific knowledge; and to consider the systemic effects of 
remedies provided.153
For interventions in the immediate post- conflict period, like supplying water 
and fuel to refugees, information about coupled systems will be limited and cer-
tain priorities will predominate. However, best practices can be incorporated to 
minimize unintended harm.154
For long- term investments by international aid donors, private investors, or 
governments, safeguards established for similar activities during peacetime may 
153 For example, Kuwait sought compensation to excavate and remove the asphalt- like layer of oil residue 
left on its desert surface from the oil well fires set by retreating Iraqi troops. Scientific experts advised that 
excavation of the tarcrete layers (although it would have restored the visual appearance of the sites) could 
reduce the success of revegetation efforts. Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners 
Concerning the Third Instalment of ‘F4’ claims () UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2003/ 31, 18 December 2003, 47.
154 Annica Waleij, Timothy Bosetti, Russ Doran, and Birgitta Liljedahl, ‘Environmental Stewardship in 
Peace Operations: The Role of the Military’ in Carl Bruch, W. Carroll Muffet, and Sandra S. Nichols (eds.), 
Governance, Natural Resources, and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (London: Earthscan, 2016).
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be used to evaluate and control for collateral damage. For example, environmen-
tal impact assessment is a common practice used to discern this kind of informa-
tion. It is widespread in domestic legal regimes and the International Court of 
Justice155 and Law of the Sea Tribunal156 have recognized environmental impact 
assessment as an international obligation in cases of potential significant trans-
boundary harm. However, armed conflict can be used as a pretext to suspend 
peacetime laws, and urgency to initiate post- conflict projects may encourage 
accelerated approvals.157 It is important that military forces and investors alike 
recognize the continuing applicability of environmental safeguards.
Expanding the focus of law from single concerns— gold mining, refugee water 
supply, a fishery— to complex systems complicates the task of post- conflict activi-
ties but is likely to make the result more robust.
5. Recognize that armed conflict constitutes a severe disruption to the environment 
and that recovery to the conditions before the conflict may not be possible or 
desirable.
A preferred historical condition may not be recoverable. As jus post bellum rules evolve, 
new criteria may be used, including:
• system resilience;
• regional, including transboundary, analysis, and potential for collaborative 
management; and
• biodiversity and evolutionary potential.
The present is a time of development for the norms and practices of protection of the 
environment in relation to armed conflict. By considering the definition of ‘environ-
ment’ in broad terms, based on the best science available at the time of interpretation, 
it should be possible to understand the legal regimes of IHL and jus post bellum consist-
ently with the evolving views of the international community.
155 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 113.
156 Seabed Disputes Chamber of the Int’l Trib. for the Law of the Sea, Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities 
and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, ITLOS 
Reports, 1 February 2011, paras. 145– 8.
157 Jensen and Lonergan (n 1) 8.
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 The Ability of Environmental Treaties to Address 
Environmental Problems in Post- Conflict
Britta Sjöstedt*
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I  argue that environmental treaties, commonly sharing four ele-
ments, can be useful to address challenges to protect and restore the environment 
arising during the transition from armed conflict to peace (post- conflict). The ele-
ments consist of:  (1)  treaty bodies (also referred to in this chapter as treaty insti-
tutions) with a broad mandate to make appropriate use of the other elements; 
(2) loosely worded provisions; (3) supportive compliance systems; and (4) ability to 
cooperate with other institutions. The elements enable the environmental treaties to 
adapt to the specific context of post- conflict and fill a normative as well as an insti-
tutional gap to safeguard the environment. As international environmental treaties 
encapsulate obligations attached to the international community to address envi-
ronmental damage, which may also serve as a means to achieve a sustainable peace 
in post- conflict, they may be of particular relevance for the search of a jus post bel-
lum framework.1 As explained by Carsten Stahn, jus post bellum may be viewed as a 
legal framework gathering rules from different bodies of international law that apply 
in the blurred phase between war and peace.2 Environmental treaties can offer types 
of measures that are relevant both in peacetime, wartime, and in post- conflict. For 
instance, they have the potential through their treaty bodies to engage various stake-
holders in responding to environmental damage, and thereby, further the principle 
of international cooperation, which has been identified as a crucial requirement in 
peacebuilding and the jus post bellum framework.3
* Postdoctoral Fellow and Senior Lecturer, Department of Law at Lund University, Sweden.
1 The concept of jus post bellum is described in various manners and it appears that there is not any 
agreed or unified view of what the concept is or should be. For further reading, see Eric de Brabandere, 
‘The Concept of Jus Post Bellum in International Law, A Normative Critique’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. 
Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2014), 124– 42. Cymie Payne has explored the aspect of jus post bellum that relates to 
‘environmental integrity,’ see Cymie Payne, ‘The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict Legal 
Regimes’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson ibid. 503– 19.
2 Carsten Stahn, ‘ “Jus ad bellum”, “jus in bello”  . . .  “jus post bellum?”— Rethinking the Conception of the 
Law of Armed Conflict’ (2007) 17 European Journal of International Law 921.
3 Dieter Fleck, ‘Jus Post Bellum as Partly Independent Legal Framework’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson 
(n 1) 47.
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To exemplify and explain my argument, I  examine the application of the World 
Heritage Convention 4 in relation to the armed conflicts taking place in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’)5 to protect its five natural World Heritage Sites.6 In the 
case of the DRC, the World Heritage Convention has fostered cooperation among the 
international community to safeguard the World Heritage Sites during and after the 
armed conflicts taking place in the region. My analysis shows that the World Heritage 
Convention is useful as a tool to guide states, international organizations, non- 
governmental organizations (‘NGOs’), and other stakeholders in the protection and 
restoration of natural World Heritage in a post- conflict context. Other environmental 
treaties with a comparable structure could be of similar use to protect and restore other 
aspects of the environment.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next Section (3.2) describes the environ-
mental problems related to armed conflict. Section 3.3 describes the application of the 
World Heritage Convention in relation to the armed conflicts in the DRC and its struc-
tural elements that enable the convention, and potentially other environmental treaties, 
to influence the environmental protection during and after armed conflict. In the final 
Section (3.4), I provide some conclusions on how environmental treaties add to the 
concept of jus post bellum.
3.2 Problems in Environmental Protection Work  
Related to Armed Conflicts
Armed conflicts can cause direct as well as indirect harm to the environment in 
different ways.7 In the DRC, the warfare has severely affected five natural World 
Heritage Sites and threatened, among other species, the endangered mountain 
gorillas.8 Armed groups have used the inaccessibility of the Sites for their military 
4 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage 
Convention), 1037 UNTS 151; 27 UST 37; 11 ILM 1358, 16 November 1972.
5 The First Congo War lasted between 1996– 1998 and involved Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. The sec-
ond Congo War lasted between 1998– 2000 and involved DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Burundi, 
Angola, Namibia, Chad, Eritrea, and Sudan to varying degrees. A peace agreement was signed between 
warring parties in April 2002. The fighting has however continued with such intensity and organization 
among the concerned armed groups, including the DRC Army, that it should be classified as a conflict of 
non- international character (although it still may have some international elements). The lines are however 
blurring. See also United Nations Office for the Cordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Democratic 
Republic of the Congo Mapping Exercise (2010) 8– 10, documenting the most serious violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law 1993– 2003, at <http:// www.ohchr.org/ Documents/ Countries/ 
CD/ DRC_ MAPPING_ REPORT_ FINAL_ EN.pdf> accessed 14 June 2017.
6 The DRC ratified the World Heritage Convention on 23 September 1974. See <http:// whc.unesco.org/ 
en/ statesparties>, accessed 14 June 2017. The DRC has now five natural World Heritage Sites protected 
under the World Heritage Convention including the Virunga National Park, Salonga National Park, Okapi 
Wildlife Reserve, Kahuzi- Biega National Park, and Garamba National Park.
7 See for instance Aaron Schwabach, ‘Environmental Damage Resulting from the NATO Military Action 
Against Yugoslavia’ (2000) 25 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 117, 121; John Alan Cohan, ‘Modes 
of Warfare and Evolving Standards of Environmental Protection under the International Law of War’ (2003) 
15 Florida Journal of International Law 481, 532.
8 The mountain gorilla has been included since 1975 on Appendix I  of the 1973 Convention of 
International Trade in Endangered Species (adopted 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975), 993 
UNTS 243 (CITES). Appendix I  lists species that are the most endangered among CITES- listed animals 
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operations, as hiding places, and to set up base camps for planning and launching 
attacks.9 The armed groups have also entered World Heritage Sites for the purpose 
of exploiting natural resources by engaging in artisanal mining, charcoal produc-
tion, and wildlife poaching. The revenues sustain their military operations and pro-
vide personal profit.10 To deny rebel groups their cover, the Congolese Army has 
entered the World Heritage Sites where it has jeopardized the integrity of the Sites 
by, for example, cutting down trees and placing army camps inside the Sites.11 In 
addition, poor discipline, irregular pay, and lack of food have resulted in the grow-
ing participation of the Congolese Army in such illegal activities. Several army 
members have collaborated with rebel groups in the illegal charcoal trade. The 
army uses their official positions to facilitate exploitation of the dealers bypassing 
any official controls.12 Such practice establishes a parallel administration system. 
This is one example of how the exploitation of natural resources and wildlife can 
continue without being addressed by the authorities, which is common in post- 
conflict. The existing governmental structures are often disrupted followed by 
an ‘institutional vacuum’ and lack of governance, which particularly affects the 
environmental work in the transition from conflict to peace.13 Moreover, due to 
the lack of investment in the infrastructure in war- torn societies, these problems 
can continue and accelerate well into the post- conflict period.14 Poor infrastruc-
ture affects a state’s ability to handle waste, sewage, or provide sanitation, water, 
and fuel. This is particularly noticeable when dealing with large numbers of dis-
placed persons generated by armed conflicts. Pollution, like water contamination 
or deforestation, is often caused by the large concentrations of displaced per-
sons living without sanitary facilities, access to fuel, or waste removal services.15 
and plants (see Art. 2(1) of the Convention). See CITES website <http:// www.cites.org/ eng/ app/ appendices.
php>, accessed 14 June 2017.
9 See UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Report, distributed 8 February 2002, Doc. WHC- 01/ 
CONF.208/ 24, 17. For example, between 2008 and 2009, armed rebel groups occupied the gorilla sector 
in the Virunga National Park. See also UNESCO World Heritage Committee, State of Conservation of the 
Properties Inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, distributed 11 May 2009, Doc. WHC- 09/ 
33.COM/ 7A, 12.
10 See UNESCO World Heritage Committee, State of Conservation of the Properties Inscribed on 
the List of World Heritage in Danger, distributed 26 May 2006, Doc. WHC- 06/ 30.COM/ 7A, 27; State of 
Conservation of the Properties Inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, distributed 10 May 
2007, Doc. WHC- 07/ 31.COM/ 7A, 9; State of Conservation of the Properties Inscribed on the List of World 
Heritage in Danger, distributed 22 May 2008, Doc. WHC- 08/ 32.COM/ 7A, 8. See also Alec Crawford and 
Johannah Bernstein, MEAs, Conservation and Conflict— A Case Study of Virunga National Park, DRC 
(Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2008), 17– 18.
11 In 2006 it was reported that four brigades totalling 12,000 soldiers, were deployed inside or close to one 
of the World Heritage Sites, some of them with their families. See UNESCO World Heritage Committee, 
State of Conservation of the Properties Inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, distributed 26 
May 2006, Doc. WHC- 06/ 30.COM/ 7A, 27; State of Conservation of the Properties Inscribed on the List 
of World Heritage in Danger distributed 22 May 2008, Doc. WHC- 08/ 32.COM/ 7A, 10. See also Joseph 
Kalpers, Overview of the Armed Conflict and Biodiversity in Sub- Saharan Africa: Impact, Mechanisms and 
Responses Washington DC Biodiversity Support Program, 2001), 13.
12 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural 
Resources and the Environment (Switzerland: UNEP, 2009), 17.
13 ibid. 14 ibid.
15 Judy Oglete, James Shambaugh, and Rebecca Kormos, ‘Parks in the Crossfire: Strategies for Effective 
Conservation in Areas of Armed Conflict’ (2004) 14 War and Protected Areas, International Journal for 
Protected Areas Managers, 3, at <https:// cmsdata.iucn.org/ downloads/ 14_ 1.pdf> accessed 14 June 2017.
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For example, after the Rwandan genocide in 1994, approximately 720,000 displaced 
persons were permitted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(‘UNCHR’) to settle in and around Virunga National Park, one of the Congolese 
World Heritage Sites.16 The UNCHR allowed the displaced population to cut fire-
wood inside the site due to the lack of fuel. This led to deforestation of an area 
of 300 km2 that imperilled the unique ecosystem and threatened the mountain 
gorillas.17
Armed conflict also generates practical challenges to addressing post- conflict 
environmental damage. One of the main challenges in undertaking environmen-
tal work in post- conflict situations is the absence of human and technical capac-
ity. Foreign and national staff with higher education is often evacuated first during 
armed conflict. As there is a shortage of competent staff, operative facilities, intact 
premises, and financial means as a result of an armed conflict, much of the envi-
ronmental protection work halts. Furthermore, in the aftermath of an armed con-
flict, most stakeholders involved in rehabilitation and restoration are mainly focused 
on humanitarian assistance and democracy issues, while the environment is a low 
priority.18 Nevertheless, in war- torn societies, managing natural resources has been 
highlighted as an important aspect to meet basic needs of the population, such as pro-
viding water, food, shelter, and livelihoods, to reconstruct the financial system, and 
to re- build governmental structure.19 Environmental degradation has the potential 
to endanger health, livelihoods, and security of the population.20 The states that are 
unable to give their population the support they require may create additional envi-
ronmental degradation and foster further conflicts. As the war- torn states’ incomes 
often end up in private pockets they become financially exhausted. For example, in 
the DRC, a large number of public officials benefit from the wars on a personal level 
and the revenues of the natural resources do not enrich the state. The DRC remains 
unable to build strong governmental institutions, and the environmental degrada-
tion continues and, as a result, the population suffers.21 Consequently, infrastructure 
deteriorates, governmental institutions become non- functioning and public officials 
are underpaid, if paid at all, which further nurtures corruption and instability. The 
environmental damage caused in relation to armed conflict impedes the outlook for 
peace and for the societies to recover.22
16 Crawford and Bernstein (n 10) 15– 16.
17 UNEP, The Democratic Republic of the Congo Post- Conflict Environmental Assess Synthesis for Policy 
Makers (Nairobi: UNEP, 2011), 26.
18 Oglete, Shambaugh, and Kormos (n 15) 3– 4.
19 Carl Bruch and others, ‘Post- conflict Peace building and Natural Resources’ (2009) Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 58, 67.
20 Onita Das, Environmental Protection, Environmental Security and Armed conflict, A Sustainable 
Development Perspective (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 122– 3; Michael Bothe et al., 
‘International Law Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’ (2010) 
International Review of the Red Cross 570– 1.
21 Phoebe Okowa, ‘Sovereignty Contests and the Protection of Natural Resources in Conflict Zones’ 
(2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 33, 40– 2.
22 UNEP (n 12) 19.
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3.3 Environmental Treaties’ Alternative Approach
As described above, the transition from conflict to peace is often characterized by the 
lack of governmental control and institutional collapse. This is a challenge for under-
taking environmental protection work and implementing international environmental 
law, which rely heavily on institutions of the state. If these are not in place, little can be 
achieved in that area. Still, environmental treaties may be prominent in such situations. 
Environmental treaties’ application is dependent on the treaty system and its treaty 
bodies, rather than states’ domestic institutions.23 I use the example of the application 
of the World Heritage Convention in the DRC to illustrate the potential of environ-
mental treaties in post- conflict.
The World Heritage Convention has played a central role in attempting to pro-
tect the natural World Heritage from the adverse impacts of the numerous armed 
conflicts taking place in the DRC since 1996.24 During the armed conflicts, four 
out of the five Congolese Sites have been under rebel control.25 For that reason, 
the Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (hereinafter referred to as 
Congolese Wildlife Authority), a Congolese state organization entrusted with the 
management of the World Heritage Sites, requested support for protection of the 
Sites.26 As response, a pilot project titled Biodiversity Conservation in Regions of 
Armed Conflict:  Conserving World Heritage Sites in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC project) was launched under the convention.27 The project aims at 
23 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little- Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) American Journal 
of International Law 623– 59.
24 For further reading on the application of the World Heritage Convention during the armed con-
flicts in the DRC, see Britta Sjöstedt, ‘The Role of Multilateral Environmental Agreements in Armed 
Conflict:  “Green- keeping” in Virunga Park, Applying the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in the 
Armed Conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2013) Nordic Journal of International Law 
129– 53.
25 These included the World Heritage Sites of Okapi Reserve, Garamba National Park, Virunga National 
Park, and Kahuzi- Biega National Park.
26 UNESCO World Heritage Committee, State of Conservation of the Properties Inscribed on the List of 
World Heritage in Danger, Doc. WHC- 99/ CONF.209/ 13, Paris, 18 October 1999, 3– 5.
27 UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Decision 23.COM.X.A4 adopted at twenty- third session on 
29 November– 4 December 1999, Doc. WHC- 99/ CONF.209/ 22, 2 March 2000, 22. In response to requests 
submitted by the Congolese Wildlife Authority in cooperation with the conservation NGOs and other part-
ners, the Bureau approved a total sum of US$ 105,000 for the four sites. These funds are being disbursed 
via contracts established with conservation NGOs and partners. The Task Force representatives, in con-
sultation with the Centre, the UNESCO Division of Ecological Sciences and the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) elaborated a 4- year project expected to cost about US$ 4  million. The 
project primarily focuses on: (a) specific and collaborative support to the four sites, including the payment 
of salaries and salary supplements linked to performance of anti- poaching and surveillance duties; (b) rais-
ing awareness and support of international and regional diplomatic and political communities dealing with 
conflict in DRC and in neighbouring states to the conservation of the sites; (c) disseminating informa-
tion of the critical role that the Site staff is playing in the protection of the Sites despite risks to their lives 
and property, and develop sustainable financing mechanisms to support the staff and the conservation of 
the sites; and (d) identify, document, and disseminate lessons learnt in the conservation of the four sites 
in the DRC to improve preparedness of the international community to meet conservation problems of 
World Natural Heritage properties in regions of armed conflict. UNESCO World Heritage Committee, 
State of Conservation of the Properties Inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, Doc. WHC- 99/ 
CONF.209/ 13, Paris, 18 October 1999, 3– 5.
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providing rudimentary protection of the universal values of World Heritage in rela-
tion to armed conflict by empowering the international society to respond in such 
situations.28
The ability to launch the project under the World Heritage Convention and adopt 
measures to meet the challenges related to armed conflicts has been facilitated by 
four elements regarding its character, structure, and operation. These elements 
include: (1) broad mandate of the treaty institutions to apply the convention; (2) open- 
ended treaty provisions; (3) non- confrontational compliance system focused on sup-
portive application measures; and (4) the possibility of the treaty bodies to cooperate 
with other environmental treaty bodies as well as with other actors including states, 
international organizations, NGOs, and private actors.29 The elements are structural 
components of how most environmental treaties are managed and applied. They 
are assets contributing to the creation of dynamic instruments competent to adopt 
context- based measures. By enabling innovative context- based strategies to achieve 
treaty objectives, the World Heritage Convention has contributed to filling the post- 
conflict institutional and legal gap in the DRC to protect and restore the natural World 
Heritage Sites. Therefore, practice developed could be of significance while identifying 
the legal norms of jus post bellum.
In the first subsection, I briefly introduce the World Heritage Convention , and in 
the second subsection, I examine the application of the World Heritage Convention in 
relation to the armed conflicts in the DRC.
3.3.1  The World Heritage Convention
The World Heritage Convention protects natural and cultural World Heritage of 
unique value to humankind. As the World Heritage Convention also focuses on cul-
tural heritage, it goes beyond the scope of environmental protection. Nevertheless, 
it is structured and operates like most environmental treaties. Pursuant to Article 4 
of the World Heritage Convention, the states parties to the convention are under the 
obligation to identify, protect, and preserve, for future generations, the cultural and 
natural World Heritage situated in their territory. Article 6(3) of the World Heritage 
Convention requires all states parties to not deliberately cause direct or indirect dam-
age to the World Heritage Sites situated in other states parties’ territory. To enhance 
protection, pursuant to Article 11(2), states parties can nominate sites in their territory 
to be inscribed on the World Heritage List. To be added onto the list, a natural World 
Heritage Site has to fulfil the requirements set out in Article 2 of the convention by hav-
ing outstanding value to humankind. The World Heritage List is supported by a separ-
ate ‘List of World Heritage in Danger’ (the ‘Danger List’), provided for in Article 11(4) 
28 UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Report of the Rapporteur on the twenty- third session of the 
Bureau of the World Heritage Committee, Doc. WHC- 99/ CONF.209/ 4, Paris 11 October 1999, 5.
29 These elements may also contribute to overcome fragmentation. See Britta Sjöstedt, ‘The 
Reconciliatory Approach:  How Multilateral Environmental Agreements Can Harmonize International 
Legal Obligations’ in Andrzej Jakubowski and Karolina Wierczyńska (eds.), The Arguments on 
Fragmentation and Constitutionalisation:  An Inquiry into the Practice of International Law (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2016).
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World Heritage Convention. This is the case when a site’s integrity is threatened by 
certain events and requires enhanced protection. The ‘outbreak of an armed conflict’ 
is expressly identified as such an event.30 All the Sites in the DRC have been put on the 
Danger List partly because of the wars.31
3.3.2  Making use of the four elements in relation to  
the Congolese armed conflicts
To respond to the challenges facing the Congolese natural World Heritage Sites , as 
described in Section 3.2, several supportive measures have been undertaken within the 
project that was launched under the World Heritage Convention— thanks to the four 
elements. The treaty bodies of the World Heritage Convention have used their wide 
mandate (first element) by interpreting the loosely formulated provisions (second ele-
ment) and applying the supportive compliance system (third element) to realize the 
measures of the project. The project has employed a partnership approach establish-
ing international cooperation of the treaty bodies with other actors (fourth element), 
including the UNESCO,32 other UN agencies and UN programmes, Congolese Wildlife 
Authority and other national governmental bodies, states, international organizations, 
as well as NGOs active in the DRC.33
I will analyse how the four elements have enabled the environmental protec-
tion measures of the Sites under the project in the following sub- subsections. To 
this end, I  will make some general remarks on the similarities/ differences of the 
World Heritage Convention with the other environmental treaties, mainly with the 
Ramsar Convention as it also protects specific areas of international environmental 
importance.
30 Other serious and specific dangers listed in Art. 11(4) of the World Heritage Convention include: ‘threat 
of disappearance caused by accelerated deterioration, large- scale public or private projects or rapid urban 
or tourist development projects; destruction caused by changes in the use or ownership of the land; major 
alterations due to unknown causes; abandonment for any reason whatsoever; calamities and cataclysms; 
serious fires, earthquakes, landslides; volcanic eruptions; changes in water level, floods and tidal waves’.
31 Guy Debonnet and Kes Hillman- Smith, ‘Supporting Protected Areas in a Time of Political Turmoil: the 
Case of World Heritage Sites in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2004) 14 War and Protected Areas, 
International Journal for Protected Areas Managers 11, at <https:// cmsdata.iucn.org/ downloads/ 14_ 1.pdf> 
accessed 14 June 2017.
32 The World Heritage Convention was adopted at the General Conference of United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Thus, UNESCO and the operation of the World Heritage 
Convention is intertwined.
33 The partnership consists of UNESCO‘s World Heritage Centre and Division of Ecological Sciences in 
cooperation with Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN) (referred to as the Congolese 
Wildlife Authority in this chapter), IUCN, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) (now GIZ), and a task 
force of conservation NGOs including International Rhino Foundation, International Gorilla Conservation 
Programme, Wildlife Conservation Society, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and the Gilman 
International Conservation. In addition, the European Union and states (i.e. Belgium, Italy, and Germany) 
as well as UN agencies or programmes (i.e. UN Development Programme, UNEP) and the UN Mission to 
DRC (MONUC) (later MONUSCO) collaborate with the Committee and the World Heritage Centre to 
address issues relating to the safeguarding of World Heritage Sites in the DRC.
 
 
80 Environmental Treaties Post-Conflict
A.  First element: broad mandate of treaty institutions
The World Heritage Committee (‘Committee’) is the executive treaty body and 
has decision- making powers for applying the World Heritage Convention. The 
Committee has a broad mandate to ensure effective application of the World Heritage 
Convention, including defining and developing the provisions of the convention 
by adopting decisions, recommendations, and guidelines.34 The treaty bodies are 
central for most environmental treaties’ efficiency as they enable the instruments 
to be revised, developed, and adjusted to shifting conditions.35 As the bodies are 
empowered to direct the general goals of the treaties within the limits of the treaty 
provisions, they can adopt various measures guided by the circumstances and prac-
tical considerations. Hence, the establishment of treaty institutions with degrees of 
context- based decision- making authority would enable them to adjust measures 
to respond to armed conflict related damage. For instance, such decision- making 
authority has made it possible for the Committee to instigate the specific project 
aimed at protecting the World Heritage Sites in relation to the armed conflicts in the 
DRC. Within the framework of the DRC project, the treaty institutions of the World 
Heritage Convention have undertaken various activities that make use of the other 
elements to safeguard the environment of the Sites despite the conditions of armed 
conflict. These include enacting green diplomacy36 between the parties of the con-
flicts to advocate neutrality of the World Heritage Sites and their staff, providing sup-
port and equipment to the park management, and attracting other stakeholders to 
endorse the project’s aim.37
Most environmental treaties have, similarly to the World Heritage Convention, 
established an institutional structure. While the World Heritage Convention has 
a General Assembly with representation of all states parties, most environmental 
treaties have the equivalent of a ‘Conference of the Parties’ (‘COP’).38 In contrast 
34 The Committee is composed of twenty- one member states and meets at least once a year. See The 
Operational Guidelines for Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (‘Operational Guidelines’) 
(November 2011), at <whc.unesco.org/ archive/ opguide11- en.pdf> accessed 14 June 2017.
35 Nele Matz, ‘Approaches to Coordination of International Environmental Agreements’ in Rüdiger 
Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 
2003), 167.
36 Green diplomacy or environmental diplomacy is described by UNEP as an activity that aims at promot-
ing the shared use of natural resources or addressing common environmental threats by establishing a plat-
form for dialogue, confidence- building, and cooperation between divided communities or states, at <http:// 
http:// staging.unep.org/ disastersandconflicts/ Introduction/ EnvironmentalCooperationforPeacebuilding/ 
EnvironmentalDiplomacy/ tabid/ 54581/ Default.aspx> accessed 14 June 2017. See also Pamela Griffin, ‘The 
Ramsar Convention: A  New Window for Environmental Diplomacy?’ The Institute for Environmental 
Diplomacy and Security (2013), at <http:// www.uvm.edu/ ieds/ sites/ default/ files/ Ramsar_ IEDSResearchSeries.
pdf> accessed 14 June 2017.
37 World Heritage Papers 17, Promouvoir et Préserver le patrimoine congolais, Lier diversité biologique 
et culturelle/ Proceedings and Preserving Conoglese Heritage, Linking biological and cultural diversity, 
Proceedings of the conference and workshops, UNESCO, 13– 17 September 2004, 110, at <http:// whc.une-
sco.org/ en/ documents/ 6411> accessed 14 June 2017.
38 The General Assembly corresponds to a conference of the parties, which is usually the supreme 
decision- making organ in environmental treaties. See Diana Zacharias, ‘The UNESCO Regime for the 
Protection of World Heritage as Prototype of an Autonomy- Gaining International Institution’ (2008) 9 
German Law Journal 1842.
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to most other environmental treaties, the World Heritage Convention has assigned 
all the decision- making competencies to the executive organ— the Committee— as 
opposed to the COP (or the General Assembly in the case of the World Heritage 
Convention).39 The Committee consists of twenty- one states parties, which makes 
decision- making smoother than if it were to go through the all the states parties in 
the General Assembly of the Convention. As the institutions under most environ-
mental treaties share the broad mandate to develop the provisions; therefore they 
too may be able to instigate comparable projects to address war- torn environments, 
although the process has to go through the convention’s COP, which may prolong 
and obstruct the process.
B.  Second element: open- ended provisions
The second element is closely connected to the first. The World Heritage Convention 
is a framework convention with open- ended provisions providing general principles 
and flexible obligations. Therefore, the treaty institutions must further develop the pro-
visions into substantive rules by adopting secondary decisions and/ or recommenda-
tions.40 For instance, Article 4 of the World Heritage Convention calls for states parties 
to do all they can to protect World Heritage ‘to the utmost of [their] own resources’. 
Likewise, Article 5 states that each state party ‘shall endeavour, in so far as possible, 
and as appropriate for each country . . . to take the appropriate legal, scientific, techni-
cal, administrative and financial measures necessary for the identification, protection, 
conservation, presentation and rehabilitation’ of its World Heritage Sites. The wording 
used in both these articles does not prescribe exact conduct of the states parties but 
allows a degree of discretion to adapt the measures.41
This element applies to most environmental treaties. There are two underlying 
reasons explaining why most environmental treaties use flexibly worded provisions. 
Firstly, because of the struggle to achieve political consensuses on global environmen-
tal issues, the treaties replicate compromises of negotiations.42 The conventions pro-
vide platforms for continued dialogue on unsettled issues putting much emphasis on 
the process of developing the rules, in which the treaty institutions play the key role. 
Secondly, because of the particularities of environmental problems, they need to be 
addressed using a less formal approach that can be modified to consider specific geo-
graphical, economic, and social factors of the states parties or evolution of scientific 
39 See Arts. 8–14 in the World Heritage Convention.
40 Annecos Wiersema, ‘The New International Law- makers? Conferences of the Parties to Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements’ (2009) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 53; Patricia Birnie, Alan 
Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 17.
41 Guido Carducci, ‘Articles 4– 7, National and International Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage’ 
in Francesco Francioni (ed.), The 1972 World Heritage Convention:  A  Commentary (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 145.
42 Maurice Kampto, ‘Normative Uncertainties’ in Yann Kerbrat and Sandrine Maljean- Dubois (eds.), 
The Transformation of International Environmental Law (Paris and Oxford: Hart Publishing and Editions 
A. Pedone, 2011), 57. See also Churchill and Ulfstein (n 23) 628.
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knowledge.43 The treaty provisions provide enough discretion so they offer an adjust-
able and context- based response.44
In the case of the DRC, the flexibility incorporated in the convention provisions 
has enabled the Committee to interpret the measures to address specially the unse-
cure situations in the DRC and the particular challenges. Because of the armed con-
flicts, the World Heritage Sites as well as the park rangers are imperilled. The conflicts 
have partly taken place in the remote areas of the World Heritage Sites where the park 
rangers patrol the Sites. Thus, the rangers have ended up inside the war zone and 
they have been exposed to risks, in particular as they carry weapons while on duty.45 
Interpreting Article 5 of the convention, the Committee has called for the state party 
(the DRC) to employ the Congolese Army to protect the World Heritage Sites and 
the park rangers as an appropriate measure. The suggested measure has been adapted 
to the realities and the challenges of the national context of the DRC. As a result, 
the Congolese Army have collaborated and performed joint patrols and exchanged 
information with the park rangers. It has also assisted in monitoring the Sites and 
has taken measures to disarm and evacuate armed groups inside the World Heritage 
Sites. The Committee has also requested military support for the park rangers as a 
measure under Article 5 of the convention, including that the park rangers must 
be provided with adequate arms and ammunition.46 The park rangers have received 
weapons and ammunition to some extent. The assistance of the army is well estab-
lished, but it has not been formalized. It takes place on an ad hoc and short- term basis 
depending on the locations of the rebel groups as well as on the security needs of the 
Sites.47 A special environmental brigade was installed in the World Heritage Site of 
Garamba National Park. In the central sector of Virunga National Park, a mixed bri-
gade consisting of both members of the Congolese Army and park rangers has been 
established to secure this area.48
The support of the army has been somewhat problematic. Since many Congolese 
Army soldiers are underpaid, if paid at all, they have been involved in illegal activi-
ties harming the World Heritage Sites. Thus, there have been some violent confron-
tations between the park rangers and the army. Such confrontations have resulted 
in the Committee demanding the Congolese Army to relocate its military posts 
from the Sites.49 Furthermore, it requested the DRC to prosecute its staff engaged 
43 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Features and Trends in International Environmental Law’ in 
Kerbrat and Maljean- Dubois (eds.), The Transformation of International Environmental Law (n 42) 10– 11.
44 Dinah Shelton, ‘Comments on the Normative Challenge of Environmental ‘Soft Law’ in Kerbrat and 
Maljean- Dubois (n 42) 71.
45 Interview with Ephrem Balole, Planning officer Virunga National Park, Congolese Wildlife Authority, 
Goma, DRC, 4 April 2015.
46 See UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Decision 30 COM 7A.4 adopted at thirtieth session on 8– 16 
July 2006, Doc. WHC- 06/ 30.COM/ 19, 23 August 2006, 14.
47 Interview with Jeff Mapilanga, Director, Congolese Wildlife Authority, Kinshasa, DRC, 30 March 2015.
48 UNESCO World Heritage Committee, State of Conservation of the Properties Inscribed on the List of 
World Heritage in Danger, Doc. WHC- 11/ 35.COM/ 7A.Add, 27 May 2011, 13.
49 See UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Decision 28 COM 15A.3 adopted at twenty- eighth session 
on 28 June– 7 July 2004, Doc. WHC- 04/ 28/ COM/ 26, 29 October 2004, 52; Decision 31 COM 7A.7 adopted 
at thirty- first session on 23 June– 2 July 2007, Doc. WHC- 07/ 31.COM/ 24, 31 July 2007, 11.
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in wildlife poaching and illegal exploitation of natural resources.50 However, in the 
case with the mixed brigade in Virunga National Park, the park authority has pro-
vided salaries to the brigade’s army members. Therefore, there have not been any 
major instances with illegal activities from the army side and, overall, this arrange-
ment has functioned well.51
Other environmental treaties have also flexible provisions concerning the meas-
ures that the states parties have to undertake to comply with the treaty in question.52 
In addition, other treaty institutions could make similar interpretation efforts as the 
Committee of the World Heritage Convention in regard to the provisions to prevent 
the environment from being put at risk by armed conflict. For instance, Article 3 in 
the Ramsar Convention uses flexibly worded provisions and requires that states parties 
‘formulate and implement their planning so as to promote the conservation of the wet-
lands’ and ‘as far as possible the wise use of the wetlands in their territory’. Such word-
ing gives the treaty bodies under the Ramsar Convention enough flexibility to adapt 
measures in relation to armed conflict.
C.  Third element: non- confrontational compliance mechanisms
The third element concerns the non- confrontational compliance mechanism installed 
under the World Heritage Convention. Most other environmental treaties employ this 
type of compliance mechanism and it is designed as a supportive scheme seeking to 
facilitate states parties’ fulfilment of their obligations, rather than punishing failures.53 
The non- confrontational mechanism builds from the idea that states parties are unable 
but willing to comply.54 The World Heritage Convention institutions, similarly to most 
other environmental treaty institutions, collect and share information on the implemen-
tation procedure, analyse causes of non- compliance, and provide recommendations and 
assistance for the states parties rather than engage in robust enforcement measures.55 
The purpose is to change behaviour among the states parties and not to achieve a speci-
fied result. This could be achieved through establishing action plans, providing financial 
and technical support, implementing capacity building measures including workshops, 
50 See UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Decision 34 COM 7A.4 adopted at thirty- fourth session on 
25 July– 3 August 2010, Doc. WHC- 10/ 34.COM/ 20, 3 September 2010, 20; see also State of Conservation 
of the Properties Inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, Doc. WHC- 10/ 34. COM/ 7A, 1 June, 
2010, 11– 12.
51 Interview with Ephrem Balole, Planning officer Virunga National Park, Congolese Wildlife Authority, 
Goma, DRC, 4 April 2015.
52 For instance, Art. 4(1) in the Ramsar Convention reads:  ‘Each Contracting Party shall promote the 
conservation of wetlands and waterfowl by establishing nature reserves on wetlands, whether they are 
included in the List or not, and provide adequately for their wardening’.
53 Churchill and Ulfstein (n 23)  629; Nils Goeteyn and Frank Maes, ‘Compliance Mechanisms in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements:  An Effective Way to Improve Compliance?’ (2011) Chinese 
Journal of International Law 797– 9.
54 Goeteyn and Maes (n 53) 799.
55 Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 226– 7, and in particular on the World Heritage Convention compliance mecha-
nism, see Edward J. Goodwin, ‘World Heritage Convention, the Environment, and Compliance’ (2008) 
Colorado Journal International Environmental Law and Policy 157.
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consultations, and training etc.56 Under the World Heritage Convention, states parties 
can request international assistance from the Committee for the purposes of securing the 
protection, conservation, presentation, or rehabilitation of the World Heritage Sites.57 
International assistance can be offered in terms of studies, provision of experts, skilled 
labour, training of staff and specialists, supply of equipment, low- interest or interest- free 
loans, or the granting of non- repayable subsidies under Article 22 of the World Heritage 
Convention. To this end, the World Heritage Convention has also established a World 
Heritage Fund to finance application activities.58
Prior to the DRC project, many park rangers located in rebel- controlled areas had 
not received a salary for several years because they were cut off from headquarters. Due 
to the insecure situation and the fact that salaries were not paid to the rangers, many 
of them left their posts and the Sites were left uncontrolled. In the case of the DRC, the 
Committee has facilitated the provision of the park rangers’ salaries as international 
assistance to keep them at their posts to monitor the World Heritage Sites and thus help 
the DRC to comply with the convention.59 In addition to distributing salaries, the park 
stations, many of which were looted during the hostilities, have been rehabilitated and 
secured under the project. The park rangers received training and equipment, includ-
ing trucks, pick- ups, speedboats, and even an airplane, as a part of the international 
assistance provided under the convention.60
The supportive measures have also consisted of green diplomacy of the treaty bod-
ies to advocate for the World Heritage Sites as well as the park rangers having neutral 
status in relation to the Congolese armed conflicts. The background of the measure 
was the fact that park rangers became direct targets in the conflicts. Being employees 
of a Congolese state organ, the park rangers were mistrusted by the rebel groups that 
associate them with the government and the Congolese Army. At the same time, the 
Congolese Army has been suspicious towards the park rangers, as they often continue 
to engage in protection work in the rebel- controlled areas.61 As a result, the park rang-
ers have been attacked from several sides of the conflicts. Between 1996 and 2008 more 
than 190 park rangers were killed.62 To protect the park rangers and to prevent further 
casualties, UNESCO called for immunity for the park rangers from attacks similarly 
56 Goeteyn and Maes (n 53) 814.
57 The Committee grants the requests in accordance with Art 13(1) of the World Heritage Convention.
58 Art. 15 of the World Heritage Convention.
59 As the Kinshasa- based Congolese Wildlife Authority was not in contact with the four rebel con-
trolled Sites in the Eastern DRC, salaries could not be provided. Therefore, it requested the World Heritage 
Convention Bureau and the Committee to help the park rangers in these Sites by providing assistance. The 
Bureau did approve the request and funds were distributed via contracts established with conservation 
NGOs and other partners to UNESCO that remained on the field. The Bureau approved a total sum of US$ 
105,000 for the four sites. See UNESCO World Heritage Committee, State of Conservation of the Properties 
Inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, Doc. WHC- 99/ CONF.209/ 13, Paris, 18 October 1999, 4.
60 During the first phase of the pilot project (2001– 2005) approximately US$ 900,000 was spent on 
salaries, equipment, etc., UNESCO World Heritage Committee, State of Conservation of the Properties 
Inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, Doc. WHC- 11/ 35. COM/ 7A.Add, 27 May 2011, 4.
61 Interview with Ephrem Balole, Planning officer Virunga National Park, Congolese Wildlife Authority, 
Goma, DRC, 4 April 2015.
62 Christian Nellemann, Ian Redmond, and Johannes Refisch (eds.), The Last Stand of the Gorilla, 
Environmental Crime and Conflict in the Congo Basin (Birkeland Trykkeri AS, Norway: UNEP, 2010), 21.
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to medical staff in armed conflict.63 To achieve this, UNESCO organized a meeting in 
Nairobi, Kenya with representatives from the Congolese government based in Kinshasa 
and two rebel groups that controlled parts of the World Heritage Sites in the Eastern 
DRC at the time. The meeting focused on how to ensure the continuation of the work 
of the park rangers in order to protect the World Heritage Sites.64 Other diplomacy 
measures consisted of conducting diplomatic missions to the rebel groups, organizing 
tripartite meetings, targeted missions to the World Heritage Sites, and individual con-
tacts with high- level authorities.65 UNESCO sent two diplomatic missions to all the 
Congolese World Heritage Sites in 1999 and 2000.66
This diplomacy achieved an agreement from the Congolese Army and the rebel 
groups to respect the World Heritage Sites as neutral for conservation purposes. Several 
rebel groups expressed their commitment to protect the Sites and respect the park rang-
ers’ neutral status. For instance, in the World Heritage Site of Kahuzi Biega National 
Park, the rebel group in control of the Site announced that the gorillas would receive 
protection and granted the rangers permission to monitor the Sites.67 Also, in Virunga 
National Park, similar announcements were made by rebels during the conflicts.68 In 
the World Heritage Site of Okapi Reserve, the park rangers described how the acknowl-
edgment of their neutral status made it possible for them to continue their work and 
also keep their weapons for this purpose.69 Engaging the different rebel groups and the 
Congolese Army to preserve the World Heritage Sites has been crucial to maintaining 
some kind of protection work during the armed conflicts, in particular in the rebel- 
controlled areas.70 UNESCO ‘s diplomatic missions managed to secure the Mikeno sec-
tor (gorilla sector) containing the important gorilla habitat of the World Heritage Site 
of Virunga National Park in 2004.71 It has also been claimed that to some extent, rebel 
groups began to respect the sites after UNESCO’s intervention. Rebel groups allegedly 
stopped engaging in bush meat and ivory trade, although this is difficult to verify.72 
63 World Heritage Papers 17 (n 37) 112. Also confirmed by interview with Radar Nishuli, Park Director 
and Chief Warden, Kahuzi Biega National Park, Congolese Wildlife Authority, Bukavu, DRC, 24 March 
2015.
64 Cosma Wilunga Balongelwa, Patrimoine Naturel et Conflicts Armés (Paris: Harmattan, 2013) 112.
65 World Heritage Papers 17 (n 37) 112.
66 Interview with Jeff Mapilanga, Director, Congolese Wildlife Authority, Kinshasa, DRC, 30 March 2015.
67 For instance, to convince the rebel leaders to protect the gorillas, the park rangers in the World 
Heritage Site of Kahuzi Biega National Park brought them to see the gorilla populations. Interview with 
Radar Nishuli, Park Director and Chief Warden, Kahuzi- Biega National Park, Congolese Wildlife Authority, 
Bukavu, DRC, 24 March 2015.
68 In January 2007, an agreement was made between senior Virunga park warden Paulin Ngobobo and 
rebel group leader Colonel Makenga for National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). The 
agreement sought to spare the gorillas during the on- going armed conflict. ‘Congo Rebel Agree to End the 
Gorilla Slaughter’ National Geographic News, 25 January 2007, at <http:// news.nationalgeographic.com/ 
news/ 2007/ 01/ 070125- gorillas- congo.html> accessed 14 June 2017.
69 Interview with Richard Tschombe, Country Director for DRC, Wildlife Conservation Society, 
Kinshasa, 1 April 2015. Tschombe has also experienced working for the Congolese Wildlife Authority in 
the World Heritage Site of Okapi Reserve.
70 Also the German Cooperation directly negotiated with rebel groups in the Kahuzi- Biega National 
Park. See World Heritage Papers 17 (n 37) 110– 12, 117.
71 World Heritage Papers 17 (n 37) 103, 120.
72 Interview with Jeff Mapilanga, Director, Congolese Wildlife Authority, Kinshasa, DRC, 30 March 2015.
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Although park rangers have remained in a vulnerable position with several rangers 
killed in the hostilities even after the diplomacy efforts, their claimed neutral status 
has reportedly improved their working conditions.73 In most of the Sites, park rangers 
could move freely around the rebel- controlled areas for protection purposes. The park 
rangers would advise the rebels of when and where they patrolled the parks to avoid 
casualties. The efforts also re- established the links between the Congolese Wildlife 
Authority’s headquarters in Kinshasa and the Sites in Eastern DRC.74 The park rangers 
were even allowed to travel to Kinshasa to coordinate their work with the Congolese 
Wildlife Authority.75
The political and diplomatic support for protecting the Sites is an innovative 
characteristic of the DRC project. UNESCO acted as mediator to convince the 
parties to the conflict that they needed to respect the World Heritage Sites and 
more importantly the park rangers. The measure was a result of the treaty bod-
ies using their wide discretionary power to adopt a creative interpretation of the 
loosely formulated provisions of the World Heritage Convention to support the 
DRC to comply with the convention in a manner that took into account the cir-
cumstances and challenges of the Sites. Park rangers have witnessed how the atten-
tion from the international community that the project brought has affected the 
rebels’ attitude towards them. Moreover, although the material support in the form 
of equipment and monetary compensation has been essential for the park rangers 
to continue their work, the moral support from the international community has 
been described as having equal importance. It has created a more secure environ-
ment for the park rangers, which has encouraged them to perform their job even 
in difficult times.76
Most environmental treaties like the World Heritage Convention share the primary 
aim of assisting and motivating states parties to be in full compliance and to secure the 
treaty objectives.77 The opportunities to adopt measures to help them comply creates 
73 In 2006– 2007 when the rebel group CNDP controlled north of the part of the gorilla sector of 
Virunga National Park, rangers continued to work to protect park and the gorillas. All governmental 
institutions left, including the Congolese Wildlife Authority, from the rebel controlled areas of the park. 
Thus, the rangers who stayed acted outside their official capacity. At this time they got equipment and 
salaries from NGOs. The International Gorilla Conservation Programme managed to stay and assist 
the park rangers. The rebel groups did accept that rangers were involved in conservation work. In 2012, 
the rebel group M23 took control of the Virunga National Park. This time, the park rangers stayed and 
continued to patrol the Park. Even though rangers were involved in casualties and some were killed 
at their posts, this did not occur by the rebel groups controlling the area. The gorillas were more or 
less spared from being subject to bush meat and intentional killing. Although the facts are hard to 
access in armed conflict, it seems that the gorilla sector in Virunga National Park remained well moni-
tored. Interview with Altor Musema, DRC Country Coordinator, International Gorilla Conservation 
Programme, Goma, DRC, 20 March 2015.
74 World Heritage Papers 17 (n 37) 111.
75 Interview with Jeff Mapilanga, Director, Congolese Wildlife Authority, Kinshasa, DRC, 30 March 2015.
76 ibid.; see also Interview with Richard Tschombe, Country Director for Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Wildlife Conservation Society, Kinshasa, 1 April 2015.
77 Goeteyn and Maes (n 53) 815.
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further degrees of flexibility, providing the treaties with tools for pragmatic solutions 
adapted to particular challenges, such as those posed by armed conflict.
D.  Fourth element: institutional cooperation
The fourth element relates to the World Heritage Convention institutions’ coopera-
tion with other stakeholders. In accordance with Article 13(7) of the World Heritage 
Convention, the Committee is authorized to cooperate with other organizations, 
bodies, and individuals to implement projects and programmes.78 The DRC pro-
ject is a collaboration between UNESCO, the Congolese Wildlife Authority and its 
governmental and non- governmental partners, other UN agencies, international 
organizations, and NGOs. The project has enabled the international community to 
cooperate in protecting the natural World Heritage Sites during and after armed 
conflicts.
Another example of international cooperation is the Committee’s invitation to the 
UN peacekeeping mission79 to assist the park rangers to evacuate armed rebel groups 
from the World Heritage Sites.80 The peacekeepers monitor areas that encompass the 
World Heritage Sites. Since October 2003, the peacekeeping forces have collaborated 
with the Committee.81 The peacekeepers have helped the rangers monitor the Sites 
and they have conducted some disarmament operations of rebel groups in cooperation 
with the rangers.82 The cooperation has not, however, been formalized between the 
peacekeeping mission or the UN Security Council and the Committee.83 Furthermore, 
the cooperation with the peacekeepers has been limited and dissatisfaction has been 
expressed from the park staff in several Sites regarding the peacekeepers’ presence. In 
addition, the peacekeeping mandate is to protect civilians and not World Heritage Sites 
or the environment per se. Nevertheless, the link between the environment and the 
hostilities is strong. This was shown in March 2015 when the peacekeeping mission in 
78 On the World Heritage Convention website, there is a list of different actors which are World Heritage 
Convention partners, including Earth Watch Institute, Panasonic, International New York Times, Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry of Affairs, GTZ, Belgian Federal Science Policy, see World Heritage Convention webpage, 
at <http:// whc.unesco.org/ en/ partners/ > accessed 14 June 2017.
79 As the Security Council has determined that the situation in the DRC constitutes a threat to interna-
tional peace and security, it has deployed a UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) in accordance with 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See UN Security Council Resolution, adopted on 28 July 2003, UN Doc. 
S/ RES/ 1493 in preamble para. 12.
80 See UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Decision 27 COM 7.A.2 adopted at twenty- seventh session 
on 30 June– 5 July 2003, distributed 10 December 2003, Doc. WHC- 03/ 27.COM/ 24, 10; see also Decision 30 
COM 7A.7 adopted by at thirtieth session on 8– 16 July 2006, distributed 23 August 2006, UN Doc. WHC- 
06/ 30.COM/ 19, 18.
81 UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Decision 28 COM 15A.3 adopted at twenty- eighth session on 
28 June– 7 July 2004, distributed 29 October 2004, Doc. WHC- 04/ 28/ COM/ 26, 52.
82 UNESCO World Heritage Committee, State of Conservation of the Properties Inscribed on the List of 
World Heritage in Danger, distributed 21 June 2004, Doc. WHC- 04/ 28.COM/ 15A Rev, 7.
83 UNESCO World Heritage Committee, State of Conservation of the Properties inscribed on the List 
of World Heritage in Danger, distributed 11 May 2009, Doc. WHC- 09/ 33.COM/ 7A, 14. In 2011, it was 
reported that the Committee remained in contact with the UN peacekeeping troops, but that little direct 
support was provided to the Park. See UNESCO World Heritage Committee, State of Conservation of the 
Properties Inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, distributed 27 May 2011, Doc. WHC- 11/ 
35.COM/ 7A.Add, 5.
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the DRC and United Nations Environmental Programme (‘UNEP’) proposed inclusion 
of the protection of the World Heritage Sites in the mandate of the UN peacekeeping 
mission. Although the protection of the World Heritage Sites was included in a draft 
decision, it did not end up in the Security Council’s final decision.84 Thus, the protec-
tion of the World Heritage Sites as such remains outside the scope of the peacekeepers’ 
mandate.
Interestingly enough, the role of UNESCO has become less significant since the 
launching of the project in 2000 because of the international cooperation. As more 
international organizations, NGOs, and other stakeholders have returned to the 
DRC to engage in environmental protection work, the project is less influential. 
Nonetheless, the World Heritage Convention remains crucial as an instrument for 
international cooperation to safeguard the World Heritage Sites. As the governmen-
tal institutions of the DRC are weak and without sufficient financial means, foreign 
stakeholders are crucial for protection work because they contribute to strengthen-
ing capacity building and provide funding. Since the outbreak of armed conflicts, 
the protection of the World Heritage Sites has mainly been funded by international 
aid. The management plan of the Sites is developed through close cooperation 
between national and international agencies, in which process the World Heritage 
Convention and its treaty bodies provide guidance.85 Several of the Sites are under 
direct management of Private- Public Partnerships or NGOs collaborating with the 
Congolese Wildlife Authority.86 The recognition of World Heritage Sites having 
rare species like mountain gorillas and okapis facilitates international cooperation 
and assistance. It gives access to funds not only from UNESCO and the UN system 
but also from other states, international organizations, and NGOs. Consequently, 
as the Congolese government is financially challenged, most of the environmen-
tal protection work of the Sites is funded by means other than domestic.87 Besides 
the direct support to the World Heritage Sites and the application measures of 
the World Heritage Convention, several development projects have occurred as a 
84 During the experts meeting, the following statement was proposed for consideration by the UN 
Security Council during the upcoming review of MONUSCO’s mandate: ‘Authorizes MONUSCO to sup-
port national and regional efforts to investigate, prosecute and sanction members of armed groups and 
criminal networks engaged in national and transnational organized crime including, but not limited to, 
the illicit exploitation and trade in natural resources, such as gold and other minerals, wildlife, charcoal 
and timber, with special emphasis on addressing sources of conflict and safeguarding protected areas from 
armed groups, particularly, but not limited to, UNESCO World Heritage Sites.’ UNEP MONUSCO Draft 
report from expert meeting, ‘ackground Paper on Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Natural Resources 
Benefitting Organized Criminal Groups and its Implications on MONUSCO’s Role in Fostering Stability 
and Peace in Eastern DR Congo (Goma, DRC, 21 March 2015). Report is not yet published, but on file 
with the author.
85 As a result of the cooperation, institutional structures were set up to facilitate implementation, includ-
ing the Congo Conservation Coalition (‘CoCoCongo’), a general management plan for all Sites and the Site 
Coordination Committees (‘CoCoSi’), management plans on a site level. These institutions are forums for 
coordination among all the partners and donors. See World Heritage Papers 17 (n 37) 110.
86 Each Site has its own donors. Interview with Ulrich Müller, Senior Planning Officer, German 
Cooperation (GIZ), DRC, Kinshasa, DRC, 1 April 2015.
87 The involvement of UNESCO has made it possible to generate additional funds to the World Heritage 
Sites. World Heritage Papers 17 (n 37) 111.
 Britta Sjöstedt 89
byproduct with the aim to protect the Sites and promote stability in the region.88 
For instance, around the Virunga National Park, investments have been made for 
building hydro plants. The building of the hydro plants aims to reduce the depend-
ence on charcoal and thus safeguard the park.89 Other types of development pro-
jects have focused on distributing energy- efficient ovens to the local population 
and planting fast- growing trees outside the park to prevent deforestation inside 
the Virunga National Park.90 Besides their main purpose of protecting the envi-
ronment, these types of development projects have positive side effects as they 
also contribute to rebuilding a war- torn society through aid from the international 
community. The element of enabling international cooperation is common to the 
majority of environmental treaties as a means of applying the treaties. The trea-
ties either can explicitly or implicitly empower institutions to instigate cooperation 
with other stakeholders.91 Generally, environmental treaties provide great flexi-
bility as to how to conduct this collaboration. Often, the environmental treaties 
lack explicit provisions or guidance on how the cooperation between organizations 
should be undertaken.92 The cooperation may consist of exchanges of information, 
partnerships, and joint activities, but there is no set template.93 In the DRC, the pro-
ject is a collaborative partnership with various international and local stakehold-
ers. The Ramsar Convention has also various partnerships with different types of 
stakeholders, mainly with other environmental treaty institutions and international 
organizations, NGOs, and the private sector in order to find innovative solutions 
and practical actions to protect wetlands. Hence, such cooperation strengthens a 
state party’s capacity to implement the Ramsar Convention by bringing together 
experts and policy makers to develop guidance and guidelines; tapping expertise 
and knowledge at a broader level; leveraging resources at all levels; seeking crea-
tive or innovative solutions of mutual interest collectively; and forging new link-
ages and alliances between capacity- building needs and cooperative actions.94 This 
88 Proposals have been made for economic alternatives to promote sustainable development by and for 
the local population. See World Heritage Papers 17 (n 37) 118– 19. One example is projects on charcoal 
reduction or alternatives, as charcoal production is a major threat to Virunga National Park. It has been 
estimated that 90 per cent of the population in the surrounding area, such as the city of Goma, depends on 
it for fuel. Furthermore, 80 per cent of the charcoal is currently estimated to come from Virunga National 
Park, which causes deforestation in the Park. WWF estimated in 2013 that this would clear about 18,000 
hectares of Virunga per year. Thus, the search for alternatives is an important measure to protect the sites. 
Interview with Juan Seve, WWF Country Director, DRC, Kinshasa, DRC, 31 March 2015.
89 Interview with Ephrem Balole, Planning officer Virunga National Park, Congolese Wildlife Authority, 
Goma, DRC, 4 April 2015.
90 Interview with Juan Seve, WWF Country Director, DRC Kinshasa, DRC, 31 March 2015. See also 
<https:// www.worldwildlife.org/ stories/ better- stoves- for- a- healthier- planet> accessed 14 June 2017.
91 Matz (n 35) 167. 92 ibid. 164, 170– 1.
93 For instance, UNEP promotes cooperation among environmental treaties and coordinates such activi-
ties. UNEP has held several conferences to coordinate the secretariats of the treaties. Such a view is con-
firmed by the UN General Assembly. See UN Doc. A/ 54/ 468. Examples of cooperation are given in the text 
on World Heritage Convention in the DRC.
94 Ramsar webpage, at <http:// archive.ramsar.org/ cda/ en/ ramsar- activities- partnershipindex/ main/ ram-
sar/ 1- 63- 506_ 4000_ 0_ _ > accessed 14 June 2017.
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indicates that an environmental treaty like the Ramsar Convention has the poten-
tial to instigate similar conjoint projects as the World Heritage Convention under 
the pre- condition that the states parties have the political will to do so. The struc-
ture for such cooperation is already in place. Environmental treaties can implement 
their agreements with limited state involvement by relying on cooperation with 
other treaty bodies or NGOs for instance. The possibility to establish cooperation 
with other stakeholders is important to apply and achieve the objective of the envi-
ronmental treaties. This is useful in a post- conflict scenario with weak domestic 
governance. A similar approach to international cooperation could inform the jus 
post bellum framework.
3.4 Conclusions
Environmental protection work is of low priority in war- torn societies, even though 
the state of the environment is a factor affecting the recovery of these societies and 
the ability to create lasting peace in many cases. Nevertheless, environmental trea-
ties may be able to ensure that some environmental protection work can be carried 
out despite institutional collapse and lack of governance. The mechanisms under 
the World Heritage Convention have managed to provide alternative support to 
natural World Heritage Sites during and after armed conflict in a manner that can 
strengthen the environmental protection throughout the conflict cycle. The opera-
tion of other environmental treaties may also be able to adapt to the context- based 
challenges during and after armed conflict to protect and restore the environment 
in post- conflict.
In the case of the DRC, the four structural elements of the World Heritage 
Convention have proven to be of essence to launch a project to protect the 
Congolese Sites. By using the open- ended provisions (second element) in the con-
vention and the broad mandate of the treaty bodies (first element) to adapt the 
measures to the national context of the DRC, the Committee has attempted to pre-
serve the World Heritage Sites through institutional collaboration (fourth element). 
The first element of open- ended provisions combined with the second element of 
institutions with a broad mandate enable the obligations to be developed on the 
basis of the contextual challenges for a particular state party. The third and fourth 
elements of supportive mechanisms and cooperative initiatives, respectively, could 
embody the principle of international cooperation by ensuring international sup-
port from different collaborating stakeholders at the time when a state party may 
struggle to protect its environment. The World Heritage Convention has minimized 
damage to these Sites during and after armed conflict by providing funds; sup-
porting the development of national institutions and associated regulations; and 
enforced the monitoring and controlling of the Sites (third element). These efforts 
have contributed to the fact that park rangers in the DRC are relatively well paid, 
respected, and adequately equipped, even though there are some differences among 
the Sites. The Congolese Wildlife Authority has its own surveillance mechanism, 
security system, and a security force to monitor and protect the World Heritage 
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Sites.95 These efforts cannot replace national governance, but they can contribute to 
the environmental protection work in the transition from armed conflict to peace. 
To some extent international organizations, NGOs, and other actors are filling the 
‘institutional vacuum’ that occurs in this transition phase. The World Heritage Sites 
in the DRC are still under threat from the insecure situation,96 but still the project 
has contributed to restore the management of the Sites and its protection.
Other projects similar to the DRC project but instigated under a different environ-
mental treaty could be launched in other conflicts to protect the environment. The 
World Heritage Convention of course has a different status than most other environ-
mental treaties as it protects World Heritage Sites representing a universal interest for 
humankind. However, the World Heritage Convention is not the only environmen-
tal treaty that has been applied to address issues connected to armed conflicts.97 The 
advantage of having the four elements addressed allows environmental treaties to adapt 
to deal with various situations. The environmental treaties operate differently than 
most international treaties by focusing on supportive measures to remedy the inability 
of states parties to comply with their international obligations. This may be of particu-
lar interest during and after armed conflict, which may be the time when states have 
particular difficulties providing adequate environmental protection. Although these 
mechanisms cannot substitute domestic governance, they can minimize environmental 
destruction through their provisions that enable funding, capacity building, equipment 
support, data analysis, consultation on national regulation, and coordination of inter-
national and local actors involved in protection work. Such measures can be adopted 
during and after armed conflict. In addition, these types of measures could contribute 
95 The security force has been described as having a paramilitary structure. It has received training from 
the Belgian and French Special Forces. Nevertheless, all the training of the rangers has been conducted 
under the supervision of the Congolese Army as such training would not be permitted without the army’s 
consent. The ability of the park rangers’ security force was demonstrated in the Virunga National Park when 
it managed to clear the volcano sector from rebel groups without assistance from the Congolese Army or 
the UN peacekeeping mission deployed in the DRC. As a result, since October 2014, tourist excursions 
are conducted to visit the volcano. Interview with Jeff Mapilanga, Director, Congolese Wildlife Authority, 
Kinshasa, DRC, 30 March 2015. Interview with Richard Tschombe, Country Director for DRC, Wildlife 
Conservation Society, Kinshasa, 1 April 2015.
96 On 2 March 2015, unnamed UN officials stated that Virunga National Park was all cleared from 
rebels, see <http:// wildlifenews.co.uk/ 2015/ 03/ virunga- cleared- of- rebels- claim/ > accessed 14 June 2017. 
Nevertheless, the park is under threat from potential oil exploration. The government permitted Soco 
International, a British oil company, to explore the possibility of exploiting oil from Lake Edward, situated 
in the heart of Virunga National Park.
97 For instance, the CITES has operated in war- torn states, including the DRC, Liberia, Central African 
Republic etc. to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten 
their survival. CITES has been involved in several projects that aim to safeguard species from, inter alia, 
effects associated with armed conflicts. For instance, the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife 
Crime (‘ICCWC’) project is a collaborated effort involving CITES, INTERPOL, the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime (‘UNODC’), the World Bank, and the World Customs Organisation (‘WCO’). ICCWC addresses 
wildlife crimes, such as poaching, illegal logging, and illegal processing of animal and plant material. 
Wildlife crimes are often connected with armed conflicts. CITES has launched another project to prevent 
illegal killing of elephants (the MIKE Project). Killing elephants for ivory trade is a common feature in 
armed conflicts. This project is in collaboration with UNEP and the European Commission. The objective is 
to create systems to monitor illegal killing of elephants. See CITES webpage, at <http:// www.cites.org/ eng/ 
disc/ what.php> accessed 14 June 2017.
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to peacemaking in post- conflict. The practices taking place within the parameters of 
international environmental treaties are of relevance for jus post bellum. Consequently, 
the role of environmental treaties in relation to jus post bellum may be of particular 
interest in how responses can be designed to be operational in armed conflict as well 
as in post- conflict.
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Kirsten Stefanik*
4.1 Introduction
The environment is omnipresent. The protection of the environment touches on nearly 
every area of law because there is little to no human action that does not have an effect, 
to one degree or another, on some aspect of the environment. The environment encom-
passes the air which people breathe, the soil from which food is harvested, the water 
which people drink. When armed conflict breaks out, the environment is equally pre-
sent in war as it is in peace.
The environment, therefore, does not fit neatly into the ‘law of peace’ or the ‘laws of 
war’. Instead it transcends such barriers and is more appropriately considered in tri-
partite fashion in terms of jus in bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum.1 The environ-
ment is present during all these phases and must be considered throughout the armed 
conflict cycle (‘pre- ,’ ‘during’, and ‘post- conflict’). This presents a tension between 
international environmental law (‘IEL’), traditionally considered ‘peacetime’ law, and 
international humanitarian law (‘IHL’), traditionally deemed lex specialis during con-
flict. This traditional dichotomy has been broken down by the International Court of 
Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons2 in 
1996 where the Court recognized that IHL does not operate to the exclusion of all other 
rules and principles of law during armed conflict. Specifically, the Court stated that 
human rights law and IEL continue to apply during armed conflicts and that ‘[existing 
international law relating to the protection of the environment] indicates important 
environmental factors that are to be properly taken into account in the context of the 
implementation of the principles and rules of law applicable to armed conflict’.3 While 
the Court was speaking specifically of the application of these bodies of law during 
* PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. This chapter is a revised and short-
ened version of portions of the author’s LLM dissertation, entitled Restoring Humanity to Humanitarian 
Law: Borrowing from Environmental Law to Protect Civilians and the Environment (University of Western 
Ontario, 2013). The author would like to thank Dr. Sara Seck and Dr. Valerie Oosterveld for their comments 
on earlier drafts of this chapter.
1 Carsten Stahn, ‘ “Jus ad Bellum,” “Jus in bello”  . . .  “Jus Post Bellum”?— Rethinking the Conception of 
the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2007) 17 European Journal of International Law 921, 923.
2 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Judgment of 8 July 1996, ICJ 
Reports, 226, para. 78. (‘ICJ, Nuclear Weapons’).
3 ibid. para. 33.
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conflict, there is no reason not to extend such an approach to the interplay of these 
bodies of law post- conflict, or jus post bellum. As Stahn notes:
some of the problems arising in the period of transition from conflict to peace can-
not be addressed by a simple application of the ‘law of peace’ or the ‘laws of war’, but 
require ‘situation- specific’ adjustments, such as organizing frameworks and princi-
ples which are specifically geared towards the management of situations of transition 
between conflict and peace.4
It is particularly important that the environment receive attention before, during, and 
after conflict because as our understanding of the environment and the interdepend-
encies between humanity and nature grows, so does our capacity to wreak serious and 
irreversible harm to human and natural environments, not only in the short term, but 
for generations to come. The harms to the environment occurring in war have negative 
consequences which often continue to affect society long after the cessation of hostili-
ties. Environmental harms committed during conflict cannot always be undone, but 
the environment must nonetheless remain at the forefront of post- conflict transitions 
because ‘all human rights depend . . . on a supportive environment’5 and ‘[p] oor [envi-
ronmental] choices made early on [in the reconstruction process] may establish trajec-
tories that will undermine the fragile foundations of peace’.6
This chapter focuses on an approach or tool for the management of this critical inter-
play between IEL and the jus in bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. It focuses on the 
power of general principles of IEL, to inform the interpretation and application of IHL, 
in particular with regards to protections for the environment and human health. This 
can be done before conflict when new weapons are being developed, during conflict as 
military operations are being planned and executed, and post- conflict as transitions 
are made to a sustainable peace. The chapter begins with an in- depth examination of 
general principles of international law as a source of international law. It explores how 
they are identified and describes four critical functions they fulfil in international law. 
Next, the chapter focuses on two particularly useful principles of international envi-
ronmental law: the general principle of intergenerational equity and the precautionary 
principle. It demonstrates how these principles bring greater understanding and guid-
ance with regard to short- and long- term consequences of actions and an approach 
to dealing with threats to the environment in the face of scientific uncertainty. It con-
cludes with an emphasis on the jus post bellum application of this approach, arguing 
that tools such as peace agreements and truth and reconciliation commissions need to 
turn their attention to such principles in the execution of their roles as tools of transi-
tion and reconstruction.
4 Stahn (n 1) 924.
5 John H. Knox, UNHRC, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations 
Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment twenty- second session, 
UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 22/ 43, 24 December 2012, 7, para. 19.
6 David Jensen and Steve Lonergan, ‘Natural Resources and Post- conflict Assessment, Remediation, 
Restoration, and Reconstruction: Lessons and Emerging issues’ in David Jensen and Steve Lonergan (eds.), 
Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (New  York:  Routledge, 2012), 
411, 413.
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4.2 The Power of Principles: General Principles 
of International Law
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’)7 provides the 
sources of international law upon which the ICJ can rely to resolve cases before it. This 
article is also depended upon more broadly as demonstrative of the sources of inter-
national law. The inclusion of general principles as a source of international law under 
Article 38(1)(c) is not only a source distinct from conventional and customary law, 
under Article 38(1)(a) and (b), but it is also, importantly, distinct from the subsidiary 
sources of international law referred to in Article 38(1)(d).
There is no one authority which clearly and completely defines what is meant by the 
phrase ‘general principles of law’.8 In fact, how to define and identify such principles 
has long been a matter of practical and academic disagreement and debate.9 For exam-
ple, in the Kupreškić judgment, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) refers to general principles from three different sources:  ‘general 
principles of international criminal law’, ‘general principles of criminal law common to 
the major legal systems of the world’, and ‘general principles of law consonant with the 
basic requirements of international justice’.10 The ICJ has also been vague, or avoided 
altogether, defining ‘principles’ or providing insight in how to identify them.11 Despite 
this lack of agreement and clarity on general principles, there are, nonetheless, key ele-
ments and important concepts that can be drawn from the abundance of discourse in 
existence on the subject.
While the language of Article 38(1)(c) gives little indication as to where or how these 
principles should be defined or identified, scholars such as the late Oscar Schachter 
provide some basic characteristics of general principles.12 Schachter highlights the 
‘generality and abstractness’ of principles by contrasting them to the ‘definiteness’ of 
legal rules.13 He states that principles ‘have a wide range of application’ and naturally 
give way, when more than one principle applies to a situation, to a weighing and bal-
ancing to find the specific solution.14 According to Joseph Raz, ‘[p] rinciples, because 
they prescribe highly unspecified acts, tend to be more vague and less certain than 
rules’.15 This is, in fact, a benefit of principles because they allow for a broader range of 
application and ‘leave room for varying interpretation’.16 This generality of principles of 
7 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1055, 33 UNTS 993, Art. 38(1).
8 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law” ’ (1989– 
1990) 11 Michigan Journal of International Law 768, 769– 817; Christopher A Ford, ‘Judicial Discretion 
in International Jurisprudence:  Article 38(1)(c) and “ ‘General Principles of Law” ’ (1994– 1995) 5 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 35, 65; Sean D Murphy, Principles of International Law (St. 
Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 2012), 10; Gideon Boas, Public International Law: Contemporary Principles 
and Practices (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012), 108– 9.
9 Bassiouni (n 8) 770– 96; Ford (n 8) 65.
10 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Trial Chamber, Judgment (IT- 95- 16- T, 14 January 2000), [591].
11 Bassiouni (n 8) 791– 800.
12 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, NLDS:  Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1991).
13 ibid. 20. 14 ibid.
15 Joseph Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ (1971– 1972) 81 Yale Law Journal 823, 841.
16 Schachter (n 12) 20.
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international law allows room for adaptation to more specific contexts in different situ-
ations and different areas of law, as well as to develop more specific content in domestic 
legal systems.
Still, this leaves open the question of how to recognize a general principle and how 
much recognition from states is required for their existence. Once again, a certain 
amount of ambiguity is encountered because, as M. Cherif Bassiouni notes, ‘no quanti-
tative or numerical test for States having such a “principle” has ever been established’.17 
What is clear is that, while the principle must exist in multiple states, it ‘does not have 
to meet the test of “universal acceptance” ’.18 The ‘universal acceptance’ requirement or 
test has been rejected by the ICJ in both the South West Africa Cases 19 and the North 
Sea Continental Shelf case.20
For Schachter, these principles are ones ‘ “intrinsic to the idea of law”, required by 
“the nature of human beings”, or necessitated by the structure of international soci-
ety’.21 Bassiouni suggests that general principles are ‘expressions of other unperfected 
sources of international law enumerated in the statutes of the PCIJ (Permanent Court 
of International Justice, the predecessor to the ICJ) and ICJ; namely, conventions, cus-
toms, writings of scholars, and decisions of the PCIJ and ICJ’.22 For Bassiouni, these 
unperfected sources, for instance, ‘when a custom is not evidenced by sufficient or 
consistent practice, or when States express opinio juris without any supportive prac-
tice  . . .  singularly or cumulatively with others, [it] may possibly be considered to be 
expressions of a given principle’.23
There are several different ways of identifying general principles as deriving 
from: (1) national legal systems of states; (2) the idea of law itself; and (3) the interna-
tional legal system. Each of these are discussed in turn below. However, it is critical to 
note that it is not a matter that only one of these is the sole correct means for identifying 
general principles. Rather, general principles can, are, and have been identified from all 
three of these sources in both academic and judicial legal discourse.
4.2.1  Derived from national laws
One of the most commonly discussed interpretations of general principles posits 
that they originate from the domestic law of states. Sean Murphy states that ‘general 
principles’ ‘can mean principles that exist in the national laws of states worldwide’.24 
However, he goes on to note that the language found in Article 38(1)(c)— general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations— ‘does not actually refer to national 
law’.25 Bassiouni also sees two avenues for identifying general principles, only the first 
17 Bassiouni (n 8) 788. 18 ibid.
19 South- West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v South Africa), Judgment of 18 July 1966 
(Second Phase) ICJ Reports 6.
20 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v.  Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Netherlands) Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 3. In his dissenting opinion, Judge 
Lachs stated that ‘to become binding, a rule or principle of international law need not pass the test of uni-
versal acceptance’.
21 Schachter (n 12) 49. 22 Bassiouni (n 8) 768. 23 ibid. 24 Murphy (n 8) 101.
25 ibid.
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of which is ‘expressions of national legal systems’.26 The other, as already noted, is that 
they are ‘expressions of other unperfected sources of international law’.27
Bassiouni asserts that there seems to be at least some consensus among scholars that 
principles ‘are found in the underlying or posited principles or postulates of national 
legal systems’, but, critically, this sentence does not end there. It is followed by the words 
‘or of international law’.28 This addition by Bassiouni recognizes the problem of solely 
identifying general principles from national legal systems. In fact, Ford suggests that 
‘[d] irect translation between domestic and international jurisprudence may well do 
violence to the real values and policies served by principles ostensibly accepted at both 
levels’.29 It is not so much that general principles can never, or should never, be found 
in domestic legal systems, but rather that ‘they should not reflexively be borrowed “after 
a census of domestic systems” ’.30 Ultimately, the key is, as Murphy notes, the language 
of Article 38(1)(c), which requires recognition of the principles by nations, not that the 
source of the principles be the domestic laws of the nations themselves.31
4.2.2  Intrinsic to the idea of law
Another potential interpretation of general principles sees them as ‘principles intrin-
sic to the idea of law’.32 That is, these principles are inherent to the very conceptions of 
justice or fairness.33 An example of this can be seen in the PCIJ‘s judgment in the River 
Meuse case, wherein the Court justified its application of the principles of equity under 
general principles of law.34 Such a use of the term ‘general principles’ can also be seen 
in the ICTY’s judgment of the Kupreškić case, in which the Tribunal refers to ‘general 
principles of law consonant with the basic requirements of international justice’.35 As 
noted earlier, the Tribunal used the term ‘general principles’ in two additional ways, 
which indicates that, while principles may found in the very idea of law itself, they may 
also be drawn from other sources.
4.2.3  Derived from the international legal system
Finally, an interpretation of general principles suggests that they are derived from inter-
national law itself. As Boas states, they ‘may be derived directly from international legal 
relations and legal relations generally’.36 By this, Boas is referring to the many inter-
pretive principles employed by international courts, such as lex specialis derogate legi 
generali (special laws prevail over general laws). He is also referring to ‘[f] oundational 
principles of the international community— such as the sovereign equality of states’.37 
This understanding of general principles can also be seen in the Kupreškić case as the 
ICTY refers to ‘general principles of international criminal law’.38 It is also inherent in 
Bassiouni’s definition of general principles as ‘expressions of other unperfected sources 
of international law’.39 This approach is further evidenced by the fact that international 
26 Bassiouni (n 8) 768. 27 ibid. 28 ibid. 771 (emphasis added). 29 Ford (n 8) 77.
30 ibid. 31 Murphy (n 8) 101. 32 ibid. 102. 33 ibid.
34 Diversion of Water from Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium) PCIJ Reports, (Series A/ B No. 70) 28 June 1937.
35 Kupreškić (n 10) [591]. 36 Boas (n 8) 107. 37 ibid. 38 Kupreškić (n 10) [591].
39 Bassiouni (n 8) 768.
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courts have drawn upon ‘State conduct, policies, practices, and pronouncements at the 
international level, which may be different from domestic legal principles’ to identify 
general principles of law.40 This understanding of general principles also emphasizes 
the usefulness of principles in the articulation of norms by courts and the ‘values of the 
“legal community” ’.41
4.3 The Role of General Principles in International Law
Just as there are many means of identifying general principles, there are also many 
functions that they serve in international law. There are four key functions general 
principles perform:
(1) A unification function: general principles act as a counterforce against the frag-
mentation of international law;
(2) A gap- filling function: where lacunae arise in international law, general princi-
ples can act to fill the gap;
(3) An interpretive function: general principles aid in the interpretation of inter-
national law; and
(4) A  development function:  general principles aid in the development of 
international law.42
Like the different origins of general principles, general principles can perform different 
functions depending on the context in which they are employed, or they can perform 
multiple functions at the same time.
4.3.1  Unification function
Fragmentation in the international legal system, as defined by the International Law 
Commission (‘ILC’) in its study on the issue, is ‘the splitting up of the law into highly 
specialized “boxes” that claim relative autonomy from each other and from the general 
law’.43 Fragmentation is the result of the creation of ‘such specialist systems as “trade 
law”, “human rights law”, “environmental law” . . .— each possessing their own princi-
ples and institutions’.44 Prost describes it as a process of expansion, densification, and 
diversification to a point at which ‘frames and margins are blurred, where legal spaces 
overlap and conflict with each other, [and] a network with a plurality of voices, lacking 
a master plan or blueprint’ is created.45
40 ibid. 788. 41 Ford (n 8) 37.
42 Note other scholars have grouped the functions of general principles into different categories. For exam-
ple, Bassiouni (n 8) 775– 6, identifies four functions which overlap and diverge from those I have chosen to use 
as identifiers. Bassiouni also has an interpretive category and a growth, or development, category. His other 
two categories are that of supplemental source of international law and modifier of convention and custom.
43 ILC Study Group, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission final-
ized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/ CN.4/ L.682 and Corr.1, 13 April 2006, 13.
44 ibid. 11.
45 Mario Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public International Law (Portland OR:  Hart Publishing, 
2012), 4– 7.
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Splitting up areas of specialization is common practice in domestic systems. 
However, in the international legal system, ‘the conceptual- doctrinal consistency, the 
clear hierarchy of norms and the effective judicial hierarchy that was developed within 
the nation- states, is lacking’.46 The big concern fragmentation presents is the ‘danger 
of conflicting and incompatible rules, principles, rule- systems and institutional prac-
tices’.47 And the critical question it raises, as the ILC describes, is ‘[h] ow should the 
relationship between such [specialized] “boxes” be conceived?’48 To understand how 
general principles can help address the concerns of fragmentation, it is useful to turn to 
the late Oscar Schachter’s analogy of the international legal system to a system of towns, 
villages, paths, and highways, as well as to look at the additional functions of general 
principles which are important for fulfilling the unification function.49
Schachter’s analogy compares international law to a large terrain. On this terrain, or 
map, a specialized branch of law is represented by a village or town, wherein they focus 
on their own affairs. There are narrow paths that run between these towns and villages, 
but they are used infrequently. Instead, covering the entire map are ‘superhighways, the 
connecting links, which in the metaphor convey the general principles and concepts’.50 
Schachter then proceeds to elaborate on how the actors on this map relate to the differ-
ent elements of the terrain. He says:
Those who travel on the highways are generally only dimly aware of the lively activities 
in the towns and villages. Those who remain only in the local communities immersed 
in their specialties tend to lose sight of the interconnections and coherence of the 
larger whole.51
Schachter goes on to emphasize the importance of the superhighways, of general prin-
ciples, because international law ‘is much more than a congery of separate legal régimes 
in particular fields. Just as facts become meaningful when they are linked to ideas and 
norms, so do ideas and norms gather strength as they become part of a coherent inter-
related system.’52 For Schachter, it is these general principles that give the system unity. 
He states that ‘[w] e need to relate concepts to practice and thus give them content. We 
need to relate practices to concepts in order to give practice meaning and direction.’53 
Principles are therefore an essential part of international law without which there can 
be no meaning and direction for practice. Principles and concepts are the important 
links uniting the growing number of specialized fields of law. Since, according to Martti 
Koskenniemi, there ‘[is] no meta- regime’ in international law,54 general principles and 
concepts can be used to increase our understanding and connect these different fields, 
as Schachter suggests.55
I would suggest that these ‘boxes’, as the ILC report refers to them, or ‘towns’ and 
‘villages’ as referred to by Schachter, are in reality merely ways of categorizing and 
46 Andreas Fischer- Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime- Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity 
in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2003– 2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999, 1002.
47 ILC Study (n 43) 14. 48 ibid. 49 Schachter (n 12) 1. 50 ibid. 51 ibid.
52 ibid. 53 ibid. 2.
54 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 
Modern Law Review 1, 5.
55 Schachter (n 12) 1– 2.
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simplifying the diverse and truly massive body of international law as a whole. It pro-
vides a language by which practitioners and academicians may label their work and 
facilitates the processing of international law. Labels (or boxes or villages) such as 
‘international humanitarian law’, ‘international human rights law’, and ‘international 
environmental law’ create more manageable, bite- sized portions, if you will, of interna-
tional law. However, in trying to make international law more easily digested, it seems 
that the ephemeral boundaries between these boxes have erroneously been trans-
formed into actual mental barriers which inhibit the ability of some to see the inher-
ent and necessary links between these so- called boxes which are, in reality, all part of 
one massive body of international law. Perhaps, to break down these mental barriers 
requires a re- emphasizing of the three other functions general principles fulfil as they 
link the content of boxes.
4.3.2  Gap- filling function
General principles ‘perform a gap- filling function where there is no customary or treaty 
law on the issue, or where a principle is required to decide which hierarchically equal 
norm should prevail in the event of a clash’.56 In doing so, general principles ‘prevent 
decision- makers from either pronouncing a non liquet (failure to decide) or, worse, 
deciding the issue according to their personal whim’.57 This is one of the most common 
functions of general principles, second only perhaps to the interpretive function.
Since gaps in positive international law do exist, there is need for something to fill 
these gaps, and general principles are the logical choice for that job. In fact, Bassiouni 
and Ford both state that this is the very reason why general principles were included as 
a source of international law in the PCIJ Statute and subsequently the ICJ Statute.58 This 
gap- filling function is ultimately articulated by the ICJ in the Right of Passage case, in 
which Judge Fernandes, in his dissenting opinion, stated that ‘[i] t frequently happens 
that a decision given on the basis of a particular or general convention or of a custom 
requires recourse to the general principles . . . A court will have recourse to those prin-
ciples to fill gaps in the conventional rules, or to interpret them.’59
4.3.3  Interpretive function
The interpretive function is the most commonly employed use of general principles. 
As Raz notes, this function is ‘of the utmost importance since it is a crucial device for 
ensuring coherence of purpose among various laws bearing on the same subject’.60 For 
instance, during armed conflict when a military operation or the use of a particular 
weapon system may simultaneously trigger concerns for the protection of the envi-
ronment as a civilian object while also posing potential threats to the human rights 
56 Boas (n 8) 47. 57 ibid. 106. 58 Bassiouni (n 8) 791; Ford (n 3) 63.
59 Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Reports 6 
(Judge Fernandes dissenting), [45]. Principles discussed by the Court in this case include the principle of 
interpretation of legal rules, the principle of sovereignty, the doctrine of implied powers in general power, 
and the principle of a right of access to enclaved property.
60 Raz (n 15) 840.
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of civilians to health, a healthy environment, and so on. In such a situation, I suggest 
general principles of international law, such as those from international environmental 
law discussed in this chapter, must guide the interpretation and application of norms of 
international humanitarian law. These principles inform the content of rule application 
in their interpretive function.
Some general principles are specifically interpretive in nature, such as the principle 
which dictates that special laws prevail over general ones (lex specialis derogate legi gen-
erali).61 Others, such as the general principle of respect for human dignity, identified by 
the ICTY in the Furundžija case, was employed by that court to help interpret interna-
tional laws relating to rape.62 This use of general principles in Furundžija exemplifies 
Bassiouni’s assertion that ‘[t] hey are useful for interpreting words not susceptible to an 
ordinary or common meaning interpretation’.63
Equally important when considering the interpretation of international law is the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’).64 Article 31(3) of the VCLT 
requires subsequent agreements, practices, and rules of international law to be taken 
into account when interpreting a treaty.65 The aim is to ensure that provisions are inter-
preted ‘so as to see the rules in view of some comprehensible and coherent objective, to 
prioritize concerns that are more important at the cost of less important objectives’.66 
It is important to note that, though the provision ‘refers to rules of international law in 
general, the words cover all the sources of international law, including custom, general 
principles, and, where applicable, other treaties’.67 While, at first glance, there may seem 
to be confusion by the use of the term ‘rules’, in the following sentence the ILC clari-
fies that this is inclusive of custom and general principles, not merely rules founded in 
conventions.68
Within a fragmented international legal system consisting of so many specialized 
institutions, law must not be employed in isolation ‘only as an instrument for attaining 
regime- objectives’.69 Rather, ‘law is also about protecting rights and enforcing obliga-
tions, above all rights and obligations that have a backing in something like a general, 
public interest’.70 The ILC emphasizes that ‘[w] ithout the principle of “systemic integra-
tion” it would be impossible to give expression to and to keep alive, any sense of com-
mon good of humankind, not reducible to the good of any particular institution or 
“regime” ’.71 If ever there is a time and a place where the common good of humankind 
is at stake and in need of protection, it is in periods of armed conflict. It is particularly 
during these periods that general principles must be held onto and held up. The inter-
pretation, and often by association the unification, functions of general principles are 
crucial to the exercise of international law and the preservation of the coherence of 
international law.
61 Boas (n 8) 107.
62 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Trial Chamber, Judgment (IT- 95- 17/ 1- T, 10 December 1998),, 
para. 183.
63 Bassiouni (n 8) 800.
64 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS, Vol. 1155, 331.
65 ibid. Art. 31(3). 66 ILC Study (n 43) 211. 67 ibid. 215. 68 ibid.
69 ibid. 244. 70 ibid. 71 ibid. 244.
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4.3.4  Development function
The final function of general principles is the development function, or as Bassiouni 
refers to it, the ‘growth function’.72 Essentially, general principles play a role in the devel-
opment of international law. Bassiouni, citing James Brierly, describes the function as 
‘an authoritative recognition of a dynamic element in international law and of the crea-
tive function of the courts which administer it’.73 This function of general principles 
serves to provide a certain amount of dynamism in the operation of international law.
The development function provides for the possibility of existing general principles 
to form the basis for creating new rules of international law.74 Bassiouni goes so far as 
to say that the ‘development of new norms of conventional and customary law required 
the existence of “General Principles” ’.75
The ICTY’s use of general principles in Furundžija, discussed above, is not only an 
example of the interpretive function of general principles but also an example of its 
development function. The Tribunal used the general principle of human dignity not 
only to interpret existing customary law on rape but also to develop the definition of 
rape in international law.76 In doing so, the Tribunal concluded that forced oral pen-
etration did constitute rape.77 The use of general principles, here, allowed for continued 
development of international law.
4.4 International Environmental Law
Treaty rules, customary norms, general principles, and subsidiary sources of interna-
tional law related to the protection of the environment can be located in the special-
ized box of international environmental law (‘IEL’). The protection of the environment 
touches on a myriad of areas because there is little to no action that does not have an 
effect, to one degree or another, on some aspect of the environment.78 Furthermore, 
‘[e] nvironmental problems present a moving target’ because ‘not only does scientific 
understanding develop, [but] environmental problems themselves change as human 
behaviour and technology change’.79 The broad, all- encompassing, transitory, scientifi-
cally uncertain, long- lasting, and potentially irreversible nature of environmental prob-
lems requires IEL to continue to adapt, adopt, and create tools to meet the needs of the 
environment and humanity.
While there may be a box for IEL, this area of international law can by no means be 
seen in isolation from other areas of international law. It would be foolish to try to sepa-
rate it from areas like international trade and development, international human rights, 
and international humanitarian law, to name but a few interconnected fields. Economic 
72 Bassiouni (n 8) 777. 73 ibid. 777 (citing JL Brierly, The Law of Nations (6d 1963) at 63).
74 Raz (n 15) 841. 75 Bassiouni (n 8) 778. 76 Furundžija (n 62).
77 ibid. [182], [184].
78 Jaye Ellis and Stepan Wood, ‘International Environmental Law’ in Benjamin J Richardson and Stepan 
Wood (eds.), Environmental Law for Sustainability (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2006) 343, 380; Daniel 
Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey, ‘International Environmental Law: Mapping the Field’ in Daniel 
Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1, 6.
79 Bodansky et al. (n 78) 7– 8.
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development based on the trade of natural resources or even the manufacture of prod-
ucts in factories affects the environment. The environment and human health cannot 
be separated and numerous, if not all, human rights depend on a healthy, sustainable 
environment if they are to be realized. In armed conflict, the environment is present 
during all military operations, even in instances where there may be no civilians pre-
sent. Therefore, it is not only the environment that is omnipresent, but also environ-
mental considerations within international law.
The legal tools of IEL include both binding treaties80 and non- binding declarations 
and resolutions.81 Tools of IEL include instruments produced by states82 as well as those 
produced by experts.83 IEL, however, lacks ‘an integrated UN special agency that could 
serve as an “umbrella organization” for coordinating environmental policies, integrat-
ing legislation, and monitoring implementation’.84 Given this lack of umbrella organi-
zation, Dupuy suggests that ‘general customary rules and general principles may act, in 
part at least, as compensation for the institutional deficiencies of the system’.85 General 
principles can, and do, operate across these imagined boundaries between specialized 
areas of international law with or without an umbrella organization. Principles of IEL 
include the principle of preventive action, cooperation, sustainable development, inter-
generational equity, the precautionary principle, the polluter- pays principle, and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility.86
In 2013, the topic of ‘Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict’ was 
added to the work of the ILC. The Commission appointed Marie Jacobsson as Special 
Rapporteur. The principles of sustainable development, prevention, precaution, pol-
luter pays, and due diligence, were noted and discussed by the Special Rapporteur in 
her Preliminary Report to the Committee in 2014.87 These principles were discussed 
as ‘candidates for continuing application during armed conflict’, however, the ‘extent to 
which they may be applicable [was] not addressed’.88 Debate on the Second Report of 
80 See, for example, Convention on Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention), 6 May 1992, 1760 
UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818.
81 See, for example, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (A/ CONF.151/ 26, Vol. I), 12 
August 1992.
82 These include binding treaties, as well as many non- binding instruments such as the Rio 
Declaration, ibid.
83 For example, reports put out by the experts groups of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(‘UNEP’) or produced by the International Law Association (‘ILA’) or International Law Commission 
(‘ILC’).
84 Pierre- Marie Dupuy, ‘Formation of Customary International Law and General Principles’ in Bodansky, 
Brunnée, and Hey (n 78) 463. Note: the UNEP does not fulfil this role primarily because it is a UN pro-
gramme with limited legal personality and controlled by the UN General Assembly, as opposed to a UN 
agency which are autonomous intergovernmental agencies created through an independent legal instru-
ment. For further discussion on the differences between UN agencies and UN programmes see UNEP, 
‘United Nations Specialised Agencies versus United Nations Programmes’, 7 June 2010, at < https:// www.
scribd.com/ document/ 212017488/ UN- Specialised- Agencies- vs- UN- Programmes.> accessed 31 May 2017.
85 UNEP (n 84) ibid.
86 See Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, with Adriana Fabra and Ruth MacKenzie (eds.), Principles of 
International Environmental Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edn, 2012), 200– 36.
87 Marie G.  Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on the Protection of the Environment 
in Relation to Armed Conflicts, ILC Doc. A/ CN.4/ 674 (30 May 2014)  paras. 125– 56 (‘ILC Preliminary 
Report’).
88 ibid. para. 117.
104 The Environment and Armed Conflict
the Special Rapporteur in 2015, prompted suggestions from some ILC members who 
‘stressed the need to methodically examine rules and principles of international envi-
ronmental law to consider their continued applicability during armed conflict and their 
relationship with that legal regime’.89 These suggestions were positively received by the 
Special Rapporteur who was in full agreement and stated, ‘that the question of what 
other rules may apply during an armed conflict, including rules and principles of inter-
national environmental law; was at the core of the topic. . . .’90 Such an examination is 
(as of early 2017) still a work in progress. A draft principle provisionally accepted by the 
ILC in 2015 notes that the ‘environment shall be respected and protected in accordance 
with applicable international law and, in particular, the law of armed conflict’.91This 
further supports the consideration of principles of IEL, as ‘applicable international law’, 
in the context of environmental protection in the application of IHL.
I now turn to a more in- depth examination of two general principles associated with 
IEL— intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle— with interpretive, gap- 
filling, developmental powers which should be applied across all fields of international 
law, in particular IHL.
4.4.1  Intergenerational equity
The first general principle I examine is the principle of intergenerational equity, also 
known as the Future Generations principle. This principle focuses on the need of each 
generation to preserve the planet’s natural and cultural heritage for future generations, 
balancing present needs with the responsibility to pass on the planet to subsequent 
generations in as good, or better, condition as it was received from prior generations.92 
At the core of the concept is a strong temporal element with the idea that ‘our actions 
today pose long- term risks to the health of our planet and to our cultural resource base 
for which the present generation will be unable to compensate future generations’.93 
Actors must consider both short- and long- term consequences of their actions within 
the context of protection of both natural and cultural environments. The rights of cur-
rent generations must be exercised in a manner that will ensure they pass on to sub-
sequent generations a world whose cultural and natural environment is in as good, or 
better, condition as when they themselves received it from preceding generations.94 
As both beneficiaries, from prior generations, and trustees, on behalf of future genera-
tions, of these environments we, the current generation, must examine our actions in 
light of their immediate effects as well as how these actions will affect these resources 
over time and spanning generations.
89 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty- seventh session, 4 May– 5 June 
and 7 July– 7 August 2015, A/ 70/ 10, 2015, chap. IX, paras. 130– 70, para. 141 (‘Report of the ILC 2015’).
90 ibid. para. 165. 91 ibid. 105 fn 378, Draft principle II- 1 (1).
92 Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations:  International Law, Common Patrimony, and 
Intergenerational Equity (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers Inc, 1989).
93 ibid. 5.
94 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework For Global Environmental Change’ 
in Edith Brown Weiss (ed.), Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1992).
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4.4.2  The history and evolution of intergenerational equity
Having established a basic understanding of the meaning and content of the concept 
of intergenerational equity, I turn to the history of the principle in IEL. Quite interest-
ingly, ‘there is no society that has not, in some way, applied the principle of current gen-
erations being responsible to future generations’ in some form or another.95 As Edith 
Brown Weiss notes, the concept of intergenerational equity, with the ‘fundamental the-
sis that we have obligations to conserve the planet for future generations and rights to 
have access to its benefits’, can be found in the ‘diverse legal traditions of the interna-
tional community’.96 Intergenerational equity can be found in ‘the common law and 
civil law traditions, in Islamic law, in African customary law, and in Asian nontheistic 
traditions’.97 These broad roots are useful in efforts to promote and strengthen the con-
cept in modern international law.
The principle of intergenerational equity first appeared in international treaty law 
in the 1946 International Whaling Convention98 and it has appeared with increasing 
frequency since that time. References to intergenerational equity can be seen in a wide 
range of conventions addressing everything from the protection of flora and fauna;99 to 
natural resources;100 to the environment more generally.101
The 1987 Brundtland Report, issued by the United Nations and written by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (‘WCED’), notably developed the idea 
of sustainable development, stating ‘Humanity has the ability to make development sus-
tainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs.’102 Crucially, the report places intergener-
ational equity at the epicentre of how it defines sustainable development and the key to 
ongoing environmental protection. While sustainable development has become more 
nuanced since 1987, intergenerational equity remains one of its key components.103
The principle of intergenerational equity has also appeared in cases and advisory 
opinions of the ICJ. One such instance is the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 104 in 1996. In its opinion, the ICJ noted that, ‘the 
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and 
the very health of human beings, including generations unborn’.105
The increasing reliance and use of intergenerational equity in international law since 
1946 demonstrates an increased awareness about human impact on the environment 
not only for current generations but also for continuing impacts on future generations.
95 Edward W Ploman, ‘Foreword’ in Weiss (n 92) xxvii. 96 Weiss (n 92) 18. 97 ibid.
98 International Protocol for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 December 1946, 161 UNTS 72, 62 Stat 1716, 
Can TS 1946 No 54.
99 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, 
993 UNTS 243, 12 ILM 1085 (CITES), preamble.
100 1985 Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (ASEAN Convention), 9 July 
1985, at ECOLEX <http:// www.ecolex.org> accessed 31 May 2017, preamble.
101 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (ENMOD), adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res 31/ 72, 10 December 1976.
102 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future [Brundtland report] 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 8 (emphasis added).
103 See Sands et al. (n 86) 206– 17. 104 Nuclear Weapons (n 2) 226 at para. 78.
105 ibid. (emphasis added).
 
106 The Environment and Armed Conflict
4.4.3  The current legal status of intergenerational equity
While the growth of the presence of, and reliance on, intergenerational equity in 
international environmental law suggests an ongoing strengthening of its status in 
international law, it is unlikely that it has achieved customary law status. As Judge 
Weeramantry notes in his dissenting opinion in the ICJ’s 1995 Nuclear Tests Case Order, 
intergenerational equity is ‘an important and rapidly developing principle of contem-
porary environmental law’.106 The more recent work of Sébastien Jodoin and Yolanda 
Saito suggests that the status continues along the lines noted by Judge Weeramantry, 
as they write that, while not customary international law, intergenerational equity 
‘undoubtedly forms an important value and concern of the international commu-
nity’.107 The inclusion of intergenerational equity in the preambles of so many inter-
national conventions is important because it provides an overarching objective or guide 
for the substantive obligations to be carried out under those conventions. As such, it 
appears that intergenerational equity is a strongly established principle of international 
environmental law.
The principle of intergenerational equity may have arisen in the field of environ-
mental law, but it has the potential to inform other areas of law such as international 
human rights law and humanitarian law. The benefits and importance of considering 
the long- term effects and repercussions of decisions made in the present are mani-
fold. It is not merely useful when dealing with the protection and preservation of our 
planet’s natural and cultural heritage, but it is also beneficial for other aspects of our 
well- being, such as health, education, and development. Employing intergenerational 
equity to guide the interpretation and application IHL is critical to ensuring that deci-
sions made in the heat of battle do not inhibit long- term goals of sustainable peace 
and reconstruction, the effects of which matter intensely not only in the present, but 
for future generations.
4.5 The Precautionary Principle
I turn now to the second general principle I wish to examine in greater depth: the 
precautionary principle. The precautionary principle asserts that, even in the face of 
scientific uncertainty, actions which present the potential for significant harm to the 
environment must be abstained from. The precautionary principle is also often con-
sidered part of, or an essential feature of, sustainable development.108
106 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Para 63 of the Court’s Judgement of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), Order of 22 September 1995, [1995] ICJ 
Rep 288 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry, 317) 341.
107 Sébastien Jodoin and Yolanda Saito, ‘Crimes Against Future Generations: Harnessing the Potential of 
Individual Criminal Accountability for Global Sustainability’ (2011– 2012) 7 McGill International Journal 
of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 115, 132.
108 See Bodansky et  al. (n 78)  14; Rajendra Ramlogan, Sustainable Development:  Towards a Judicial 
Interpretation (Leiden, NLDS: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 99; Rio Declaration (n 81).
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4.5.1  The emergence and development of the precautionary principle 
in international environmental law
The precautionary principle began to emerge in IEL instruments in the mid- 1980s, 
such as the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,109 though 
earlier instances of the principle can be seen in national legal systems.110 The articu-
lation of the precautionary principle in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, though a 
non- binding instrument, has come to be a definition of great importance. Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration states:
In order to protect the environment, the Precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost- effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.111
This definition has since been said to reflect the core, or essence, of the principle.112 It is 
also said to be the ‘most cited and conclusive definition of the principle in effect at the 
international level’.113 The importance of the Principle 15 definition is also emphasized 
by the fact that, ‘[s] ince the 1992 Rio Conference, [the precautionary principle] has 
been taken up in the majority of bilateral and multilateral international treaties relating 
to environmental protection’.114
In all, since its emergence in the 1980s, the precautionary principle is now included 
in most environmental protection treaties.115 In total, there are ‘some 60 multilateral 
treaties, covering a wide array of environmental issues ranging from air pollution to 
waste management’116 in existence currently, and this number seems likely to continue 
rising.
4.5.2  Defining the precautionary principle
The precautionary principle has rapidly emerged as an important principle in IEL. It 
endeavours to respond to the lesson of history: ‘[t] oo often, our experience in matters 
relating to the environment indicates that when we are certain we are impotent— it 
is too late to repair the damage’.117 Therefore, rather than wait until there is scientific 
certainty and, most likely the damage has already occurred, the precautionary princi-
ple ‘assert[s] that potential long- term, adverse, unintended consequences should be 
109 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, Vienna, Austria, 
1513 UNTS 293/ [1988] ATS 26/ 26 ILM 1529 (1987).
110 See Sands et al. (n 86) 217– 18. 111 Rio Declaration (n 81).
112 Sands et  al. (n 86)  218; Arie Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (Leiden, 
NLDS: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 32.
113 Joakim Zander, The Application of the Precautionary Principle in Practice: Comparative Dimensions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 72.
114 Nicolas de Sadeleer, ‘The Principles Of Prevention And Precaution In International Law:  Two 
Heads Of The Same Coin?’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M. Ong, and Panos Merkouris (eds.), Research 
Handbook on International Environmental Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 182, 187.
115 ibid. 183. 116 ibid. 187.
117 James Cameron, ‘The Precautionary Principle:  Core Meaning, Constitutional Framework and 
Procedures for Implementation’ in Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher (eds.), Perspectives on the 
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considered in advance rather than addressed after the fact’.118 This means acting in a 
precautionary manner under conditions of scientific uncertainty.
However, the principle is often criticized for being ‘vague and undefined’.119 There 
are at least twelve different definitions of the principle in international instruments.120 
Nonetheless, these varying definitions do have certain essential elements of the princi-
ple and its objectives in common: the precautionary principle seeks to protect the envi-
ronment from serious damage, even where scientific uncertainty exists as to the causal 
link between the action and the damage. Common to these different articulations and 
classifications of key elements of the precautionary principle are a threat of harm to the 
environment and related uncertainty.
Before turning to a more in- depth examination of these key elements, however, 
an important note must be made with regards to the terminology used in labelling 
the principle. Some instruments will refer to it as the ‘precautionary principle’, while 
others use the term ‘precautionary approach’. According to some scholars, a ‘pre-
cautionary approach’ is softer and less legalistic than a ‘precautionary principle’.121 
This is a view in which ‘precautionary approach’ is seen as not legally binding, as 
compared to a legal principle.122 There seems to be a geographic preference between 
the labels, with the European Community being more closely associated with the 
term ‘precautionary principle’, while the United States seems to have a preference 
for the term ‘precautionary approach’.123 Ultimately, it seems the difference is no 
more than a ‘semantic squabble’, with numerous scholars and international instru-
ments seeming to use the terms interchangeably.124 For example, while Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration uses ‘precautionary approach’, the Programme for Further 
Implementation of Agenda 21, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1997, in 
referring to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration refers to the ‘precautionary princi-
ple’.125 There seems to be no tangible differences in reality between ‘precautionary 
approach’ and ‘precautionary principle’.126
118 Peter J Balint, Ronald E Stewart, Anand Desai, and Lawrence C Walters (eds.), Wicked Environmental 
Problems: Managing Uncertainty and Conflict (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2011), 66.
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University Press, 2002), 97.
121 ibid. 98; Zander (n 113) 4, 29. 122 De Sadeleer (n 114) 186.
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4.5.3  Threat of harm
The threat of harm to the environment is without doubt one of the key elements of the 
precautionary principle. Since all interactions with the environment produce some sort 
of effect or potential change on the environment, it is important to distinguish between 
acceptable and unacceptable environmental change. According to Arie Trouwborst, 
‘[e] nvironmental change . . . qualifies as harm only when it is negative’, which, in the 
context of the precautionary principle, includes ‘the impairment of values of nature to 
humans and the impairment of the intrinsic value of nature’.127 Furthermore, generally 
only anthropogenic— that is, human- caused or - produced, threats— are considered.128 
Modern examples include deforestation, air pollution, and hunting species to the point 
of extinction. The threshold terms associated with the level of environmental harm fre-
quently used in the precautionary principle are ‘serious or irreversible damage’.129
Two key indicators of the seriousness of harm are geographic dispersion, that is, how 
large an area the harm is going to affect, and the duration or persistence of the harm 
over time:130 the inference is that the larger the area affected and the more long- term or 
persistent the harm, the more serious the harm. The fact that the harm is also irrevers-
ible will also add to its seriousness, ‘since irreversible damage is by definition serious’.131 
However, while irreversibility of harm bolsters a finding of seriousness, serious harm is 
not always irreversible.132 For example, the damage from oil spills at sea, such as those 
seen in the 1990– 1 Gulf War, is largely reversible, but oil spills nonetheless ‘fall within 
the scope of the precautionary principle owing to their seriousness’.133 Meanwhile, irre-
versibility is still an indication of the gravity of the potential harm, as well as incorpo-
rating a specific temporal element into the harm threshold.134
Finally, for the threat of environmental harm to trigger the precautionary principle 
there must be more than a ‘theoretical possibility of environmental damage’.135 There 
must be ‘at least a minimal requirement of proof ’ otherwise ‘the remotest possibilities 
would be eligible as a basis for precautionary action’.136 From this point, the question 
then becomes a threshold question, not about the threat of harm, but about the degree 
of scientific uncertainty which triggers the precautionary principle.
4.5.4  Uncertainty and risk
The sheer complexity of the environment, its many elements, many ecosystems, and the 
interconnectedness of them all, makes scientific certainty in the environmental realm 
a challenge, to say the least. Isolating causes and effects becomes difficult and this dif-
ficulty is only increased when effects may not be fully known or realized in the short 
term. Scientific uncertainty is, of course, not unique to the environmental realm either. 
It can often be seen in IHL, for example, with regards to the effects or failure rates of 
127 Trouwborst (n 112) 133.
128 Per Sandin, ‘Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle’ (1999) 5(5) Human and Ecological Risk 
Assessment 889, 891.
129 See, for example, Ramlogan (n 108) 99. 130 Trouwborst (n 112) 56.
131 De Sadeleer (n 120) 165. 132 ibid. 133 ibid. 134 Trouwborst (n 112) 58.
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certain weapons. To understand scientific uncertainty in the context of the precaution-
ary principle, it is crucial to first understand uncertainty and risk in science.
Certainty and uncertainty have slightly different meanings in the scientific context 
than in ordinary day- to- day life. In science, ‘certainty is generally considered to lie in 
the realm of 95%’137 and not 100 per cent, since 100 per cent certainty is deemed virtu-
ally impossible. A scientist will find something certain if the probability of occurrence 
or accuracy of the finding is 95 per cent or higher. Therefore, uncertainty in the scien-
tific community exists between 0 and 95 per cent.138 In terms of risks, there are cer-
tain risks and uncertain risks. Certain risks are those where there is scientific certainty 
as to the link between cause and effect, while uncertain risks are those for which the 
‘occurrence of such risks remains controversial at a scientific level, but it is not unrea-
sonable to anticipate their occurrence on the basis of certain data, even if those data 
have not yet been fully validated’.139 Uncertainty here is ‘a situation in which the haz-
ard and harm is known, but it is impossible to assign probabilities to its realisation’.140 
Uncertain risks are the focus of the precautionary principle, whereas certain risks, since 
they are known, fall under a principle of prevention.141
As science and technology continue to progress, it is possible for new knowledge 
and capabilities to resolve past uncertainties, thereby initiating a shift from precaution-
ary to preventive measures.142 In the meantime, scientific uncertainty, when combined 
with a ‘serious or irreversible’ threat to the environment, will trigger the precautionary 
principle. The threshold terminology generally associated with scientific uncertainty 
in the precautionary principle is ‘reasonable grounds for concern’.143 This refers to the 
likelihood of the threat occurring or ‘how (scientifically) plausible a threat must be 
to trigger precaution’.144 If there are reasonable grounds for believing the threat may 
materialize, then precautionary action is required. It is suggested that this threshold 
falls ‘somewhere between the possibility and the probability of harm coming about’.145
4.5.5  The burden of proof
No understanding of the precautionary principle would be complete without an exami-
nation of the burden of proof that attaches to the principle. In the context of the pre-
cautionary principle, the burden of proof is often described as a ‘reverse onus’ or a 
‘shifting burden of proof ’.146 Traditionally, the burden of proof lies with the opponent 
137 Nancy J. Myers, ‘Precautionary Procedures: Tools of Analysis and Intention’ in Nancy J. Myers and 
Carolyn Raffensperger (eds.), Precautionary Tools for Reshaping Environmental Policy (Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 2006), 29, 41.
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141 ibid. 15. 142 Cameron (n 117) 55.
143 Trouwborst (n 112) 116; De Sadeleer (n 120) 160.
144 Trouwborst (n 112); Sandin (n 128) 893.
145 Trouwborst (n 112) 117 (referencing E.J. Molenaar, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel- Source 
Pollution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 45).
146 Sands et al. (n 86) 222; De Sadeleer (n 120) 203; Balint et al. (n 118) 66; Cameron (n 117) 46– 7; 
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of the proposed activity, who must provide sufficient evidence of guilt, harm, or risk 
of harm, depending on the context and standard of proof in question.147 In criminal 
justice, the accused is innocent until proven guilty and has no obligation to provide 
evidence against him/ herself.148 Even in the environmental context, ‘[t] raditional legal 
standards . . . have tended to privilege parties accused of degrading the environment; 
until “proven wrong” such parties can continue the activity in question’.149
In contrast, under the precautionary principle, the burden is shifted to the propo-
nent of action, thereby ‘placing the burdens and responsibilities for safety and under-
standing on producers and not putting the burden of proof of harm on the potential 
victims’.150 In doing so, the burden shifts to ‘the party or entity that will benefit from the 
activity’ and, even more importantly, ‘on the party best able to generate the information 
needed to make the decision’.151 The burden lies with the entity looking to change the 
status quo, wherein the status quo is the current less polluted world prior to the intro-
duction of the newly proposed risks.152
Such a shift in the burden of proof would seem very appropriate, perhaps even a mat-
ter of common sense, in situations where the precautionary principle is in operation. 
First, the environment and individuals likely to be the victims are rarely in the position 
to mount an objection prior to the risky activities having taken place. Furthermore, 
the shifting burden is arguably necessary to align with the objectives and intentions of 
the precautionary principle which ‘posits a presumption in favour of protection of the 
environment and public health’.153 Trouwborst equates the presumption of innocence 
in criminal law with a presumption of harmfulness under the precautionary princi-
ple.154 Therefore, where threat of harm and scientific uncertainty have triggered the 
precautionary principle, the maxim should be ‘harmful until proven harmless’.155
Evidence suggest that, in practice, states often apply this shifted burden, but even 
more frequently states have used and created definitions of the precautionary principle 
which are silent with regard to the burden of proof to be applied.156 In such cases, it is 
unclear whether the traditional burden of proof is automatic and assumed. A strong 
argument for the precautionary style burden’s logic and trueness to the objectives and 
aims of the principle itself can be made to suggest it is inherent in the invocation of the 
principle even where it is not explicitly stated.157
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4.5.6  The legal status of the precautionary principle
The status of the precautionary principle as a general principle of international law is 
largely accepted. 158 Those who deny it has achieved this status primarily attribute it to 
the fact that the principle is subject to so many varying interpretations, that there are 
‘no clear rules of application’, and that the term itself is ‘ambiguous and undefined’.159 In 
contrast, proponents of the principle note that the more general nature of the principle 
is essential because in order ‘to be effective it must be general in character but capable 
of devolving to the particular’.160 In practice, the principle has demonstrated this capac-
ity through its application to both specific areas of IEL, such as ozone depletion, as well 
as to more general concepts, as in the case of environmental protection and develop-
ment.161 Furthermore, they note that it is ‘characteristic of general principles with a 
wide scope of application [ . . . to have] various elements . . . open to interpretation’.162
The principle has ‘received widespread support by the international community’163 
and also forms ‘an essential part of all municipal (domestic) systems for protecting 
health, safety and the environment’.164 Cameron notes that ‘[i] t has also achieved near 
universal recognition as a fundamental element in the creation of new environmen-
tal policy instruments’165 which suggests that the principle’s acceptance is continuing 
to increase. It appears there is a great deal of evidence to support not only widespread 
practice by many states,166 but also recognition by many national courts that the pre-
cautionary principle has achieved international legal status.167
The decisions of international courts do little to support or denounce the status of the 
precautionary principle as a general principle. The precautionary principle was raised 
before the ICJ in the Nuclear Test case.168 The majority did not address it in its judgment; 
however, Ad Hoc Judge Palmer and Judge Weeramantry each addressed the principle 
in their dissenting opinions. Ad Hoc Judge Palmer stated that the principle ‘m[ight] 
now be a principle of customary international law’,169 while Judge Weeramantry said 
the principle ‘was gaining increasing support as part of the international law of the 
environment’.170 In the 2010 Pulp Mills case before the ICJ, both parties discussed the 
precautionary principle in their submissions, but the majority judgment did not deal 
with the principle.171 Judge Trinidade, in his separate opinion, discussed the precau-
tionary principle at length. He noted that both parties to the dispute seemed to have 
accepted the principle and only disagreed over whether it applied in the particular cir-
cumstances of the case.172 Finally, he noted that ‘[t] he fact that the Court’s Judgment 
silenced on them does not mean that the principles of prevention and of precaution do 
not exist. They do exist and apply, and are . . . of the utmost importance as part of the 
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jus necessarium. We can hardly speak of International Environmental Law nowadays 
without those general principles.’173
Ultimately, despite limited discussion of the principle by international courts, there 
appears to be strong support for concluding that the precautionary principle is a gen-
eral principle of international law.
4.5.7  Health and the precautionary principle
Human health is often reliant on a healthy environment. Environmental degradation in 
the form of air pollution, water contamination, or health risks entering the food chain 
can have negative effects on human health. Health is one part of a broader definition of 
‘environment’, such as was used in the 2005 Iron Rhine case decided by the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration. The Court defined ‘environment’ as including ‘air, water, land, 
flora and fauna, natural ecosystems and sites, human health and safety, and climate’.174 
Furthermore, it is very difficult to separate one from the other since a healthy environ-
ment promotes good human health and, even more so, an unhealthy environment is 
likely to have negative health impacts on individuals.175
Oftentimes, the threat to human health can be an important factor in the assess-
ment of the severity of the threat of harm under the precautionary principle. This link 
between the environment and health is often even more evident in conflict zones where 
weapons can simultaneously threaten both the environment and human health, such in 
the case of depleted uranium weapons or unexploded munitions.
4.6 Precaution and Proportion: The Precautionary Principle 
Versus International Humanitarian Law
Precaution and proportionality are key components, not only of the precautionary 
principle but also under IHL. However, these concepts are not entirely interchangeable 
under the precautionary principle and IHL.
Proportionality arises under the precautionary principle when considering the 
course of action for addressing the threat of harm that has arisen.176 Proportionality 
seeks to ensure that responses to threats of harm ‘correspond to the perceived dimen-
sions of the risk involved’.177 In other words, ‘[t] he more significant or the more serious 
the expected environmental impact, the more rigorous preventive or abatement meas-
ures may, respectively must be’.178 Should there be more than one option available and 
uncertainty or doubt as to which should be chosen, in keeping with the precautionary 
principle the option which errs on the side of protecting the environment should be 
selected.179
Under IHL proportionality is the ‘requirement to select the method or means of 
attack likely to cause the least collateral damage or incidental injury, all other things 
173 ibid.
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being equal, relative to the military advantage obtained’.180 Proportionality under the 
precautionary principle is similar to proportionality under IHL in that it serves to 
‘[adjust] the means to the objective’ and demands that ‘a course of action is chosen that 
corresponds to the size of the risk involved’.181 Where it differs is in the objective that 
is sought. Under the precautionary principle, actors are seeking to balance the desired 
action, usually development, with environmental protection. In this process ‘the pre-
cautionary principle posits a presumption in favour of protection of the environment 
and public health’.182 In IHL, the consideration of proportionality results in weighing 
and balancing military necessity and humanity with the benefit of the doubt generally 
given to military actors.183 Critically, the draft principles on protection of the environ-
ment in relation to armed conflict provisionally accepted by the ILC in 2015 include 
recognition of the requirement to consider the environment in the application of the 
principle of proportionality in IHL.184
Precaution also differs in its precise meaning. While precaution under IHL with-
out question ‘constitute[s] obligatory standards of conduct’185 and is enshrined in cus-
tomary international law,186 the concept ‘remains relatively abstract’,187 perhaps even 
more so than under the precautionary principle. Whereas the precautionary principle 
includes thresholds such as ‘serious or irreversible harm’ and ‘reasonable grounds for 
concern’, precaution in IHL is merely phrased as ‘all feasible precautions’. This is worri-
some because it largely leaves it to the military decision- maker to determine what the 
requirements for fulfilling this duty will be. It fails to provide a yardstick by which to 
gauge whether the duty has been fulfilled. General principles of international law, such 
as intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle, can and should be used to 
provide more of a yardstick in IHL.
Whereas scientific uncertainty triggers the precautionary principle, the duty to take 
precautions in IHL flows from the principle of distinction. The duty of precaution in 
IHL includes things such as a ‘duty to verify the nature of the target’,188 an ‘obligation 
to choose the military objective that involves the least danger to civilian lives and civil-
ian objects’,189 and an ‘obligation to give advance warning of an attack that may affect 
the civilian population’.190 As ILC Special Rapporteur Marie Jacobsson has stated, ‘If 
the environmental effects of a particular activity are known, then the measures taken 
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181 Trouwborst (n 112) 149– 58. 182 De Sadeleer (n 120) 203.
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to avoid them are preventative only; if the effects are unknown, then the same meas-
ure can be labelled as precautionary.’191 While Jacobsson notes this in the context of 
the environmental distinction between prevention and precaution, I believe that this 
distinction would be usefully applied in the IHL context. The nature of the obligations 
said to flow from precaution in IHL would seem to suggest it has more of a preventive 
than precautionary nature, as precaution is understood in the IEL context, since the 
IHL precaution provisions appear to target commonsense risks to civilians which do 
not attract a high degree of uncertainty. For instance, providing a warning in advance 
to clear an area of civilians or attacking at night when fewer civilians are out or in the 
area. If civilians are unaware of a pending attack they cannot take measures to protect 
themselves. Likewise, if an attack is conducted during the day there are likely to be 
more civilians in the streets, in office buildings, etc. Issuing a warning and/ or attacking 
at night would simply seem to be commonsense preventive measures, rather than pre-
cautionary in the sense of the precautionary principle.
Meanwhile, the precautionary principle has thresholds which trigger action and is 
closely linked to science even if uncertainty plays a large role. Fundamentally, where 
precaution in IHL seems to demand certain actions/ outcomes, ‘[a] fundamental fea-
ture of the precautionary principle is that it is not concerned with guaranteeing a par-
ticular outcome, but rather with the process by which a decision is made’.192
While precaution and proportionality in IHL and under the precautionary princi-
ple both seek to protect entities from damage, under the precautionary principle they 
appear to provide better protection. Both seek to balance the size of the threat with the 
response to the harm, but under IHL the benefit of the doubt is often given to the mili-
tary actor carrying out the risky activity. Meanwhile, under the precautionary principle 
the benefit of the doubt lies in favour of protecting the environment. Furthermore, the 
precautionary principle provides more substantive content and guidelines for assess-
ing precaution (threat of serious or irreversible harm and scientific uncertainty) while 
under IHL a general and vague duty to take ‘all feasible precautions’ is given with lit-
tle guidance as to the content of that duty. The precautionary principle provides more 
detailed and more protective standards than precaution and proportionality under IHL.
4.7 Principles of IEL in Jus Post Bellum
Ceasefire and peace agreements can provide a framework for jus post bellum.193 Within 
these documents should be the norms which will provide the foundation for a sus-
tainable peace. However, these agreements are limited by who gets to participate in 
the negotiations and by what these individuals and groups chose to prioritize. Serious 
humanitarian and security concerns often dominate discussions at the cost of consid-
eration for the protection, rehabilitation, and remediation of the environment. If it is 
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true that a healthy environment is essential for the realization of most if not all human 
rights, then it would seem an essential component for the foundation of a sustainable 
peace. Ensuring access to and the infrastructure for energy, clean water, and sanitation 
is an important building block in post- conflict reconstruction and can also contribute 
to the restoration of confidence in the government.194
Easterday notes the silences in peace agreements which exclude the voices of mar-
ginalized groups such as women and indigenous groups,195 but there can also be subject 
matter silences and the environment has been, at times, one such silence. For example, 
conflicts in Liberia (1999– 2003) and Sierra Leone (1991– 2002) both had strong natural 
resource and environmental degradation elements, yet neither of the peace agreements 
ending these conflicts addressed environmental protection or remediation. While the 
Lomé Accord in Sierra Leone makes mention of natural resources, the management of 
these resources is discussed in the context of their exploitation, not their protection.196 
This suggests that, moving forward, a more concerted effort is required to place envi-
ronmental protection and remediation on the agenda during peace negotiations.
There are, however, several examples of peace agreements which have included 
environmental protection and/ or remediation. These include the 1992 Chapultepec 
Agreement,197 the 1998 Northern Ireland Peace Agreement (the Good Friday 
Agreement),198 and the 2003 Sun City Agreement.199 Consequently, while considera-
tion of environmental protection and remediation has not always featured in peace 
agreements, there is considerable evidence that ‘environmental considerations have 
become an accepted part of peace agreements’.200 ILC Special Rapporteur, Marie 
Jacobsson, has proposed the inclusion of a principle addressing peace agreements in 
the draft principles on the protection of the environment in relation to armed con-
flict.201 While the language of the provision merely encourages (as opposed to requir-
ing) parties to a conflict to address ‘the restoration and protection of the environment 
damaged by the armed conflict in their peace agreements’,202 it nonetheless represents 
a crucial acknowledgement of the importance of considering and addressing environ-
mental protection and remediation in peace agreements.
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Liberacíon Nacional (Chapultepec Agreement), done at Mexico City, 16 January 1992, A/ 46/ 864, annex, 
chap. II, at <http:peacemaker.un.org/ elsalvador- chapultepec92> accessed 31 May 2017.
198 The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement (Good Friday Agreement), done at Belfast, 10 April 1998, 20, 
at <http:// peacemaker.un.org/ uk- ireland- good- friday98> accessed 31 May 2017.
199 Final Act of the Inter- Congolese Political Negotiations (Sun City Agreement), done at Sun City, 2 
April 2003, at <http:// peacemaker.un.org/ drc- suncity- agreement2003> accessed 31 May 2017.
200 Marie G.  Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in 
Relation to Armed Conflicts, ILC Doc. A/ CN.4/ 700, 3 June 2016, para. 160.
201 ibid. The draft text for this provision reads:  ‘Parties to a conflict are encouraged to settle matters 
relating to the restoration and protection of the environment damaged by the armed conflict in their peace 
agreements.’
202 ibid.
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In addition to peace agreements, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (‘TRC’) 
are being increasingly employed as a mechanism for identifying and prioritizing areas 
of focus for countries during a transitional jus post bellum phase. TRC final reports 
outline the results of its fact- finding mission, and offer recommendations on reforms, 
reparations, and steps needed to address and redress wrongs that have been committed, 
thereby facilitating post- conflict transition and the construction of a sustainable peace.
Both Liberia and Sierra Leone had Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in the 
wake of their respective civil wars. The final reports of both commissions address natu-
ral resources and the environment. The Liberian TRC recommended the sustainable 
‘utilization and exploitation of [Liberia’s] natural resources . . . for the benefit of [the] 
current generation and in the interest of generations to come’.203 Furthermore, it advo-
cates that the environmental impacts of resource exploitation be ‘mitigated to the high-
est extent possible’.204 The Sierra Leone TRC devoted an entire chapter of its report to 
‘Mineral Resources, their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and the Country’. The 
TRC did note the negative environmental consequences of alluvial mining such as the 
destruction of land for agricultural purposes leading to food shortages, as well as defor-
estation and stagnant water (both undrinkable and a breeding ground for disease).205 
Unfortunately, the TRC’s commentary on this environmental degradation was not 
matched by recommendations on how to address the problem, instead recommenda-
tions focused only on improved governmental regulation of the industry.206 The TRC 
did, however, in a separate chapter, advocate for a Human Rights Commission which 
would be tasked with upholding fundamental human rights as well as protection of the 
environment.207 Even still, recommendations from TRCs are generally not binding on 
the actors they are addressed to, generally national governments and, consequently, are 
not necessarily the most effective tool for ensuring that action is taken.
While TRCs provide a platform for creating a framework for jus post bellum, their 
often long and drawn- out process may make them less efficient tools than the more 
immediate tool of peace agreements. However, presently, neither tool seems to be ade-
quately (in the case of TRCs) or consistently (in the case of peace agreements) employed 
to address issues of environmental degradation and remediation essential to form the 
foundation for sustainable peace.
4.8 Conclusion
That the environment will be affected negatively by armed conflict is inevitable: armed 
conflict is inherently destructive and the environment is omnipresent and cannot be 
203 Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. II: Consolidated Final Report, 30 
June 2009, 403 para. 20.7, at <http:// trcofliberia.org/ resources/ reports/ final/ volume- two_ layout- 1.pdf> 
accessed 31 May 2017.
204 ibid.
205 Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 3B, 2004, 
51 para. 197, at < http:// www.sierra- leone.org/ Other- Conflict/ TRCVolume3B.pdf> accessed 31 May 2017.
206 ibid. 1– 55.
207 Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 2, 2004, 136 
para. 99 fn 32, at <http:// www.sierra- leone.org/ Other- Conflict/ TRCVolume2.pdf> accessed 31 May 2017.
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disassociated from military operations. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the envi-
ronmental consequences of military operations may be ignored or that they do not 
demand consideration before, during, and post- conflicts. No area of international law, 
not even international humanitarian law, operates in a vacuum, unaffected by inter-
national law as a whole. General principles of international law serve to link the many 
areas of international law academics and practitioners label and divide into boxes. 
General principles may not have the strict and specific content and contours of rules 
found in treaties or customary law, but this is the very reason why they are such useful 
tools across the entire breadth of international law. Their generality and abstractness 
allow them to unify international law through interpretive guidance, filling gaps in the 
law, and allowing international law to continue to develop with the needs of the inter-
national community.
Whether a military decision- maker assessing the legality of a particular weapon or a 
delegate at the table of a peace negotiation, the environment must be a consideration. It 
is in these decision- making processes that decision- makers should be employing gen-
eral principles of international law to guide their interpretation and application of rules 
of jus in bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. This chapter has shown that principles 
of international environmental law, in particular intergenerational equity and the pre-
cautionary principle, can and should enrich IHL. Principles, such as intergenerational 
equity and the precautionary principle which provide thresholds and guidance as to 
how to proceed when dealing with decisions involving short- and long- term conse-
quence as well as those affected by scientific uncertainty, can only improve the consid-
eration afforded to the environment in armed conflict.
Ultimately, wars end. The legal requirements in IHL and, in international law more 
generally, to ensure the protection of humanity (inclusive of the environment) require 
that action before, during, and after war is guided by principles designed and equipped 
to minimize and prevent the longevity of harms associated with war. Principles of IEL 
provide necessary nuance to military decision- makers applying existing jus in bello 
protections for civilians and the environment, but this is not sufficient unto itself. 
Environmental destruction and degradation during conflict can and must be mini-
mized, but it is next to impossible to eradicate it completely. As a result, it is critical that 
IEL principles continue to be at the forefront of decision- makers’ minds in the transi-
tion to peace, the jus post bellum. While serious humanitarian and security concerns 
often dominate in peace negotiations, there must be equal recognition of the significant 
adverse impacts of environmental insecurity and the need for the ongoing application 
of principles of IEL. TRCs provide a mechanism for continuing attention to environ-
mental remediation and protection and a platform for strong recommendations to gov-
ernments on how to achieve this post- conflict. A  lasting and sustainable peace and 
reconstruction may begin with adherence to and application of IHL protections for the 
environment and civilians during conflict, but it will be realized in the jus post bellum. 
Principles of IEL provide the best path to attaining this lasting and sustainable peace.
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5.1 Introduction
According to the United Nations Environment Programme (‘UNEP’) in its 2002 post- 
conflict report on Afghanistan, ‘Nearly 25 years of armed conflict, and four years of 
extreme drought, have created widespread human suffering and environmental devas-
tation across the country.’1 Similarly, recent conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Somalia, 
DRC, and Colombia, to name but a few, have left clear scars on the affected societies and 
their environments. As UNEP’s post- conflict country reports frequently demonstrate, 
including the report on Afghanistan, armed conflict often entails extensive damage to 
key natural resources needed for human survival, such as drinking water installations 
and agricultural lands, crops, and other food sources. Frequently, however, exacerbat-
ing the environmental damage caused during armed conflict are structural inequalities 
in land tenure and long- term socio- economic injustices, including in accessing healthy 
natural resources. These historic grievances often provide key causal factors in sparking 
conflict and in perpetuating the cycle of conflict.
That there is a clear synergy between environmental protection and human rights, 
particularly economic, social, and cultural rights, is well established.2 In 2009 the Office 
of the High Commissioner on Human Rights stated that ‘while the universal human 
rights treaties do not refer to a specific right to a safe and healthy environment, the 
United Nations human rights treaty bodies all recognize the intrinsic link between the 
environment and the realization of a range of human rights, such as the right to life, to 
health, to food, to water, and to housing’.3 Yet, the relationship between human rights 
and environmental protection is an unexplored dimension for achieving post- conflict 
environmental protection and remediation. This contribution, therefore, is novel in 
framing post- conflict environmental remediation in terms of using human rights laws 
* Professor, School of Law at the University of Essex, England.
1 UNEP, Afghanistan: Post- Conflict Environmental Assessment (UNEP, 2003), 14.
2 General Assembly Resolution 45/ 94, ‘Need to Ensure a Healthy Environment for the Well- being 
of Individuals’, 14 December 1990. There is a burgeoning literature discussing the field of environmen-
tal human rights, see Anna Grear and Louis Kotze (eds.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and the 
Environment (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2015).
3 UNHRC, Report of the OHCHR on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, UN 
Doc. A/ HRC/ 10/ 61, 15 January 2009, para. 18.
 
 
120 Human Rights and Transitional Justice
and enforcement mechanisms, including to some degree the mechanisms of transi-
tional justice. The undeniable value of human rights as a body of law in this context 
is that it affords a comprehensive set of binding, universal obligations with a generally 
well- developed system of international mechanisms for redress and as a check on state 
compliance. Environmental law, on the other hand, does not afford such methods of 
redress, remedy, or reparation.
The focus of this chapter, therefore, will be to test the value of a human rights frame-
work as a tool for addressing environmental damage in the post- conflict context. 
Particular emphasis will be placed on survival rights, such as the rights to water, food, 
and health found within economic, social, and cultural rights (‘ESC rights’), via the 
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’),4 
and the emerging right to a healthy environment. A focus on post- conflict human 
rights mechanisms also has implications for the discipline of transitional justice, 
among others. While the chapter will focus largely on human rights mechanisms, there 
is also scope for enhanced consideration of environmental remediation and reparation 
within transitional justice approaches. Such transitional justice mechanisms have often 
struggled with the issue of incorporating ESC rights, particularly as regards histori-
cal environmental injustices and inequalities, including when these inequalities have 
been a causal factor in sparking the conflict. Nevertheless, it also has to be recognized 
that both human rights and transitional justice now function within a much broader 
post- conflict legal and political landscape, which includes peacebuilding and, arguably, 
the emerging field of jus post bellum. Section 5.2, therefore, will briefly analyse this 
landscape, situating the human rights framework within it and suggesting what val-
ues it might promote. Section 5.3 will analyse how human rights law already embraces 
protection for the environment via ESC rights and the right to a healthy environment. 
Finally, discussion of the value of the human rights framework for post- conflict envi-
ronmental remediation will be situated in Section 5.4, identifying key issues for analy-
sis throughout the section.
5.2 Post- Conflict Legal Frameworks
Human rights law sits among myriad other frameworks or mechanisms in the post- 
conflict domain, such as those of transitional justice, international criminal justice, 
and peacebuilding, as well as those centred on the liberal democratization agenda, and 
now the emerging notion of jus post bellum.5 International criminal law (‘ICL’) remains 
principally a criminal accountability tool for top- tier perpetrators of gross human 
rights violations or grave breaches of humanitarian law, while transitional justice is 
often able to achieve a measure of both accountability and reparation for a broader 
range of violations. This section will demonstrate where human rights fit within these 
various post- conflict mechanisms.
4 (1976) 993 UNTS 3.
5 See generally Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s)’ in Carsten Stahn and Jann 
K. Kleffner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace (The Hague: T.M.C. 
Asser Press, 2008).
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Annan defined transitional justice as comprising ‘the full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of 
large- scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve rec-
onciliation’.6 Transitional justice has, therefore, moved beyond its original conception 
of confronting the ‘wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes’,7 including breaches 
of human rights and humanitarian law, to advancing nation- building via an alternative 
source of rule of law and the goal of preserving peace.8 Hannum suggests that the only 
component of transitional justice which is still truly ‘transitional’ relates to the fact 
that a transitional government is often in power.9 Otherwise states are merely protect-
ing and enforcing human rights and instituting punishment for war crimes. Once one 
moves to the third component that he identifies, namely ensuring the rule of law, it 
is no longer only about human rights, he argues, but the creation of functioning and 
effective state bodies and legal system.10 Teitel refers to the growth of truth commis-
sions, suggesting these to be the product of the broadening of the aims of transitional 
justice to include reconciliation and, again, the promotion of peace.11 Others accuse 
proponents of this aspect of transitional justice of playing the role of ‘handmaiden’12 
to liberal peacebuilding, whereby transitions to Western- style market democracies are 
predicated on the over- simplistic basis that democracies are less likely to go to war.13 
Emerging in this already busy field is the modern concept of jus post bellum, where 
there also appears to be a similar focus, at least by some, on the notion of achieving 
a sustainable and just peace.14 Yet, while the contemporary jus post bellum concept 
remains to be fully defined and its scope identified,15 Wählisch argues for a central 
role for human rights. Human rights, he proposes, ‘play a critical role as an indicator 
for jus post bellum’,16 suggesting that ‘their respect is essential for the completion of 
peacebuilding’.17 To this basis others add the key peacebuilding attributes of reparation, 
reconciliation, justice (transitional justice and ICL mechanisms), and, ultimately, and 
somewhat controversially, democracy.18 On the other hand, a narrower approach to the 
jus post bellum concept, however, refers more simply to the jus post bellum as offering 
merely a valuable ‘framework’19 for post- conflict reconstruction.20 Clearly, whether a 
6 Report of the Secretary- General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post- conflict 
Societies’, S/ 2004/ 616, 23 August 2004, para. 8.
7 Ruti G. Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69, 69.
8 ibid. 76.
9 Hurst Hannum, ‘Human Rights in Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuilding’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 1, 36.
10 ibid. 37. 11 Teitel (n 7) 81.
12 Lars Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio- Economic Wrongs’ (2012) 21 Social 
& Legal Studies 171, 173.
13 ibid.
14 Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius and Meionexia’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens 
Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum:  Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2014), 25.
15 See generally Stahn (n 5).
16 Martin Wählisch, ‘Conflict Termination from a Human Rights Perspective: State Transitions, Power- 
Sharing, and the Definition of the ‘Post’ in Stahn et al. (n 14) 321.
17 ibid. 18 May (n 14). 19 Stahn (n 5) 105.
20 ibid. Indeed, Stahn suggests that humanitarian lawyers view jus post bellum primarily as a mechanism 
for post- conflict reconstruction.
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narrow approach or a more comprehensive definition is ultimately adopted for the jus 
post bellum concept, both approaches or frameworks could include human rights (and, 
therefore, the remediation of environmental damage via reparation for human rights 
violations) at the core.
Arguably, all of the international mechanisms, processes, and frameworks for deal-
ing with post- conflict societies place human rights at their core, whether they seek 
criminal accountability for violations of human rights, the creation of a lasting rule of 
law, or sustainable and just peace. However, as with the general bifurcation of human 
rights into civil and political rights21 on the one hand and economic, social, and cul-
tural rights on the other, these post- conflict processes, mechanisms, and frameworks 
have also tended to emphasize one set of rights over the other, namely civil and politi-
cal rights. Indeed, a major criticism of transitional justice in recent years has been due 
to its clear inattention to ESC rights.22 Laplante and Arbour, in particular, deplore the 
way in which socio- economic injustices are frequently ignored or are omitted from any 
resulting recommendations.23 Sharp blames this omission on the tendency to focus 
only on the means of transitioning to a Western- style democracy rather than a transi-
tion to ‘positive peace’.24 As distinguished from ‘negative peace’ or simply the absence 
of armed conflict, the notion of positive peace would, he suggests, require the ‘inclu-
sion of mechanisms to specifically address all forms of ‘structural violence’, including 
poverty, radical economic, social, civil, and political inequalities, and other forms of 
social injustice’25— thus, arguably, including environmental inequalities and access to 
resources.
For all of the post- conflict, justice, and peacebuilding frameworks there remains the 
key question of when they start and when they end. Often such processes will have 
no clear starting point and an even less clear end point. Some post- conflict processes 
may have to be specifically negotiated, set up, and adapted for particular situations 
and states. This observation is especially pertinent for transitional justice mechanisms, 
which often take many years to negotiate and establish.26 Human rights mechanisms, 
on the other hand, are different, as these should already have some measure of accept-
ability and presence within most states— and thus there is a clear advantage in using 
21 Note the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) 999 UNTS 171 (‘ICCPR’).
22 Shedrack C. Agbakwa, ‘A Path Least Taken: Economic and Social Rights and the Prospects of Conflict 
Prevention and Peacebuilding in Africa’ (2003) 47 Journal of African Law 38, 40.
23 Lisa J. Laplante, ‘Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the Socioeconomic 
Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework’ (2008) 2(3) International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 331, 333; Louise Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’ (2007– 2008) 40 
NYU Journal of International Law & Policy 1, 4; but now see the inclusion of land redistribution in the 2016 
Colombian Peace Agreement, in Nicole Summers, ‘Colombia's Victims’ Law: Transitional Justice in a Time 
of Violent Conflict?’ (2012) 25 Harvard Human Rights Journal 219.
24 Dustin N. Sharp, ‘Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition:  Toward A  Positive- Peace 
Paradigm For Transitional Justice’ (2012) 35 Fordham International Law Journal 780; Johan Galtung, 
‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’ (1969) 6(3) Journal of Peace Research 167.
25 Sharp (n 24) 807; see also Geoff Harris ‘The Costs of Armed Conflict in Developing Countries’ in Geoff 
Harris (ed.), Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing Countries:  An Economic and Political Analysis 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 23.
26 Clara Sandoval, ‘Transitional Justice and Social Change’ (2014) 20 SUR International Journal on 
Human Rights 181.
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human rights mechanisms, in principle, for post- conflict redress— but we must also 
recognize, of course, that these mechanisms may have been ineffective before the 
conflict.27
There is a final point to note as regards human rights obligations and, what Orend 
terms, the ‘termination’ phase of conflict.28 There is often no clear moment when an 
armed conflict ends. And, since it is clear that human rights obligations (including ESC 
rights) continue to remain applicable during armed conflict,29 as well as during times 
of occupation,30 human rights and its mechanisms, therefore, may have enhanced value 
during such a ‘legally- messy’ time. This aspect is especially pertinent as it could be 
argued that the continuing applicability of human rights during armed conflict aids 
in bridging the termination phase between conflict and peace. Consequently, human 
rights law undoubtedly provides a very valuable, if not unique, legal discipline for fram-
ing the current analysis.
5.3 Environmental Damage as a Human Rights Issue
It is clear that environmental damage is a human rights issue. It has long been recog-
nized that environmental damage can have both direct and indirect impacts on the 
enjoyment of a wide range of human rights and, in some circumstances, damage to the 
environment can be a violation of human rights laws.
Since all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated,31 
a healthy, functioning environment, therefore, is a necessary basis from which most 
other human rights are possible, including the human rights to development,32 food,33 
27 Note the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guar-
antees of non- recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, 'Human Rights and Transitional Justice', A/ HRC/ RES/ 33/ 19, 
5 October 2016, at <https:// documents- dds- ny.un.org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ G16/ 225/ 83/ PDF/ G1622583.
pdf?OpenElement> accessed 1 June 2017.
28 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective’ in Stahn and Kleffner (n 5) 34.
29 General Assembly Resolution 2675 (XXV), Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations 
in Armed Conflict, 9 December 1970; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
Judgment of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 226, para. 25; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 136, para. 106; Case Concerning 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v.  Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, ICJ 
Reports 168, para. 216. On the issue of extra- territoriality of human rights obligations see Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 31:  The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State 
Parties to the [International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights], UN Doc. CCPR/ C/ 21/ Rev.1/ Add.13, 
26 May 2004, para. 10; CESCR, Concluding Observations, Israel, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ 1/ Add.90, 23 May 2003, 
para. 31; Al- Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom App no 55721/ 07, (ECtHR, 7 July 2011), paras. 147– 9; 
Hassan v. the United Kingdom App no 29750/ 09, (ECtHR, 16 September 2014), paras. 76 and 104. See Noam 
Lubell, ‘Human Rights Obligations in Military Occupation’ (2012) 94(885) International Review of the Red 
Cross 317, 322.
30 ICJ, Wall Opinion (n 29) paras. 107– 13; ICJ, Armed Activities Case (n 29) paras. 216– 20.
31 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World Conference on Human 
Rights, Vienna, 1993, 1993 32 ILM 1661, para. 5.
32 United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, General Assembly Resolution 41/ 128, UN 
Doc. A/ RES/ 41/ 128, 4 December 1986.
33 Art. 11(1) ICESCR ‘right of everyone to an adequate standard of living . . . including adequate food’; 
Art. 11(2) ICESCR ‘fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger’.
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water,34 health,35 and even the right to life36 itself.37 For example, in 2000, the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’) issued General Comment 14 on 
implementation of the right to health, recognizing that ‘the right to health embraces a 
wide range of socio- economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead 
a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinates of health, such as food and 
nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and 
healthy working conditions, and a healthy environment’.38 Focusing more specifically 
on the relationship with a healthy environment, the Committee reiterated that ‘The 
improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene (art. 12.2 (b)) com-
prises, inter alia, . . . the requirement to ensure an adequate supply of safe and potable 
water and basic sanitation; the prevention and reduction of the population’s exposure 
to harmful substances such as radiation and harmful chemicals or other detrimen-
tal environmental conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human health.’39 
And, of course, the European Court of Human Rights, the African Commission on 
Human Rights, and the Inter- American Court of Human Rights have all declared that 
the right to life includes the notion of a healthy environment.40 Domestic case law 
around the world is also adding to the burgeoning jurisprudence in this area.
Thus, key human rights, such as the rights to water, food, health, and life cannot 
be ensured in an environmental vacuum; these rights cannot be delivered without 
the protection of the quality of the soils and waters of this world or even the pro-
tection of biodiversity to ensure viable and healthy ecosystems. Notably, in its 2011 
Discussion Paper entitled Our Planet, Our Health, Our Future: Human Health and the 
Rio Conventions: Biological Diversity, Climate Change and Desertification,41 the World 
Health Organization (‘WHO’) acknowledged the central role of biodiversity as the 
‘foundation for human health’,42 commenting that ‘biodiversity underpins the function-
ing of the ecosystems on which we depend for our food and fresh water; aids in regulat-
ing climate, floods and diseases; and provides recreational benefits and offers aesthetic 
and spiritual enrichment’.43 The WHO Discussion Paper specifically references the 
34 Art. 11(1) ICESCR the right to water is generally read into the ‘right of everyone to an adequate stand-
ard of living’.
35 Art. 12 ICESCR ‘right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health’.
36 Art. 6 ICCPR.
37 See both para. 1 and Principle 1 of the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (Stockholm) (1972) 26 YUN 319.
38 Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights notably on the implementation of the right to health (Art 12), UN Doc. E/ C.12/ 2000/ 
4, 11 August 2000, para. 4.
39 ibid. para. 15.
40 Oneryildiz v.  Turkey App no 48939/ 99 (ECtHR, 30 November 2004); Communication 155/ 96, The 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v. Nigeria (AHRLR 60, 27 October 2001); 
Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan (AHRLR 
153, 27 March 2009); Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Series C no. 125) (IACHR, 
17 June 2005).
41 World Health Organization (‘WHO’) 2011, at <http:// www.who.int/ globalchange/ publications/ 
reports/ health_ rioconventions.pdf> accessed 1 June 2017.
42 ibid. 2. 43 ibid.
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conclusion of the 2010 Global Biodiversity Outlook 3,44 that since the rate of biodiversity 
loss is not slowing down but is actually intensifying in some cases that this is ‘bringing 
us closer to a number of potential tipping points that would catastrophically reduce the 
capacity of ecosystems to provide these essential services’.45 The WHO consequently 
endorsed the Aichi Biodiversity Targets46 adopted under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, especially Target 14, which refers to ecosystem services to human health and 
well- being with the objectives of promoting the integration of ecosystem management 
considerations into health policy and promoting ecosystem integrity in order to secure 
water and food security and protection from diseases.47
While the environment has been recognized to form a central component of most, 
if not all, human rights, this notion of ‘greening’ or expanding existing human rights is 
only the starting point. There are two further strands to the notion of ‘environmental’ 
human rights, namely, procedural rights and the substantive right to a healthy environ-
ment recognized in certain regional human rights treaties. Procedural ‘environmental 
rights’ have developed to guarantee the three- fold aspects of (1) public participation 
in environmental decision- making, (2)  the right of appropriate means of seeking 
redress, and (3) the right to environmental information. Like environmental protec-
tion regimes, procedural environmental rights also seek to ensure that through active 
and fair public participation in the decision- making process people can work towards 
a better quality of environment. The European Court of Human Rights has undertaken 
such an expansive reading of Article 8 cases involving environmental pollution.48
Finally, there is the notion of a stand- alone human right to a healthy environment. 
Both the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights49 and the 1988 Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights50 (Inter- American Convention regime) contain a provision 
protecting the right to environment,51 as do three- quarters of states via a constitutional 
right or duty to the environment.52 In the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre 
(SERAC) v.  Nigeria53 case in 2002 the African Commission delivered what is prob-
ably the best elucidation of what the right to environment entails, including for the 
state to take reasonable measures ‘to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to 
promote conservation, and to secure ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources’.54 Reminding states of the centrality of the right to a healthy environ-
ment to all ESC rights and referencing the importance of procedural rights, such as 
44 Global Biodiversity Outlook 3, Montreal, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010, 
at <https:// www.cbd.int/ gbo3/ > accessed 1 June 2017.
45 ibid. 5, 71– 81. See also Global Environment Outlook (GEO- 5) (UNEP, 2012), 134– 66.
46 COP 10 Decision X/ 2, X/ 2. Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011– 2020, at <http:// www.cbd.int/ sp/ tar-
gets/ > accessed 1 June 2017.
47 WHO (n 41) 20.
48 See Guerra and Others v.  Italy App no.  116/ 1996/ 735/ 932 (ECtHR, 19 February 1998); Kate Cook, 
‘Environmental Rights as Human Rights’ (2002) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 196.
49 < http:// www.achpr.org/ instruments/ achpr/ > accessed 1 June 2017.
50 <https:// www.cidh.oas.org/ Basicos/ English/ basic5.Prot.Sn%20Salv.htm> accessed 1 June 2017.
51 Art. 24 1981 African Charter, Art. 11 of the 1988 Protocol to the American Convention.
52 David R. Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights 
and the Environment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), 47.
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environmental impact assessments for development projects, the Commission called 
for the comprehensive clean- up of lands and rivers damaged by Shell’s oil operations 
in the Niger Delta.55
Thus, states from all over the globe, the UN, and all the major regional human rights 
systems have recognized that ESC rights, in particular, but also the right to life, cannot 
be protected without a healthy environment. What states have produced, therefore, is 
a rich basis of environmental protection via human rights. It remains to be seen, how-
ever, what value such rights can offer in the post- conflict setting to help remediate war- 
time damage.
5.4 Environmental Damage as a Post- Conflict  
Human Rights Issue
In the context of armed conflict, and the aftermath of conflict, the link between envi-
ronment and human rights is more pertinent than ever. Clearly, a community’s normal 
food and water supplies might be cut off or damaged by the impact of warfare, liveli-
hoods might be impeded by the military presence, and health may be affected by pollu-
tion from toxic substances released in a military attack or via weapons debris. There are 
many examples of drinking wells being deliberately poisoned during armed conflict, 
food crops systematically destroyed, livestock deliberately slaughtered, and villages 
razed to the ground in an effort to terrorize or displace the population.56 For example, 
during the 2008 conflict in Gaza, Israel bombed water wells,57 used armoured bull-
dozers to systematically destroy agricultural land, crops, and approximately 100,000 
chickens,58 and bombed a sewage plant causing the inundation of neighbouring farm-
land with approximately 200,000 cubic metres of raw sewage.59 Oil pollution is also a 
common wartime occurrence. In Hussein’s environmental assault in 1991, for exam-
ple, 650 oil- wells were destroyed and the oil set  alight causing thick plumes of oily 
black smoke to engulf the region.60 In the 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon 
the bombing of the Jiyeh power plant and fuel storage tanks caused an oily slick in the 
Mediterranean Sea, choking marine life and destroying fishing resources as it stretched 
all along the 225 km Lebanese coastline, including the Palm Islands Nature Reserve 
55 Commission Findings, ibid.
56 Initial prosecution submissions in the case of Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (‘Omar Al 
Bashir’) reference repeated destruction, polluting, and poisoning of communal wells by the Janjaweed and 
the Armed Forces ‘so as to deprive the villagers of water needed for survival’, see (International Criminal 
Court Pre- Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) (ICC- 02/ 05– 01/ 09, 4 March 2009); The Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation in Timor- Leste found violations of the right to food in the systematic destruction of food 
crops, gardens and fields, and livestock by Indonesian armed forces during the armed conflict, see The 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor- Leste, Chega, The Report of the Commission 
for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor- Leste (CAVR), (Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation 31 October 2005), Part 7, Chapter 7.3: Forced Displacement and Famine, at <http:// www.
cavr- timorleste.org/ en/ chegaReport.htm> accessed 1 June 2017, para. 506.2.
57 Report of the United Nations Fact- Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (‘Goldstone Report’), Human 
Rights Council, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 12/ 48, 25 September 2009, paras. 987– 9.
58 ibid. para. 943. 59 ibid. paras. 962– 74.
60 Philip Elmer- Dewitt, ‘A Man- Made Hell on Earth’ Time Magazine (18 March 1992) 22, at 23.
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and the cultural heritage site of Byblos.61 Yet, the impacts on the environment and the 
consequent impacts on human rights are far too numerous to catalogue.62 And, clearly, 
the environmental impacts of war are only one dimension to the bigger, on- going envi-
ronmental assault taking place in many states, including the environmental neglect that 
often accompanies poverty and decades of environmental resource over- exploitation, 
pollution, and disease.
There are, therefore, likely to be a number of key environment- related issues facing 
the population in the final phases of conflict and in the immediate aftermath of armed 
conflict. These might be categorized as follows: (1) degraded or contaminated environ-
mental resources, including pollution of waters for drinking water, bathing, and fish-
ing; destruction of crops and pollution of agricultural areas, (2) depleted environmental 
resources, including number of livestock for farming, loss of timber for rebuilding and 
shelter; deforestation impacting on food sources or livelihoods, and, often, (3) poverty 
and other social inequalities, including access to land (some of these may be historical 
or resulting from the conflict), disease, and displacement. As regards the environment, 
the post- conflict period, therefore, can simply be summed up as one of clean- up, reme-
diation, and restoration. Yet, the warring state(s) will frequently have many competing 
priorities and few resources with which to rebuild. How might a human rights frame-
work, therefore, aid in the speedy realization of a healthier post- conflict environment?
The analysis, therefore, will focus on utilizing the human rights framework to address 
three key issues that cut across the range of environmental harms caused by warfare; 
namely (1) clean- up and environmental restoration, including explosive and toxic rem-
nants of war, (2) depletion of natural resources, and (3) poverty and historical inequali-
ties. First, however, we need to briefly map the human rights legal landscape, including 
the nature of human rights obligations under the ICESCR, to establish which of these 
mechanisms might be of more value in remediating environmental damage.
5.4.1  Addressing post- conflict environmental harm  
through human rights law
A.  Human rights mechanisms
The issue of human rights obligations in times of crisis (including the post- conflict 
phase) has been the subject of focus throughout the full range of human rights mech-
anisms, including those created by the UN Charter and through multilateral trea-
ties. Clearly, the simpler and quicker complaint process via domestic legal systems is 
often unavailable in the immediate aftermath of armed conflict, as governments are 
often faced with a period of instability and confusion and public bodies are, there-
fore, often slow to recover the intellectual and technical capacity to address violations. 
For many states there may even be international intervention to set the peacebuilding 
agenda, possibly including a formal criminal tribunal process or transitional justice 
mechanism.
61 UNEP, Lebanon: Post- Conflict Environmental Assessment (UNEP, 2007), 132– 43.
62 Note the efforts of UNEP in its post- conflict assessments. There are more than twenty reports to date 
relating to post- conflict assessments.
 
 
128 Human Rights and Transitional Justice
Of the international mechanisms, probably the most obvious for seeking redress 
and reparation for violations are those of the specialized regional human rights treaty 
systems (such as the Inter- American, European, and African systems)— although, of 
course, not every state is covered by a regional treaty system, and these mechanisms 
can be both slow and expensive. Here adjudication can be legally binding through the 
formally constituted courts, and in each of these systems there is an expanding juris-
prudence governing the human rights obligations of states related to armed conflict.63
The monitoring bodies established under the two international covenants (the 
Human Rights Committee for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the CESCR for the covenant of the same name), although not able to render legally 
binding judgments, have created an invaluable, weighty body of jurisprudence of their 
own,64 clearly with greater reach than the regional mechanisms. The Human Rights 
Committee (‘HRC’) has considered many communications stretching over decades 
involving violations taking place during conflict as well as in the aftermath of conflict, 
but, lamentably, its environmental jurisprudence remains extremely limited. With the 
very recent adoption of the individual communications procedure under the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR there is, as yet, no jurisprudence on matters related to conflict 
or post- conflict violations before the CESCR, but its clearer ESC rights focus may hold 
greater promise for environment- related complaints. The HRC and CESCR have cer-
tainly both been especially influential, however, through the two pivotal dimensions of 
issuing General Comments and Concluding Observations on state reports.
Through the reporting process the state party is required to explain to the moni-
toring bodies the measures being taken to comply with its human rights obligations. 
This process is generally much more rigorous than that which occurs under environ-
mental treaties. Clearly, for a state emerging from armed conflict immediate compli-
ance with its full range of human rights obligations might be problematic. Sudan, for 
example, following decades of conflict, reported to the CESCR in 2013 that it was 
severely hampered in meeting its human rights obligations under the covenant by 
a lack of financial resources and capacity.65 Such situations are, clearly, most acute 
for poverty- stricken states caught in protracted armed conflict. While human rights 
bodies have certainly had to recognize the impact of such difficulties encountered 
by states, particularly in the achievement of ESC rights in the post- conflict phase, 
what they have absolutely not allowed is the complete avoidance of commitments. 
For example, in the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (‘CRC’) regarding Sri Lanka, the Committee recognized that the armed conflict 
and the challenges of reconstruction ‘pose difficulties’ to the full implementation of 
Convention obligations,66 but nevertheless required that Sri Lanka take immediate 
action to ensure the state meets its minimum core obligations, notably that the state 
63 See Hassan v. the United Kingdom (n 29).
64 See the view of the International Court of Justice in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v 
Democratic Republic of the Congo), 19 June 2012, ICJ Reports 639, para. 66.
65 Second periodic report of Sudan to the CESCR, submitted 27 July 2012, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ SDN/ 2, 18 
September 2013, para. 275.
66 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations:  Sri Lanka, UN Doc. CRC/ C/ 15/ 
Add.207, 2 July 2003, para. 5.
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prioritize the provision of drinking water and sanitation services in reconstruction 
activities,67 and ‘strengthen ongoing efforts to prevent malnutrition, malaria and other 
mosquito- borne diseases’.68 Similarly, in its Concluding Observations on the report 
by Guatemala in 2003, the CESCR recognized that the ‘consequences of the armed 
conflict have seriously affected the full enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights’,69 but did not fail to say that it remained concerned by the insufficient progress 
as regards the effective implementation of the Peace Agreements of 1996 (including 
the Global Agreement on Human Rights, the Agreement on Social and Economic 
Aspects and the Agrarian Situation between the Presidential Peace Commission of the 
Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca),70 
which the CESCR believed had led to persistent serious problems, including a lack 
of agrarian reforms.71 And in the context of decades- long internal conflict, the 
Committee, in its Concluding Observations on the report by Colombia in 2010, 
reminded the state that it is ‘precisely in situations of crisis, that the Covenant requires 
the protection and promotion of all economic, social and cultural rights, in particular 
of the most marginalized and disadvantaged groups of the society, to the best of its 
ability under the prevailing adverse conditions’.72
Redress for violations of rights or action to simply highlight a particular problem of 
human rights compliance can also be channelled through the UN Charter body mecha-
nisms, with individual communications possible under the Special Procedures of the 
Human Rights Council, by writing directly to one of the thematic Special Rapporteurs, 
such as the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, or Water and Sanitation. 
Undoubtedly, the expertise of the Special Rapporteurs has greatly advanced the practi-
cal application of human rights, and the wealth of statements presented to the Human 
Rights Council and General Assembly at the global level have created a rich underpin-
ning of the Charter provisions.
Undoubtedly, an invaluable mechanism in the context of environmental protec-
tion will be the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations related to 
the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment,73 created by the 
Human Rights Council in 2012 in recognition of the importance of the environment to 
human rights.74 A final, noteworthy mechanism for possible environmental redress is 
that of the fact- finding missions of the Human Rights Council, which have so far inves-
tigated alleged human rights violations during the armed conflicts in Syria and Gaza, 
albeit not without controversy.75
67 ibid. para. 39.b (emphasis added). 68 ibid. para. 39.c (emphasis added).
69 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Guatemala, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ 1/ Add.93, 12 December 2003, para. 9.
70 < http:// www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/ services/ cds/ agreements/ pdf/ guat6.pdf> accessed 1 June 2017.
71 ibid. para. 10.
72 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Colombia, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ COL/ CO/ 5, 7 June 2010, para. 7.
73 Human Rights and the Environment, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ RES/ 19/ 10, 19 April 2012, para. 2 (emphasis 
added).
74 ibid. Preamble.
75 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza Conflict, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 29/ 52, 24 June 2015.
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B.   ESC rights and progressive realization
Before moving to consideration of how human rights obligations might be utilized in 
remedying post- conflict environmental damage, it is necessary to examine the key fac-
ets of the ESC rights most relevant for this purpose, notably the notions of ‘progressive 
realization’, minimum core obligations, and ‘maximum available resources’ (‘MAR’)— 
because these notions could serve to limit achievement of ESC rights in the post- con-
flict phase.
Economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the rights to water, food, health, and 
livelihood (via Art. 11, the right to an adequate standard of living) require full realiza-
tion of the right by states but allow that realization to be achieved ‘progressively’, taking 
into account the financial and other resources available to states in that endeavour.76 
Clearly, this allowance for a progressive achievement of rights cannot be an excuse for 
complete non- compliance by states, but this notion has certainly led to foot- dragging 
by states over the years in achieving ESC rights. Consequently, the CESCR has been 
required to assume the role of judging whether state actions are ‘reasonable’ and, thus, 
in compliance.77
Importantly, to temper the weak obligation of progressive realization of rights, the 
CESCR has also mandated ‘minimum core obligations’ for each ESC right, which are 
of immediate effect. For example, such immediate obligations include to accord the 
achievement of the right the highest priority78 and to adopt and implement a national 
strategy and plan of action addressing the whole population.79 Clearly, where the state 
fails to meet the minimum essential levels of the right the state will, prima facie, be in 
breach of human rights law, bearing the burden of proof that it lacks the capacity and 
resources to comply.80 Here the state ‘must demonstrate that every effort has been made 
to use the ‘maximum available resources’, including via international assistance, that are 
at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, the minimum obligations.81 
And the obligation is imposed regardless of the level of economic development82 and 
‘even in times of severe resources constraints’.83
The issue of resource constraints impacts on the fulfilment of ESC human rights 
obligations even in peacetime, thus what does MAR mean in the post- conflict phase? 
76 Art. 2(1) ICESCR. See generally Magdalena Sepulveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oxford: Intersentia, 2003).
77 Art. 8(4) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
UN Doc. A/ 63/ 435, 28 November 2008; C.N.869.2009; CESCR, An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take 
Steps to the ‘Maximum of Available Resources’ Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, UN Doc. E/ 
C.12/ 2007/ 1, 21 September 2007, para. 8; see also Constitutional Court, South Africa, Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).
78 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de 
Albuquerque, ‘Common Violations of the Human Rights to Water and Sanitation’, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 27/ 55, 
30 June 2014, paras. 49– 53; see also Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 131.
79 ECOSOC, General Comment No.15, ‘The Right to Water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2002), UN Doc. E/ C.12/ 2002/ 11, 20 January 2003, para. 37(f).
80 de Albuquerque (n 78) para. 49.
81 General Comment No.3, ‘The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (art. 2, para. 1, of the Covenant)’, 1 
January 1991, UN Doc. E/ 1991/ 23 (SUPP), para. 10; Principle 26, Limburg Principles on the Implementation 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 124.
82 Principle 25, Limburg Principles (n 81). 83 General Comment No. 3 (n 81) para. 12.
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Skogly criticizes the overly narrow approach of many in viewing the ‘resources’ as 
largely financial or budgetary.84 She argues for a more diverse, holistic approach includ-
ing using natural environmental resources available in society, including both pub-
lic and private resources. Clearly, however, the inclusion of natural resources within 
the concept could exacerbate and prolong environmental damage caused in conflict. 
In similar vein, Robertson recognized that the state must not diminish the natural 
resources available to people who depend on such resources to feed themselves.85 There 
is, consequently, a clear argument to use the environment as a resource for rebuilding 
society and for development, in the implementation of ESC rights post- conflict, but 
this must be achieved in an environmentally sustainable way. Causing further dam-
age to, and depletion of, natural resources in the aftermath of conflict may only serve 
to exacerbate any existing inequalities and slow down environmental recovery. Thus, 
in using a state’s natural resources, human rights and environmental protection in the 
post- conflict stage need to go hand- in- hand.
Thus, in sum, the state must take steps to achieve these rights, and such steps must 
be ‘deliberate, concrete, and targeted’86 to meeting the obligations required by the right. 
We can use these human rights obligations requiring immediate effect, therefore, in the 
post- conflict phase to provide protection for the environment. Immediate obligations, 
therefore, could include the requirement that the state adopt a strategy for the realiza-
tion of environmental rights,87 which will necessitate a post- conflict environmental 
assessment to inform the state’s human rights obligations. Arguably, the minimum core 
obligations could be used to help states to prioritize among remediation and recovery 
programmes, as well as to leverage international assistance to help the state to meet its 
human rights obligations.
The following section will now analyse the value of using a human rights framework 
to address the range of environmental harms caused by warfare.
5.4.2  Clean- up and environmental restoration
Even beyond the most protracted, war- ravaged, battle- scarred states it is not difficult 
to see why populations surviving armed conflict struggle with basic survival needs. 
Examples of the destruction of water wells in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as 
well as the destruction of 100,000 chickens and the bull- dozing of olive groves, the use 
of chemical weapons in Syria, the cutting of pistachio trees in Afghanistan and forests 
in the DRC demonstrate that the impacts of conflict on the environment, and, conse-
quently, on human sustenance and survival needs, is immense and exceedingly com-
mon during armed conflict.
There are, thus, likely to be significant impacts in the aftermath of conflict on the 
environment, and, therefore, on the enjoyment of ESC rights, through degradation to 
84 Sigrun Skogly, ‘The Requirement of Using the “Maximum of Available Resources” for Human Rights 
Realisation: A Question of Quality as Well as Quantity’ (2012) 12(3) Human Rights Law Review 393.
85 Robert E. Robertson, ‘Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the “Maximum 
Available Resources” to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 
693, 708.
86 General Comment No. 3 (n 81) para. 2. 87 de Albuquerque (n 78) para. 37.
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ecosystem services (so- called ‘natural capital’) either caused directly as bomb damage, 
or as a side effect by contamination from damaged infrastructure, or explosive or toxic 
remnants of war. Some environmental damage will, clearly, be more urgent than oth-
ers in terms of clean- up and restoration, such as explosive remnants of war impeding 
access to agricultural lands for vital food resources, or environmental contamination of 
drinking water wells or rivers which seriously endangers life and health. Consequently, 
this section will analyse examples of wartime environmental damage and suggest how 
we can use human rights legal mechanisms to provide vital assistance in their remedy.
A.  Water sources
The CRC observed in war- ravaged Afghanistan in 2011 the ‘absolute poverty’ that one 
third of families and children were living in, with less than one quarter of families hav-
ing access to safe drinking water, and less than one third access to sanitation facili-
ties.88 The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, reported in 2002 
that twenty- one groundwater wells and sixty- four irrigation networks were destroyed 
or blocked up by Israeli operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.89 And in 
Afghanistan the water supplies were overwhelmed by wastewater infiltration and were 
heavily contaminated with E. coli and coliforms,90 representing ‘a severe threat to pub-
lic health’.91 Clearly, polluted wells, lakes, and rivers are both an environmental and a 
human rights concern. And, therefore, in using human rights advocacy and mecha-
nisms we may achieve speedier post- conflict environmental clean- up by focusing on 
the impact of such degraded environments to human survival.
As the South African High Court case of Mazibuko and Other v. City of Johannesburg 
and Others recognized, the right to water is of paramount importance to fulfilling the 
right to life itself, stating simply that, ‘Water is life. Life without water is not life. One 
cannot speak of a dignified human existence if one is denied access to water. The right 
to water is the bedrock of most of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights’.92 This 
point was reiterated by the United Nations General Assembly in 2010 when states for-
mally recognized a human right to water and sanitation by adopting Resolution 64/ 292, 
which states that water and sanitation are ‘essential for the full enjoyment of life and all 
human rights’.93
In the context of the right to water, therefore, the minimum core obligations of 
immediate effect require the state to provide access to an essential level of safe, accepta-
ble, physically accessible, and affordable water without discrimination.94 Furthermore, 
88 UN Doc. CRC/ C/ AFG/ CO/ 1, 8 April 2011, para. 57.
89 Report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ 2002/ 58, 10 January 2002, 
para. 103
90 UNEP, Afghanistan (n 1) 34. 91 ibid.
92 (06/ 13865) 30 April 2008, ZAGPHC 491, para. 124.
93 General Assembly Resolution 64/ 292, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, A/ RES/ 64/ 292, 3 
August 2010. Previously the right to water had been read into the right to an adequate standard of living, 
Art. 11 ICESCR.
94 General Comment No.15 (n 79)  37(a– c). See generally Mara Tignino, ‘The Right to Water and 
Sanitation in Post- Conflict Legal Mechanisms: An Emerging Regime?’ in Erika Weinthal, Jessica Troell, 
and Mikiyasu Nakayama, Water and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (Abingdon: Earthscan, 2014).
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states must immediately respect the right to water by not engaging in discriminatory 
actions in the provision of access to water. Clearly, this latter aspect of the obliga-
tion to respect is also often a causal factor for conflict itself, and so in ensuring non- 
discrimination in water resource (re)distribution in the post- conflict phase states can 
alleviate future issues of contestation, and so avoid the cycle of conflict. Within the state’s 
obligation to respect we can also require that the state refrain from actions that further 
damage water resources, such as causing further pollution (for example by dumping 
toxic waste into water resources), diversion or depletion of water resources.95 Clearly, 
in order to ensure the minimum essential level of water supply for its people the state 
may also need to redistribute resources, being careful not to interfere with the rights of 
other users or states, including in the use of transboundary waters and aquifers. This 
dimension will be especially important to get right in regions experiencing water scar-
city. Similarly, we can advocate that in ensuring minimum essential levels states should 
fix damaged or destroyed drinking water wells and pipes, such as those destroyed by 
Iraq in the 1991 Gulf Conflict,96 and decontaminate polluted water resources, such 
as the rivers polluted in the 1999 Kosovo conflict.97 In addition, it is recognized that 
the right to water may also be fulfilled by states allowing non- governmental organiza-
tions, inter- governmental organizations, and other states to help to repair or rebuild 
facilities— and in a post- conflict situation such assistance could clearly be built into the 
peacebuilding process.
In fulfilling the right to water, states are required to take immediate measures to 
prevent, treat, and control diseases linked to water.98 And part of the right to water is 
the right to adequate sanitation, because inadequate sanitation is the primary cause 
of waterborne contamination and diseases.99 In relation to the environment, there-
fore, the vital recognition that water must also be free from microorganisms, chemical 
substances, and radiological hazards that constitute health risks will again be a useful 
advocacy tool.100 In post- conflict DRC, for example, spot checks on drinking water 
points by UNEP found that 92 per cent were contaminated with faecal- related bacteria, 
with the consequence that ‘as little as three percent of the population’ had access to safe 
water in some rural zones.101
As regards emergency situations, such as the onset of armed conflict, states are 
obliged to have plans already in place to ensure a rights- compliant response, including 
ensuring that the state can respond promptly, and as the highest priority, to continue to 
provide essential services to affected populations.102 It is imperative that environmental 
protection considerations are, thus, built into such plans to ensure that, ‘Water and san-
itation [are] provided in a way that respects the natural environment; finite resources 
[are] protected and overexploitation cannot occur’.103 Ensuring environmental hygiene, 
95 de Albuquerque (n 78) para. 17.
96 UNEP, Desk Study on the Environment in Iraq (UNEP, 2003), 28.
97 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Afghanistan, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ AFG/ CO/ 2- 4, 7 June 2010, para. 35.
98 General Comment No.15 (n 79) para. 37(i).
99 ibid. para. 1; WHO, The Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 (WHO, 2000), 1.
100 General Comment No.15 (n 79) para. 12(b).
101 UNEP, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Post- Conflict Environmental Assessment, Synthesis for 
Policy Makers (UNEP, 2011), 41.
102 de Albuquerque (n 78) para. 53. 103 General Comment No. 15 (n 79) para. 28.
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recognized as an aspect of the right to health under Article 12(2)(b) ICESCR, will also 
be valuable in requiring states to prevent threats to health from unsafe and toxic water 
conditions,104 including from landmines and other weapons debris.105
Water resources may also be a source of food and, thus, livelihood. Three hundred tons 
of fish, for example, were killed in a military strike on a fish farm in Lebanon106 and the 
fishing industry, including artisanal fishermen, and other species are damaged every time 
a military attack causes an oil spill or chemical contamination of the marine environment. 
In advocating for compliance with the right to an adequate standard of living, therefore, 
we could require states in the aftermath of conflict to clean up and decontaminate polluted 
waters, thus helping local livelihoods and the environment to recover.
B.  Agriculture/ food sources and land
In this section we will see how in using the right to food, and health to some degree, we 
can aid agricultural areas in their post- conflict recovery, as well as reduce air, soil, and 
water pollution more generally.
In 2002, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food highlighted reports of the 
destruction of environmental resources, namely crops, agricultural land, rooftop water 
tanks, groundwater wells, irrigation networks, and livestock, by the military forces of 
Myanmar.107 Restrictions on movement also served to deny access to food and water.108 
Such destructive actions increase the strain on already depleted and damaged environ-
mental resources. Indeed, common post- conflict threats to agriculture and land used 
for food production are generally from bomb damage, chemical contamination, soil 
compaction, clearing land for ‘security purposes’, and plant/ tree damage due to the 
presence of heavy vehicles and toxic and explosive remnants of war. In Lebanon and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, for example, recent conflicts have caused the destruc-
tion of hundreds of thousands of olive trees and thousands of acres of arable land109— 
undoubtedly leading to reverberating impacts in the food web and agrobiodiversity 
loss. With approximately 90 per cent of the South Lebanese’s population being reli-
ant on agriculture for their livelihood,110 the presence of unexploded cluster bombs 
in agricultural areas is both a human rights and environmental issue.111 Further eco-
logical damage by heavy metal contamination may have been caused in the burning of 
olive trees— a staple crop in Lebanon— with white phosphorus.112 Thus, emphasizing 
104 ibid. para. 8.
105 CESCR, Concluding Observations:  Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ BIH/ CO/ 2, 16 
December 2013, Committee recommendation at para. 30; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Angola, UN 
Doc. E/ C.12/ AGO/ CO/ 3, 1 December 2008, para. 33.
106 UNEP, Lebanon (n 61) 123.
107 The Right to Food, Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, UN 
Doc. E/ CN.4/ 2003/ 54, 10 January 2003, para. 55.
108 ibid. para. 56.
109 Report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ 2002/ 58, 10 January 2002, 
para. 103; UNEP, Desk Study on the Environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (UNEP, 2003) 103.
110 UNEP, Lebanon (n 61) 155.
111 Landmine Action, Foreseeable Harm, the Use and Impact of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon:  2006 
(Landmine Action, 2006) 26; UNEP, Lebanon (n 61) 149.
112 UNEP, Lebanon (n 61) 153– 4.
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the human rights of farmers to their livelihoods will help recognize and remedy these 
environmental harms and will help provide for a speedier remediation of the environ-
mental damage.
The African Commission stated that the right to food is ‘inseparably linked to the 
dignity of human beings and is therefore essential for the enjoyment and fulfilment 
of such other rights as health, education . . .’113 The right guarantees the availability of 
food in a ‘quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free 
from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture’.114 Thus, similarly to 
the right to water, it guarantees access to food resources that are of sufficient quantity 
and quality. The minimum core obligations of the right to food require, first, that the 
state should not destroy or contaminate food sources, and by extension agricultural 
areas for growing food crops and water sources carrying fish stocks. Clearly, this is a 
common, albeit illegal, conflict tactic, but what is probably more likely to occur in the 
post- conflict phase, however, is the destruction or contamination of food sources by 
private companies, as much needed investment in post- conflict states often leads to an 
influx of companies undertaking natural resource extraction or assisting in large devel-
opment projects. Emphasizing the state’s obligation to respect and protect the rights 
to water, health, and food, therefore, human rights can be used to aid environmental 
protection in the post- conflict phase by requiring that such private parties do not con-
taminate or destroy access to food sources.115 We should also advocate that the state use 
such investment contracts or development permits to require companies to help it fulfil 
its human rights obligations, such as by attaching conditions to permits for the building 
of, or rehabilitation of water sources and environmental clean- up.
Similarly, in ensuring the rights to health and adequate standard of living states must 
take 'concrete and targeted steps' towards the full realization of the rights,116 which 
includes the adoption of legislative or other measures. Using human rights in a pro-
active way, one such measure could, therefore, demand the removal of environmen-
tal threats to human rights, such as requiring the prioritized clean- up of agricultural 
areas to ensure the health of food and farm workers, and the clean- up of rivers and 
lakes used for irrigation, fishing, and other aquaculture. Such an approach was adopted 
by the African Commission in relation to the conflict in Sudan. First, the African 
Commission held that the wartime destruction of livestock and farms as well as the 
poisoning of water sources, such as wells, exposed the victims to serious health risks, 
which amounted to a violation of the right to health under Article 16 of the African 
Charter.117 Secondly, the Commission made far- reaching recommendations in post- 
conflict Sudan, requiring the state to ensure the rehabilitation of the entire economic 
and social infrastructure in Darfur, including in relation to health, water, and agri-
cultural services.118 Clearly, in a situation of such historic and conflict- based rights 
violations the state could also approach remediation through relevant post- conflict 
peacebuilding or transitional justice mechanisms.
113 SERAC v. Nigeria (n 40) para. 65.
114 General Comment No.12, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ 1999/ 5, 12 May 1999, para. 8 (emphasis added).
115 See SERAC v. Nigeria (n 40) para. 65.
116 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v. Egypt II (AHRLR 90, 1 March 2011), para. 264.
117 COHRE v. Sudan (n 40) para. 212. 118 ibid. para. 229.
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C.  Environmental damage more generally
Thus, the broad range of human rights, including the 'greened' human rights, could be 
used to require the clean- up of industrial sites where people work, agricultural land, 
rivers and forests where people forage or fish for food, the clean- up of water sources 
such as wells and monitoring of aquifers, and air pollution. The European Court of 
Human Rights, for example, has found violations of Article 8 regarding property rights 
based on the health impacts on residents from environmental pollution.119 Invaluably, 
the Court emphasized procedural rights, including requiring environmental impact 
assessments and information on environmental threats, which reflect core principles 
of environmental protection and remediation.120 And this approach is also reflected 
in the Inter- American and African regional human rights systems.121 Damage to other 
environmental resources, such as forests and wetlands, and other areas of environmen-
tal significance might also be brought within an expanding human rights notion of 
right to environment— thus adding even greater scope for environmental protection. 
In this vein, the Special Rapporteur on the right to a healthy environment has included 
the protection of biodiversity and conservation within the emerging human right to 
environment.122 Fulfilment of the right to a healthy environment, or, indeed, transi-
tional justice mechanisms, might also be used in a post- conflict setting to promote 
environmental justice, for example to prohibit the siting of vulnerable communities 
in polluted areas, to redistribute land, to remedy any existing environmental injustices 
and to promote peace.
D.  Toxic and hazardous remnants of war
Uncleared landmines and unexploded cluster munitions are a typical hazard for post- 
conflict states, especially where the population is reliant on the environment for its live-
lihood, and, as such, these dangerous remnants are worthy of special consideration.123
According to UNEP, in post- conflict Lebanon, ‘the land scarcity resulting from clus-
ter bomb contamination has the potential to generate a new socio- economic dynamic 
and set in train a cycle of poverty and environmental degradation’.124 Thus, a com-
mon theme in states’ reports and Concluding Observations following protracted armed 
conflict are the social and economic difficulties posed by the continued presence of 
119 See Guerra v. Italy (n 48); López Ostra v. Spain App no. 16798/ 90 (ECtHR, 9 December 1994); Taşkin 
and Others v. Turkey App no. 46117/ 99 (ECtHR, 10 November 2004).
120 Principles 10 and 17, 1992 UN Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/ 
CONF.151/ 26/ REV.1; 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, ECE/ CEP/ 43.
121 SERAC v. Nigeria (n 40) para. 53; Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (Series C no. 185) (IACHR, 
28 November 2007), at <http:// www.corteidh.or.cr/ docs/ casos/ articulos/ seriec_ 172_ ing.pdf> accessed 1 
June 2017.
122 John H. Knox, Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to 
the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, Preliminary Report, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 
22/ 43, 24 December 2012, paras. 7– 11.
123 UNEP, DRC (n 101) 28; the use of cluster munitions in the Lebanon Conflict in 2006 was influential 
in their prohibition, see Handicap International, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions 
on People and Communities (Handicap International, 2007).
124 UNEP, Lebanon (n 61) 155.
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landmines or other explosive remnants of war, and the consequent need for states to 
clear them.125 A number of reports, for example, highlight the difficulties posed by land-
mines in post- conflict states such as Sudan,126 Myanmar,127 Colombia,128 Croatia,129 
Cambodia,130 Bosnia Herzegovina,131 and Palestine.132 In his report on the situation 
of internally displaced persons in Croatia,133 Special Representative Kälin also specifi-
cally recommended the removal of landmines from agricultural areas,134 but also high-
lighted that the physical environment must also be rendered free from ‘environmental 
damage such as the release of heavy metals and poisonous materials into the environ-
ment as a direct or indirect result of the armed conflict’.135
The long- term environmental risks from toxic weapons were clearly most apparent 
from the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, including the use of Agent Orange in 
Vietnam. More recent battlefields have seen debris from other chemically toxic weap-
ons, such as from depleted uranium munitions, chemical weapons, white phosphorous, 
and tungsten,136 as well as other abandoned, contaminated military detritus. And oth-
ers in the current volume have also discussed the particular environmental problems 
caused by using burn pits to destroy military waste, both during conflict and in the 
post- conflict phase.137 Clearly, some health and environmental impacts from such dan-
gerous debris may be immediate, but some impacts may take decades to manifest,138 
and, as Harris suggests, as a consequence, these impacts may well be missed in post- 
conflict assessments and peacebuilding.139
As regards the particular problem of explosive remnants of war (‘ERW’), in 1997 states 
adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti- Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,140 which imposes an absolute ban 
on the use as well as the stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti- personnel land-
mines.141 Similarly, in 2008 the Convention on Cluster Munitions142 (‘CCM’) imposed 
125 CESCR, Bosnia (n 105)  Committee recommendation at para. 30; CESCR, Concluding 
Observations: Angola, E/ C.12/ AGO/ CO/ 3, 1 December 2008, para. 33; see also Neryl Lewis, Geoff Harris, 
and Elisa dos Santos, ‘The Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex- Combatants’ in Harris (n 25) 162.
126 Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Mohamed Chande 
Othman, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 18/ 40, 22 August 2011, para. 40.
127 Progress report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea 
Quintana, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 19/ 67, 7 March 2012, para. 59.
128 CRC, Concluding Observations: Colombia, UN Doc. CRC/ C/ COL/ CO/ 3, 8 June 2006.
129 Report of the Representative of the Secretary- General on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons, Walter Kälin, Mission to Croatia, UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ 2006/ 71/ Add.3, 29 December 2005.
130 CRC, Concluding Observations: Cambodia, UN Doc. CRC/ C/ 15/ Add.128, 28 June 2000.
131 CESCR, Concluding Observations:  Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ BIH/ CO/ 1, 24 
January 2006.
132 Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, Report of the United Nations 
Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict Conclusions and recommendations, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 12/ 48 
(ADVANCE 2), 24 September 2009, para. 1975.e.
133 Kälin (n 129). 134 ibid. para. 50.b. 135 ibid. para. 36.
136 Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (n 132) para. 1975.e.
137 See, for example  chapter 13 in this volume.
138 Chad Briggs and Inka Weissbecker, ‘Salting the Earth: Environmental Health Challenges in Post- 
Conflict Reconstruction’ in David Jensen and Steve Lonergan (eds.), Assessing and Restoring Natural 
Resources in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (Abingdon: Earthscan, 2012), 112.
139 Neryl Lewis, ‘Social Recovery from Armed Conflict’ in Harris (n 25) 98– 101.
140 (1997) 36 ILM 1507 (‘APM Treaty’). 141 Art. 1 ibid.
142 https:// www.icrc.org/ ihl/ INTRO/ 620 accessed 1 June 2017.
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an absolute ban on cluster munitions.143 State parties are, furthermore, obliged to clear 
remnant- affected areas situated in their territory.144 In the future, therefore, it is hoped 
that the extensive human rights problems posed by ERW in the post- conflict phase can 
be reduced, if not eliminated altogether. Under these treaties, mandatory and imme-
diate obligations arise for detailed surveying, recording, and marking of cluster muni-
tion contaminated areas within a state party’s jurisdiction and control.145 There is also 
‘strong encouragement’ for user states to transfer information about the type, number, 
and location of use of certain weapons,146 as well as an obligation of international assis-
tance (including financial) which should ease the job of weapons clearance. In Kosovo, 
for example, extensive information regarding location mappings, safety information, 
and technical assistance was provided by NATO, in part to help in the environmental 
clean- up,147 but such information- sharing is rare.
These arms controls treaties are not, prima facie, human rights instruments, but the 
provisions for clearance obligations and victim assistance for those injured by such 
ERW definitely have an ESC rights dimension to them relating to social security, 
healthcare, gender, and disability rights. The demining and decontamination process, 
therefore, can arguably be used to fulfil human rights obligations and environmental 
protection, both directly, such as protecting the right to health, and indirectly, such as 
the notable example of Cambodia where the process for carrying out demining led the 
state to establish land titling for local populations.148 Using the human rights frame-
work we could add a more general obligation on states to routinely transfer informa-
tion on the use and location of toxic and explosive remnants of war, thus, going beyond 
the existing limited provision for this obligation in specific treaties. And there may also 
be a role here for the human rights civil society to do more, particularly in terms of 
capacity building of local populations.
5.4.3  Natural resource depletion
In addition to the contamination of environmental resources, states are also likely to 
be faced with the depletion of natural resources following conflict, which will impact 
on livelihoods, food and water sources, health and, ultimately, on life itself. Using the 
human rights framework such depletion can be halted and post- conflict justice mech-
anisms could be used to remedy the environmental damage and compensate for any 
historical grievances.
The UNEP Afghanistan Report highlighted the deforestation, over decades of con-
flict, of pistachio trees, which had been used as a means of livelihood by much of the 
143 Note the definition of cluster munitions in Art. 2(2) CCM, ibid.
144 Art. 10, 1996 Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby- 
Traps and Other Devices to the 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects (1996) 35 ILM 1206; Art. 5 APM Treaty; Art. 4 CCM.
145 Art. 4(2) CCM. 146 Art. 4(4) CCM.
147 Andrew Osborn, ‘NATO Brings Out Big Guns to Kill Off Cancer Scare’ The Guardian (11 January 
2001) 16.
148 Nao Shimoyachi- Yuzawa, ‘Linking Demining to Post- Conflict Peacebuilding:  A  Case Study of 
Cambodia’ in Jensen and Lonergan (n 138) 188.
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population.149 The principal causes of this loss were the cutting and stockpiling of wood 
for fuel by the population, as well as by the military for fuelwood and in clearing trees 
to prevent ambush by enemy forces.150 And whether the resources have been depleted 
by the state itself or by rebel groups, by companies or individuals, including those tak-
ing advantage of the rule of law vacuum, by bomb damage or by refugees seeking food 
and shelter for their very survival, the depletion of natural resources can leave a very 
lasting scar on a post- conflict society. The distribution and use of natural resources, 
therefore, need to form key components in the post- conflict settlement, and, clearly, 
this implies distribution and access to such resources in a human- rights- compatible 
way. Showing the value of the human rights machinery there is clear condemnation by 
the CESCR of the DRC’s continued illicit trade in timber resources and ‘abusive exploi-
tation of the country’s forests’,151 specifically making reference to the adverse impacts 
of such exploitation on the ecology and biodiversity, and the human rights of the local 
indigenous pygmies. The CESCR went so far as to strongly criticize the impunity for 
human rights violations and illegal exploitation of natural resources, including by for-
eign companies, suggesting that these factors constituted ‘major obstacles’ to the enjoy-
ment of ESC rights within the DRC.152
Indeed, environmental damage and resource exploitation, as well as the ESC rights 
negatively impacted, may actually increase after the conflict due to the temporary gov-
ernance vacuum within a war- ravaged state, and an increasingly desperate population. 
Examples also include the exploitation of fishing resources in the exclusive economic 
zone or exclusive fishing zone of states engaged in conflict or its aftermath. And clearly, 
as in Darfur, the survival needs of the population and, especially, displaced persons 
often lead to the breakdown of normal, peacetime food networks and the consequent 
exploitation of bushmeat, such as occurred in the Virunga forest in the DRC, the clear-
ance of forests for agriculture, and other impacts on the environment, such as trade in 
animal products, such as ivory. And this is where human rights can undoubtedly assist 
in the post- conflict phase. First, the state’s obligations to respect and protect the right 
to food, and the broader right to an adequate standard of living, require the state not 
to diminish further vital agricultural and other natural resources for those who are 
dependent upon access to such sources. Secondly, recent practice shows an emphasis 
in human rights machinery on fusing environmental protection and human rights in 
the post- conflict, arguably peacebuilding, context. For example, the CESCR required 
the DRC to ensure human rights compliance by requiring that future forestry projects 
were both ‘centred on advancing the rights of forest- dependent peoples’ and ‘conducted 
only after comprehensive studies are carried out, with the participation of the peoples 
concerned, to assess the social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impact on them 
of planned activities’.153
The key, again, is arguably to ensure that natural resource distribution is included 
within peacebuilding or transitional justice processes, and to anchor such measures in 
149 UNEP, Afghanistan (n 1) 64– 6. 150 ibid.
151 UN Doc. E/ C.12/ COD/ CO/ 4, 16 December 2009, para. 6 (emphasis added). 152 ibid.
153 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ COD/ CO/ 
4, 16 December 2009, para. 14.
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ESCR and environmental human rights, including in promoting better environmen-
tal education and participation in environmental decision- making through participa-
tory rights, equity in natural resource distribution, particularly respecting the rights of 
indigenous peoples, and recognizing that the right to development must take place in 
a sustainable and fair way.
5.4.4  Poverty and historical inequalities
There is often an environmental dimension to the causal factors for conflict, as recog-
nized by human rights organs, including by ad hoc fact- finding missions.154 Common 
causes of conflict, in addition to poverty, gross disparities in wealth and resources of 
populations within a state, and unbalanced development policies,155 are the factors of 
competition for land and water resources, desertification, and environmental degrada-
tion.156 This section will, therefore, suggest how human rights can be used to address 
such historical inequalities and help prevent the return to conflict.
In Rwanda and Mali, as McCoy explains, ‘horizontal inequalities’ were major causal 
factors of conflict, particularly group inequalities in land ownership and access to 
resources.157 Using transitional justice mechanisms, the Truth Commission in Kenya, 
for example, found that ‘historical grievances over land’ constituted the ‘single most 
important driver of conflicts and ethnic tension in Kenya’,158 while ‘close to 50 percent 
of statements and memorandum received by the Commission related to or touched 
on claims over land’.159 UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan has also recognized trans-
boundary water resources, food insecurity, land concentration, and access to land- 
based resources as root causes of conflict, which are often coupled with poverty and 
social inequality, particularly, he says, in African and Latin American countries.160 
And, of course, due to future climate change impacts on natural resources it is likely 
that we will see greater land inequalities, water disputes, food insecurity, and resource- 
dependent livelihoods lost across the globe and so the resource- competition/ conflict 
nexus is only going to increase in importance.
As stated by Secretary- General Kofi Annan, however, ‘conflict prevention and sus-
tainable development are mutually reinforcing’.161 Thus, a key aspect of conflict pre-
vention, particularly in the era of unpredictable climate change, must be in ensuring 
environmental human rights— including via robust and comprehensive transitional 
154 Report of the High- Level Mission on the situation of human rights in Darfur pursuant to Human 
Rights Council decision S- 4/ 101, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 4/ 80, 9 March 2007.
155 ibid. para. 54.
156 ibid. para. 55. See also Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
situation of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 49, 14 June 2011, para. 52(1)(f).
157 David McCoy, ‘Rectifying Horizontal Inequalities: Lessons from African Conflict’ (2008) 8(1) African 
Journal on Conflict Resolution 105.
158 Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, Kenya, Final Report, Vol. 1 (2013), para. 
vii; Paul Gready, ‘From Transitional to Transformative Justice:  A  New Agenda for Practice’ (2014) 8(3) 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 339.
159 Truth Commission Report, Kenya (n 158) para. vii; Gready (n 158).
160 Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/ 55/ 985- S/ 2001/ 574 (7 
June 2001), paras. 114– 15.
161 ibid. para. 11.
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justice mechanisms. In the post- conflict phase, therefore, rebuilding the state must first 
entail a thorough assessment of how the three dimensions of poverty, degraded envi-
ronmental resources, and human rights violations have contributed to past tensions and 
abuses. Human rights can be a determinant of peace and sustainable development, and 
safeguarding a sustainable and just peace will necessarily involve states finding a way 
to ensure that human rights are factored into the peacebuilding process in a mutually 
supportive way with environmental protections. In this way, for example, emergency 
methods adopted to address environmental health problems would be connected to 
environmental protection and long- term development policies,162 and could help to sta-
bilize communities through helping to mitigate any feelings of injustice related to prior 
unequal distribution of environmental resources.163 And as part of this approach states 
should ensure that every organ created, developed, or reinstituted following conflict is 
built on a firm recognition of human rights, including environmental rights.
While poverty is not mentioned in the ICESCR, the CESCR observes that poverty 
constitutes a denial of human rights,164 and requires states in a position to do so to 
provide international assistance to others to help them to fulfil their core obligations 
and to ensure the eradication of poverty.165 Thus, while post- conflict states may need 
to rebuild or remediate their entire economic and social infrastructure, including in 
relation to education, health, water, and agricultural services,166 international assis-
tance is an obligation under the covenant. Such funding could also, therefore, be used 
to provide training in environmental human rights and, thus, environmental conserva-
tion and remediation.167 Peacebuilding agendas, including through transitional justice 
mechanisms, could include the creation (and funding) of such mechanisms, possibly 
at the local level, to resolve land, property, and resource disputes, and, possibly, even to 
provide compensation to land owners for damage caused to their lands.168 In this way, 
states will be promoting the notion of local- based solutions, which should include and 
engender local support for reconstruction and clean- up efforts, including in an envi-
ronmentally aware way.
5.5 Conclusions
It must be noted at the outset, of course, that there can be clear tensions and potential 
risks in using human rights, as suggested here, as a framework to achieve environmen-
tal protection. Specifically, human rights have previously been side- lined in the peace-
building process, with states preferring the rule of law notion because it was seen as a 
less value- laden concept and, thus, less contentious.169 There is also the possibility that 
162 Briggs and Weissbecker (n 138) 129. 163 ibid.
164 CESCR, Statement on Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ 2001/ 10, 10 May 2001, para. 1.
165 ibid. paras. 16– 17. 166 COHRE v. Sudan (n 40) para. 229.
167 Second periodic report of Sudan to the CESCR, submitted 27 July 2012, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ SDN/ 2, 18 
September 2013.
168 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ LKA/ CO/ 2- 4, 9 December 2010, 
para. 29.
169 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘Invoking the Rule of Law in Post- Conflict Rebuilding:  A  Critical 
Examination’ (2007– 2008) 49 William & Mary Law Review 1345, 1357.
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using human rights rhetoric might over- politicize the issue of environmental remedia-
tion. And so a human rights focus might arguably constrain pure environmental pro-
tection in the post- conflict era, and risk diverting some of the effort and resources away 
from pure environmental protection work and monitoring. There is a further risk that 
all environmental damage might be shoehorned into being only human rights issues, 
with potential loss of focus on those aspects of environmental damage that do not easily 
fit into the mould— possibly causing delay in the clean- up and remediation of the envi-
ronment, decreasing the environmental expertise inputting into the decision- making 
processes, or forcing clean- up efforts to focus on human harms from environmental 
damage to the detriment of purely environmental concerns.
On the other hand, as this contribution has attempted to demonstrate, using a 
human rights framework to greater effect in the post- conflict period could enhance the 
existing level of environmental protection. Such strategic use of human rights mecha-
nisms is not occurring at present among the environmental and environmental rights 
movements. With the expansion of ESC rights to incorporate environmental dimen-
sions, and even what would traditionally be seen as pure environmental concerns at 
times, such a framework could provide strong legal obligations on states to under-
take environmental clean- up and restoration— and strong mechanisms to review state 
actions and ensure environmental remediation. Looking beyond clean- up, considering 
‘structural violence’ issues of environmental justice in the allocation and use of natural 
resources, in a combined human rights and environmental approach to peacebuilding, 
jus post bellum or transitional justice could offer the potential for long- term solutions, 
and, potentially, an end to what is often a cycle of conflict.
And so in using human rights we must be aware of their pros and cons in factoring 
their use into the post- conflict processes in a way that is mutually supportive of envi-
ronmental protection and rights. Such mutually supportive rights- based environmen-
tal protection is an aspect that can be built into peacebuilding and transitional justice 
mechanisms, of course, with the idea of fostering a stable peace.
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6.1 Introduction
The link between conflict and natural resources has been firmly established in recent 
decades. At least eighteen violent conflicts have been fuelled by natural resource exploi-
tation since 1990,1 and according to one study, between 1970 and 2008 from 29 per cent 
to 57 per cent of non- international armed conflicts (‘NIAC’) were related to high- value 
natural resources.2 In addition to the number of resource- fuelled conflicts being on the 
rise, both the nature of conflicts and the source of financing have undergone transfor-
mation since the end of the Cold War: there are now substantially more NIACs than 
international wars, and the source of financing has shifted from support from Cold 
War powers for proxy wars to natural resource revenues in many conflict- affected situ-
ations.3 As the President of the UN Security Council noted in 2007: ‘in specific armed 
conflict situations, the exploitation, trafficking, and illicit trade of natural resources 
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have played a role in areas where they have contributed to the outbreak, escalation, or 
continuation of armed conflict’.4
Furthermore, conflicts with the presence of lootable natural resources tend to be 
more prolonged and more destructive;5 and the longer that a conflict persists, the 
weaker the rule of law becomes, reducing the opportunities to establish durable peace.6 
Accordingly, there are three principal pathways in which natural resources play a role 
in conflict: by contributing to the outbreak of conflict, by financing and thereby sus-
taining conflict, and by undermining peacemaking.7 Natural resources are also central 
to post- conflict peacebuilding.
The causation between natural resources and armed conflict is rarely clear or 
straightforward. Since Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler identified greed and grievance 
as the primary motivations of NIACs,8 scholarship has developed a more nuanced con-
ceptualization that recognizes the complex forces shaping the onset and sustainment 
of conflict.9 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the plunder and pillage of natural 
resources is probably as old as conflict itself, no matter the intricacies of this linkage. As 
one commentator notes: ‘Traditionally, armies live off the land. Where there is nothing 
left to plunder, they wither and die, as Napoleon discovered at the gates of Moscow.’10
The pillage of natural resources— witnessed in conflicts in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (‘DRC’), Colombia, Cambodia, and elsewhere— can act not only as a 
means for financing the conflict,11 but also put an enormous strain on the environment 
as a result of predatory exploitation practices, often leading to severe damage and the 
eventual depletion of resources.12 This, in turn, can undermine long- term livelihoods, 
trigger further violence, and lock communities in a vicious cycle of destruction. This 
4 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/ PRST/ 2007/ 22, 25 June 
2007. <http:// www.un.org/ en/ ga/ search/ view_ doc.asp?symbol=S/ PRST/ 2007/ 22> accessed 5 June 2017.
5 Michael L. Ross, ‘Booty Futures’ 6 May 2005, at < https:// www.sscnet.ucla.edu/ polisci/ faculty/ ross/ 
papers/ working/ bootyfutures.pdf > at 4, accessed 5 June 2017. For an opposing point of view, see Philippe 
Le Billon, who argues that under the right conditions, natural resource presence can make a conflict less 
destructive by giving one side a definitive advantage in Philippe Le Billon, ‘The Geopolitical Economy of 
‘Resource Wars’ 9(1) Geopolitics 1, 12.
6 Emily E. Harwell, ‘Building Momentum and Constituencies for Peace: The Role of Natural Resources 
in Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding’ in Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols (n 3).
7 UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding (UNEP, 2009), 8, at < http:// postconflict.unep.ch/ publications/ 
pcdmb_ policy_ 01.pdf > accessed 5 June 2017.
8 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War 2’ (2000), World Bank Dev. Research 
Group, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2355.
9 See UNEP, Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment, Consultation 
Draft, at 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 10 (September 2008), noting that the relationship between natural resources, the envi-
ronment, and conflict is multidimensional and complex, with three principle pathways: natural resources 
contributing to the outbreak of conflict; financing and sustaining conflict; and undermining peacemaking. 
Lujala and Rustad note three main avenues leading from natural resources to conflict: resource capture, 
resource- related grievances, and adverse effects on the economy and institutions. See also van den Herik 
and Dam- de Jong (n 3) 242; Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad, ‘High- Value Natural Resources: A Blessing or 
a Curse for Peace’ in Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad (eds.), High- Value Natural Resources and Post- Conflict 
Peacebuilding (New York: Routledge, 2012), 7.
10 See Schabas (n 3).
11 For a list of recent civil wars and the specific types of natural resources that fuelled them, see UNEP 
(n 7) 11.
12 Dam- de Jong (n 3) at 156; James G. Stewart, ‘Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural 
Resources’ (2011) Open Society Justice Initiative 9.
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has been taking place in Afghanistan, where the pressure of warfare, combined with the 
destruction of livelihoods, has resulted in mass displacement of rural people and to this 
day contributes to brewing tensions.13
Reigning in predatory natural resource exploitation both in conflict and in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict can be critical to maintaining stability and prevent-
ing a relapse to conflict. Furthermore, predatory natural resource exploitation often 
continues well after the signing of peace agreements; unbalanced resource contracts— 
negotiated during conflict or as a result of what Michael Ross calls ‘booty futures’14— 
can lead to the continuation of exploitative practices in the post- conflict period as well, 
rendering a long- lasting vision of peace illusory.
At the same time, while it is imperative to recognize the role of natural resources— 
particularly high- value natural resources— in fuelling and financing conflict, they also 
have a role in promoting peace.15 Revenue from natural resources often represents 
the backbone of the national economy of conflict- affected countries, and in the after-
math of conflict these revenues can be instrumental in financing reconstruction and 
development— if they are managed soundly.16
Recent years have seen a revival of usage for the ancient crime of pillage as a poten-
tial avenue to address conflict- related illegal natural resource exploitation. Yet, despite 
this revival in the sphere of international criminal law, pillage has so far not been used 
by any international criminal courts to prosecute illegal natural resource exploitation. 
Indeed, to date, the International Court of Justice has been the sole international tri-
bunal that applied pillage directly to the exploitation of natural resources, in the DRC 
v. Uganda case.17 In addition to the dearth of pillage prosecutions, there is the con-
cern about the potential scope of pillage prosecutions:  corporate actors have had a 
well- documented role in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in a number of 
conflicts, yet the criminal liability of corporations remains contested in international 
criminal law. War crime trials— including pillage prosecutions— are essential for the jus 
post bellum legal framework and could be an important bridge towards lasting peace.
While the pillage of natural resources is in many ways an environmentally based 
crime— due to the predatory exploitation of natural resources and its effects on the 
environment— it may be best, as Michael Lundberg notes, to avoid prosecuting resource 
exploitation as an environmental crime, say under the International Criminal Court’s 
environmental war crime provision.18 While the environmental costs of such crimes 
13 UNEP (n 7) 17.
14 Ross (n 5) 3, defining ‘booty futures’ as future exploitation rights to natural resources owned by gov-
ernments that rebel groups are aiming to overthrow. Rebel groups sell these rights to outsiders, thereby 
raising money to fund their cause. See also van den Herik and Dam- de Jong’s argument that booty futures 
are covered by law prohibiting plunder: in the IG Farben judgment, the Nuremberg Tribunal found that 
‘property’ covers all sorts of objects, including physical and intangible ones, thereby also covering rights 
attached to resources, see van den Herik and Dam- de Jong (n 3) 252.
15 Lujala and Rustad (n 9) 3; Emily E. Harwell and Phillipe Le Billon, ‘Natural Connections: Linking 
Transitional Justice and Development Through a Focus on Natural Resources’ (2009), at <http:// www.
ictj.org/ publication/ natural- connections- linking- transitional- justice- and- development- through- focus- 
natural> accessed 5 June 2017; Harwell (n 6).
16 Lujala and Rustad (n 15) 3. 17 van den Herik and Dam- de Jong (n 3) 269.
18 Michael A. Lundberg, ‘The Plunder of Natural Resources During War: A War Crime (?)’ (2008) 39 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 495, 496, 502. A similar argument is made for Additional Protocol 
I to the Geneva Conventions’ similar provisions (Arts. 35(3) and 55). ibid. 502.
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can be significant, there is doubt as to whether the threshold of ‘widespread, long- term 
and severe damage’ would be reached, and its potential scope is further restricted by 
military necessity.19 Furthermore, while resource plunder can often have serious envi-
ronmental ramifications, it is a ‘fundamentally economic and property- based crime’,20 
where the aim is not environmental destruction per se, but resource capture.
This chapter argues that the primary focus of pillage as a war crime must necessar-
ily be on the economic damage and loss it causes to a country and communities, while 
recognizing that part of this damage is the harm caused to the environment by pred-
atory exploitation practices. This chapter explores natural resource pillage as a fun-
damentally economic crime, and places it in the larger panoply of economic crimes 
committed during conflict. In addition to examining the war crime of pillage and its 
relation to illegal natural resource exploitation in conflict, the chapter assesses the rel-
evance and potential utility of the law of pillage to jus post bellum. The goal is not only 
to address the potential that prosecutions for pillage may have for curbing the role of 
natural resources in enabling and financing conflict; it is necessary to take a broader 
view of pillage in the context of jus post bellum to consider the role that prosecution of 
the crime of pillage may fulfil in post- conflict peacebuilding and restoration of natural 
resources, together with other avenues addressing illegal natural resource exploitation.
6.2 Background
6.2.1  Key terms: overlap and ambiguity
‘Pillage’, ‘spoliation’, ‘plunder’, and ‘looting’ have been used interchangeably in most 
international humanitarian law instruments, as well as international jurisprudence and 
popular parlance. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘pillage’ as ‘the forcible taking of pri-
vate property by an invading or conquering army from the enemy’s subjects’.21 The ori-
gins of the word ‘looting’ come from the Sanskrit ‘lunt’ or to rob and the Hindi ‘lut’.22 
The terms ‘pillage’ and ‘plunder’ were used interchangeably by commentators, such as 
Hugo Grotius, across centuries.23 This interchangeability continued in the twentieth 
century:  the English and French versions of the Statutes of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
used the terms ‘plunder’ and ‘pillage’ respectively, while referring to the same legal 
concept.24 The statute and the judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
19 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Steve Freeland, Addressing the 
Intentional Destruction of the Environment During Warfare Under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012).
20 Lundberg (n 18) 502.
21 See ICRC website, at <http:// www.icrc.org/ customary- ihl/ eng/ docs/ v1_ rul_ rule52> accessed 5 June 
2017. Pillage is not the same as ‘booty of war’, which is defined as a ‘State’s taking of public property by its 
organs and for its benefit’, whereby title to public movable property taken from the enemy is granted to the 
state that captured it upon seizure, and the original owners are only entitled to compensation. Pillaged or 
plundered property is not meant to give title to the captor and concerns both private and public property. 
See Oxford Public International Law (OPIL), ‘Pillage’ Encyclopedia Entry, August 2009, at < http:// opil.
ouplaw.com> accessed 5 June 2017.
22 Stuart P. Green, ‘Looting, Law and Lawlessness’ (2007) 81 Tulane Law Review 1129, 1137 citing John 
A. Simpson and Edmund S.C. Weiner (eds.), The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd 
edn, 1989), 21.
23 Stewart (n 12) 15. 24 ibid.
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Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) similarly conflate plunder and pillage, and the ICTY specifically 
acknowledged the interchangeability of the terms ‘pillage’, ‘plunder’, and ‘spoliation’ as 
applied to the unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict.25 ‘Looting’ has 
emerged as yet another synonym,26 and has appeared in the US Uniform Code for 
Military Justice, as well as a number of ICTY judgments.27 In the course of post- Second 
World War Nuremberg prosecutions,28 ‘spoliation’ was used interchangeably with 
‘plunder’ and was defined as ‘the widespread and systematised acts of dispossession 
and acquisition of property in violation of the rights of the owners which took place in 
territories under the belligerent occupation or control of Nazi Germany’.29
The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), in the Armed Activities Case between the 
DRC and Uganda, used the terms ‘plundering’, ‘looting’, and ‘exploitation’, when find-
ing Uganda ‘internationally responsible for acts of looting, plundering and exploitation 
of the DRC’s natural resources committed by members of the UPDF in the territory of 
the DRC’.30 The Court also used the term ‘pillage’.31 The ICJ did not make a legal dis-
tinction among these four terms, leading to both ‘some doctrinal uncertainty about the 
precise scope and meaning of each’, but also maintaining consistency with ICTY juris-
prudence.32 The decision on the ICJ’s part to refrain from establishing a legal distinc-
tion between the terms pillage, plunder, and looting, allowed it to ‘look more broadly 
at patterns of misappropriation’.33
6.2.2  Evolution of norms against pillage
Historically, pillage was a right of the victors in the context of war and the immedi-
ate aftermath of war.34 From antiquity into the Middle Ages, while regarded by many 
as criminal, pillage bore the imprimatur of legitimacy as spoils of war, applicable dur-
ing conflict but not for instance in the case of civil disasters.35 Pillage fulfilled a dou-
ble function in medieval times:  it served as a weapon against the enemy— by way of 
25 ibid. 16. As Stewart observes, the ICTY Statute’s interpretation of plunder may in fact be broader and 
encompass pillage, which also included an element of violence not present in plunder. The notion that pil-
lage is perpetrated with an element of violence is also present in the definition of pillage provided by the 
Oxford English Dictionary, according to which pillage is generally defined as ‘to rob or steal with violence, 
especially in Wartime’. Oxford English Dictionary (n 22), cited in OPIL (n 21).
26 Stewart (n 12) 17. While looting is generally considered synonymous with pillage, it also appears to 
extend to disasters, riots, and other, non- conflict contexts. See also Green (n 23), 1140– 1.
27 Stewart (n 12) 17, referring to the Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT- 95- 9- T, Judgment, para. 98.
28 Stewart (n 12) 16.
29 See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law Database, Rule 52, at <http:// www.icrc.org/ 
customary- ihl/ eng/ docs/ v2_ rul_ rule52> accessed 5 June 2017, quoting the Krauch case (IG Farben Trial). 
For a nuanced distinction regarding spoliation, see Robert Dufresne, ‘Reflections and Extrapolation of the 
ICJ‘s Approach to Illegal Resource Exploitation in the Armed Activities Case’ (2008) 40 NYU Journal of 
International Law and Politics 171, 192.
30 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v.  Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, ICJ Reports 168 (‘Armed Activities Case’), para. 243; see also Drufresne (n 29) 185.
31 ICJ, Armed Activities Case (n 30) para. 245.
32 As noted above, in the Delalić case, the ICTY made an explicit decision to use plunder and pillage 
interchangeably. See also Dufresne (n 29) 186.
33 ibid. 187. 34 Green (n 22) 1137.
35 ibid. 1137, making reference to Roman law provisions. The Old Testament allows looting in the context 
of war, but if done for personal gain, it was punishable by death. See Joshua 11:14 and Joshua 7:1– 26.
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destroying the enemy’s property— and it provided for the maintenance of the army on 
foreign land through provisioning and in lieu of payment to soldiers, while reinforcing 
its control over the countryside.36 In the seventeenth century, Grotius’s writings largely 
consider pillage and plunder of enemy property as acceptable under the laws of war, 
calling it ‘equivalent for a debt’ or ‘for reasonable punishment’ but only for an enemy 
and not for third parties.37
A slow change began occurring, starting from the seventeenth century, when philos-
ophers such as John Locke began to challenge the right of victors to spoils of war.38 The 
definitive shift, however, came in the nineteenth century, when the 1863 Lieber Code 
prohibited pillage: ‘all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main force . . . are 
prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may seem 
adequate for the gravity of the offense’.39 The Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 also 
prohibit pillage, as do the Hague Conventions IX and X.40
The devastations and systematic plundering of property41 of the Second World 
War reinforced the need to reaffirm the prohibition against pillage in international 
law. Thus, prohibitions against pillage appear in the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg),42 the Fourth Geneva Convention,43 and Additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (under Fundamental Guarantees).44 As 
of 2015, similar prohibitions appear in forty- eight national military manuals, the 
national legislation of ninety- two countries, and the case law of twelve countries.45 
Furthermore, the prohibition against pillage is now accepted as a rule of customary 
international law.46
36 Tuba Inal, Looting and Rape in Wartime:  Law and Change in International Relations 
(Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 28. Regarding the connection between pillage 
and rape in wartime, while women were considered ‘booty’ for soldiers much along the lines of prop-
erty, rape in war was rejected and found inacceptable much sooner than pillage. In modern times, 
the occurrence of rape and pillage is still often synchronous. See Holly Dranginis, ‘Interrupting the 
Silence:  Addressing Congo’s Sexual Violence Crisis within the Great Lakes Regional Peace Process’ The 
Enough Project (20 March 2014), 8, 10, at <http:// www.enoughproject.org/ files/ InterruptingtheSilence_ 
AddressingCongosSexualViolenceCrisiswithintheGreatLakesRegionalPeaceProcess.pdf.> accessed 5 
June 2017.
37 Inal (n 36) 28– 9.
38 Salome Kiwara- Wilson, ‘Restituting Colonial Plunder: The Case for the Benin Bronzes and Ivories’ 
(2013) 23 DePaul Journal of Art, Technology and Intellectual Property Law 375, 388.
39 Lieber Code (1863), Art. 44. This shift in the nineteenth century from pillage being accepted to being a 
prohibited act is also manifest in several arbitral awards from that era. See OPIL (n 21).
40 Hague Regulations (1899), Arts. 28, 47; Hague Regulations (1907), Arts. 28, 47. In addition to prohibit-
ing pillage, Art. 21 of Hague Convention X (1907) provides that parties ‘undertake to enact or to propose 
to their legislatures . . . the measures necessary for checking in time of war individual acts of pillage.’ See 
<http:// www.icrc.org/ customary- ihl/ eng/ docs/ v2_ rul_ rule52> accessed 6 June 2017.
41 OPIL (n 21).
42 Art. 6(b) of the 1945 IMT Charter (Nuremberg) includes ‘plunder of public or private property’ in its 
list of war crimes, for which there must be individual responsibility.
43 Geneva Convention IV (1949), Art. 33.
44 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (1977), Art. 4(2)(g).
45 For the full list of military manuals and countries, see <http:// www.icrc.org/ customary- ihl/ eng/ docs/ 
v2_ rul_ rule52 and http:// www.icrc.org/ customary- ihl/ eng/ docs/ v1_ rul_ rule52#refFn_ 82_ 9> accessed 5 
June 2017.
46 Stewart (n 12) 14.
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Yet another revival of the crime of pillage came with the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) as well as special courts, such as the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (‘SCSL’),47 the Iraqi Special Court,48 the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’),49 and the ICTY.50 Codification of the crime of pillage is 
of particular significance in the context of the SCSL and ICTR statutes, as both tribu-
nals’ statutes apply to non- international armed conflict.51 It does not come as a surprise 
then that pillage as a war crime is prohibited under these special tribunals’ statutes, 
since all of these conflicts witnessed widespread pillaging and exploitation of private 
and public property.
The Rome Statute establishing the ICC prohibits ‘pillaging a town or place, even 
when taken by assault’52 under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) and (e)(v), thereby making pillage 
a war crime in both international and non- international armed conflict.53 The Rome 
Statute contains three other important war crime provisions relevant to the protection 
of property in wartime. These are Article 8(2)(a)(iv) on the extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, and Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) and (e)(xii) on the destruction and 
seizure of enemy property.54 All three of these provisions criminalize different forms of 
unjust takings of property.55
6.2.3  Towards a standard definition of pillage
Despite the progressive development in the criminalization of pillage in international 
law, a firm definition of the crime did not, and many would argue still does not, exist 
until the late twentieth century, when the ICC Elements of Crime specified the required 
elements for the war crime of pillage— at least for purposes of prosecution under the 
ICC Statute.56 Until that time, pillage was mostly defined as appropriation of property 
without the consent of the owner, usually subject to the exceptions contained in the 
Hague Regulations.57 Traditionally the prohibition against pillage covered the taking 
of both private and public property; and with respect to natural resources, the prohibi-
tions protected both extracted natural resources as well as the rights to such resources, 
such as concessions.58
47 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002), Art. 3(f).
48 Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute, Art. 2(b)(17). 10 December 2003.
49 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 4(f).
50 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Art. 3(e).
51 Stewart (n 12) 13.
52 The language of this provision is closely aligned with Art. 28 of the Hague Regulations, see Rome 
Statute Art. 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(e)(v). The language referring to ‘a town or place, even when taken by 
assault’ holds no legal relevance in modern international criminal law, and is not present in the SCSL Statute 
or the ICTR Statute. See Stewart (n 12) 13. The ICC Pre- Trial Chamber held in the Bemba case that the 
reference to a town or place may be understood to imply a certain scale requirement. See van den Herik and 
Dam- de Jong (n 3) 261.
53 ICC Statute, Arts. 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(e)(v).
54 ICC Statute, Arts. 8(2)(a)(iv), 8(2)(b)(xiii), and 8(2)(e)(xii).
55 For a fuller discussion of Arts. 8(2)(a)(iv), 8(2)(b)(xiii), and 8(2)(e)(xii), see van den Herik and Dam- 
de Jong (n 3) 257– 61.
56 The ICC Elements of Crimes— according to Art. 9(1) of the ICC Statute— are non- binding definitions 
adopted by consensus vote to assist the Court in its interpretation and application of Arts. 6, 7, and 8. ICC, 
Elements of Crimes, UN Doc. PCNICC/ 2000/ 1/ Add.2, 2 November 2000; Stewart (n 12) 19.
57 Stewart (n 12) 21. 58 Dam- de Jong (n 3) 164.
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The ICC Elements of Crime finally gave firmer contours to the crime of pillage. They 
also unnecessarily restricted the application of the crime, as discussed below. According 
to the ICC Elements of Crimes, the elements of pillage are:
(1) The perpetrator appropriated certain property.
(2) The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropri-
ate it for private or personal use.
(3) The appropriation was without the consent of the owner.
(4) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an interna-
tional armed conflict or an armed conflict not of an international character.
(5) The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the exist-
ence of an armed conflict.59
The legal construct advanced by the ICC Elements of Crime covers a range of actors 
(combatants and civilians) and types of property (private and public).60 Regarding the 
first element of appropriation of property, even acquiring control legally may be pro-
hibited.61 Examples from post- Second World War cases include instances where the 
accused purchased illegally requisitioned property at an auction and where representa-
tives of a firm were convicted for pillage arising out of the commerce in illegally seized 
scrap metal.62 James Stewart identifies at least twenty- six pillage cases involved the legal 
appropriation of stolen property during the Second World War.63 Importantly, pillage 
under this construct covers both organized, systemic pillage and individual acts of pil-
lage committed without consent of military authorities.64 These aspects provide for 
an adequately general scope for the provision, while other aspects in the Elements are 
more restrictive.
One particularly problematic aspect of the Elements is the overly restrictive require-
ment that the taking of property be for private or personal use (the last clause of the 
second element). This condition can lead to a restrictive application of the prohibition, 
especially on occasions when it is challenging to disentangle the symbiotic relation-
ship that often exists between exploitation activities that are done in furtherance of an 
armed conflict— either by government or rebel groups— or for strictly personal gain 
59 ICC, Elements of Crimes (n 56), Art. 8(2)(e)(v). James Stewart’s book on Corporate War Crimes con-
tains a thorough discussion of the elements of the crime, therefore this chapter refrains from examining 
each element in detail. See James G. Stewart, Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources, Open Society 
Justice Initiative Publication (New  York, 2011), <https:// www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ sites/ default/ 
files/ pillage- manual- 2nd- edition- 2011.pdf> accessed 5 June 2017.
60 van den Herik and Dam- de Jong (n 3) 262.
61 Michael A. McGregor, ‘Ending Corporate Impunity:  How to Really Curb the Pillaging of Natural 
Resources’ (2009) 42 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 469, 478, citing to the I.G. Farben 
Trial, in which defendants were found guilty of spoliation of Polish companies even though they purchased 
the stocks to the companies legally since the action took place in the context of conflict and the purchases 
were done under duress, thus without consent (The I.G. Farben Trial, Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty- two 
Others, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 August 1947– 29 July 1948, Law Reports of the Trials of War 
Criminals, Vol. X, 1– 68) (‘I.G. Farben Trial’).
62 I.G. Farben Trial 35. The element of consent is important: in the industrialist trials after the Second 
World War, the US Military Tribunal found that despite the seemingly legal acquisitions of Polish factories, 
these acts constituted pillage as the owners had no choice but to sell their property under duress.
63 ibid. 36. 64 van den Herik and Dam- de Jong (n 3) 262.
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and enrichment.65 The wording is a departure from both Second World War judgments 
as well as the approach of present day international criminal courts.66 The SCSL in fact 
declared in the Brima case that this ‘requirement of “private or personal use” is unduly 
restrictive and ought not to be an element of the crime of pillage’.67 Applying this 
requirement of private or personal use to the instances of pillage and plunder of natu-
ral resources, in some cases could still mean a successful pillage prosecution before the 
ICC. For instance in the DRC– Uganda conflict, since members of the Ugandan army— 
as well as Ugandan third parties— were exploiting the DRC’s natural resources for their 
own personal benefit, the ‘personal use’ criterion would still be applicable.68 However, 
in many other situations of natural resource exploitation, particularly when revenue 
from the exploitation is used to finance armed activities— that is, exploiting a con-
flict resource— this restrictive interpretation of pillage could mean that illegal resource 
exploitation would go unaddressed, at least by the ICC if it could not be shown that the 
exploitation is for personal gain.69 Such failure to address conflict resources could have 
serious implications for the continuing conflict.
International criminal tribunals have yet to apply the war crime of pillage to the ille-
gal exploitation of natural resources.70 Instead of addressing systemic natural resource 
plunder, most pillage prosecutions to date by international criminal tribunals have 
been confined to the appropriation of the personal property of civilians, mostly per-
petrated in the course of raids on villages.71 Thus, none of these tribunals have adju-
dicated pillage as it applies to natural resource exploitation to fund conflict. Based on 
the ICC Elements of Crime’s limitation regarding personal or private gain, it seems that 
natural resource exploitation to finance rebellions would not fall under the purview of 
Article 8(2)(b)(xvi), while illegal natural resource exploitation for the purposes of per-
sonal enrichment could.72 This means that one of the most important nexuses between 
conflict and natural resources— the financing of conflict through illegal or illicit natural 
resource exploitation— would be unaddressed by the war crime of pillage in the ICC.73
6.3 The Law of Pillage and Jus Post Bellum
How does the law of pillage fit into the jus post bellum framework? The classical, binary 
distinction between war and peace that has been prevalent historically is disappearing.74 
65 ibid. 263. 66 Stewart (n 12) 20.
67 The Prosecutor v.  Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (the AFRC 
Accused), Judgment (SCSL- 04- 16- T, 20 June 2007), para. 754; see also Stewart (n 12) 20.
68 Dam- de Jong (n 3) 165.
69 ibid. 165. Dam- de Jong also notes that with regards to rebel groups, the definition of what constitutes 
public purpose may be more difficult and may be subject to an evaluation of the nature of the fight (i.e. 
whether it is motivated by ideology or self- interest), making it difficult to judge the applicability of the 
crime of pillage.
70 ibid. 165, referencing the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Database, Rule 52, at 
<http:// www.icrc.org/ customary- ihl/ eng/ docs/ v2_ rul_ rule52> accessed June 2017.
71 Dam- de Jong (n 3) 165; van den Herik and Dam- de Jong (n 3) 266– 9.
72 Dam- de Jong (n 3) 166. 73 ibid.
74 ibid. 334; Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s)’ (2008) 23 American University 
International Law Review 311, 322 (‘Jus Post Bellum’), noting also that ‘A conflict can no longer be tempo-
rally defined simply by looking at the date of signature of the relevant peace treaty, nor will the conclusion 
of a peace treaty mean the end of hostilities.’ See also Carsten Stahn, ‘ “Jus ad bellum”, “Jus in bello” . . .  ‘ “Jus 
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Just as there is often no clear line between the cessation of hostilities and the post- 
conflict period,75 historic concepts of peacetime and wartime law— divided further 
into jus ad bellum and jus in bello— share an inability to provide an adequate framework 
for all stages of conflict, particularly for the transitory, legally grey period between hot 
conflict and stable peace that is prevalent.76
It is posited that the jus ad bellum/ jus in bello division reflects the traditional— and 
now less and less relevant— distinction between war and peace, by suggesting that ‘each 
of these two bodies of law contains its own specific and exclusive system of rules which 
comes into play in circumstances when the traditional rules of the “law of peace” cease 
to be of adequate guidance’.77 However, just as the traditional view that the presence of 
a state of war means that peacetime rules cease to apply is no longer tenable in its abso-
lutist form,78 so is the jus ad bellum/ jus in bello division similarly inadequate to capture 
all stages of conflict, particularly the transition from conflict to peace.79 Regarding the 
consequences of this inadequacy of the current framework, Brian Orend observed: ‘the 
lack of rules regulating postwar conduct on the part of states creates serious problems 
of legal vacuum, political insecurity and profound injustice’.80 It is this lacuna of the 
legal landscape that jus post bellum intends to address.81
This section explores four aspects of the role of pillage in the emerging body of jus 
post bellum:  temporal considerations, relationship to the law of occupation, scope of 
actors to whom pillage would apply, and legal and practical implications of approach-
ing pillage as an economic war crime.
6.3.1  Temporal considerations: when is pillage a war crime?
One gap in the traditional framework is the temporal scope of application of the norms 
of international humanitarian law: how far do these norms extend in time?82 In the 
context of pillage as a war crime, the question arises:  when does pillage have to be 
perpetrated in order to fall within the scope of international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law? Are there temporal boundaries to the war crime of pil-
lage? In many instances, the answer would be clear: while the armed conflict lasts, and 
perhaps to a limited extent following the end of hostilities as long as military opera-
tions continue.83 There must be a nexus between the crime and the armed conflict; for 
post Bellum”?— Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force’ (2007) 17 European Journal of 
International Law 921, 923 (‘Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force’).
75 See Stahn, ‘Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force’ (n 74) 926. 76 ibid. 927.
77 ibid. 924.
78 ILC, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, with Commentaries (2011).
79 Stahn, ‘Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force’ (n 74) 926.
80 Brian Orend, War and International Justice:  A  Kantian Perspective (Waterloo, ON, Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2000), 222, as quoted in Richard P. Dimeglio, ‘The Evolution of the Just War Tradition’ 
(2005) 186 Military Law Review 116, 131.
81 David E. Kellogg, ‘Jus Post Bellum: The Importance of War Crimes Trials’ (2002) 32 Parameters 87, 91; 
Stahn, ‘Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force’ (n 74) 924, 926.
82 Stahn, ‘Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force’ (n 74) 927.
83 ibid. 928. For a discussion the legal requirements for a finding of an international armed conflict based 
on Art. 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and for a non- international armed conflict based on Common 
Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Art. 1 of Additional Protocol II, please see the ICRC, Opinion 
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pillage, this is expressly provided for by the ICC Elements of Crimes, which requires 
that ‘the conduct took place in the context and was associated with an international 
armed conflict or an armed conflict not of an international character’.84 Moreover, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber has identified a number of factors indicative of the nexus: the 
fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non- combatant; the 
fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact that the act may be said 
to serve the ultimate goal of military campaign; and the fact that the crime is commit-
ted as part of, or in the context of, the perpetrator’s official duties.85
However, the nature of conflicts has changed: too often, a ceasefire or peace agree-
ment is not an end to hostilities, and there is no clear dividing line where armed con-
flict turns into peace. John P. Quinn, writing of the operations of the US naval forces, 
notes that these operations ‘can be said to operate at all times at some point along a 
continuum that ranges from peace through MOOTW (military operations other than 
war) to war’.86 The question is where along this continuum from conflict to peace is pil-
lage still a war crime. This becomes all the more challenging to answer as the nature of 
modern conflicts becomes more complex and varied.87 With conflicts lasting longer or 
oscillating between peace and outbreaks of violence, combined with the involvement 
of numerous actors with diverse agendas and at times shifting loyalties and affiliations, 
it is often challenging to fix a point in time when the conflict terminates and the laws of 
war no longer apply.88 When hostilities have ceased in theory— as a result of a ceasefire 
or peace agreement— but acts of extreme violence and gravity persist, the question as 
to which legal framework applies may arise.
The Iraqi conflict is a case in point. Adam Roberts in his discussion of the Iraqi occu-
pation post- June 2004 raised the question:  ‘When the occupation ends, and assum-
ing that the violent opposition continues, will the Geneva Conventions and other 
rules of war still apply to the actions of coalition and Iraqi personnel?’89 His answer— 
specifically in the case of Iraq after 28 June 2004— is that the ongoing hostilities were 
‘of sufficient gravity as to make it implausible to suggest that the situation of armed 
conflict is definitely over’, noting also that ‘the situation does not conform exactly to 
recognized definitions of either international or civil war, or of military occupation’.90 
In conclusion, Roberts found that the laws of war should still apply to post- occupation 
Paper, March 2008, ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?’, at 
<https:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ assets/ files/ other/ opinion- paper- armed- conflict.pdf.> accessed 5 June 2017.
84 See ICC, Elements of Crimes (n 56).
85 See van den Herik and Dam- de Jong (n 3) 256, referencing the ITCY Appeals Chamber’s decision in 
the Kunarac case. ICTY, Appeal Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać and Others, Case No. IT- 
96- 23- A, Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, paras. 57– 9.
86 John P. Quinn, Richard T. Evans, and Michael J. Boock, ‘United States Navy Development of Operational- 
Environmental Doctrine’ in Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds.), The Environmental Consequences of 
War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 156, 163.
87 ibid. As Adam Roberts noted regarding the conflict in Iraq after 2004: ‘Numerous acts of the opposi-
tion forces have involved violations of fundamental rules of international law, including the laws of war: for 
example, attackers appearing as civilians, attacks on civilians and civilian objects, attacks on ICRC and UN 
personnel, and the taking and killing of hostages. It is undoubtedly true that such attacks form a pattern 
of conflict significantly different from what is envisaged in the laws of war.’ Adam Roberts, ‘The End of 
Occupation: Iraq 2004’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 27, 34.
88 ibid. 89 ibid. 34– 5. 90 ibid. 46.
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Iraq based on an examination of the factual scenario ‘it is the reality, not the label, that 
counts’.91
In light of this, it is quite plausible that even following the conclusion of a peace agree-
ment, acts of pillage may take place that would give rise to responsibility and liability 
under the laws of war and international criminal law. Whether this is the case would 
require an examination of the factual context of the violations to determine whether 
the laws of war were still to be applied or whether peacetime law should be applicable.
6.3.2  Natural resource exploitation and the law of occupation
Occupation is another point on the war- to- peace continuum that bears relevance for 
jus post bellum and the law of pillage.92 While there has been some contention that 
the law of occupation has become obsolete, situations of formal occupations or situ-
ations akin to occupations have once again resurfaced. 93 Many of the recent occupa-
tions involved resource- rich countries, such as Iraq or the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. The question then arises: do occupying powers need to be concerned about 
being held responsible for pillage? Natural resource exploitation in occupied territo-
ries by the occupant is an issue that arises in the context of almost every occupation, 
particularly those of resource- rich countries or in situations of long- term occupations.
Regarding the exploitation of natural resources by a belligerent occupant,94 some of 
the most important questions are: Is a belligerent occupant allowed to exploit the natu-
ral resources of the occupied territory? Under what circumstances may a belligerent 
occupant use non- renewable natural resources? For what purposes can the yields of 
natural resource exploitation be used?
The Hague Regulations of 1907 are the principal governing body of law regarding 
belligerent occupation; since they are considered customary international law, they are 
binding even on nations that have not ratified the Regulations.95 While it has been 
91 ibid. 47.
92 See Quinn et al. (n 86). According to the ICRC Handbook on International Rules Governing Military 
Operations, ‘occupied territory’ is territory that is actually placed under the authority of adverse foreign 
armed forces. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and 
can be exercised. ICRC, Handbook on International Rules Governing Military Operations, 7 March 2014, 
98, at <http:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ resources/ documents/ publication/ p0431.htm> accessed 5 June 2017.
93 Dufresne (n 29) 197.
94 It is worth noting that the general principle of law ex injuria jus non oritur, according to which legal 
rights should not be able to arise from an illegal act, does not apply in the context of occupation law, and 
as Edward Cummings points out, this has been so since the Nuremberg Trials where in U.S. v. List (The 
Hostages Trial), the US Military Tribunal held that ‘international law makes no distinction between a law-
ful and an unlawful occupant in dealing with the respective duties of occupant and population in occupied 
territory . . . Whether the invasion was lawful or criminal is not an important factor in the consideration 
of this subject.’ See Edward R. Cummings, ‘Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories Under the Law of 
Belligerent Occupation’ (1974) 9 Journal of International Law and Economics 533, 550.
95 Brice M. Claggett and O. Thomas Johnson Jr., ‘May Israel As A Belligerent Occupant Lawfully Exploit 
Previously Unexploited Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez’ (1978) 72 American Journal of International 
Law 558, 560. Additional protection is provided by Art. 147 of the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, as well as Arts. 46– 56 of the Hague Regulations: Art. 53 
prohibits the destruction of both private and public property for any reason other than military necessity, 
Art. 52 forbids the seizing of immovable property, Art. 46 forbids confiscation of private property, and Art. 
47 forbids pillage.
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contested in the past, notably in the Israeli occupation of The Gulf of Suez and Sinai, 
it is now firmly established that the Regulations remain relevant even after the con-
clusion of actual fighting over the occupied territory.96 During the Nuremberg Trials, 
the US Military Tribunal held in the Krupp case that:  ‘The Articles of the Hague 
Regulations . . . are clear and unequivocal. Their essence is: if, as a result of war action, a 
belligerent occupies a territory of the adversary, he does not, thereby, acquire the right 
to dispose of property in that territory, except according to the strict rules laid down in 
the Regulations.’97
Articles 53(1) and 55 of The Hague Regulations deal with occupied state property, 
distinguishing between movable and immovable property, while Article 46 regulates 
the occupant’s powers regarding private property.98 Article 53(1) is applicable to all 
movable property belonging to the state and allows for anything that may be used for 
military occupations to be possessed by the occupant,99 while Article 55 regulates the 
occupation of real estate, providing that ‘the occupying State shall be regarded only as 
administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural 
estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country’.100
The Hague Regulations apply to natural resources, and particularly to resources such 
as oil and gas, which are both non- renewable and high- value (and thus could be instru-
mental in financing conflict). Different regimes apply to already- extracted resources 
and to resources that are still in the ground: oil and gas, once extracted, become mov-
able property, as confirmed by a leading Second World War case,101 and fall under 
Article 53(1); prior to extraction, however, they fall under Article 55’s purview.102 
Article 55, however, only makes mention of real estate and forests, and remains silent 
on the use of other resources, such as gas, oils, or minerals. Article 55 itself sets up a 
system of usufruct, a concept originating in Roman law and defined in the Institutes of 
Justinian as ‘the right of using and enjoying the property of other people, without detri-
ment to the substance of the property’.103 This concept entails an obligation to preserve 
96 Claggett and Johnson (n 95) 561. For a different view, see Allan Gerson, who argues that new wells, 
and even exploration of new oil fields enhances the value of the real estate. Allan Gerson, ‘Off- Shore 
Oil Exploration by a Belligerent Occupant:  The Gulf of Suez Dispute’ (1978) 71 American Journal of 
International Law 725.
97 In re Krupp and Others, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Judgment of 30 June 1948, 15 AD 620, Case 
No. 214 , 622.
98 ibid. 562. Art. 46 of the Hague Regulations: ‘Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and pri-
vate property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be 
confiscated.’
99 Hague Regulations of 1907, Art. 53(1). 100 Hague Regulations of 1907, Art. 55.
101 N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschaap v. The War Damage Commission, 23 ILR 810 (Court of 
Appeal, Singapore 1956), as referenced in Cummings (n 94) 557. The Court found that crude oil in the 
ground, even if the oil production commenced prior to occupation, was immovable property. Cummings 
notes that some civil law jurisdictions handle minerals to be extracted from mines (and presumably oil too) 
as movable property. Cummings (n 94) 573. Guano, coal, and minerals have been treated as movable prop-
erty once extracted from rock, but not before. See Yutaka Arai- Takahashi, The Law Of Occupation: Continuity 
And Change Of International Humanitarian Law, And Its Interaction With International Human Rights Law 
(Leiden: Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 211.
102 Claggett and Johnson (n 95) 562– 3.
103 ibid. 567– 8. It is worth noting, as Claggett and Johnson do, that Romans had a fundamental miscon-
ception about the nature of minerals: they thought them to be inexhaustible, and thus the usufruct con-
cept was modified to allow for opening of new mines, not only exploiting the ones opened by the original 
owners.
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the capital of the property and to avoid deteriorating the position of the owner with 
regards to the capital, while allowing for the use and collection of the ‘fruits’ of the 
property by the occupant power.104 Could this usufruct regime be applicable to non- 
renewable resources, such as oil and gas, where exploitation necessarily consumes the 
capital?105 Scholars argue that Article 55’s list of resources is non- exhaustive, and in fact 
does apply to non- renewable resources.106 It is also important to note that while under 
Article 53 of the Hague Regulations, certain movable property that would qualify as 
munitions of war may be seized, even if belonging to private individuals, crude oil has 
been considered not to be a form of war munitions and therefore arguably would not 
fall under this exception.107
The decision to expand the ambit of Article 55 to non- renewables poses some practi-
cal questions: Would an occupying power be allowed to open new oil wells or would it 
be restricted to use wells that had been in use prior to occupation? Would the occupant 
be allowed to grant new concessions? Would the occupied country be allowed to do so? 
If so, who in the occupied country would decide, and how?
Regarding non- renewable resources, such as oil, arguments have been made that 
exploitation may be a way to preserve the possibility to exploit the resource after the 
end of occupation.108 These arguments have largely been refuted.109 The consensus 
seems to be that under Article 55’s usufruct regime, the occupying power would not 
be allowed to open new wells in occupied territory.110 This issue arose in the case of 
Israeli efforts to drill new wells in the occupied Sinai Peninsula and the Gulf of Suez in 
the 1970s.111 Commentators argued that such extraction would be an ‘impermissible 
taking of the capital of property protected by Article 55 whether or not the oil taken is 
newly discovered’.112 In addition, while old mines or wells may be used by an occupying 
power, there is a strong suggestion that such usage should not exceed the average levels 
of exploitation that took place prior to occupation and mines that were not in use prior 
to occupation should not be exploited at all.113 Along these lines, an occupying power 
would not be able to grant concessions to unexploited oil or gas reserves.114 In the case 
of the Iraqi occupation, commentators have noted that an occupying power should not 
engage in granting oil concessions to private companies, thereby quasi- privatizing the 
resource, and should also avoid engaging in the state- owned oil production and dis-
tribution industry.115 In summary, an occupying power would have limited authority 
104 ibid. 568; Dufresne (n 29) 200. For more on the regime of usufruct and its various interpretations, see 
Cummings (n 94) 559– 66.
105 Dufresne (n 29) 200.
106 See, for example, Jean D’Aspremont, ‘Towards an International Law of Brigandage:  Interpretative 
Engineering for the Regulation of Natural Resources Exploitation’ (2013) 3 Asian Journal Of International 
Law 1, 4– 5.
107 Arai- Takahashi (n 101) 213. 108 D’Aspremont (n 106) 5. 109 ibid.
110 Claggett and Johnson (n 95) 575.
111 Harold Dichter, ‘The Legal Status of Israel’s Water Policies in the Occupied Territories’ (1994) 35 
Harvard International Law Journal 565, 590; Cummings (n 94) 533.
112 Claggett and Johnson (n 95) 575.
113 ibid. 575; D’Aspremont (n 106) 5. For a more detailed discussion of the rates of exploitation, see R. 
Dobie Langenkamp and Rex J. Zedalis, ‘What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?: Thoughts on Some Significant, 
Unexamined International Legal Questions Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields’ (2003) 14 European 
Journal of International Law 417, 425– 30; Arai- Takahashi (n 101) 210.
114 D’Aspremont (n 106) 5. 115 Arai- Takahashi (n 101) 214.
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to utilize immovable resources of an occupied country under a usufruct regime, could 
not overexploit those resources, and would need to maintain their long- term value.116
An occupied country has the ability to grant natural resource concessions while 
the territory is being held by the occupant. The legality of such concessions arose in 
the case of the Amoco concessions granted by Egypt for oil in the Gulf of Suez.117 
Commentators noted that, ‘a displaced sovereign may take action affecting occupied 
territory as long as such action does not conflict with the right of the occupant’.118 Since 
Israel was not allowed to open new wells in the Gulf of Suez under the usufruct regime, 
Article 55 prohibited Israel from exploiting the oil there, and therefore its rights as an 
occupying power would not be harmed by Egypt’s granting of concessions.
Another concern is what rights, if any, would rebel groups have to natural resources 
that are located in their territory. With respect to these groups’ exploitation of natural 
resources, including non- renewable resources, in territories under their control, it is 
arguable that the same principles should be applicable that are in place for occupying 
powers, despite the fact that only foreign armies who establish an occupation can apply 
the Hague Regulation exceptions.119
International law limits the purposes for which an occupying power may use the 
natural resources of an occupied territory:  ‘1) to meet the occupant’s own security 
needs in the occupied territory; 2) to defray the expenses involved in the belligerent 
occupation; and 3) to protect the interest and well- being of inhabitants’.120 Regarding 
expenses of the belligerent occupation, the Nuremberg judgments— both in the Major 
War Criminals Trial and later in the Flick Case— give some guidance on this: ‘an occu-
pant may only take so much property, whether publicly or privately owned, as is nec-
essary to meet the costs of the occupation’,121 as the “economy of an occupied country 
can only be required to bear the expenses of the occupation’.122 While it was not defined 
what constitutes costs or expenses in this regard, it was also clear that expenses could 
not include costs for the occupying power to wage war against the occupied: ‘Just as 
the inhabitants of the occupied territory must not be forced to help the enemy in wag-
ing the war against their own country or their own country’s allies, so must the eco-
nomic assets of the occupied territory not be used in such a manner.’123 In the N. V. de 
Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Commission case, the Singapore 
court ruled that the Japanese seizure of oil resources in the East Indies would be con-
trary to the law of occupation partly because the seizure was not aimed at meeting the 
requirements of the occupation army, but instead to supply the military and civilian 
needs of the occupying force, and as such it constituted plunder.124
Modern commentators essentially say the same thing: ‘The benefits obtained from a 
belligerent occupant’s working of immovable state property, such as oil reserves, can be 
116 Claggett and Johnson (n 95) 577. 117 ibid. 579. 118 ibid. 579.
119 Stewart (n 12) 61. 120 Dufresne (n 29) 203.
121 For analysis, see Claggett and Johnson (n 95) 580; Langekamp and Zedalis (n 113) 430– 1.
122 Claggett and Johnson (95) 580; Langenkamp and Zedalis (n 113) 430, both quoting the Trial of the 
Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, vol. I, at 230, 6 Fed. Rules Dec. (1947) 69, 
at 120.
123 Claggett & Johnson (n 95) 582.
124 N. V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Commission (n 101). For analysis, see 
Arai- Takahashi (n 101) 212.
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applied only to defraying the “expenses of the occupation”, and that concept does not 
extend to the overall costs of the military operation.’125 This seems to be reinforced by 
the fact that the Hague Regulations’ relevant provisions regarding the requisitioning 
of movable private property, for instance, also require a close tie to occupation activi-
ties.126 The notion that proceeds from the working of occupied state- owned immovable 
property should only be used to defray the costs of occupation was echoed in a 1943 
resolution coming out of the London International Law Conference, which states that 
an occupant had no right to dispose of property— be it private or public— for any pur-
pose other than the maintenance of public order and safety in the occupied territory.127 
This understanding gains particular relevance for high- value natural resources, where 
revenue from such resources could then be used to maintain the preparedness of the 
military of the occupying power. Similarly, any revenue use for the occupant’s own per-
sonal enrichment would be unlawful.128
Revenues from the operation of immovable state property, such as non- renewable 
resources, under the usufruct regime could be used only for the benefit of the popu-
lation of the occupied territory, besides the expenses of the occupation itself.129 The 
ICJ‘s judgment in the Armed Activities Case did not clarify whether exploitation car-
ried out for the benefit of the local population would be lawful or not, but it did state 
that ‘Uganda’s argument that any exploitation of natural resources in the DRC was car-
ried out for the benefit of the local population, as permitted under humanitarian law, 
is not supported by reliable evidence.’130 The Court did hold that Uganda was under an 
obligation based on the duty of vigilance— which the Court specifically tied to Uganda’s 
status as an occupying power— to take adequate measures to prevent its nationals or 
groups under its control to engage in illegal natural resource exploitation on the occu-
pied territories of the DRC.131 Thus, an occupying power is under a duty to prevent not 
only ‘official’ looting, but also private acts of looting.132 The ICJ’s Namibia Advisory 
Opinion also suggests that as long as the use is for the benefit of the local popula-
tion, the exploitation is lawful, even despite the unlawfulness of the occupation itself.133 
James Stewart also notes that cautiously allowing for the proceeds from the sale of non- 
renewable resources to be used for humanitarian needs of the population is necessary 
since in many conflict zones, large parts of the populace may be dependent for their 
survival on the sale of such proceeds.134
In closing, it is also important to briefly refer to the principle of permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources and how that applies to natural resource exploitation 
in occupied territories: while the ICJ in the Armed Activities Case has found that the 
principle— while a part of customary international law— did not apply to the specific 
situation of looting, pillage, and the exploitation of certain natural resources committed 
125 Langenkamp and Zedalis (n 113) 430. 126 ibid. 430. 127 ibid. 431.
128 ibid. 434. 129 D’Aspremont (n 106) 6.
130 ibid., quoting the Armed Activities Case (n 30) para. 249. 131 Dufresne (n 29) 196.
132 ibid. 197.
133 ibid. 203, referencing Legal Consequences for States of the Continued  Pres ence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 
21 June 1971, ICJ 16, at 56– 7. 
134 Stewart (n 12) 60.
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by the occupying power.135 Nevertheless, some commentators still argue that perma-
nent sovereignty may still be relevant.136
6.3.3  Who?— corporate liability for pillage
Corporate accountability, both in terms of holding corporations themselves and hold-
ing corporate officers and managers criminally responsible before international crimi-
nal tribunals has been one of the most contested legal areas of recent years. As the role 
of corporate actors in some of the worst resource conflicts of the past decades has been 
revealed and documented, the issue has received heightened attention both in policy 
and academic circles.
Historically, the liability of individual corporate officers is well established. Several 
corporate officers and managers were held liable in Second World War related cases. As 
James Stewart observes, aside from the more usual references to the industrialist cases— 
such as Flick, Farben, and Krupp— there were a number of less well- known examples of 
individual corporate liability in the Nuremberg cases.137 Since the Nuremberg Trials, 
however, corporate actors became largely invisible in war crimes tribunals. Recently, 
however, the role that corporations play in some of the worst resource conflicts and 
particularly the way this role is being documented and publicized, the notion of ‘com-
mercial responsibility of pillaging’ is gaining strength.138
A.  Corporate accountability before the ICC
While the ICC can prosecute heads of state, political and military leaders, and corpo-
rate officers and managers, corporations are not subject to liability before it. There were 
several arguments raised both for and against including corporations within the per-
sonal jurisdiction of the Court when drafting the Rome Statute.139 Some argued that 
including corporations under the Court’s jurisdiction would facilitate compensation 
for victims— a valid point, considering the meagre activity of the Victim’s Trust Fund 
to date.140 Others argued that since not all national systems recognize the criminal 
liability of corporations, their exclusion is warranted to ensure fairness.141 Evidentiary 
challenges in pursuing legal entities were also raised as an objection.142 In the end, only 
natural persons were included within the Court’s jurisdiction.143
B.  Liability of corporate officers and managers before the ICC
In both civil and common law systems, the individual criminal liability of rep-
resentatives of the corporation is well established.144 Furthermore, corporate 
135 Armed Activities Case (n 30) para. 244. 136 Dufresne (n 29) 213– 16.
137 James G. Stewart, Corporate War Crimes Begin, Opinio Juris, 14 November 2013, at <http:// opinio-
juris.org/ 2013/ 11/ 14/ corporate- war- crimes- begin/ > accessed 5 June 2017.
138 ibid.
139 Julia Graff, ‘Corporate War Criminals and the International Criminal Court: Blood and Profits in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2004) 11 Human Rights Brief 23, 23.
140 ibid. 23. 141 ibid. 142 ibid. 143 Rome Statute, Art. 25(1).
144 Stewart (n 12) 76.
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he either knew or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated that 
the subordinates were committing or were about to commit such crimes; the crimes 
concerned activities that were within his or her effective responsibility and control; 
and the superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or 
her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the com-
petent authorities.154 The mens rea requirement under Article 28(b)— ‘knew or con-
sciously disregarded’— is much more stringent than under Article 28(a).155 In addition, 
a superior– subordinate relationship must also be established, based on either de jure or 
de facto control.156 An example of a corporate officer being held liable for a war crime 
under the theory of command responsibility is Prosecutor v. Musema, where the ICTR 
held liable the director of a tea factory for genocide and crimes against community 
because he failed to prevent his employees from committing acts of genocide while 
under his effective control.157
ii.  Accomplice liability
Under Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, an individual can be held liable for a crime 
under the Court’s jurisdiction if he or she:
(a) commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through 
another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible; 
(b) [o] rders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs 
or is attempted; (c) [f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, 
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, includ-
ing providing the means for its commission; (d) [i]n any other way contributes to the 
commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting 
with a common purpose . . .158
The contribution can be made either ‘with the aim of furthering the criminal activity 
or criminal purpose of the group’ or in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime.159
Article 25 may provide a less stringent standard for individual corporate liability. 
Examples of such liability include for example the Zyklon B case, in which a German 
businessman and supplier of poison gas and equipment was convicted of a war crime as 
an aider- and- abettor for selling the gas and equipment to Nazi concentration camps.160 
A more recent example would be Charles Taylor’s case before the SCSL, who was held 
liable as an aider and abettor for eleven counts of war crimes, including pillage, for his 
role in the Sierra Leone conflict.161
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157 ibid. Prosecutor v. Musema, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and Sentence (ICTR- 96- 13- A, Judgment, 16 
November 2001).
158 Rome Statute, Art. 25(3). 159 Rome Statute, Art. 25(3)(d)(i)(ii).
160 Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (the Zyklon B case), British Military Court, Hamburg, 8 March 
1946, Law Report of Trials of War Criminals 93. For analysis, see Graff (n 139) 25.
161 Prosecutor v.  Charles Ghankay Taylor Judgment Summary (SCSL- 03- 1- T, Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, 26 April 2012).
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C.  Liability of corporations for war crimes
Many argue that beyond holding corporate representatives individually liable for war 
crimes, the criminal liability of the legal entity itself is necessary, especially in the con-
text of natural resource exploitation.162 While individual criminal responsibility is 
important to create disincentives, by pursuing the corporate entity itself, the possible 
measure of reparations is greater, since in case of a conviction, assets of the company 
itself could be forfeited. 163 The Rome Statute does not grant the ICC jurisdiction over 
legal entities and many argue that corporate accountability for war crimes— for now, at 
least— is much more imaginable before domestic courts than in international forums. 
Efforts in that direction can be seen in domestic courts. In 2013, one of the leading 
gold refineries in the world, Argor- Heraeus, became the subject of a domestic crimi-
nal investigation in Switzerland for pillaging Congolese natural resources.164 While the 
prosecutor ultimately decided not to prosecute the company,165 it signals that in the 
absence of prosecution of corporate entities by international courts, domestic courts 
are increasingly willing to act. Importantly, this case focuses on the acquisition of pil-
laged gold rather than on the violation of embargoes, which has often been the case in 
regional and national prosecutions.166 Another case that merits attention is the lawsuit 
in France against Dalhoff, Larsen, and Horneman, a French timber company, for han-
dling and profiting from goods obtained in an illegal manner, the company allegedly 
having continued to purchase Liberian timber despite evidence that the timber was 
harvested illegally and in an environmentally destructive manner and that the arms 
purchased from the proceeds from the timber violated UN embargoes.167
6.3.4  The law of pillage and economic crimes
While the number of conflicts may arguably be declining, there is a growing number of 
recurrent and persistent conflicts— conflicts where lasting resolution seems elusive.168 
Accordingly, a modern jus post bellum must necessarily be ‘focused on the sustainability 
162 Stewart (n 12) 82. 163 ibid.
164 Tom Miles and Emma Farge, Switzerland Opens Probe into Gold Refiner Argor for Congo 
Dealings, Reuters, 4 November 2013, at <http:// www.reuters.com/ article/ 2013/ 11/ 04/ congo- gold- 
idUSL5N0IP29K20131104> accessed 5 June 2017.
165 James G.  Stewart, The Argor Heraeus Decision on Corporate Pillage of Gold, 19 October 2015, 
at <http:// jamesgstewart.com/ the- argor- heraeus- decision- on- corporate- pillage- of- gold/ > accessed 5 
June 2017.
166 Anne- Cecile Vialle, Carl Bruch, Reinhold Gallmetzer, and Akiva Fishman, ‘Peace through Justice? 
International Tribunals and Accountability for Wartime Environmental Damage’ in Bruch, Muffett, and 
Nichols, Governance, Natural Resources, and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (n 3).
167 Global Witness, Bankrolling Brutality, 2010, at <http:// www.globalwitness.org/ sites/ default/ files/ 
import/ bankrolling_ brutality_ hi.pdf> accessed 5 June 2017.
168 See Human Security Report 2012 , at 164, 170– 1, noting that ‘60 percent of the conflict terminations 
between 2000 and 2004 were followed by renewed violence in less than five years’. See also, ibid. 171. Full 
report at <http:// hsrgroup.org/ docs/ Publications/ HSR2012/ 2012HumanSecurityReport- FullText- LowRes.
pdf> accessed 5 June 2017. According to a World Bank Development Report from 2011, the majority of 
the conflicts currently active are recurrences of violence. In fact, the report finds that ‘every civil war that 
began since 2003 was in a country that had a previous civil war’. World Bank Development Report 2011, at 
<http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTWDRS/ Resources/ WDR2011_ Full_ Text.pdf> accessed as quoted 
in Human Security Report 171.
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representatives can be held liable for war crimes, including pillage, in the same way 
that civilians can be prosecuted for violations of the laws of war— a notion that has 
gained confirmation both through codification and practice.145 Corporate officers 
were held liable in a number of Nuremberg cases, such as the IG Farben, Flick, or 
Krupp cases.146 There are also more recent cases. In the 2000s, Dutch businessmen 
were found guilty of war crimes in Dutch courts.147 The ICTR has held accountable 
members of a commercial radio station for incitement to genocide and the owner 
of a tea factory of genocide for failing to prevent or punish acts of genocide perpe-
trated by his employees.148
Individual corporate liability on the part of officers and managers of the company— 
in the absence of direct participation in the atrocities— is conceivable under two theo-
ries: command responsibility and accomplice liability.149
i.  Command responsibility
Under command responsibility, a person may be individually criminally responsible 
for failing to supervise properly and control the conduct of others who are acting under 
his or her effective authority and control.150 While command responsibility appeared 
in the statutes of both the ICTY and the ICTR, the Rome Statute is different in its 
treatment of the subject since— unlike the other two statutes— it distinguishes between 
military commanders and civilian superiors under Article 28.151 Article 28(a) governs 
military commanders and Article 28(b) governs civilian superiors.152 Corporate offic-
ers would fall under Article 28(b) as civilian superiors. Under Article 28(a), a military 
commander would face criminal liability if he or she knew or should have known of 
a subordinate’s crimes under his effective command and control and failed to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to competent authorities.153 Under Article 28(b), a 
civilian superior can be held criminally responsible for crimes under the Court’s juris-
diction committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, if 
145 ibid. Trial of Alois and Anna Bommer and their Daughters, Permanent Military Tribunal, Metz, 19 
February 1947, 9 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals 64. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional 
Protocol II acknowledge civilian liability for violating the laws of war, binding rebel groups. Prior to that, 
the Nuremberg Tribunal confirmed the binding power of international law over individuals. A number 
of cases in the wake of the Second World War held civilians accountable for war crimes, such as murder. 
See, for example, Trial of Erich Heyer and Six Others (Essen Lynching case), British Military Court for the 
Trial of War Criminals, Essen, 22 December 1945, 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 88– 92 (). On 
pillage, see the Bommer case, in which members of a German family were found guilty of pillage for retain-
ing illegally acquired property from a deported civilian’s farm, Trial of Alois and Anna Bommer and their 
Daughters, Permanent Military Tribunal, Metz, 19 February 1947, 9 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals. 
For analysis, see Stewart (n 12) 76– 7.
146 For an analysis of these cases, see Stewart (n 12) 77.
147 ibid., referencing Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, Netherlands, LJN: BA6734, Gerechtshof ’s- Gravenhage, 
2200050906- 2 (9 May 2007); Prosecutor v. Kouwenhoven, Netherlands, LJN: AY5160, Rechtbank’s- 
Gravenhage, 09/ 750001- 05 (28 July 2006).
148 Stewart (n 12)  77, referencing Prosecutor v.  Barayagwiza et  al., Trial Chamber I, Judgment and 
Sentence (ICTR- 99- 52- T, 3 December 2003); Prosecutor v.  Musema, Trial Chamber I, Judgment and 
Sentence (ICTR- 96- 13- A, 16 November 2001).
149 Graff (n 139) 25. 150 ibid. 25. 151 ibid. 152 Rome Statute, Art. 28(a), (b).
153 Rome Statute, Art. 28(a).
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of peace, rather than on simply brokering an end to violence’.169 There is now a recog-
nized obligation not only to focus on the termination of violence, but also on peace-
making and rebuilding.170 A comprehensive framework for peacebuilding must make a 
credible attempt to address the root causes of conflict, and must look beyond the objec-
tive of merely ending violence by applying a more holistic and comprehensive approach 
to peacebuilding.171
However, economic crimes— and in fact, violations of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights in general— have been largely marginalized in the context of peacebuilding, 
despite well- recognized connections between violations of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights and violations of civil and political rights. International criminal law is still 
far from addressing these violations in an integrated and interdependent manner.172 
This is unfortunate, particularly considering the very real risk that without scrutinizing 
and responding to the economic, social, and cultural rights violations that often lie at 
the root causes of conflict, there can be no lasting, sustainable, and just peace.173 This 
is just as true of war crimes violating economic, social, and cultural rights as of crimes 
of violence against a person. In addition, by failing to acknowledge the reality of eco-
nomic crimes and address them, the justice system fails to acknowledge the mutually 
reinforcing relationship between economic crimes and violations of civil and political 
rights, as well as the way economic crimes and human rights violations can mutually 
reinforce impunity as proceeds of previous or ongoing economic crimes are used to 
169 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ (n 74) 335.
170 Stahn, ‘Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force’ (n 74) 930, making reference to the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’.
171 Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ (n 74) 335. Wendy Lambourne, ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after 
Mass Violence’ (2009) 3 International Journal Of Transitional Justice 28, 34. Louise Arbour has called for 
a more holistic understanding of transitional justice: ‘Transitional justice must have the ambition to assist 
the transformation of oppressed societies into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through 
measures that will procure an equitable future. It must reach to— but also beyond— the crimes and abuses 
committed during the conflict that led to the transition, and it must address the human rights violations 
that pre- dated the conflict and caused or contributed to it. With these aims so broadly defined, transitional 
justice practitioners will very likely expose a great number of discriminatory practices and violations of eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights.’ Louise Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’ 
(2007), 40 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 1, 2.
172 Harwell and Le Billon (n 15); Lisa Hecht and Sabine Michalowski, ‘The Economic and Social 
Dimensions of Transitional Justice’, ETJN Concept Paper, available at <http:// www.essex.ac.uk/ tjn/ docu-
ments/ TheeconomicandsocialdimensionsofTJ.pdf > accessed 7 June 2017. As Louise Arbour noted, the 
reality of this marginalization is also reflected in the conception of justice itself, as expressed for instance in 
the UN Secretary General’s report on The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post- Conflict 
Societies: ‘For the United Nations, “justice is an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and 
vindication of rights and the prevention and punishments of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the rights 
of the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well- being of society at large.” The first sentence, 
“fairness in the vindication of rights,” liberally construed, may imply the need to guarantee economic, 
social, and cultural rights. However, the language of “the victim” and “the accused” in the second sentence 
appears to circum- scribe the concept of justice within a more traditional dispute resolution framework 
that primarily focuses on violations of civil and political rights. To the extent that this characterization is 
accurate, it reflects a narrow approach to justice.’ (Arbour (n 171) 4). As Arbour goes on to note, this may 
be ‘symptomatic of a deep ambivalence within justice systems about social justice.’ (Arbour (n 171) 5). 
What this results in is an incomplete concept of justice, and translated into the realm of transitional justice 
mechanisms, such as international criminal prosecutions and truth commissions, this results in an equally 
incomplete narrative of the conflict as well as impunity for some. Arbour (n 171) 4– 5.
173 DiMeglio (n 80) 153 (‘Failure to pursue justice against morally culpable individuals after war may 
result in a peace that lacks a sense of closure.’).
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derail transition.174 Philippe Le Billon and Emily Harwell warn that ‘persistent impu-
nity for widespread economic crimes with broad societal effects sends the message that 
there is still no rule of law’.175 Indeed, Harwell observes elsewhere that: ‘
the pattern of control and criminality in authoritarian regimes and among violent bel-
ligerents is intimately tied to the financial rewards of crimes in natural resource sectors. 
Therefore, as both a conceptual and practical matter, efforts to pursue accountability 
for civil and political abuses are rendered less effective by the neglect of economic 
crimes that facilitate and motivate those abuses.176
In light of this and the now well- established recognition of the links between armed 
conflict and natural resource exploitation, resolving issues of the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources must necessarily be made one of the objectives of a nascent jus post 
bellum. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, illegal natural resource exploitation 
is at its core an economic crime, but as with other economic crimes, it has been largely 
absent from war crimes prosecutions.
The lack of provisions under which such crimes may be prosecuted in international 
criminal law is one example of how economic crimes have been marginalized in post- 
conflict contexts.177 Kristen Boon aptly observes: ‘The laws of war are notoriously silent 
on matters relating to the economy.’178 Aside from the provisions regarding pillage, 
which is almost universally present in the statutes of war crimes tribunals, there are no 
provisions with regard to related economic crimes, such as money laundering or illicit 
arms trade.179
This leaves the crime of pillage as one of the main, if not only, potential avenues for 
addressing the illegal exploitation of natural resources in conflict and post- conflict situ-
ations.180 As already noted, the war crime of pillage has been underutilized by interna-
tional criminal tribunals when it comes to natural resource exploitation. In fact, other 
than the industrialist trials in the wake of the Second World War, this type of crime has 
been absent from the practice of these courts despite the growing recognition that eco-
nomic crimes are often just as much at the heart of the conflict as crimes against per-
sons.181 This recognition has not translated into actual prosecutions for illegal natural 
resource exploitation.182
In addition to a lack of prosecutions of such crimes— and an absence of provisions 
that would be able to fully capture all aspects of illegal natural resource exploitation— the 
174 Asset Recovery, Reconciliation and Economic Truth Commissions in Transitional Egypt— An Interview 
with Ruben Carranza, 20 June 2013, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, at <http:// eipr.org/ en/ blog/ 
post/ 2013/ 06/ 20/ 1738> accessed 7 June 2017, noting that ‘economic crimes committed by dictators and by 
combatants in an armed conflict often have a mutually reinforcing relationship with the human rights viola-
tions that they carried out.’ See also Ruben Carranza, ‘Pain and Plunder: Should Transitional Justice Engage 
with Corruption and Economic Crimes?’ (2008) 2 International Journal of Transitional Justice 310, 314.
175 Harwell and Le Billon (n 15). 176 Harwell (n 6). 177 Kyriakakis (n 3) 117.
178 Kristen E. Boon, ‘ “Open for Business”: International Financial Institutions, Post- conflict Economic 
Reform, and the Rule of Law’ (2007) 39 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 513, 536.
179 See Kyriakakis (n 3) 116; Schabas (n 3) 2– 4. 180 Schabas (n 3) 3.
181 The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in 2003, shortly after his election, touched 
on the importance of examining the economic aspects of the Congo conflict. Communications Received by 
the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Press Release No.: pids.009.2003- EN, 16 July 2003, 3– 4.
182 Schabas (n 3) 2.
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marginalization of the economic side of conflict is also manifest in the limited pool of 
actors who are prosecuted for such crimes.183 Some of the most important actors in 
the illegal exploitation of natural resources in conflict worldwide are transnational cor-
porations; despite their prominent role, though, these actors have largely managed to 
remain under a cloak of invisibility when it comes to criminal prosecutions for their 
role in the pillage of natural resources.184 Moreover, certain features of international 
criminal law influence national criminal tribunals’ practice and approach. The lack of 
attention to the economic dimension of conflict and specifically the lack of prosecu-
tions for illegal natural resource exploitation may lead to a decreased focus on these 
issues in domestic criminal law and can negatively affect accountability in general.185 
In addition, these trends have a tendency to solidify, and the absence of accountability 
for economic war crimes may become ingrained.186
Even when pillage prosecutions take place with regards to acts perpetrated in the 
context of resource conflicts, these prosecutions have been mostly in relation to the 
pillage of personal property, such as goods, chattel, money, and not for the systemic 
plunder of property that was in fact used to finance and thus perpetuate the conflict.187 
Prosecutions for pillaging of relatively small personal property were the norm in the 
Yugoslav conflict and also with respect to the conflict in Sierra Leone, where a num-
ber of pillage prosecutions were in relation to livestock theft and money.188 The ICC 
found Germain Katanga guilty of pillage for extensive destruction of property— such as 
houses, roofing sheets, furniture, and various other effects, such as food, livestock, and 
animals— in Bogoro, DRC.189 In many of these cases, the stolen goods were not con-
sidered to be the principal reason for the fighting or the fighting was not considered to 
be impossible to sustain without the revenue produced by the theft.190 Curiously, the 
illegal natural resource exploitation underlying and sustaining the Congolese conflict 
has gone largely unaddressed by the ICC.
The marginalization of the economic aspects of conflicts has also been true for truth 
and reconciliation commissions.191 Of more than thirty truth commissions established 
between 1974 and 2004, only three expressly engaged with economic crimes— those 
for Chad, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.192 The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission report touched on the link between armed conflict and extractive indus-
tries, identifying specific diamond mining companies that had links to the armed 
groups in Sierra Leone, and making the connection between human rights violations, 
corruption, and bad governance.193 The Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
183 ibid.; see also Kyriakakis (n 3) 117. 184 Schabas (n 3); Kyriakakis (n 3) 117.
185 Kyriakakis (n 3) 118. 186 ibid. 119.
187 Patrick J. Keenan, ‘Conflict Minerals and the Law of Pillage’ (2014) 14 Chinese Journal of International 
Law 524, 536.
188 ibid. 534– 5.
189 See Summary of Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial 
Chamber II (ICC- 01/ 04- 01/ 07, 7 March 2014), at: <http:// www.icc- cpi.int/ en_ menus/ icc/ press%20and%20
media/ press%20releases/ Documents/ 986/ 14_ 0259_ ENG_ summary_ judgment.pdf> accessed 7 June 2017.
190 Keenan (n 187) 537. 191 Harwell (n 6).
192 Carranza, ‘Pain and Plunder:  Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic 
Crimes? (n 174) 315.
193 ibid. 320; Carranza Interview (n 174); Schabas (n 3) 14– 15.
166 Pillage, Conflict Resources, and Jus Post Bellum
Commision included within its mandate the examination of economic crimes, such as 
grand corruption, irregular land acquisitions, and exploitation of natural resources.194
In addition, the role of business is rarely scrutinized by these commissions.195 
Without transitional justice mechanisms addressing the economic aspects of conflict, 
they too forego the possibility to establish a more complete narrative.196
It is therefore not surprising that there have been calls to establish so- called economic 
truth commissions.197 Whether separate economic truth commissions will receive trac-
tion has yet to be seen. It is also uncertain whether scrutinizing economic wrongdoings 
in separate commissions (as opposed to being part of truth and reconciliation more 
broadly) will ultimately help mainstream accountability for economic crimes. It is pos-
sible that separate economic truth commissions may solidify the narrative of economic 
crimes— and the associated violations of economic, social, and cultural rights— as sec-
ondary to the violations of political and civil rights.198 Another option, aside from sep-
arate economic truth commissions, could be a single truth commission with separate 
chambers for violations of civil and political rights and for economic crimes.199 One 
benefit of separate commissions would be that these could potentially address one of 
the most important aspects of economic crimes: asset recovery.200 While asset recovery 
should not be the primary focus of these commissions, they may be able to take steps 
towards this objective through establishing a narrative for the atrocities that have taken 
place, adequately accounting for economic misdeeds.201
The International Commission against Impunity (‘CICIG’) in Guatemala is an inter-
esting hybrid body. Established at the behest of Guatemalan authorities and operating 
through the national courts, it is an international body investigating ‘corruption as an 
instrumentality of organized crime and human rights violations’ cases in Guatemala, 
with a specific focus on security forces.202 Such a hybrid body, perhaps with a specific 
focus on economic crimes, including those related to natural resource exploitation, 
represents an option for states to take steps towards prosecuting those who have com-
mitted the worst of the atrocities, while also building the foundation for strong asset 
recovery cases.
To the extent that truth commissions take on economic crimes, attention will 
need to be paid to ensuring the commission has the necessary expertise. Most truth 
194 See Final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, at <http:// tjrckenya.
org/ index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=573&Itemid=238> accessed 7 June 2017.
195 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission did examine the role of business in main-
taining the apartheid regime in its final report. Schabas (n 3) 14.
196 Carranza, ‘Pain and Plunder:  Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic 
Crimes?’ (n 174) 320; Kyriakakis (n 3) 117.
197 Schabas (n 3) 3, 14; Carranza Interview (n 174); Carranza, ‘Pain and Plunder: Should Transitional 
Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes?’ (n 174) 319– 20.
198 Harwell (n 6). Arguing for separate economic truth commissions, Professor Carranza asserts that 
such a commission ‘can link human rights violations involving physical integrity— torture, killing, dis-
appearances, sexual violence and displacement— with the motivation of gaining financial advantage or 
preserving impunity for corrupt or repressive regimes’, thereby examining their mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship. Carranza Interview (n 174).
199 Harwell (n 6) . 200 ibid. 201 ibid.
202 World Bank and UN Office of Drugs and Crimes, Stolen Asset Recovery:  Towards a Global 
Architecture for Asset Recovery, at <https:// www.unodc.org/ documents/ corruption/ Publications/ StAR/ 
StAR_ Publication_ - _ Global_ Architecture.pdf> 47, accessed 7 June 2017.
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commissions lack the kind of expertise that is needed for efficient recovery and repa-
triation of looted assets.203
6.4 Conclusion: Alternative Avenues for  
Accountability and Prevention
War crimes trials, including prosecutions for pillage, as well as alternative mechanisms 
of accountability, such as truth commissions, are integral to the jus post bellum legal 
landscape. Their role is to provide justice and accountability; and where there is a par-
ticular risk of conflict recurrence, they play an essential role in building a lasting peace. 
The normative necessity for war crime trials has been reaffirmed by a number of theo-
rists.204 According to Richard DiMeglio, war crimes trials are necessary to provide a 
remedy for violations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello as well as to serve as deterrent.205 
War crimes trials are also important in terms of establishing closure and addressing 
grievances, and thus forging the path towards lasting peace.206
Yet, as critics note, it is problematic to equate these trials with justice, especially con-
sidering that the narrative that they provide is often far from being complete.207 While 
such trials may be an important tool in providing accountability, just by reason of their 
limited resources and thus necessarily incomplete focus, paired with their marginaliza-
tion of the economic dimensions of conflict, it must be recognized that they cannot in 
and of themselves provide the kind of justice and closure that is sought in post- conflict 
societies. The kind of selectivity in terms of prosecution seen to date, and not solely 
in terms of the crimes that are pursued, but also in terms of the actors that are put on 
trial, is indicative of the inability— in their current form and with the current focus— 
of international criminal law to address all of the key issues of justice in the after-
math of conflict. This lacuna is illustrated by the clear absence of any form of corporate 
accountability in international criminal tribunals. Moreover, the selectivity of interna-
tional criminal tribunals in terms of the countries of origin of persons having been or 
being prosecuted has also generated criticisms, mostly from the global South.208
The selective focus of international criminal law is all the more problematic when 
we consider that achieving durable, sustainable peace must necessarily be one of the 
goals of any jus post bellum framework. If economic crimes— and in particular eco-
nomic crimes relating to the illegal exploitation of natural resources— indeed lie at the 
root of many of our most current and recent violent conflicts, the lack of a comprehen-
sive effort to address and disrupt these toxic processes results in impunity for many of 
the worst offenders and will result in continued conflicts over resources and continued 
203 Mark V. Vlasic and Gregory Cooper, ‘Beyond the Duvalier Legacy:  What New “Arab Spring” 
Governments Can Learn from Haiti and the Benefits of Stolen Asset Recovery’ (2011) 10 Northwestern 
Journal of International Human Rights 19. Moreover, the reparations system of the ICC has been meagre to 
date. Joseph M. Isanga, ‘The International Criminal Court Ten Years Later: Appraisal and Prospects’ (2013) 
21 Cardozo Journal of International & Competition Law 235, 279.
204 See, for example, Kellogg (n 81); Gary J. Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ (2004) 32 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
384; DiMeglio (n 80); See also Larry May, After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 67– 70.
205 DiMeglio (n 80) 154. 206 ibid. 153. 207 Kyriakakis (n 3) 128– 9. 208 ibid. 137.
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international trade in conflict resources. Moreover, the perception of justice is just as 
important as justice itself. Much like corruption is measured by perception, the same 
can be said to apply to justice. Without fair, equitable, and equal justice for all, there can 
be no long- term resolution to conflict. As Brian Orend notes, a just ending to a conflict 
must necessarily encompass: (1) rolling back aggression and reestablishing the integ-
rity of the victim of aggression as a rights- bearing political community; (2) punishing 
the aggressor; and (3) in some sense deterring future aggression, notably with regard 
to the actual aggressor but perhaps also, to some extent, other would- be aggressors.209
In addition, prosecutions can present an important step towards the recovery of 
assets squandered and plundered away. These assets, once recovered, could be instru-
mental in rebuilding and recovery efforts. The repatriation of assets could also help 
these societies to provide much needed funding for transitional justice mechanisms, 
without the need to rely solely on international assistance.210
The regime of international criminal law, while often effective, is unable and at times 
unwilling to reach every aspect of a conflict, nor should it be expected to be a panacea 
of sorts. However, the economic dynamics that so often motivate, enable, and sustain 
armed conflict (and its associated war crimes and crimes against humanity) are glaring 
and serious omissions. This omission means that the necessary resolution and closure 
is unmet, as are expectations of fulfilling the requirements of justice and accountabil-
ity. It is necessary therefore to reach beyond the possibilities of international criminal 
law as it currently stands. One option is to complement international criminal law with 
other avenues in an effort to terminate the link between natural resource exploitation 
and conflict. The more effective use of human rights mechanisms in the post- conflict 
period, as well as the application of the collective security regime— such as targeted UN 
sanctions— may be necessary, depending on the particular context, to curb the pillage 
of natural resources. Pillage of natural resources cuts across sectors and by its nature 
impacts human rights, can cause environmental degradation, and results in the deple-
tion of natural resources, depriving societies of critical assets for reconstruction and 
development through corruption, the use of illicit financial flows and money launder-
ing, thereby undermining the economic health of entire nations.
The law of pillage presents an as- yet underutilized tool for addressing conflict 
resources. To improve its application as part of jus post bellum, it is necessary to address 
temporal considerations, the relationship to the law of occupation, the scope of actors 
to whom pillage would apply, and the legal and practical implications of approaching 
pillage as an economic war crime.
209 Orend, as quoted in DiMeglio (n 80) 140.
210 Carranza, ‘Pain and Plunder:  Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic 
Crimes’ (n 174) 324.
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7.1 Introduction
Natural resources have played a key role in many modern armed conflicts, either as a 
driver for conflict or as a means to sustain the violence.1 It is commonly acknowledged 
that restoring the governance of natural resources in conflict- torn states is imperative 
in order to end these armed conflicts and to achieve a lasting peace. The UN Security 
Council, in its resolutions, has set standards to this effect. In many of its resolutions 
the Security Council has emphasized the need to ensure effective, transparent, and 
accountable natural resource management. Also, in a more general vein, the Security 
Council emphasized that, ‘in countries emerging from conflict, lawful, transparent and 
sustainable management  . . .  and exploitation of natural resources is a critical factor 
in maintaining stability and in preventing a relapse into conflict’,2 while in relation to 
peacebuilding it underscored ‘the need for early and predictable support in priority 
areas of peacebuilding, including . . . management of natural resources’.3
This chapter examines the standards set by the UN Security Council in relation to 
the management of natural resources in conflict- torn states, their operationalization, 
and their potential to shape the normative content of the applicable jus post bellum. 
For this purpose, the chapter examines the contribution of the UN and other interna-
tional organizations to restoring the governance of natural resources in two particular 
countries recovering from armed conflicts, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (‘DRC’). Section 7.2 will provide a brief overview of the historical background 
against which the Security Council acted. Section 7.3 will then discuss the standards 
developed by the Security Council in its relevant resolutions. Section 7.4 will focus on 
* Assistant Professor, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies. Parts of this chapter are based on 
research undertaken for my book: Daniëlla Dam- de Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural 
Resources in Conflict and Post- Conflict Situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
1 See, for example, Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (ed.), The Political Economy of Armed 
Conflict:  Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder, CO:  International Peace Academy, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003); and Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke (eds.), Profiting from Peace: Managing the 
Resource Dimensions of Civil War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).
2 UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Natural Resources and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/ 
PRST/ 2007/ 22, 25 June 2007, para. 12.
3 UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Post- conflict Peacebuilding, UN Doc. S/ PRST/ 2010/ 
20, 13 October 2010, para. 4.
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the implementation of these standards in the mandates of peacekeeping operations, 
while Section 7.5 examines their implementation in programmes set up by regional 
and international organizations involved in conflict resolution. Finally, Section 7.6 will 
assess the relevance of the Security Council’s standard- setting practices for the devel-
opment of a jus post bellum framework for the management of natural resources in 
conflict- torn states.
7.2 The Role of Natural Resources in Fuelling Armed 
Conflict in West Africa and the DRC
Natural resources have played a significant role in sustaining the armed conflicts that 
took place in the West African region in the 1990s and early 2000s, while they still 
fuel the armed violence in the DRC. Despite the fact that the dynamics of these armed 
conflicts differ significantly, in both instances natural resources provided the warring 
factions with revenues to continue their armed struggle, thereby hampering the pros-
pects for a lasting peace. The current section aims to provide a brief historical overview 
of these armed conflicts and the role played by natural resources therein in order to 
explain the background for and the focus of the Security Council’s measures.
7.2.1  The Situation in Liberia and the wider region
Liberia is a country rich in natural resources, particularly in timber, rubber, gold, dia-
monds, and iron ore.4 The country is also highly dependent on those resources. It 
derives around 70 per cent of its GDP from its agricultural sector, mainly from timber 
and rubber production.5 Founded as an independent state by freed American slaves, 
the Americo- Liberians, in 1847,6 Liberia was ruled by this minority group for over a 
century, much to the detriment of the majority of indigenous peoples. Some reforms 
were introduced in the 1970s when William Tolbert came to power. He tried to rec-
oncile the interests of the different groups within Liberia with the aim of gradually 
transforming the autocratic system into a democracy. It was also his government that 
established a Forest Development Authority with the mandate to sustainably manage 
and conserve all forest resources. However, under his administration the economic 
situation seriously deteriorated and civil unrest broke out as a consequence. Samuel 
4 According to African Economic Outlook 2014, Liberia‘s iron ore reserves are estimated between 2 to 
5 billion metric tonnes.
5 In 2006, Liberia derived 68.9 per cent of its GDP from its agricultural sector, while in 2001 this was 72.7 
per cent, with logging and rubber production as the main sources of foreign exchange for the government. 
See OECD, African Economic Outlook 2008 for Liberia, 365 for the 2006 figures and the Report of the Panel 
of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), para. 19, concerning Liberia, , UN Doc. 
S/ 2001/ 1015, 17 October 2001, for the 2001 figures. On the role of timber, see the Report of the Liberian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. III (2009), Appendices, Title III on Economic Crimes and the 
Conflict, 10: ‘Timber is one of Liberia’s most significant natural resources and is a central source of govern-
ment revenue. Between 1979 and 2003, timber comprised over 50% of the country’s reported exports. In 
2001, the timber sector represented over 20% of Liberia’s GDP.’
6 For a comprehensive account of Liberia‘s history, see the Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Final Report, Vol. II, Consolidated Final Report of 30 June 2009, 93– 172.
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Doe, a member of the indigenous majority, benefited from this situation by taking over 
power through a coup d’état in 1980. Originally, Doe enjoyed wide popular support as 
Liberia’s first indigenous president, but his regime soon became despotic and corrupt. 
These were the events leading up to the 1989– 2003 Liberian civil war.
In the first year of the civil war, the two most important armed factions, the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (‘NPFL’) led by Charles Taylor and the Independent National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (‘INPFL’) led by Prince Johnson, conquered major parts of 
Liberian territory, resulting in the capture and assassination of Samuel Doe in September 
1990. With Doe out of the way, the rivalling factions started to fight each other. In the 
following years, as many as fifteen peace agreements were concluded, but to no avail.7 
According to the Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the issue of control 
over the country’s natural resource wealth was among the crucial issues explaining the 
failure of these agreements.8 Where the INPFL was willing to participate in a transi-
tional government, Taylor refused to cooperate. Between 1990 and 1997, Taylor was 
in control over large portions of the Liberian territory. During this period, he granted 
important timber concession contracts to companies in territory under his control.9
Following the Abuja Peace Agreement of 1996, presidential elections were held in 
Liberia in July 1997 which were won by Charles Taylor. This position gave Taylor the 
opportunity to use the country’s natural wealth to further his political agenda, includ-
ing to use revenues from the diamond and timber industry to fight of opposing groups 
trying to take over power in Liberia and to support the Revolutionary United Front 
(‘RUF’) in the armed conflict that raged in neighbouring Sierra Leone.10 In January 
2000, the Taylor government adopted a law declaring all forest resources to constitute 
the property of the government and making the issuing of new logging concessions 
subject to final approval by the president.11 Similar laws were enacted for the mineral 
7 These were the Banjul Communique, ECOWAS plan of 7 August 1990; the Bamako Ceasefire of 28 
November 1990; the Banjul Joint Statement of 21 December 1990; the Lomé Agreement of 13 February 1991; 
the Yamoussoukro Accords of 30 June, 29 July, 17 September, and 30 October 1991; the Geneva Ceasefire 
of 17 July 1993; the Cotonou Agreement of 25 July 1993; the Akosombo Agreement of 12 September 1994; 
Acceptance and Accession to Akosombo Agreement, 21 December 1994; the Accra Clarification of the 
Akosombo Agreement of 21 December 1994; the Abuja Agreement of 19 August 1995; and the Supplement 
to the Abuja Agreement of 17 August 1996. See the Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final 
Report, Vol. II, Consolidated Final Report of 30 June 2009, 159– 60.
8 Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Vol. II, Consolidated Final Report of 30 
June 2009.
9 The Panel of Experts established by the UN Security Council to, inter alia, investigate links between 
the exploitation of natural resources and other forms of economic activity in Liberia, and the fuelling of 
conflict in Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries noted in its 2001 Report that ‘[d] uring the 1989– 1996 
civil war, timber provided Charles Taylor and his NPFL rebels their main independent source of revenue’. 
The Panel also pointed to the role of specific logging companies, the most important being the Oriental 
Timber Company (OTC), chaired by the Dutch Businessman Guus van Kouwenhoven, who currently 
stands trial before the Dutch court for his role in supplying weapons to the Taylor government in contra-
vention of the weapons embargo imposed against Liberia by the UN Security Council. The Panel’s 2001 
report indicates that Van Kouwenhoven ‘managed logging operations for [Taylor] through rebel- controlled 
Buchanan in the early 1990s’. See the Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1343 (2001), para. 19, concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/ 2001/ 1015, 17 October 2001, paras. 322 and 333. See 
also the following section of this chapter for more details on the Panel of Experts and its mandate.
10 See Section 7.3.1 of this chapter for more details.
11 See the Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), para. 19, 
concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/ 2001/ 1015, 17 October 2001, paras. 329– 32.
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sector, giving President Taylor ultimate power over all the country’s natural resources. 
These laws enabled the Taylor government to set up opaque structures of public admin-
istration, the revenues being used inter alia for off- budget military expenditure.12
Where a fragile peace had been concluded in 1996, the civil war in Liberia flared up again 
from 1998 onwards. Armed resistance against the government became stronger with the 
years. One of the principal armed opposition groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy (‘LURD’), was able to take over control of some key diamond mining 
areas and engaged in smuggling practices to finance its armed struggle.13 Strong, armed 
opposition and increasing pressure by the international community forced Charles Taylor 
to resign in August 2003.
On 18 August 2003, the former government of Liberia and the two principal armed 
opposition groups, the LURD and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (‘MODEL’), 
signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This agreement dealt with a number of issues, 
including arrangements for the installation of a transitional government and a request for 
the deployment of a UN stabilization force. Although it did not contain any specific provi-
sions on natural resources, these were among the priority issues of the transitional govern-
ment that was installed in October that year under chairmanship of Gyude Bryant. The 
transitional government embarked upon large- scale reforms of its public administration, 
including the forestry sector under the leadership of an international consortium consist-
ing of UN related organizations and states.14 These reforms were undertaken as part of the 
Liberia Forest Initiative (‘LFI’) and the Governance Economic Management Assistant Plan 
(‘GEMAP’).15
When Ellen Johnson- Sirleaf was elected as president in 2006, most of the reforms 
had been initiated, but progress had been very limited and corruption and patron-
age politics remained rampant.16 In order to ensure a proper implementation of the 
reforms, President Johnson- Sirleaf enacted an executive order which implemented all 
recommendations of the Forest Concession Review Committee and declared null and 
void all existing concession claims.17 The same executive order established a Forest 
Reform Monitoring Committee, which undertook great legislative reforms in the for-
estry sector. Reforms were also introduced in the diamond sector, resulting in Liberia 
joining the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds in 2007.18
12 See the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1395 (2002), 
para. 4, in relation to Liberia, UN Doc. S/ 2002/ 470, 19 April 2002, para. 141.
13 See the Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted in accordance with Resolution 1458 (2003), 
UN Doc. S/ 2003/ 498, 24 April 2003, paras. 125– 30.
14 See for example. Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council Resolution 
1521 (2003) concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/ 2004/ 396, 1 June 2004, paras. 93 and 107; Report of the Panel of 
Experts pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 1549 (2004) concerning Liberia, UN Doc. 
S/ 2004/ 752, 24 September 2004, paras. 16– 41.
15 These programmes will be discussed in Section 7.5 of this chapter.
16 See for example, Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant to Resolution 1647 
(2005), UN Doc. S/ 2006/ 379, 7 June 2006, paras. 7– 13.
17 ibid. para. 17.
18 The Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds is an import and export regime for the 
trade in rough diamonds, based on certification of rough diamonds to verify their origin. Diamond produc-
ing countries that participate in the system are to issue a certificate and take additional measures to ensure 
that the diamonds traded do not contribute to financing armed conflict. Diamond importing countries 
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7.2.2  The situation in the DRC
The DRC is particularly rich in natural resources. According to the United Nations 
Environment Programme (‘UNEP’), the state owns 24 trillion dollars of untapped min-
eral reserves.19 This natural resource wealth has however never actually benefited the 
Congolese population. Throughout the DRC’s history, political elites have used the nat-
ural resource wealth of the country for their personal enrichment. This practice con-
tinued after the country attained independence in 1960, in particular during President 
Joseph Mobutu’s rule between 1965 and 1997. The DRC Mapping Report, drafted by 
independent experts under the auspices of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights concluded, for example, that;
During Mobutu’s rule, natural resource exploitation in Zaire was characterised by 
widespread corruption, fraud, pillaging, bad management and a lack of accountability. 
The regime’s political/ military elites put systems in place that enabled them to control 
and exploit the country’s mineral resources, thereby amassing great personal wealth 
but contributing nothing to the country’s sustainable development.20
The invasion by Laurent- Désiré Kabila and his Alliance des Forces Démocratiques 
pour la Liberation du Congo- Zaire (‘AFDL’) with the support of Rwanda and Uganda 
in 1996 gave rise to new forms of misappropriation of the DRC’s natural resources. 
A year after Kabila had been assigned president in May 1997, he ordered the Rwandan 
and Ugandan troops that had stayed behind to fight rebel groups operating from the 
DRC’s border regions to leave the country.21 After this statement, fighting broke out 
between Rwandan and Ugandan troops on one side and the Congolese army, supported 
inter alia by Angola and Zimbabwe, on the other. In addition to these states, a number 
of armed groups was participating in the hostilities as well.
This moment in time signalled the start of a series of interlinked armed conflicts, which 
were characterized by practices of large- scale looting of the DRC’s natural resources by 
the various parties to the conflict. Gaining control over natural resources played an 
that participate in the system can only accept rough diamonds that are certified. Since all countries with 
major diamond centres, such as Belgium and Israel, currently participate in the system, diamond producing 
countries that do not participate in the Kimberley Process are effectively blocked access to the international 
diamond market. For more details on the Kimberley Process, see Jan Wetzel, ‘Targeted Economic Measures 
to Curb Armed Conflict? The Kimberley Process on the Trade in ‘Conflict Diamonds’ in Noëlle Quénivet 
and Shilan Shah- Davis (eds.), International Law and Armed Conflict: Challenges in the 21st Century (The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010), 161– 81; Andrew Grant, ‘The Kimberley Process at Ten: Reflections on a 
Decade of Efforts to End the Trade in Conflict Diamonds’ in Païvi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad (eds.), High- 
Value Natural Resources and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (Oxford/ New York: Earthscan, 2012), 159– 79; and 
Daniëlla Dam- de Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in Conflict and Post- Conflict 
Situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015),  chapter 8.
19 UNEP, Post- Conflict Environmental Assessment of the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNEP, 2011).
20 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting 
the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed Within the 
Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Between March 1993 and June 2003 (2010), 351.
21 See ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment of 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 168, paras. 30 and 49. It was disputed before the Court whether 
this statement referred to all foreign troops (assertion of the DRC) or to Rwandan troops only (assertion 
of Uganda).
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important role in the armed conflict for all parties, both as a means to obtain revenues 
to finance the conflict and for purely commercial purposes. During this period, foreign 
states as well as armed groups tried to secure access to mining sites in the DRC to amass 
the wealth. These practices have been extensively documented, both in reports issued 
by national authorities, but also by the Panel of Experts that was established by the UN 
Security Council. Furthermore, Uganda’s role in the exploitation of the DRC’s natural 
resources has been held to judicial scrutiny in the Case Concerning Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo before the International Court of Justice. In this case, the 
International Court of Justice found Uganda to be internationally responsible for acts 
of looting, plundering, and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources committed by 
members of the Ugandan army in the territory of the DRC and for violating its obliga-
tion of vigilance towards these same acts committed by armed groups operating within 
territory under its effective control.22
Misappropriation of Congolese natural resources was not only committed by for-
eign states and armed groups but also by the Congolese government itself. The DRC 
Mapping Report indicates in relation to the role of the Congolese government in these 
episodes that ‘[t] he two Congolese wars of 1996 and 1998 represented a further major 
setback to development, causing the destruction of a great deal of infrastructure and 
propagating the practice of resource pillaging inherited from Mobutu’s kleptocratic 
regime, under the pretext of funding the war effort’.23
The attraction of the natural resource wealth gradually changed the nature of the 
armed conflict. Control over lucrative natural resources became a reason to prolong 
the war, both for foreign states and for armed groups operating within the DRC. When 
Laurent- Désiré Kabila died in 2001, he was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, as 
president of the DRC. Under his leadership, agreements were signed with Rwanda 
and Uganda, and international troops from neighbouring countries started to with-
draw from Congolese territory.24 In addition, Kabila Jr. signed a peace agreement with 
several Congolese militias, the Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and established a Government of National 
Unity and Transition.
Formally, this momentum signalled a gradual transition into peace for the DRC. 
Nonetheless, fighting has continued until today, mostly in the Eastern part of the coun-
try, where some of the country’s most important mining sites are located. There are a 
number of factors that aggravate the situation. One of these relates to the role of the 
Congolese army, the FARDC. Insurrectional movements within the army have taken 
over control of mining sites that used to be controlled by armed groups. These move-
ments have started exploiting the sites for their own economic gain. Another factor 
relates to the fragile situation in the region, especially the difficult relationship between 
the DRC and its neighbouring states, most notably Rwanda and Uganda. These states 
are suspected of providing support to armed groups operating in Eastern Congo, 
22 ibid., specifically paras. 222– 50.
23 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 20) 351.
24 The Pretoria Accord with Rwanda was signed on 30 July 2002, while the Luanda Agreement with 
Uganda was signed on 6 September 2002.
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among which is M23, which succeeded in taking over parts of Eastern Congo in the 
course of 2012.25 Even though M23 was defeated a year later by the Congolese army 
together with the newly established UN Intervention Brigade, the situation in the DRC 
remains tense. Some armed groups have surrendered after the defeat of M23, but others 
remain active. The process of disarmament proves troublesome, while violent clashes 
still occur at the moment of writing this chapter.26
7.3 Standards Developed in UN Security Council Resolutions
The current section focuses on the sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council 
to address the situations in Liberia and the DRC. In both cases, the Security Council 
took an expanded view of its mandate to address threats to international peace and 
security, introducing structural reforms to the natural resources sectors in these states. 
These reforms were aimed at assisting the states to regain control over their natu-
ral resources sectors with a view to cutting off armed groups from existing revenue 
streams and to prevent natural resources being used to finance future conflict. Even 
though the Security Council has been cautious not to overstep its mandate, relying for 
the most part on consent by the government in relation to specific reforms, it is impor-
tant to note that the measures imposed by the Council on these states as well as well 
as on companies contained substantive requirements in relation to the management of 
natural resources. These substantive requirements reflect common standards set by the 
Council for the management of natural resources in conflict- torn states.
Section 7.3.1 explains the Council’s working methods in relation to threats posed 
to the peace by resource- related armed conflicts. Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 analyse the 
measures imposed by the Council to address the situations in Liberia and the DRC. 
Finally, Section 7.3.4 contains an appraisal of the Security Council’s practice in rela-
tion to these two situations and takes a closer look at the standards developed by the 
Council for improving the management of natural resources in conflict- torn states 
which can be inferred from its practice in relation to Liberia and the DRC.
7.3.1  The Security Council’s working methods
The UN Charter has assigned the Security Council the primary responsibility for main-
taining international peace and security.27 For this purpose, it has given the Security 
Council a wide range of powers to perform its functions effectively. The principal pow-
ers of the Security Council relate to its role in the pacific settlement of disputes under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter and its authority to adopt coercive measures in response 
to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. Together these chapters offer the Security Council a variety of 
25 See, for example, the Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC submitted in accordance with 
paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2021 (2011), UN Doc. S/ 2012/ 843, 15 November 2012.
26 See the Final report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security 
Council resolution 2136 (2014), UN Doc. S/ 2015/ 19, 12 January 2015.
27 The legal basis for this function of the Security Council may be found in Art. 24 of the UN Charter.
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options to address specific situations which constitute a threat to international peace 
and security.
In practice, resource- related economic measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter 
have been the principal means used by the Security Council to address the links 
between natural resources and armed conflict,28 especially in the last two decades.29 
Examples include diamond sanctions in the cases of Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
and Côte d’Ivoire and timber sanctions in the case of Liberia.30 In addition to these 
commodity sanctions, the Council has also imposed sanctions against individuals and 
companies involved in the trade in conflict resources, most particularly in the DRC. 
A striking aspect of these Security Council measures is that they do not only target 
companies that deal directly with armed groups, but also those operating further up in 
the supply chain.
The resource- related sanctions regimes are special in several ways. First of all, they 
are generally not directly targeting states. To the contrary, their aim is to assist the 
government of a conflict- torn state to regain control over the state’s natural resources. 
Moreover, many of the sanctions regimes contain exemptions for natural resources 
traded by the government as well as incentives for the government to institute reforms 
in the management of the state’s natural resources. Their aim is therefore not only to bar 
natural resources that fuel armed conflict from access to the market, but also to address 
the underlying mechanisms that make trade in these resources possible. This is the sec-
ond reason which makes the resource- related sanctions regimes special.
In its Statement of 25 June 2007, the President of the Security Council clarified the 
objectives of the resource- related sanctions regimes adopted by the Security Council in 
the following words:
[t] he Security Council, through its resolutions, has taken measures on [the issue of 
natural resources contributing to armed conflict], more specifically to prevent illegal 
exploitation of natural resources, especially diamonds and timber, from fuelling armed 
conflicts and to encourage transparent and lawful management of natural resources, 
including the clarification of the responsibility of management of natural resources.31
28 See Philippe Le Billon, ‘Natural Resources, Armed Conflicts, and the UN Security Council’ (Liu 
Institute for Global Issues, Briefing Paper No. 07- 001, 30 May 2007), 2. Other tools include peacekeeping 
operations, which will be examined in the following section.
29 Before the end of the Cold War, the Council only used its powers under Chapter VII once to impose 
resource- related coercive measures aimed at ending a conflict situation, namely in the case of natural 
resources originating in Southern Rhodesia. See UN Security Council Resolution 232 (1966) concerning 
an import ban on certain natural resources, including iron ore and copper and Resolution 253 (1968) 
concerning an import ban on all commodities and products. In this case, the Security Council imposed 
commodity sanctions against the illegal white minority regime as part of a broader package of measures 
in order to force the regime to step down. In addition, the purpose of these measures differed from mod-
ern regimes, since the measures were not directly aimed at addressing the specific contribution of those 
natural resources to the financing of the conflict situation. Their aim was rather to target all Southern 
Rhodesian export products in order to exert economic pressure on the regime.
30 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 1173 (1998) concerning an import ban on diamonds 
originating in Angola; Resolution 1306 (2000) concerning an import ban on diamonds originating in Sierra 
Leone; and Resolution 1521 (2003) concerning an import ban on diamonds and timber products from 
Liberia.
31 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/ PRST/ 2007/ 22, 25 June 2007, para. 6.
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This statement reveals the dual purpose of the Security Council’s resolutions, that is 
to stop the trade in conflict resources on the one hand and to promote responsible 
resource management in conflict- torn states on the other. It also shows the interlink-
ages between conflict resolution and post- conflict peacebuilding: where the principal 
aim of the measures is to end an armed conflict, it is clear that those same measures 
constitute the basis for the management of natural resources in the immediate after-
math of armed conflict.
This also has implications for the applicable legal framework. Even though the rel-
evant Security Council measures do not always have a mandatory character, they do set 
standards for the management of natural resources in the aftermath of armed conflict. 
This is another feature of the sanctions regimes which makes them special, the hypoth-
esis being that the Security Council measures help to shape the normative content of 
the applicable jus post bellum in this way.
7.3.2  Resolutions adopted in relation to Liberia
The UN Security Council imposed three consecutive sanctions regimes in relation 
to Liberia. The first sanctions regime was established in 1992 with the aim of ending 
the civil war between the transitional government of Liberia and the NPFL and con-
sisted of an arms embargo.32 It was terminated and replaced in 2001 by a new sanctions 
regime.33 Interestingly enough, the objective of this sanctions regime was not related to 
the hostilities in Liberia itself, where opposition groups were fighting the government 
of Charles Taylor. Instead, it aimed to address the support provided by Charles Taylor 
to the RUF in Sierra Leone. Finally, the third sanctions regime was imposed after the 
departure of Charles Taylor in 2003. The aim of this sanctions regime was primarily to 
address threats to the peace in Liberia, particularly the threat posed by the proliferation 
of illegal arms to the Liberian peace process.34
The sanctions imposed in relation to Liberia included commodity sanctions from 
2001 onwards. The first commodity sanctions were imposed against diamonds, subse-
quent to the publication of a report by the Panel of Experts established by the Council 
to investigate the trade in rough diamonds from Sierra Leone. This report concluded 
that a large portion of Sierra Leonean diamonds exploited by the RUF reached the 
international diamond market through Liberia and that this was not possible without 
the involvement of high Liberian officials.35
In light of these findings, the Security Council determined in Resolution 1343 
(2001) that ‘the active support provided by the Government of Liberia for armed rebel 
32 See UN Security Council Resolution 788 (1992). For more details regarding this sanctions regime, 
see Jeremy Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 316– 19.
33 See UN Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001).
34 See UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), preamble, in which the Council determines that ‘the 
situation in Liberia and the proliferation of arms and armed non- State actors, including mercenaries, in the 
sub region continue to constitute a threat to international peace and security in West Africa, in particular 
to the peace process in Liberia’.
35 See the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), 
para. 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/ 2000/ 1195, 20 December 2000.
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groups in neighbouring countries, and in particular its support for the RUF in Sierra 
Leone, constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region’.36 Invoking 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council demanded that the government 
of Liberia ‘cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds which are 
not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the Government of Sierra 
Leone’ and called upon the government ‘to establish an effective Certificate of Origin 
regime for trade in rough diamonds that is transparent and internationally verifiable’.37 
In addition, the Security Council requested the Secretary- General to establish a Panel 
of Experts with the mandate to investigate, inter alia, violations of the sanctions and 
‘possible links between the exploitation of natural resources and other forms of eco-
nomic activity in Liberia, and the fuelling of conflict in Sierra Leone and neighbouring 
countries’.38
In its subsequent reports, the Panel of Experts investigated the role of the embargo 
on the trade in diamonds both from Liberia and Sierra Leone. An interesting con-
clusion was that, as a result of the embargo, Liberian diamonds were smuggled inter 
alia into Sierra Leone to be exported to the international diamond market under the 
guise of the newly set- up Sierra Leonean Certificate of Origin regime.39 In addition, the 
reports highlighted the role of timber in the financing of armed conflict in the region, 
concluding that the exploitation of timber provided the government of Liberia with 
large amounts of money used to provide support to the (former) RUF and other rebel 
groups.40
In response to these reports, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1408 (2002), 
which provided that ‘the active support provided by the Government of Liberia to 
armed rebel groups in the region, in particular to former RUF combatants who con-
tinue to destabilize the region, constitutes a threat to international peace and security 
in the region’.41 In addition, the Security Council addressed the role of diamonds and 
timber in financing armed conflict in the region. In relation to diamonds, the Security 
Council reiterated its earlier call to the Liberian government to establish a Certificate 
of Origin regime for Liberian rough diamonds.42 The Security Council also called 
upon the Liberian government to bear in mind ‘the plans for the international cer-
tification scheme under the Kimberley Process’43 and proposed to exempt from the 
36 UN Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), para. 9 of the preamble.
37 ibid., especially paras. 2(c) and 15. It is important to note here that the Sierra Leone sanctions regime 
exempted from the measures those rough diamonds controlled by the government of Sierra Leone with a 
certificate of origin regime to be set up by the government in cooperation with other states and relevant 
organizations. See UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), especially paras. 2– 5.
38 UN Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001) especially para. 19.
39 Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), para. 19, concern-
ing Liberia, UN Doc. S/ 2001/ 1015, 17 October 2001, paras. 374– 9; Report of the Panel of Experts appointed 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1395 (2002), para. 4, in relation to Liberia, UN Doc. S/ 2002/ 470, 
11 April 2002, para. 136.
40 Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), para. 19, con-
cerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/ 2001/ 1015, 17 October 2001, paras. 309– 15 and 319– 50; Report of the Panel of 
Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1395 (2002), para. 4, in relation to Liberia, UN 
Doc. S/ 2002/ 470, 11 April 2002, paras. 138– 50.
41 UN Security Council Resolution 1408 (2002), para. 11 of the preamble.
42 UN Security Council Resolution 1408 (2002), especially para. 7.
43 Reference is made here to the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds.
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embargo those rough diamonds controlled by a transparent and internationally verifi-
able Certificate of Origin regime.44 In relation to timber, the Council called upon the 
government of Liberia to ‘take urgent steps, including through the establishment of 
transparent and internationally verifiable audit regimes, to ensure that revenue derived 
by the Government of Liberia from the . . . Liberian timber industry is used for legiti-
mate social, humanitarian and development purposes’.45
As this resolution did not produce any tangible results,46 the Security Council 
decided to extend the sanctions regime to include timber sanctions. In Resolution 
1478 (2003), the Council considered that the government of Liberia had not demon-
strated that the revenue derived from the Liberian timber industry ‘is used for legit-
imate social, humanitarian and development purposes, and is not used in violation 
of Resolution 1408 (2002)’.47 Therefore it decided that ‘all States shall take the nec-
essary measures to prevent  . . .  the import into their territories of all round logs and 
timber products originating in Liberia’.48 Furthermore, in relation to diamonds, the 
Security Council reiterated its appeal to the Liberian government to adopt a transpar-
ent and internationally verifiable Certificate of Origin Regime and also demanded that 
the regime be ‘fully compatible with the Kimberley Process’, which had become opera-
tional in January 2003.49
A closer look at the Security Council’s approach in relation to the commodity sanc-
tions reveals that the Council, instead of simply imposing sanctions on diamonds and 
timber, offered the government a way out by setting conditions for the lifting of sanc-
tions. These conditions reflect the standards set by the Security Council. In relation to 
diamonds, the Council called upon the government ‘to establish an effective Certificate 
of Origin regime for trade in rough diamonds that is transparent and internationally 
verifiable’.50 In relation to timber, the Council called upon the government of Liberia 
to ‘take urgent steps, including through the establishment of transparent and interna-
tionally verifiable audit regimes, to ensure that revenue derived by the Government of 
Liberia from the . . . Liberian timber industry is used for legitimate social, humanitarian 
and development purposes’.51
The sanctions regime imposed pursuant to Resolution 1343 (2001) was terminated 
only a month after the timber sanctions came into effect, in response to the departure 
of President Taylor in August 2003 and the installation of a new transitional govern-
ment in October that year. Nevertheless, in light of the fragile situation in the country, 
the timber and diamond sanctions were brought under a new sanctions regime. In con-
trast with the previous sanctions regime, which aimed to address the role of Liberia in 
fuelling threats to the peace in neighbouring countries, the aim of the new sanctions 
regime was primarily to address threats to the peace in Liberia, particularly the threat 
44 UN Security Council Resolution 1408 (2002), especially paras. 7 and 8.
45 ibid., especially para. 10.
46 See the Report of Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted in accordance with Resolution 1408 (2002), 
UN Doc. S/ 2002/ 1115, 25 October 2002 and the Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted in 
accordance with Resolution 1458 (2003), 24 April 2003, UN Doc. S/ 2003/ 498.
47 UN Security Council Resolution 1478 (2003), especially para. 16.
48 ibid. especially para. 17(a). 49 ibid. especially para. 13.
50 UN Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001) (author’s emphasis).
51 UN Security Council Resolution 1478 (2003), especially para. 16 (author’s emphasis).
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posed to the Liberian peace process by the proliferation of illegal arms.52 Recognizing 
the interlinkages between the illegal arms trade and the exploitation of diamonds and 
timber,53 the objective of the sanctions regime was to stop these natural resources from 
fuelling armed conflict in the region and, for this purpose, to assist the new transitional 
government of Liberia to regain control over the diamond and timber industries.
The focus of the new sanctions regime was again on enhancing transparency and 
accountability in the government’s management of natural resources as well as on pro-
moting responsible business practices and proper use of the revenues derived from nat-
ural resources exploitation. In relation to diamonds, the Security Council instructed all 
States in Resolution 1521 (2003) ‘to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct 
or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia to their territory, whether or 
not such diamonds originated in Liberia’.54 Furthermore, the resolution called upon 
the National Transitional Government of Liberia ‘to establish an effective Certificate of 
Origin regime for trade in Liberian rough diamonds that is transparent and interna-
tionally verifiable’ and encouraged the government ‘to take steps to join the Kimberley 
Process as soon as possible’.55
In relation to timber, the resolution stipulated that all states were to take the neces-
sary measures ‘to prevent the import into their territory of all round logs and timber 
products originating in Liberia’.56 The Security Council also urged the government ‘to 
establish its full authority and control over the timber producing areas, and to take all 
necessary steps to ensure that government revenues from the Liberian timber industry 
are not used to fuel conflict or otherwise in violation of the Council’s resolutions but 
are used for legitimate purposes for the benefit of the Liberian people, including devel-
opment’.57 To this end, the Liberian government was encouraged ‘to establish oversight 
mechanisms for the timber industry that will promote responsible business practices, 
and to establish transparent accounting and auditing mechanisms’.58
In order to achieve the above- mentioned objectives and to ensure that the diamond 
and timber sanctions could eventually be lifted, the Security Council explicitly called 
upon states, international organizations, and other relevant bodies to offer assistance to 
the Liberian government, including assistance with regard to ‘the promotion of respon-
sible and environmentally sustainable business practices in the timber industry’.59 In 
response to this call, a number of states and international organizations set up a pro-
gramme in early 2004 to assist the Liberian government in introducing good govern-
ance reforms in the Liberian forestry industry (‘LFI’).
In Resolution 1579 (2004), the Security Council expressed its support for the LFI, 
referring to progress towards implementing the programme as a condition for lifting 
the sanctions. It encouraged the government to ‘intensify its efforts’ to meet the con-
ditions for the lifting of sanctions, ‘in particular by implementing the Liberia Forest 
Initiative and the necessary reforms in the Forestry Development Authority’.60 In 
52 UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), preambular para. 8.
53 UN Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), paras. 7 and 8 of the preamble.
54 ibid. para. 6 of the preamble. 55 ibid. especially paras. 7 and 9.
56 ibid. especially para. 10. 57 ibid. especially para. 11. 58 ibid. especially para. 13.
59 ibid. especially para. 15. 60 UN Security Council Resolution 1579 (2004), especially para. 3.
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subsequent resolutions the Council added that these reforms would ‘ensure transpar-
ency, accountability and sustainable forest management’.61
In 2005, an additional programme was launched to assist the Liberian government 
to enhance transparency and accountability in its public administration, including in 
the granting of natural resources concessions. The GEMAP was set up in response to 
reported irregularities in the granting of diamond concessions by the Liberian author-
ities, preventing Liberia‘s accession to the Kimberley Process.62 Again, the Security 
Council encouraged the Liberian government to implement the programme as a means 
to expedite the lifting of the sanctions.63
The Liberian government effectively implemented the reforms proposed by the two 
programmes, leading to the lifting of the commodity sanctions. The timber sanctions 
were lifted in 2006 after extensive reforms of the forestry sector, including the adop-
tion of legislation and the establishment of independent audits.64 The diamond sanc-
tions were lifted almost a year later, upon Liberia‘s accession to the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme.65
The sanctions regime imposed in relation to Liberia is a prime example of how the 
Security Council’s standard- setting practice functions. In the case of Liberia, the Council 
formulated substantive standards for the management of the state’s natural resources, 
while leaving their implementation to the Liberian government and third parties. At 
the same time, the Council put pressure on the Liberian authorities to proceed with the 
necessary reforms by conditioning the lifting of the sanctions on diamonds and timber 
upon implementation of the standards. It was only when the Security Council was sat-
isfied with the reforms undertaken by the authorities that it lifted the sanctions.
7.3.3  Resolutions adopted in relation to the DRC
The UN Security Council adopted a large number of resolutions in relation to the DRC 
before actually resorting to sanctions. These resolutions stated the Council’s concern 
for the situation in the DRC and comprised reiterated calls on the parties to end the 
illegal exploitation of the DRCo’s natural resources. A sanctions regime was adopted 
only in 2003, when the armed conflict in the DRC had entered the phase of a gradual 
transition to peace.66 It should therefore be seen as an attempt by the Security Council 
to support the peace process in the DRC.
The sanctions regime imposed by Resolution 1493 (2003) originally consisted of an 
arms embargo targeting particular armed groups, but two years later it was broadened 
61 UN Security Council Resolution 1607 (2005), especially para. 4; and Resolution 1647 (2005), especially 
para. 3(a).
62 In this respect, see, for example, the Preliminary Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted 
pursuant to Resolution 1579 (2004) (On Diamonds) of 17 March 2005, UN Doc. S/ 2005/ 176, in particular, 
paras. 17– 24; and Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant to Resolution 1579 (2004) 
of 13 June 2005, UN Doc. S/ 2005/ 360, paras. 97– 119.
63 See UN Security Council Resolution 1647 (2005), especially para. 4.
64 See UN Security Council Resolution 1689 (2006), especially para. 1.
65 UN Security Council Resolution 1753 (2007), para. 2 of the preamble and especially paras. 1– 3.
66 For an overview of the different phases in the armed conflict in the DRC between March 1993 and June 
2003, see Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 20).
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to include travel and financial sanctions.67 The Council refrained from imposing 
resource- related sanctions at this stage, even though it consistently condemned the 
illegal exploitation of the natural resources and other sources of wealth of the DRC, 
expressing its intention to consider possible ways of ending it.68 Rather, the Council 
urged ‘all States, and especially those in the region, to take the appropriate steps to end 
these illegal activities, including through judicial means where possible, and, if nec-
essary, to report to the Council’ and later demanded that neighbouring states as well 
as the Congolese government ‘impede any kind of support to the illegal exploitation 
of Congolese natural resources, particularly by preventing the flow of such resources 
through their respective territories’.69
Nevertheless, from 2006 onwards, the Security Council started to address the illegal 
exploitation of Congolese natural resources in a more coherent manner, looking for 
more direct ways to stem the flow of conflict resources from the DRC. In Resolution 
1698 (2006) the Council requested the Group of Experts to report on ‘feasible and 
effective measures the Council might impose to prevent the illegal exploitation of natu-
ral resources financing armed groups and militias in the Eastern part of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, including through a certificate of origin regime’.70 The Council 
further requested the Secretary- General to assess the economic, humanitarian, and 
social impacts of such measures on the Congolese population.71 On the basis of this 
impact assessment,72 the Security Council decided to address the illegal exploitation 
of natural resources principally through the existing financial and travel sanctions, 
extending these to ‘individuals or entities supporting the illegal armed groups [oper-
ating] in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the illicit 
trade of natural resources’.73
This decision has been instrumental in subsequent standard- setting practices, 
because it set in motion a process leading to the adoption of due diligence guidelines 
for companies operating or sourcing from the minerals industry in the DRC. Where 
Resolution 1857 (2008) encouraged states to take measures ‘to ensure that import-
ers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products under their 
jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their suppliers and on the origin of the miner-
als they purchase’,74 Resolution 1896 (2009) explicitly recommended that importers 
and processing industries adopt policies and practices to prevent their businesses from 
67 UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003), especially para. 20. The travel and financial sanctions 
were introduced in Resolution 1596 (2005). For an overview of the sanctions regime, see Farrall (n 32) 411– 
18. See also Nico Schrijver, Development without Destruction: The UN and Global Resource Management 
(United Nations Intellectual History Project Series, Bloomington and Indianapolis:  Indiana University 
Press, 2010), 184– 6.
68 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003), especially para. 28; and UN Security 
Council Resolution 1533 (2004), especially paras. 6 and 7.
69 UN Security Council Resolution 1649 (2005), para. 16; UN Security Council Resolution 1698 (2006), 
para. 1.
70 UN Security Council Resolution 1698 (2006), para. 6. 71 ibid. para. 8.
72 The Secretary- General’s report concluded that commodity sanctions would have negative impacts on 
artisanal miners and on the fragile peace process in the DRC. See the Report of the Secretary- General 
pursuant to paragraph 8 of Resolution 1698 (2006) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN 
Doc. S/ 2007/ 68, 8 February 2007, paras. 62– 3.
73 UN Security Council Resolution 1857 (2008), especially para. 4(g).
74 ibid. especially para. 15.
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providing indirect support to armed groups.75 More importantly, the Council man-
dated the Group of Experts to draw up guidelines for this purpose.76
The due diligence guidelines presented by the Group of Experts in its 2010 final 
report require companies to adopt appropriate procedures to identify the risk of their 
purchases of minerals providing any sort of support to armed groups, sanctioned indi-
viduals or entities, and criminal networks or perpetrators of serious human rights 
abuses in the eastern part of the DRC, including from within the Congolese army. 
The guidelines follow a five- step risk- based approach to due diligence, consisting of 
strengthening company management systems, identifying and assessing supply chain 
risks, designing and implementing strategies to respond to identified risks, conducting 
independent audits, and publicly disclosing supply chain due diligence and findings.77 
The objective of the guidelines is therefore to provide companies with the tools to con-
duct a proper risk assessment in order to enable them to adequately respond to these 
risks. Once a risk has been identified, the guidelines require companies to suspend 
their contracts with their suppliers until the risk is removed.78
In Resolution 1952 (2010), the Security Council expressed its support for the due 
diligence guidelines,79 calling upon States
to take appropriate steps to raise awareness of the due diligence guidelines  . . .  , to 
urge importers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products 
to exercise due diligence by applying the aforementioned guidelines, or equivalent 
guidelines [and] to regularly report to the Sanctions Committee on the actions they 
have taken to implement [the recommendations].80
More significantly, the Security Council established an express link between compli-
ance with the due diligence guidelines on the one hand, and the imposition of financial 
and travel sanctions on the other. It decided that the failure of an individual or entity 
to exercise due diligence consistent with the steps set out in the resolution could be a 
reason for them to be placed on the sanctions list.81 In this way the guidelines have a 
mandatory character for companies operating in or sourcing from the DRC.
The Security Council’s subsequent resolutions focused strongly on ways to imple-
ment the due diligence guidelines adopted by the Group of Experts, including on the 
creation of a mechanism to trace the minerals supply chain, considered by the Group 
of Experts to constitute ‘a key element of any due diligence exercise’.82 It is relevant 
75 UN Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009), especially para 16, which reads in full: ‘Recommends that 
importers and processing industries adopt policies and practices, as well as codes of conduct, to prevent 
indirect support to armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the exploitation and 
trafficking of natural resources’.
76 ibid. especially para. 7.
77 See the Final report of the Group of Experts prepared pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council 
Resolution 1896 (2009), UN Doc. S/ 2010/ 596, 29 November 2010, para. 318.
78 For more details, see ibid. paras. 328– 55 for the first set of guidelines and paras. 356– 69 for the 
second set.
79 The Security Council supported ‘taking forward the Group of Experts’ recommendations on guidelines 
for due diligence for importers, processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products’. See 
UN Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010), especially para. 7.
80 ibid. paras. 8 and 20. 81 ibid. para. 9.
82 See the Interim Report of the Group of Experts prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security 
Council Resolution 1952 (2010), UN Doc. S/ 2011/ 345, 7 June 2011, para. 77.
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to note here that the Security Council assumed a secondary role in this, leaving the 
initiative largely to the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region and the 
Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (‘OECD’).83 The Council 
limited its role to providing general support to these initiatives, including by adapting 
the mandate of MONUSCO to assist in the demilitarization of mining sites.84
A final issue that is relevant to note is that the Security Council did not confine itself 
to addressing the role of individuals and entities providing direct or indirect support 
to armed groups. In many of its resolutions, the Council emphasized the responsibility 
of the Congolese government to improve the transparency of resource management, 
including in relation to revenues derived from the exploitation of natural resources.85 
Not only did the Council call on the government to establish tracing and certification 
systems to track the origin of minerals sourced in the DRC, but it also encouraged the 
government ‘to further increase transparency in the administration of contracts for 
mining rights and the collection and accounting for taxes’.86 Even though the Council 
formulated its request in non- hortatory language, it can clearly be regarded as a strong 
signal to the government to improve its management of natural resources.
7.3.4  Appraisal of the Security Council’s standard- setting practice
In both sanctions regimes the UN Security Council focuses primarily on eliminat-
ing sources of revenue for armed groups. In Liberia two phases can be distinguished. 
Where the first phase addressed the Liberian government’s active support of specific 
armed groups, most importantly the RUF, the second phase aimed to provide assis-
tance to the new Liberian government to regain control over the state’s natural resource 
sectors. Likewise, in the DRC, reinstating governance over the state’s natural resources 
to the Congolese government is among the principal aims of the sanctions regime.
In both sanctions regimes the Security Council formulates standards that do not 
only affect the trade in natural resources, but also impact upon the management of 
natural resources within states. In this way, the Council aims to address the factors 
underlying the illegal exploitation of natural resources in a more structural manner. 
The most important common standards which can be derived from the sanctions 
regimes imposed by the Council in relation to Liberia and the DRC include ‘transpar-
ency’ and ‘accountability’. These standards constitute the basis for the proper manage-
ment of natural resources within states, and have particular relevance for addressing 
the root causes of armed conflict in conflict- torn states. Where in the case of Liberia, 
the Council applied these standards to government administration, in the case of the 
DRC, those same standards were held applicable to companies operating in the miner-
als sector.
In relation to government administration, the Council places great emphasis on 
transparency and accountability in relation to three issues. These are the granting 
83 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 1991 (2011), para. 17; and Resolution 2078 (2012), 
preambular para. 8.
84 This is discussed in more detail in the following section.
85 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 1756 (2007), para. 7.
86 UN Security Council Resolution 2053 (2012), para. 25.
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of concession contracts to companies; the trade in natural resources itself; and the 
administration of resource revenues. In relation to companies, the Council stresses the 
responsibility of companies for their business practices, both in relation to the choice of 
their business partners and, to a lesser extent, in relation to the impact of their business 
on the environment. Among the principal means indicated by the Security Council to 
implement the standards is the tracking and tracing of natural resources (verification 
of origin) and legislative reforms. The following section examines how these standards 
were operationalized in the mandates of UN operations.
7.4 Implementation of Standards in the Mandates 
of Peacekeeping Operations
The Security Council has employed peacekeeping operations in many resource- related 
armed conflicts. Examples include the UN Observer Mission in Angola (‘MONUA’), 
the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (‘UNTAC’), the UN Assistance Mission in 
Sierra Leone (‘UNAMSIL’), and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (‘UNOCI’). So far, 
the Council has however only in a few cases expressly included issues related to natural 
resources management in the mandate of a peacekeeping mission. The UN Mission in 
Liberia (‘UNMIL’) and the UN Organization (Stabilization) Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC, later renamed MONUSCO), which are the focus of the 
current section, have received the most explicit mandate in this regard.87
This mandate consisted both in enforcing the Security Council’s sanctions and in pro-
viding assistance to the national government in the implementation of governance reforms 
proposed by the Council. Even though both operations received a Chapter VII mandate, 
it is relevant to note that they were employed with the consent of the government.88 Their 
principal purpose was to provide assistance to the government in the transitional phase 
from armed conflict to peace. This section examines the two peace operations from the 
perspective of standard- setting. It explores the Council’s approach towards operational-
izing the standards identified in the previous section into the mandates of the two peace-
keeping operations.
7.4.1  The UN Mission in Liberia
UNMIL which was established by the Security Council in September 2003 to relieve the 
ECOWAS mission in Liberia (‘ECOMIL’) forces that were already deployed in Liberia, 
from its very start, received an explicit mandate to assist the transitional government in 
the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the estab-
lishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels 
87 For more details on these and other peacekeeping operations, see UNEP, Greening the Blue 
Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources and UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNEP, 2012). See also on these 
operations Dam- de Jong (n 18)  chapter 7.6.
88 For the legal basis and typology of UN operations, see, for example, Carsten Stahn, The Law and 
Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); and Gregory Fox, Humanitarian Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008).
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and in restoring proper administration of natural resources.89 In addition to typical law 
enforcement tasks, relating to assisting the government to reinstate control over the 
diamond and timber producing areas,90 UNMIL was also given an important advisory 
function, which was undertaken by the civil component of the mission. In addition, a 
specific Environment and Natural Resources Unit was created to give effect to UNMIL’s 
mandate in relation to restoring proper administration of natural resources.
Most of the tasks undertaken by UNMIL pursuant to its mandate set out above 
included providing assistance to the government in drafting and implementing legisla-
tive reforms, assistance in the implementation of the GEMAP and LFI programmes, and 
providing advice to the government on sanctions compliance. Although the Council 
did not explicitly delegate these tasks to UNMIL, they were understood to fall within 
UNMIL’s broad mandate. In addition, UNMIL was specifically instructed to assist the 
government in working ‘towards establishing an official Certificate of Origin regime for 
trade in rough diamonds that is transparent and internationally verifiable, with a view 
to joining the Kimberley Process’.91 Another important task that was given to UNMIL 
was to assist the Liberian government and the Panel of Experts in the monitoring of 
sanctions.92 Finally, UNMIL was instructed to assist the Panel of Experts on its field 
missions in carrying out its investigations, also after the sanctions had been lifted.93
UNMIL was therefore actively engaged in implementing the standards developed by 
the Security Council. Part of its work focused on providing practical assistance to the 
government in regaining control over the state’s natural resources, while the operation 
also provided assistance to the government in devising the necessary administrative 
structures to enhance transparency and accountability in the state’s management of 
natural resources. It should however be noted that UNMIL had a secondary role. Most 
of the reforms were undertaken by the group of states and international organizations 
that established the LFI and GEMAP programmes.
7.4.2  The UN Organization (Stabilization) Mission in the DRC94
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(‘MONUC’) was established in November 1999 to assist the parties to the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement, concluded earlier that year by the DRC, Angola, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, in its implementation.95 Although the 
Council was aware of illegal resource exploitation activities in the DRC when it estab-
lished MONUC,96 it did not include resource- related tasks in MONUC’s mandate until 
2007. In its Resolution 1756 (2007), the Council instructed MONUC
89 UN Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003), para. 3.
90 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolutions 1607 and 1647 (2005).
91 UN Security Council Resolution 1607 (2005), para. 2. 92 ibid. para. 11.
93 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 1961 (2010).
94 The current section is drawn from Dam- de Jong (n 18)  chapter 7.6.
95 See UN Security Council Resolution 1279 (1999).
96 Only seven months after it established MONUC, the Council requested the Secretary- General to 
establish an expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the 
DRC. See Security Council Presidential Statementon the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/ 
PRST/ 2000/ 20, 2 June 2000.
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to assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in establishing a 
stable security environment in the country, and, to that end, to . . . support operations 
[of the Congolese army] with a view to . . . prevent the provision of support to illegal 
armed groups, including support derived from illicit economic activities.97
A year later, this mandate was broadened to include monitoring and inspection tasks to 
curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in nat-
ural resources.98 MONUC was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out these 
tasks, although, in light of its limited capacities, priority was given to its primary task 
to protect the civilian population.99 Pursuant to its new mandate, MONUC embarked 
upon a pilot project in cooperation with the Congolese government to bring together 
all state services in a limited number of trading counters in the eastern part of the DRC 
with a view to reinstate government control over the key mining sites. In Resolution 
1906 (2009) the Security Council urged MONUC to ‘consolidate and assess, jointly 
with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, its pilot project . . . in 
order to improve the traceability of mineral products’.100
In 2010, MONUC was renamed MONUSCO in order to reflect the new phase of the 
DRC’s transition to peace.101 MONUSCO’s tasks remained essentially the same, focus-
ing inter alia on providing assistance to the Congolese government in reinstating gov-
ernment control over the key mining sites. Its mandate included consolidating the five 
trading counters set up to facilitate tracing the origin of minerals as well as to carry out 
spot checks and regular visits to mining sites, trade routes, and markets in the vicinity 
of the five pilot trading counters.102
In addition to inspection tasks, MONUC/ MONUSCO was also given the mandate to 
assist the Congolese government in its endeavours towards improving transparent and 
accountable management of the state’s natural resources and revenues. In 2005 already, the 
Council encouraged MONUC ‘to provide advice and assistance as well as the necessary 
support to the setting up by the Transitional Government, international financial institu-
tions and donors, of an arrangement to strengthen support for good governance and trans-
parent economic management’.103 In its Resolution 1856 (2008), the Council decided that
MONUC will also have the mandate, in close cooperation with the Congolese authori-
ties, the United Nations Country Team and donors, to support the strengthening of 
democratic institutions and the rule of law and, to that end, to  . . . contribute to the 
promotion of good governance and respect for the principle of accountability.104
Likewise, MONUC/ MONUSCO was given a role in assisting the government in 
strengthening its justice system in order to prosecute those responsible for illegal 
resource exploitation.105
97 UN Security Council Resolution 1756 (2007), para. 2.
98 UN Security Council Resolution 1856 (2008), para. 3. 99 ibid. paras. 5 and 6.
100 UN Security Council Resolution 1906 (2009), para. 28.
101 See UN Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010), establishing MONUSCO.
102 See UN Security Council Resolutions 1952 (2010), para. 16 and 1991 (2011), para. 17.
103 UN Security Council Resolution 1621 (2005), para. 4.
104 See UN Security Council Resolution 1856 (2008), para. 4.
105 UN Security Council Resolutions 1952 (2010), para. 16.
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In 2013, a special Intervention Brigade was established within MONUSCO with the 
mandate to neutralize armed groups, to contribute in reducing the threat posed by 
armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space 
for stabilization activities.106 The Brigade did not receive specific instructions in rela-
tion to the mining sites. Likewise, the overall mandate of MONUSCO remained largely 
the same.107
The mandate given by the Security Council to MONUC/ MONUSCO in relation to 
natural resources was broad. In addition to monitoring and inspection tasks, MONUC/ 
MONUSCO was also mandated to assist the government in good governance reforms. 
Nevertheless, although MONUC/ MONUSCO focused largely on monitoring and 
inspection tasks, it engaged in some important administrative reforms to realize its 
mandate. By concentrating on the trade in natural resources in a specified number of 
trading counters, MONUC/ MONUSCO made an important effort to enhance trans-
parency in the commercial transactions of natural resources. It thereby established the 
basic facilities for a more advanced tracking and tracing system in the future.
7.4.3  The contribution of peacekeeping operations towards 
the implementation of standards
The UN operations in Liberia and the DRC received an explicit mandate to address 
issues related to the management of natural resources. In both states, reinstating gov-
ernment control over the state’s natural resources was among the priorities of the 
operations. Part of their mandate consisted of law enforcement measures, including 
demilitarizing mining sites and effectuating controls, but they also actively assisted the 
government in implementing legislative reforms. In this way the Council’s requests for 
transparency, accountability, and sustainability were operationalized within the state’s 
institutions. Improving management of natural resources was realized inter alia by 
strengthening institutions, reflecting principles of democracy and good governance. 
The UN operations contributed to this by providing advice to the government and by 
actively engaging in legislative reforms.
7.5 Implementation of Standards in Management  
Reform Programmes
The requests of the Council to increase transparency and accountability in relation to 
the management of natural resources resulted in the establishment of programmes set 
up by international organizations and states to assist the government to operationalize 
these requirements. In relation to diamonds, states and the diamond industry set up 
106 UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013), para. 9.
107 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 2136 (2014), para. 25. In its most recent resolu-
tions, the Council expanded the civilian mandate of MONUSCO to include ‘the consolidation of an effec-
tive national civilian structure to control key mining activities and to manage in an equitable manner the 
extraction and trade of natural resources in eastern DRC’. However, the Council formulated this task in the 
form of a recommendation and tied it to the use of good offices. See UN Security Council Resolutions 2098 
(2013), para. 14 and 2147 (2014), para. 5.
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the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds, which introduced a 
tracking and tracing system for the trade in rough diamonds.108 A similar system was 
introduced in relation to minerals originating from the DRC and neighbouring states. 
This system was developed within the framework of the International Conference for 
the Great Lakes Region (‘ICGLR’), a partnership between the states situated in the 
Great Lakes Region. In addition, the ICGLR has set up a regional database on mineral 
flows.109 These mechanisms aim to contribute to the effectuation of the due diligence 
guidelines approved by the Security Council, since the exercise of due diligence by 
companies depends upon systems that enable these companies to trace the origin of 
the traded minerals.110
Furthermore, the Security Council’s call to assist the Liberian government in achiev-
ing the objectives set for the timber industry resulted in the establishment of the LFI 
set up by the United States, together with the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission, the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Orgnization and several other inter-
national and non- governmental organizations. The aim of the LFI was to assist the 
Liberian government to adopt the necessary reforms in its forestry sector to allow 
for the sustainable and transparent management of its forest resources for the ben-
efit of the Liberian population.111 The LFI programmes were comprehensive, in the 
sense that they focused on every aspect of sustainable forest management, including 
the three internationally recognized components of sustainable forest management.112 
This programme was complemented by the GEMAP initiated by the same partner-
ship. The GEMAP was a very ambitious initiative, aimed at establishing transparent 
and accountable government administration, encompassing all aspects of government 
administration. Part of this programme was dedicated to the review of the Liberian sys-
tem for issuing concessions for the exploitation of natural resources.113
108 For more details on the Kimberley Process, see <http:// www.kimberleyprocess.com> accessed 1 
March 2015. Also see Wetzel (n 18); Grant (n 18); and Dam- de Jong (n 18)  chapter 8.
109 See < http:// www.icglr.org> accessed 1 March 2015. The member states of the ICGLR held a Special 
Summit on illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Great Lakes region in 2010. The resulting Lusaka 
Declaration approves six practical tools that have been developed to curb the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources. These comprise the adoption of a regional certification mechanism; harmonization of national 
legislation; the creation of a regional database on mineral flows; the formalization of the artisanal mining 
sector; promotion of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative; and a Whistle Blowing Mechanism, 
offering individuals the possibility to report anonymously on illegal activities.
110 It must be noted that the ICGLR and the OECD were actively involved in the drafting of the guide-
lines submitted by the Group of Experts to the Security Council. This cooperation resulted in the adoption 
of a due Diligence Guidance as part of the OECD framework on investment. For more details, see Dam- de 
Jong (n 18)  chapter 8.
111 For more information on this initiative, see the website of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 
at <http:// www.fao.org/ forestry/ lfi/ en/ > accessed 1 March 2015. Also see Stephanie Altman, Sandra Nichols, 
and John Woods, ‘Leveraging High- Value Natural Resources to Restore the Rule of Law: The Role of the 
Liberia Forest Initiative in Liberia’s Transition to Stability’ in Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad (eds.), High- 
Value Natural Resources and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (Oxford/ New York: Earthscan, 2012), 337– 65.
112 The Non- Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests, UN Doc. A/ C.2/ 62/ L.5, 22 October 
2007 defines sustainable forest management in its Art. III (4) as ‘a dynamic and evolving concept, [which] 
aims to maintain and enhance the economic, social and environmental values of all types of forests, for the 
benefit of present and future generations’.
113 See, for example, the Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant to Resolution 1647 
(2005) , UN Doc. S/ 2006/ 379, 7 June 2006.
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The contribution of the regional programmes to the implementation of the stand-
ards set in the resolutions of the Security Council consists mostly of measures that ena-
ble the control of the trade in natural resources. Much attention is dedicated to finding 
ways to increase transparency in the trade in natural resources, notably by adopting 
measures that enable tracing of the origin of minerals throughout the supply chain. 
Legislative reforms in this respect focus on strengthening internal and border controls. 
Nonetheless, more structural efforts, aimed at improving government administration 
of the state’s natural resources, are undertaken as well. Reform of the system for issuing 
concessions is an important focus of these efforts.
7.6 Lessons for Jus Post Bellum
The standards developed by the Security Council for the management of natural 
resources aim to assist states in the transition from armed conflict to a durable peace. 
This is what makes these standards relevant for the purposes of defining a framework 
for a jus post bellum. The standards identified in this contribution are transparency, 
accountability, and sustainability. This chapter demonstrated that these standards have 
been operationalized in different ways, principally by strengthening national institu-
tions and through regulating the trade in natural resources.
Some important questions remain however for the purposes of defining a frame-
work for a jus post bellum. The first relates to the normative value of the standards 
developed by the Security Council. Can these standards be considered mandatory for 
states recovering from armed conflict and for companies conducting business in these 
states, thereby doing justice to the jus element in jus post bellum? Or are they merely 
recommendations, without formal legal authority?
In fact, the standards can be regarded as a mixture of voluntary and mandatory 
measures. For the most part the standards should be regarded as recommendations, 
adopted for the purpose of assisting states in the transition from armed conflict to peace. 
However, at the same time the standards are directly linked to sanctions imposed by 
the Security Council. The most obvious example is the link established by the Council 
between disrespect by companies for the due diligence requirements formulated by the 
Group of Experts on the DRC and their inclusion in a sanctions list. Also, by making 
implementation of the standards a prerequisite for the lifting of sanctions, the Council 
indirectly obliges states to adhere to them. This implies that the standards do have 
normative value.
In addition, it is important to note that the Security Council also provides clear indi-
cations regarding the means and methods for implementation of the standards. Even 
though the Security Council leaves the modes for the implementation of the standards 
largely to the states themselves, it formulates a clear preference for adherence to par-
ticular systems and programmes set up by third parties. The most notable examples are 
the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds as well as the LFI and 
GEMAP programmes as means to give effect to the standards. In this way, the Council 
also gives clear indications on the substantive interpretation of the standards.
Finally, a more fundamental question would be whether the Security Council is the 
appropriate body to formulate partly binding standards that impact upon the right of 
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states to manage their own natural resources. According to the Principle of Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, states have the right to freely dispose of their natu-
ral resources. The standards developed by the Security Council infringe upon this free-
dom. Does the Council have the authority to restrain this freedom for the purpose of 
addressing threats to the peace? Or should we conclude vice versa that these standards 
are not specific to jus post bellum but, to the contrary, reflect existing obligations under 
international law for all states in relation to the management of their natural resources?
This chapter cannot provide a clear- cut answer to this question. It is however to be 
noted that the standards set by the Security Council reflect developments in several 
fields of international law and practice, most notably in relation to the ‘good govern-
ance’ requirements developed by the international financial institutions. This is an indi-
cation of their broad acceptance by the international community. It is now time to build 
upon this practice and to develop the standards into clear guidelines for conflict resolu-
tion and peacebuilding as part of the broader framework of jus post bellum.
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Environmental Implications of Disarmament
The CWC Case
Ayṣe- Martina Böhringer and Thilo Marauhn*
8.1 The CWC Obligation to Disarm
The Chemical Weapons Convention (‘CWC’)1 is one of the most complex arms con-
trol and disarmament agreements having ever been concluded. This is not only due 
to the subject matter of the agreement but also to the underlying security interests of 
participating states parties, both at the time of negotiating the treaty and in the process 
of its continuous implementation.2 In addition, the CWC is a truly ambitious exercise 
of global governance,3 aiming at dismantling existing stocks of chemical weapons and 
preventing the re- emergence of these weapons of mass destruction. To this end, the 
CWC seeks to achieve universality (and indeed has come close to, even though it has 
not yet been fully met),4 and it entails the establishment of a continuous monitoring of 
chemical industries (in light of the many dual use substances that are or may turn into 
precursors of chemical weapons).5
It is against this already existing complexity that states parties and experts alike have 
long been hesitant to address a further complication of the regime, namely the envi-
ronmental implications of the CWC. At the time of negotiating the agreement and dur-
ing the early years of its implementation there even was concern that environmental 
considerations might hamper the principal objectives of the CWC, and the question 
* Ayṣe- Martina Böhringer is an Assistant Professor at the Franz von Liszt- Institute for International and 
Comparative Law. Thilo Marauhn is a Professor of Public Law and International Law at the Justus- Liebig- 
Universität Gießen.
1 1974 UNTS 45; 32 ILM 800 (1993).
2 For insights into the negotiating process see Thomas Bernauer, The Chemistry of Regime Formation: 
Explaining International Cooperation for a Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishers, 1993). See also Daniel Feakes, ‘The Adoption of the Convention and the Work of the Preparatory 
Commission’ in Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer, and Ralf Trapp (eds.), The Chemical Weapons Convention: A 
Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 17– 25.
3 Tejal Chandan and Ramesh Thakur, ‘The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation, Challenges 
and Opportunities’ (2006) United Nations University, Policy Brief No. 8, at <http:// collections.unu.edu/ 
eserv/ UNU: 3092/ pb8_ 06.pdf> accessed 14 June 2017.
4 Scott Spence, ‘Efforts by the OPCW to Promote Universality’ in Krutzsch, Myjer, and Trapp (n 2) 27– 35.
5 Lisa Tabassi, ‘The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention)’ in Geir Ulfstein, 
Thilo Marauhn, and Andreas Zimmermann (eds.), Making Treaties Work: Human Rights, Environment and 
Arms Control (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 273– 300; Jennifer D. Wheatley, ‘Chemical and Biological 
Weapons: Monitoring Compliance with Arms Control Agreements’ in Paul C. Szasz (ed.), Administrative 
and Expert Monitoring of International Treaties (Ardsley, New  York:  Transnational Publishers, 1999), 
219– 43.
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was raised whether there is a tension of ‘green vs peace’.6 This notwithstanding, one of 
the current authors, having always had an interest in both fields of public international 
law, has had the pleasure to research and publish on the issue at a relatively early stage, 
partly together with the late Ulrich Beyerlin.7
This chapter is meant to provide some insights into the interrelationship of arms 
control law and environmental law in light of the fact that arms control and dis-
armament have traditionally been an issue in post bellum situations.8 The chapter 
does not cover the subject matter as a whole. By way of example, it focuses on the 
CWC. With a view to the destruction of Syrian CW stocks and CW production 
facilities, this has recently been debated in the context of a current armed con-
flict that— at the time of writing— unfortunately continues and has not yet come 
to an end.
Taking a look at the disarmament obligations under the CWC first, Article I CWC 
requires states parties to destroy the chemical weapons and production facilities they 
possess, as well as CWs they may have abandoned on another state’s territory:
(2) Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or 
that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with 
the provisions of the Convention.
(3) Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on 
the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention.
(4) Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facili-
ties it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or 
control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
The obligation to destroy also applies to ‘old chemical weapons’ as defined in Article II 
CWC.9 Reference to ‘the provisions of this Convention’ in Article I points to, among 
others, further specifications arising from Articles IV and V as well as from parts of 
the ‘Annex on Implementation and Verification’ (in the following: Verification Annex) 
6 This was the title of a study on the Johnston Atoll, islands administered by the US, and eventually used 
for the destruction of chemical weapons; see Trevor Findlay, ‘Green vs Peace’ The Johnston Atoll Controversy 
(Canberra: Australian National University, Peace Research Centre, 1990).
7 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, ‘The Protection of the Environment in the Context of Chemical 
Weapons Destruction’ in Daniel Bardonnet (ed.), La Convention sur L’interdiction et L’élimination des Armes 
Chimiques (Hague Academy of International Law, Dordrecht/ Boston/ London:  Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 
187– 211; the article builds on earlier research, the outcomes of which were published in German: Ulrich 
Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, Abrüstung und Umweltschutz  – eine völkerrechtliche Interessenkollision? 
(Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1994).
8 Jann K. Kleffner, ‘Peace Treaties’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), margin note 16, at <http:// opil.ouplaw.com/ 
home/ EPIL> accessed 14 June 2017; Jens Iverson, ‘Contrasting the Normative and Historical Foundations 
of Transitional Justice and Jus Post Bellum’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds.), 
Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 80– 101, at 
97, characterizing disarmament ‘(m)ixed procedural and substantive regional or mid- level applications’ of 
jus post bellum.
9 According to Art. II(5) CWC the term ‘old chemical weapons’ means ‘(a) Chemical weapons which 
were produced before 1925; or (b) Chemical weapons produced in the period between 1925 and 1946 that 
have deteriorated to such extent that they can no longer be used as chemical weapons.’
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attached to the Convention.10 The CWC includes a rigorous destruction schedule, 
based upon Article IV(6) of the Convention, clearly stating that
(s)uch destruction shall begin not later than two years after this Convention enters 
into force for it and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this 
Convention.
In the process of implementing the Convention the destruction schedule had to be 
adapted on the basis of Part IV(A) (24)– (25) of the Verification Annex, and subse-
quently again after the final deadline of fifteen years had passed.11
8.2 Environmental Implications of Chemical Disarmament
While it is obvious that CWs destruction is not an easy exercise,12 neither in terms of 
chemical processes nor in terms of the quantity of stocks, additional challenges arise 
from CW agents stored in munitions: first, CW agents in munitions were more diffi-
cult to destroy than those stored separately, as CW munitions had been built with no 
or very little thought of how they might be taken apart; second, munitions contained 
various types of explosives; third, the ageing of munitions gives rise to further risks.13
In principle, the CWC holds possessor states financially liable for the costs of destruc-
tion. Article IV, para. 16, CWC applies straightforward language: ‘Each State Party shall 
meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons it is obliged to destroy.’ Problems 
arise in respect of CWs on a state party’s territory belonging to a non- party. Unless 
these weapons have been removed within the first year after the CWC has entered into 
force, the state party will be liable for destruction, and for the costs of destruction, sub-
ject to Article IV, para. 11, CWC, allowing for assistance by the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other states parties. It has rightly been 
argued that this may entail financial assistance, even though the CWC lacks a specific 
provision for the granting of such financial assistance through the OPCW.14 Beyond 
this joint reading of paras. 11 and 16, Article IV, para. 12, CWC includes a general obli-
gation of states parties to cooperate, which may also be applied to financial matters.
Transportation problems arise for the purpose of transferring CWs from storage 
places to destruction sites (destruction facilities may not be available near storage loca-
tions), for abandoned CWs and in respect of samples. The timing envisaged by the 
Convention, including Article IV, para. 11, CWC is a complicating factor in this regard. 
A pertinent illustration of transportation is the removal of US CWs from Germany to 
10 Detailed rules on the destruction of CWs and of CW facilities emerge from Parts IV(A), IV(B), and V 
of the Verification Annex.
11 OPCW CSP, Decision: Final Extended Deadline of 29 April 2012, C- 16/ DEC.11, 1 December 2011.
12 Studies by scientists and engineers provide useful insights into the matter, see for example, Vladimir M. 
Kolodkin and Wolfgang Ruck (eds.), Ecological Risks Associated with the Destruction of Chemical Weapons 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2006).
13 See Beyerlin and Marauhn, ‘The Protection of the Environment in the Context of Chemical Weapons 
Destruction’ (n 7) 187– 8.
14 Ralf Trapp and Paul Walker, ‘Article IV: Chemical Weapons’ in Krutzsch, Myjer, and Trapp (n 2) 119– 
50, at 146 (margin note 16).
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the US facility on Johnston Island in the Pacific for destruction.15 Based upon a bilateral 
agreement preparations for the transportation of US CW stocks began in early 1990.
8.3 From Fragmentation to Integration
In fact, at least some provisions of the CWC relate to environmental issues. With 
regard to national implementation of state party obligations according to the CWC, the 
Convention, in its Article VII(3), stipulates that:
[e] ach State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this Convention, 
shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the 
environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this regard.
However, the Convention is silent on the question of the standards to be applied. The 
first question arises with regard to the word ‘priority’. In that respect, it is necessary to 
have a closer look at the relationship between environmental protection on the one 
hand, and chemical weapons destruction as the primary objective of the CWC on 
the other hand. Even though environmental concerns do not permit states parties to 
escape their obligations under the CWC, the Convention does recognize the need to 
reconcile the two positions.16 To this end, the extension of the deadline for the destruc-
tion of chemical weapons due to environmental concerns has been a valuable means.17
Furthermore, Article IV (10) CWC obliges states parties:
during transportation, sampling, storage and destruction of chemical weapons, 
[to] . . . assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting 
the environment. Each State Party shall transport, sample, store and destroy chemical 
weapons in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions.
Similarly, Article V(11) CWC obliges states parties to:
assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the envi-
ronment during the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities according 
to national standards for safety and emissions.
Both provisions specify Article VII(3) CWC to a certain extent by concretizing the kind 
of activities with regard to CWs destruction and the destruction of chemical weapons 
production facilities.
The reference to ‘national standards’ in both provisions gives states considerable 
leeway in determining how to transport, sample, store, and destroy CWs or how to 
destroy chemical weapons production facilities.
15 For details and further references see Beyerlin and Marauhn, ‘The Protection of the Environment in 
the Context of Chemical Weapons Destruction’ (n 7) 190.
16 Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, Guide to International Environmental Law, (Leiden/ Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2007), 258; Beyerlin and Marauhn, ‘The Protection of the Environment in the Context of Chemical 
Weapons Destruction’ (n 7) 193.
17 Beyerlin and Marauhn, ‘The Protection of the Environment in the Context of Chemical Weapons 
Destruction’ (n 7) 193.
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These provisions are further specified by the Verification Annex of the CWC as well 
as by the OPCW, which provides support to states parties.18
In principle, Part IV(A), para. C.13 of the Verification Annex leaves it up to states 
parties to determine how they shall destroy CWs, which is, however, only allowed at 
specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facilities. An explicit 
prohibition is only imposed on the following processes: dumping in any body of water, 
land burial, or open- pit burning.
There are also many bilateral agreements dealing with environmentally sound destruc-
tion of chemical weapons. While contributing to an additional normative framework 
between participating states on matters related to CWs, they also play an important part in 
establishing rules on treatment of environmental risks related to storage and destruction of 
CWs. For instance, the agreement between Sweden and Russia deserves to be mentioned 
in this context. Under that agreement, Sweden undertook to assist Russia in considering 
possible threats resulting from the storage and destruction of the Russian CWs stockpile.19
However, as the existing normative framework on the basis of the CWC and bilateral 
agreements does not provide enough substantive and procedural standards with regard 
to environmental protection it is necessary to identify norms of international environ-
mental law that are important in terms of chemical weapons destruction. In this respect 
the ‘no harm’ concept is of particular importance. The Trail Smelter case20 provided the 
basis for the concept of prohibition on causing transboundary environmental harm:
The Tribunal, therefore, finds that the above decisions, taken as a whole, constitute an 
adequate basis for its conclusions, namely, that, under the principles of international 
law, as well as of the law of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the 
use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of 
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence 
and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.
In the following, some legally binding international environmental agreements21 as well 
as non- binding instruments such as Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
included this concept, stipulating that:
[s] tates have . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states . . . 22
18 See Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, International Environmental Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing/ 
München: CH Beck, 2011), 419 with further references.
19 Beyerlin and Marauhn, ‘The Protection of the Environment in the Context of Chemical Weapons 
Destruction’ (n 7) 199.
20 (1941) 3 RIAA 1907.
21 See, for example, Art. 3 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 ILM 818 (1992):  ‘States 
have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sov-
ereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsi-
bility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’; Art. 194(4) of the 1982 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, 21 ILM 1261 (1982): ‘In taking measures to prevent, reduce or control pollution of the 
marine environment, States shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried out by other 
States in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in conformity with this Convention.’
22 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5– 16 June 
1972, UN Doc. A/ CONF.48/ 14/ Rev.1.
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This concept is also reflected in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice,23 
stating that:
[a] State is . . . obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities 
which take place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing signifi-
cant damage to the environment of another State.24
The ‘no harm’ concept comprises the following two elements: on the one hand, it pro-
hibits states from causing significant transboundary environmental harm. On the 
other hand, it requires states to undertake adequate measures in advance of a case of 
significant transboundary environmental harm.25 Yet, it is rather difficult in practice 
to determine the ‘significance’ of the harm in question. Another difficulty, for exam-
ple, arises with regard to the question of ‘reasonableness’ of the activities to be taken 
by states. Actually, the application of relevant technical standards may provide a cer-
tain degree of certainty in this regard.26 Despite these difficulties, however, this concept 
can be regarded as a ‘customary substantive rule at the universal level’.27 As regards the 
procedural obligations flowing from ‘no harm’, such as the obligation of consultation, 
exchange of information, early warning, and the assessment of potential transboundary 
impacts of projects at the national level, the latter does not seem to have become part of 
customary international law.28 Against this background, it can be concluded that at least 
a set of minimum standards guide the transport of weapons and war material for the 
purpose of destruction, elimination, and conversion.29
Similarly, the conduct of an environmental impact assessment and the precaution-
ary principle are important tools to ensure environmental protection during disarma-
ment operations. Even though the latter is not part of customary international law, it is 
reflected in many international environmental agreements.
Furthermore, there are certain international environmental agreements which may 
be relevant with regard to measures covered by the CWC especially in the context 
of transborder transport. For example, the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal30 as well as the 
1991 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of 
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa31 may 
23 See the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Judgment of 
8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 226, 241 et seq.; cf. Case Concerning the Gabčikovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary 
v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 7, 41.
24 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 
14, 56, para. 101; Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) 
and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgment 
of 16 December 2015, ICJ Reports 665, para. 118, at <http:// www.icj- cij.org/ docket/ files/ 150/ 18848.pdf> 
accessed 14 June 2017.
25 Günther Handl, ‘Transboundary Impacts’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 531, 533 et seq.
26 Beyerlin and Marauhn (n 18) 42.
27 ibid. 44. See also Volker Röben, ‘Air Pollution, Transboundary Aspects’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), The 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) margin note 
14, at <http:// opil.ouplaw.com/ home/ EPIL> accessed 14 June 2017.
28 Beyerlin and Marauhn (n 18) 45.
29 Beyerlin and Marauhn, ‘The Protection of the Environment in the Context of Chemical Weapons 
Destruction’ (n 7) 202.
30 28 ILM 657 (1989). 31 30 ILM 775 (1991).
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be interpreted as establishing the principle of priority of inland destruction. This means 
that one may argue that transborder transport of chemical weapons is only permitted if 
there are reasonable grounds for their destruction abroad.32 By way of example, it may 
be argued on the basis of the ‘proximity principle’, that is, that the foreign destruction 
facility is closer to the storage place of the weapons than domestic destruction facili-
ties.33 Although this principle has not yet become part of customary international law, 
it, however, requires reasoned justification for the transport of weapons for the purpose 
of destruction abroad. Furthermore, they both as well as several other international 
environmental agreements34 establish the requirement of prior informed consent, obli-
gating exporting states to provide adequate information on the planned transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes.35
The 1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation36 establishes a comprehen-
sive regime for liability and compensation for damage resulting from the transbound-
ary movement of hazardous wastes. Once it enters into force it has the potential to 
adequately complement the framework of norms addressing transboundary movement 
of hazardous wastes.
Another important treaty regime establishing rules with regard to transboundary 
pollution is the 1979 Convention on Long- range Transboundary Air Pollution37 and its 
eight protocols.38 At least some of the protocols may contribute to the protection of the 
environment during the disposal of weapons by establishing certain minimum stand-
ards.39 For instance, the 1984 Protocol on Long- term Financing of the Cooperative 
Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long- range Transmission of Air 
Pollutants in Europe (‘EMEP’)40 establishes a cost- sharing framework for a monitoring 
programme regarding review and assessment of air pollutants in Europe.41
It should also be noted that norms governing the transport of dangerous goods 
are also relevant in this context. Among these rules, there are the RID Rules of the 
Convention relative aux transports internationaux ferroviaires,42 the European 
32 Beyerlin and Marauhn, ‘The Protection of the Environment in the Context of Chemical Weapons 
Destruction’ (n 7) 203.
33 ibid.
34 Such as the Waigani Convention to Ban the importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous 
and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous wastes within the 
South Pacific Region, see Katharina Kummer Peiry, ‘Prior Informed Consent’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), 
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) margin 
note 1, available at <http:// opil.ouplaw.com/ home/ EPIL>.
35 ibid. (margin note 5).
36 See <http:// www.basel.int/ TheConvention/ Overview/ LiabilityProtocol/ tabid/ 2399/ Default.aspx> accessed 
14 June 2017.
37 18 ILM 1442 (1979).
38 For an overview of the protocols see the information at <http:// www.unece.org/ env/ lrtap/ status/ lrtap_ 
s.html> accessed 14 June 2017.
39 Beyerlin and Marauhn, ‘The Protection of the Environment in the Context of Chemical Weapons 
Destruction’ (n 7) 203.
40 27 ILM 701 (1988).
41 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge/ 
New  York/ Melbourne/ Madrid/ Cape Town/ Singapore/ São Paulo/ Delhi/ Mexico City:  Cambridge 
University Press, 3rd edn, 2012), 248; see also <http:// www.unece.org/ env/ lrtap/ emep_ h1.html> accessed 
14 June 2017.
42 German Bundesgesetzblatt 1985 II, 666; the latest version is available at <http://otif.org/fileadmin/
new/2-Activities/2D-Dangerous-Goods/RID_2017_E.pdf> accessed 14 June 2017.
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Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road43 
and by Inland Waterways,44 and the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code.45 
Another example are the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous 
Goods— Model Regulations46 aiming at the provision of a basis for the development of 
uniform rules with regard to safe transport of dangerous goods.
8.4 The Syrian Case
The CWC only came into force in Syria on 14 October 2013 after formal accession to 
the Convention on 14 September 2013.47 In addition to an exceptional disarmament 
procedure resulting from, inter alia, the civil war and the application of procedures and 
mechanisms partially modifying the CWC rules, the decision to destroy Syria’s CWs at 
sea raised serious environmental concerns.48
According to EC- M- 33/ DEC.1, the OPCW Executive Council decided, inter 
alia, that:
the Syrian Arab Republic shall . . . complete the elimination of all chemical weapons 
material and equipment in the first half of 2014, subject to the detailed requirements, 
including intermediate destruction milestones, to be decided by the Council not later 
than 15 November 2013; . . . complete as soon as possible and in any case not later than 
1 November 2013, the destruction of chemical weapons production and mixing/ filling 
equipment . . .49
Furthermore, the UN Security Council in its Resolution 2118 decided:
to authorize Member States to acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy chemi-
cal weapons identified by the Director- General of the OPCW, consistent with the 
objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to ensure the elimination of the 
Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program in the soonest and safest manner.50
This Resolution finds its legal basis in Article 24 in conjunction with Article 103 UN 
Charter, inter alia giving the Security Council primary responsibility for peace and 
security.
43 German Bundesgesetzblatt 1969 II, 1489. 44 German Bundesgesetzblatt 2007 II, 1906.
45 See the latest version (2016 Edition Amendment 38- 16), at <http:// www.imo.org/ en/ Publications/ 
IMDGCode/ Pages/ Default.aspx> accessed 14 June 2017.
46 See the nineteenth revised edition (2015), at <http:// www.unece.org/ trans/ danger/ publi/ unrec/ rev19/ 
19files_ e.html> accessed 14 June 2017.
47 See S/ 1315/ 2015 (19 October 2015), Note by the Technical Secretariat, Status of Participation in the 
Chemical Weapons Convention as at 17 October 2015, at <https:// www.opcw.org/ fileadmin/ OPCW/ S_ 
series/ 2015/ en/ s- 1315- 2015_ e_ .pdf> accessed 14 June 2017. See more generally Marie Jacobsson, ‘Syria 
and the Issue of Chemical Weapons:  A  Snapshot of a Legal Time- Frame:  The United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 2118 (2013) and the OPCW Executive Council Decision’ in Jonas Ebbesson et al. (eds.), 
International Law and Changing Perceptions of Security: Liber Amicorum Said Mahmoudi (Leiden: Brill/ 
Nijhoff, 2014), 134– 51.
48 Ralf Trapp, ‘Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Stockpile of Syria’ (2014) 19 Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law 7– 23, 15 et seq.
49 OPCW EC, Decision:  Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons, EC- M- 33/ DEC.1 (27 September 
2013), para. 1(c)– (d).
50 UN Doc. S/ RES/ 2118, 27 September 2013, para. 10.
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Apart from some legal questions arising from EC- M- 33/ DEC.1,51 there are several 
special features foreseen with regard to the Syrian case. Firstly, Resolution 2118 of the 
UN Security Council and EC- M- 33/ DEC.1 establish the possibility of transfer of bulk 
agents from Syria to other countries for destruction.52 Secondly, these legal instru-
ments foresee a relatively short time line for the completion of destruction. Thirdly, 
among others, the question of responsibility arises as:
upon removal of declared chemical weapons from its territory, the Syrian Arab 
Republic no longer has possession, nor jurisdiction, nor control over these chemical 
weapons.53
However, as no country agreed to host the destruction of CWs coming from Syria— 
among others due to environmental concerns— the option of destruction of CWs at sea 
became the only solution.54 Finally, the destruction process— chemical hydrolysis— 
was, among others, realized by a US freighter in the Mediterranean Sea,55 which 
eventually brought the neutralized sulphur mustard effluent to Germany for disposal 
operations.56 Moreover, many countries, among them Russia, Finland, Denmark, and 
Norway, were involved in the maritime transport of chemical agents, bringing them to 
the US freighter.
Against this background, especially the normative framework of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter57 as well as of regional international 
environmental agreements, such as the 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection 
of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution,58 became highly relevant in practice for 
the first time in the history of the CWC.
In one of its reports issued in 2017 the OPCW Technical Secretariat again confirms 
the destruction of twenty- four of twenty- seven chemical weapons production facilities 
declared by Syria as well as all of the chemicals that were removed from its territory in 
2014.59 However, the OPCW Executive Council
[e] xpresses grave concern that the Secretariat . . . is not able to resolve all identified gaps, 
inconsistencies and discrepancies in the declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic, and 
51 See Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer, and Ralf Trapp, ‘Issues Raised by the Accession of Syria to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention’ in Krutzsch, Myjer, and Trapp (n 2) 689– 701, at 695.
52 ibid. 699.
53 OPCW EC, Decision: Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and 
Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, EC- M- 34/ DEC.1, 15 November 2013, para. 5.
54 Trapp (n 48) 20.
55 See OPCW, ‘United States offers to destroy Syria’s Priority Chemicals, OPCW receives expressions of 
interest from 35 private companies to destroy other Syrian chemicals’, 30 November 2013, at <https:// www.
opcw.org/ news/ article/ united- states- offers- to- destroy- syrias- priority- chemicals/ > accessed 14 June 2017.
56 See Paul F. Walker, ‘Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead’ (2014), 
at <https:// www.armscontrol.org/ ACT/ 2014_ 12/ Features/ Syrian- Chemical- Weapons- Destruction- Taking- 
Stock- And- Looking- Ahead#note7> accessed 14 June 2017. See also Christoph Beinlich and Benjamin 
Jüdes, ‘Germany’s Role in the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons’ in Andreas von Arnauld, Kerstin 
Odendahl, and Nele Matz- Lück (eds.), German Yearbook of International Law Vol. 57 (Dunker and 
Humblot, 2014), 597– 611.
57 11 ILM 1294 (1972). 58 15 ILM 290 (1976).
59 OPCW, EC- 84/ DG.11, 24 January 2017, Note by the Director- General, Progress in the Elimination of 
the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme, paras. 6 and 7.
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therefore cannot fully verify that the Syrian Arab Republic has submitted a declara-
tion that can be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention 
or Council decision EC- M- 33/ DEC.1; and demands that the Syrian Arab Republic 
comply fully with its obligations under the Convention, Council decision EC- M- 33/ 
DEC.1, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) . . .60
Therefore, it decided
that the Secretariat shall, as soon as security conditions permit, conduct inspections in 
the Syrian Arab Republic at those sites identified by the OPCW- United Nations Joint 
Investigative Mechanism in its third and fourth reports as involved in the weaponisa-
tion, storage, delivery, and use of toxic chemicals as weapons . . .61
In particular, the involvement of non- state actors in the development, acquisition, and 
use of chemical weapons currently poses a major challenge to the implementation of 
the CWC as a whole.62 Therefore, it does not seem that environmental protection will 
become one of the most important priorities of the CWC in the near future.
8.5 Lessons Learned
As the Syrian case shows, disarmament becomes more and more a ‘complex project’,63 
among others due to factors such as civil wars making it more difficult to realize chemi-
cal weapons destruction in an environmentally sound manner. As such, substantive 
environmental standards for the disposal of chemical weapons are a crucial aspect in 
achieving disarmament. However, it is at least equally important to have procedural 
cooperation and control mechanisms ensuring the implementation of obligations 
resulting from the CWC in an environmentally sound manner.64
It has not been discussed in public how environmental issues would be considered 
within this process.65 The OPCW Director- General assured in a public statement that:
the safety of people and protecting the environment has been one of the foremost 
considerations in all activities relating to the transportation and destruction of Syria’s 
chemical weapons . . . With regard to . . . the destruction of two types of chemical agents 
aboard the Cape Ray, I would like to stress that hydrolysis is a mature technology that 
has been used for decades, for example within the US chemical destruction programme, 
60 OPCW, Executive Council, Decision, OPCW- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports 
on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic, EC- 83/ DEC.5, 11 November 2016, para. 6 (empha-
sis in original).
61 ibid. para. 10.
62 ibid. paras. 2 and 7: ‘Expresses grave concern with the finding of the third report of the OPCW– UN 
Joint Investigative Mechanism that the so- called “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) had been 
involved in the use of sulfur mustard in Marea, Syrian Arab Republic, on 21 August 2015;  . . . Expresses 
grave concern with the continued interest in the development, acquisition, and use of chemical weapons by 
non- State actors and the potential for this threat to increase over time, and underscores the essential role of 
the Organisation, with respect to preventing and responding to the threat posed by non- State actors to the 
object and purpose of the Convention’.
63 Trapp (n 48) 22.
64 Beyerlin and Marauhn, ‘The Protection of the Environment in the Context of Chemical Weapons 
Destruction’ (n 7) 207.
65 Trapp (n 48) 22.
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with no incidents of harm to people or the environment. While this technology has 
never before been used onboard a ship, the US authorities have undertaken rigorous 
trials of the Field Deployable Hydrolysis System (‘FDHS’) since it was installed aboard 
the ship and have implemented numerous safety and containment measures . . . [A] ll 
destruction operations are conducted in accordance with US national regulations 
relating to the protection of people and the environment . . .66
However, it is doubtful whether it is satisfactory that such an international and com-
plex project is ‘only’ conducted in accordance with US national regulations. The review 
process should at least also involve the legal services of the OPCW and the United 
Nations.67
66 OPCW, Director- General, L/ ODG/ 192695/ 14, The Hague, 29 July 2014, at <https:// www.opcw.org/ 
fileadmin/ OPCW/ ODG/ uzumcu/ DG_ Letter_ Pancretan_ Commission.pdf> accessed 14 June 2017.
67 Trapp (n 48) 22.
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Legal Protection of the Environment
The Double Challenge of Non- International Armed  
Conflict and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding
Dieter Fleck*
9.1 Introduction
The protection international law provides against environmental damage in relation 
to armed conflict is less than perfect. A  comprehensive regulation is not available. 
Applicable principles and rules are to be searched in different branches of interna-
tional law. Their contents and consequences are often less than clear. Warring parties 
have taken advantage of such deficiencies. Military planners and operators notoriously 
tend to marginalize environmental obligations during military operations. Multilateral 
environmental agreements that have been concluded in peacetime are often neglected 
in the conduct of hostilities. Parties to an armed conflict may even find certain justifi-
cation for such conduct in the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, 
a body of law that on the one hand requires no more (and no less) than ‘due regard’ to 
the protection and preservation of the natural environment, in that:
[m] ethods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the protection 
and preservation of the natural environment. In the conduct of military operations, all 
feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental 
damage to the environment. Lack of scientific certainty as to the effects on the envi-
ronment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to the conflict from 
taking such precautions1
and on the other provides but few specific treaty obligations of doubtful relevance: in 
international armed conflicts significant rules are limited to a prohibition of ‘environ-
mental modification techniques having widespread, long- lasting or severe effects as the 
means of destruction, damage or injury’2 and ‘widespread, long- term and severe dam-
age’ to the natural environment,3 that is damage of an extreme kind and scale that have 
* Former Director International Agreements and Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member 
of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Honorary President, 
International Society for Military Law and the Law of War.
1 Jean- Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 3 Vols 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)— CIHL— Rule 44.
2 Art. I(1) of the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (ENMOD), 1108 UNTS 151.
3 Arts. 35(3), 55(1) of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), 1125 UNTS 3.
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not occurred so far and may hardly be expected in the conduct of hostilities, unless 
weapons of mass destruction would be used. As far as the protection of the natural 
environment in non- international armed conflict is concerned, international humani-
tarian law is even less precise. The aforementioned Rule 44 of the Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law (‘CIHL’) applies, according to its authors, ‘arguably’ 
also during non- international armed conflicts. Yet there is but little relevant practice 
in non- international armed conflicts and the question whether opinio juris may bridge 
this vacuum to develop customary law nevertheless, still deserves some discussion.
The present situation has the potential to obscure existing environmental obliga-
tions and to deny clear legal guidance on this matter. Such guidance is, however, neces-
sary for policy- makers and military operators alike. Lack of convincing assessment and 
uncertainty about the contents of existing rules may increase unnecessary suffering of 
civilian populations in war- torn territories, disrupt important ecosystems, and even 
prevent effective peacebuilding in post- conflict situations.4
The current International Law Commission (‘ILC’) project on the Protection of the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts5 undertakes to develop proposals on 
legal protections against environmental effects both in bello and post bellum.6 Taking 
a ‘phased’ approach by considering preparation and prevention measures (phase I), 
obligations relating to the protection of the environment during an armed conflict 
(phase II), and finally reparation and reconstruction measures (phase III), the pro-
ject promises an in- depth evaluation of principles and rules deriving from several rel-
evant branches of international law, most particularly environmental law, international 
humanitarian law, and human rights law. The Second Report explains existing rules of 
the law applicable during both international and non- international armed conflict that 
are directly relevant to the protection of the environment. The Third Report is focusing 
on post- conflict measures, including cooperation, sharing of information, best prac-
tices, and reparation. The ILC has started with identifying relevant principles and rules 
deriving from treaties and evolving custom.7 As the Special Rapporteur has noted in 
the Third Report, some matters such as environmental protection during the different 
phases of occupation, the role of non- state actors, and the responsibility of organized 
armed groups deserve further elaboration. Consultation and contact with states and 
the UN, the United Nations Environment Programme (‘UNEP’), the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (‘UNESCO’), the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’), and relevant non- governmental organizations 
remains essential to reaffirm and further develop existing rules.
4 See the 2011 Report of the International Law Commission, Annex E, UN- Doc A/ 66/ 10, 347.
5 See International Law Commission, Reports by Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Preliminary 
Report, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ 674, 30 May 2014 and Corr. 1; Second Report, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ 685, 28 May 
2015; Third Report, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ 700, 3 June 2016.
6 See Michael Bothe, ‘The ILC’s Special Rapporteur’s Preliminary Report on the Protection of the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict: An Important Step in the Right Direction’, in Pia Acconci et al. 
(eds.), International Law and the Protection of Humanity (Leyden: Brill/ Nijhoff, 2016).
7 Text of the draft principles provisionally adopted in 2015 and technically revised and renumbered dur-
ing the present session by the Drafting Committee, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ L.870 Rev. 1 (26 July 2016); Text of 
the draft principles provisionally adopted during the present session by the Drafting Committee, UN Doc. 
A/ CN.4/ L. 876, 3 August 2016.
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This chapter examines the legal basis on which environmental protections can be 
deemed to apply to non- international armed conflicts and what specific obligations 
may be entailed in post- conflict peacebuilding. In an effort to evaluate pertinent obliga-
tions in the conduct of hostilities (Section 9.2), several questions will be addressed that 
appear to have been widely neglected so far, including the following: would a specific 
international regulation constitute an unjustified intrusion on state sovereignty? Can 
rebel groups fighting governments realistically be expected to adhere to environmen-
tal obligations? Does individual criminal responsibility attach to breaches of relevant 
prohibitions? In what sense are parties to the conflict accountable for environmental 
devastation? May states be liable also for injurious consequences of acts not explic-
itly prohibited by international law? Furthermore, issues of post- conflict peacebuilding 
will be discussed, to explore which principles and provisions are accepted or should 
be developed here, thus addressing important aspects of jus post bellum (Section 9.3). 
Although many issues of the protection of the environment in relation to armed con-
flicts are still uncertain, an attempt to draw some conclusions appears necessary and 
possible (Section 9.4).
9.2 Environmental Obligations  
in Non- International Armed Conflict
It is typical for the jus in bello that rules on the protection of the environment in times 
of war have first been developed for international armed conflicts, whereas a state’s mil-
itary operations against insurgents was for a long time considered as that state’s internal 
affair in which only rules of domestic law would apply. When after the Second World 
War international legal obligations of a state towards its own citizens in armed conflict 
were formally recognized with Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
there was still little idea that there should also exist international legal obligations to 
ensure the protection of the natural environment in non- international armed conflicts, 
despite the fact that significant examples of ecological devastation in such conflicts 
were known already at that time and the high probability of cross- border effects of such 
devastation which have become more evident in the following years, was clearly fore-
seeable by experts.
The use of chemical defoliants in the Vietnam War and a progressively develop-
ing environmental awareness in the 1970s have led to the first relevant treaty prohibi-
tions with the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (‘ENMOD’) and Articles 35(3) and 55(1) AP 
I. Yet both treaties are applicable in international armed conflicts only and their specific 
prohibitions are limited to environmental damage far above the scope of what had hap-
pened in any armed conflict so far. It remains, indeed, still subject to proof, whether the 
new treaty provisions exclude otherwise available options for military operations or— 
by prohibiting what is less than realistic anyway— may only lend themselves to disre-
gard ecological devastation below the level so described. The latter reaction would not 
only neglect important principles of discipline and efficiency in the conduct of military 
operations, but also misinterpret relevant principles and rules of international humani-
tarian law: any attempt to argue that ecological damage below the level of ‘widespread, 
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long- term and severe’ devastation may be unlimited in armed conflicts is, indeed, 
excluded under the principle that the natural environment as such is to be recognized 
as a civilian object. It would also disregard the principle of proportionality and the rule 
that precautions in attack shall be taken. But the present state of law is less than explicit. 
Clear conclusions for military behaviour are yet to be drawn. Unequivocal commit-
ments to specifically ensure protections against environmental damage in the conduct 
of armed hostilities are required and in non- international armed conflicts this task is 
particularly pertinent.8 Legal efforts to improve the present situation have not led to 
significant success so far.
It is impressive to see opinio juris developing nevertheless, showing states ready to 
confirm the protection of the natural environment in any armed conflict as a civil-
ian object, and to describe the legal conditions for and consequences of using the 
environment as a military objective. General rules of international humanitarian 
law including those on the protection of enemy property from wanton destruction, 
the prohibition of excessive damage in the conduct of hostilities, the prohibition of 
pillage, the protection of civilian objects, and the rules regulating the use of weapons 
may, indeed, be more important and more effective for the protection of the natu-
ral environment than the specific rules of ENMOD and Articles 35(3) and 55(1) AP 
I mentioned above.9 It is important to note that those general rules apply in interna-
tional and non- international armed conflicts alike. Moreover, there may be a better 
understanding today for peacetime protections of the natural environment under 
other international treaties and their continuing relevance in times of armed con-
flict,10 a factor that may further contribute to diminish differences in the rules per-
taining to the conduct of hostilities in international and non- international armed 
conflict.
There is a long history of environmental damage in times of war. The Scythians 
scorched the earth to slow the advancing Persians. The Romans salted the land around 
Carthage to make it infertile. But such examples cannot lead to the acceptance of simi-
lar conduct today, in a world that has become more densely populated, more vulner-
able, and much smaller in the sense that accepted principles and rules progressively 
spread around the globe. The destruction of oil wells in Kuwait during the Gulf War 
of 1990– 1, excessive environmental damage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
between 2000 and 2011, the release of hazardous substances in industrial sites as a 
result of attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon 2006, and ecological devastations in 
a great many other non- international armed conflicts have, indeed, alerted public 
opinion at global scale. Yet many armed opposition groups are fighting to secure (and 
8 Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non- International Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 528, refers to a 2006 commitment of the Lord’s Resistance Army (‘LRA’) in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo to protect certain endangered species located in Garamba National Park, adding that in sub-
sequent years the LRA continued to launch attacks inside the Park and has killed park rangers.
9 For a recent comprehensive evaluation of pertinent rules of current international law see Jean- Marie 
Henckaerts and Dana Constantin, ‘Protection of the Natural Environment’ in Andrew Clapham and Paola 
Gaeta, The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2014), 469– 91.
10 See 2011 Report of the International Law Commission, chap. VI, sect. E, Draft Articles on Effects of 
Armed Conflicts on Treaties, UN- Doc. A/ 66/ 10, 171– 96.
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denying the state to exercise) control on natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, gold, 
logging timber, and wildlife animals. It is difficult to ensure respect for legal limitations 
where the exploitation of natural resources, even resources necessary for the survival 
of civilians, is used for war funding, thus misusing natural resources as sources of war 
and drivers of war.
Too many warring parties today hazard the consequences of large- scale devas-
tations despite the fact that in long- term perspective such conduct may jeopard-
ize their own interests. While this may explain the difficulties for progressive legal 
developments, international rules for internal armed conflicts have been successfully 
invoked nevertheless. After long and difficult negotiations on the contents of the 
Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions,11 attacks on objects indis-
pensable to the survival of the civilian population12 and pillage13 were prohibited for 
non- international armed conflicts of a higher threshold.14 Predatory exploitation of 
natural resources has been condemned in UN reports and used as inducement for 
Security Council sanctions irrespective of whether or not it falls under existing treaty 
prohibitions of the jus in bello.15
9.2.1  Due regard for the natural environment in armed conflict
A more systematic elaboration on the extent of customary rules on the protection of the 
natural environment and their applicability in non- international armed conflict may 
be based on the principle that in any armed conflict the right of the parties to choose 
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited (see Art. 35(1) AP I) and that such meth-
ods and means must be employed with due regard to the protection and preservation 
of the natural environment (Rule 44 CIHL). As argued in the Study on CIHL, the lat-
ter obligation may apply also in non- international armed conflicts, if there are effects 
in another state.16 Such effects are, indeed, notorious for environmental destruction, 
as pollution of air or water may hardly be limited to a state’s national territory. The 
Study goes even further in suggesting that the customary rule may also apply to par-
ties’ behaviour within the state where the armed conflict takes place.17 While the appli-
cability of this rule as a legal obligation in non- international armed conflicts has been 
11 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts (AP II), 1125 UNTS 609.
12 Art. 14 AP II. 13 Art. 4(2)(g) AP II.
14 The threshold for application of that Protocol is considerably higher than what was more liber-
ally circumscribed as ‘armed conflict not of an international character’ in Art. 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions. It requires an armed conflict between regular armed forces of a state and organized armed 
groups under responsible command, exercising territorial control and carrying out sustained and concerted 
military operations (see Art. 1(1) AP II). The Protocol does not even apply to armed conflicts between dif-
ferent groups of non- state actors, which have become quite common today.
15 See Daniëlla Dam- de Jong, ‘From Engines for Conflict into Engines for Sustainable Development: The 
Predatory Exploitation of Natural Resources in Situations of Internal Armed Conflict’ (2013) 82(1) Nordic 
Journal of International Law 155– 77, reprinted in Rosemary Rayfuse (ed.), War and the Environment: New 
Approaches to Protecting the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict (Leiden/ Boston: Brill/ Nijhoff, 2014), 
205– 27.
16 Henckaerts and Doswald- Beck (n 1) Vol. I, 148– 9. 17 ibid. 149.
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disputed still recently,18 and relevant state practice shows but slow developments,19 a 
discussion of the underlying legal principle may help to clarify the situation.
It should be noted that the ‘due regard’ formula that forms a central part of Rule 
44 CIHL is also used in other branches of international law for situations in which a 
more specific legal obligation does not (yet) exist. An obligation to show ‘due regard’ 
appears in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (‘UNCLOS’)20 in a few 
instances which are, however, not typical for that convention’s rules on the protection 
of the marine environment. Before these shall be examined here for better understand-
ing, it may be recalled that while the main objective of UNCLOS is regulating peace-
time cooperation, the convention is of considerable relevance also for the law of naval 
warfare and maritime neutrality, due to the fact that the conduct of naval operations in 
peacetime has an impact on wartime naval operations as well.21 While the provisions 
of the convention regarding protection and preservation of the marine environment 
do not apply to warships and state aircraft, ‘each State shall ensure, by the adoption of 
appropriate measures not impairing operations or operational capabilities of such ves-
sels or aircraft’ that such vessels or aircraft ‘act in a manner consistent, so far as is rea-
sonable and practicable’, with the convention (Art. 236 UNCLOS). These saving clauses 
notwithstanding, the convention generally requires a distinct behaviour in respect of 
the natural environment even for warships, mitigated only by the clauses ‘not impair-
ing operations or operational capabilities’ and ‘so far as is reasonable and practicable’, 
whereas the ‘due regard’ formula, wherever it applies, requires only to consider certain 
aspects or interests, without, however, prescribing a specific action to take. The general 
standard used in UNCLOS for obligations concerning the protection and conserva-
tion of the marine environment in peacetime is rather straightforward. It requires, for 
example, that:
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction 
or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and 
their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their 
jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign 
rights in accordance with this Convention (Art. 194(2) UNCLOS)
and that states take measures ‘to minimize to the fullest possible extent’ any release of 
toxic, harmful, or noxious substances and any pollution (Art. 194(3) UNCLOS). This 
clearly requires more than what is expressed by the ‘due regard’ formula: it establishes 
an obligation to take appropriate measures, not only to just consider navigational rights 
18 See Karen Hulme, ‘Natural Environment’ in Elisabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds.), 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 204– 37, 232; Karen Hulme, ‘Taking Care to Protect the Environment Against 
Damages: A Meaningless Obligation?’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red Cross 675, 686, 691.
19 See Practice Relating to Rule 44. Due Regard for the Natural Environment in Military Operations, at 
<https:// www.icrc.org/ customary- ihl/ eng/ docs/ v2_ rul_ rule44> accessed 9 June 2017.
20 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1833 UNTS 397.
21 See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘The Law of Military Operations at Sea’ ( chapter 20) and Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg and Martin D. Fink, ‘Maritime Interception/ Interdiction Operations’ in Terry D. 
Gill and Dieter Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edn, 2015).
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of others and ecological consequences involved while leaving it to planners and opera-
tors to balance these measures and consequences against military requirements.
The ‘due regard’ formula is used in UNCLOS only in a few instances: to confirm that 
a coastal state in exercising its rights and performing its duties in an exclusive economic 
zone shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other states (Art. 56(2) UNCLOS); 
to describe a state’s obligations in respect of the removal of abandoned installations (Art. 
60(3) UNCLOS); and to regulate the prevention, reduction, and control of marine pollu-
tion in ice- covered areas (Art. 234 UNCLOS).
While these are clearly defined exceptional cases, literature and practice have used the 
‘due regard’ formula more broadly to address a general obligation on the protection of 
the natural environment in armed conflict: the 1994 San Remo Manual on International 
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea was the first international document that intro-
duced this formula for the protection of the natural environment in armed conflict.22 It 
stipulates that methods and means of warfare should be employed with due regard for the 
natural environment23 and that states establishing an exclusion zone or war zone shall give 
due regard to the rights of neutral states to legitimate uses of the sea.24 More recently the 
Harvard Manual on the Law of Air and Missile Warfare stated that ‘due regard ought to 
be given to the natural environment’ when planning and conducting air or missile oper-
ations.25 While the Harvard Manual thus appears to slightly step behind well accepted 
stricter standards (without offering any explanation for the use ‘ought to’ instead of ‘must’ 
in its Commentary), it also confirms that this rule applies in international and non- inter-
national armed conflict likewise.26
As demonstrated by this short overview, the ‘due regard’ formula in discussions of the 
protection of the natural environment in armed conflict, first in naval warfare and later in 
air and missile warfare, was borrowed from UNCLOS where it is used, however, for situa-
tions other than operations affecting the natural environment. Nevertheless, Rule 44 of the 
Study on CIHL applies this formula in all theatres of war, yet without explaining its mean-
ing and without commenting on practical consequences.
The relevant standard of behaviour in the exercise of due regard for the interests 
of others and for other protection requirements has often been specified as ‘due dili-
gence’. The ILC, in its 2001 Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities, has used this latter term to describe appropriate measures to pre-
vent significant transboundary harm in order to exert the best possible efforts to mini-
mize an existing risk, not, however, to guarantee that significant harm will be totally 
prevented, if it is not possible to do so.27 In an effort to offer a definition of this term in 
a form as specific as possible, the Commentary states the following:
22 International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to 
Armed Conflicts at Sea, prepared by international lawyers and naval experts convened by the International 
Institute of Humanitarian Law, edited by Louise Doswald- Beck (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1995).
23 ibid. 119– 20. 24 ibid. 181– 3.
25 Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Bern, 2009 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research— HPCR), Rule 89.
26 ibid. Rule 89, commentary para. 4.
27 Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities with Commentaries, UN 
Doc. A/ 56/ 10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, 148, at <http:// legal.
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What would be considered a reasonable standard of care or due diligence may change 
with time; what might be considered an appropriate and reasonable procedure, stand-
ard or rule at one point in time may not be considered as such at some point in the 
future. Hence, due diligence in ensuring safety requires a State to keep abreast of tech-
nological changes and scientific developments.28
It may also follow from this understanding that during wartime a different degree of 
obligation will apply than in a situation of normal peace. Yet the 2001 ILC Articles have 
not offered any specific comment on this question. Fundamental obligations to prevent 
transboundary harm continue to exist in the event of an armed conflict. These obliga-
tions are closely connected with the obligation to take precautions for the protection 
of the civilian population in the conduct of hostilities. Due diligence, precaution, and 
prevention are closely linked and difficult to be treated separately The answer for what 
is appropriate and reasonable may drastically change as soon as armed hostilities are 
conducted. As will be discussed below (Section 9.3), also in post- conflict peacebuild-
ing the applicable standards of protection may still be different from normal peacetime 
situations. This should be taken into consideration when, in rather general terms and 
without further consideration, due diligence is being referred to as the standard basis 
for the protection of the environment from harm.29
‘Due diligence’ standards are not unique to the protection of the natural environ-
ment. They are equally relevant for other branches of international law where agree-
ment on stricter rules may not have been reached, but a need was felt to find a balance 
between rights and obligations of different subjects of international law. Thus an obli-
gation of states to apply due diligence in ensuring cyber security30 and taking preven-
tive measures against malicious cyber activities originating from their territory is being 
discussed as part of the duty not to harm rights of other states.31 This obligation, too, 
has been developed as a peacetime rule and may be subject to change in bello and post 
bellum.
While the question remains open to what extent there is a commonality of under-
standing in the different areas in which the notion of due diligence is applied, there 
appears to be consensus that due diligence is of relevance to obligations that require 
states to have due regard for the interests of others and that due regard/ due diligence 
is an obligation of conduct, not an obligation of result.32 What is at stake here is a 
un.org/ ilc/ texts/ instruments/ english/ commentaries/ 9_ 7_ 2001.pdf> accessed 16 June 2017, Art. 3, com-
mentary paras. 7– 11.
28 ibid. para. 11.
29 Timo Koivurova, ‘Due Diligence’ in Max- Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at <www.
mpepil.com> accessed 14 August 2017, paras. 20– 26.
30 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Legal Implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace’ in 
Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis, and Katharina Ziolkowski (eds.), 4th International Conference on Cyber 
Conflict (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012), at <https:// ccdcoe.org/ publications/ 2012proceed-
ings/ CyCon_ 2012_ Proceedings.pdf>, 7– 19, 17– 18, accessed 14 August 2017.
31 See Katharina Ziolkowski (ed.), Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. International 
Law, International Relations and Diplomacy (Tallinn:  NATO CCD COE Publication, Tallinn 2013), xvi, 
165– 71, 186.
32 See ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, at <https:// olympereseauinternational.
files.wordpress.com/ 2015/ 07/ due_ diligence_ - _ first_ report_ 2014.pdf> accessed 9 June 2014, First Report 
(Washington Conference, 2014), 5, 30; Second (Final) Report (Johannesburg Conference, 2016), 2, 46– 7.
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primary rule of conduct, rather than a secondary rule of state responsibility. The notion 
so described remains very general in its contents, and its application is subject to var-
ious considerations. Yet it provides an objective standard of behaviour, taking into 
account the technical, economical, and financial capacities available at the time. While 
that standard may change according to the particular context, developments over time 
and in relation to the risks involved, an objective assessment of responsibilities, consid-
ering all relevant circumstances of the specific case, is required here.
Based on this understanding of the ‘due regard/ due diligence’ standard, the contents 
of Rule 44 CIHL and its applicability in non- international armed conflicts becomes 
clearer. It describes an obligation of parties to an armed conflict to show concern for 
environmental effects of their military operations, and to minimize such effects not 
only in view of transboundary damage, but also within the territory of operations. This 
includes the special consideration expressed in the last sentence of Rule 44, which may 
be read together with the preceding sentence as follows:
Lack of scientific certainty as to the effects on the environment of certain military 
operations does not absolve a party to the conflict from taking [feasible] precautions 
[to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental damage to the environment].33
While some doubts have been expressed in this respect, based on the argument that a 
party cannot be expected to exercise due regard based on information other than that 
available at the time,34 it should be considered that lack of certainty is nothing one may 
neglect in planning and performing military operations, even less so when it is feasible 
to take appropriate precautions in the conduct of military operations.
9.2.2  Customary obligations in non- international armed conflict
Standard- setting projects have underlined the importance of, and also realistic possibil-
ities for, environmental protection projects during armed conflicts, both international 
and non- international.35 During the last decades consensus among decision- makers on 
the importance of ecological considerations for military operations has progressively 
developed. UNEP has conducted a comprehensive review of the environmental effects 
of armed conflicts,36 thus helping to build a systematic and reliable base of knowl-
edge that may be used for policy- making and military planning and has broadened 
33 See above, accompanying text to n 1.
34 William H. Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2009) 101.
35 See, for example, Britta Sjöstedt, ‘The Role of Multilateral Environmental Agreements in Armed 
Conflict: “Green- keeping” in Virunga National Park. Applying the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in 
the Armed Conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2013) 82(1) Nordic Journal of International 
Law 129– 53, reprinted in Rosemary Rayfuse (ed.), War and the Environment. New Approaches to Protecting 
the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict (Leiden/ Boston: Brill/ Nijhoff, 2014), 179– 204; see also Britta 
Sjöstedt, Protecting the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict— The Role of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (Lund: Lund University, 2016).
36 UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict. An Inventory and Analysis of International 
Law (UNEP, 2009).
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acceptance of pertinent international obligations.37 The development of new rules of 
the jus in bello has often started with experience in internal wars, as can be demon-
strated by the Lieber Code38 and the Prohibition of Dum- Dum Bullets.39 A specific case 
in point is the prohibition of landmines through the 1997 Ottawa Convention,40 which 
according to its Article 1(1) applies likewise in international and non- international 
armed conflicts and is, at least in part, a result of concerns about the effect of land-
mines on the natural environment.41 But while it is clearer today than in former dec-
ades that states do have international obligations vis- à- vis their own citizens, it remains 
a complex question, whether— and if so how— armed opposition fighters are in fact 
bound to apply principles and rules of international law.42 An affirmative answer to 
this question may be given, following the concept of legislative jurisdiction: states have 
to transform international law into domestic law, as binding for the state, not just the 
present government.43 They may also accept self- executing provisions of international 
humanitarian law as binding for all citizens, including armed opposition groups. Yet 
clear and reliable commitments of warring parties and special agreements, as foreseen 
under Article 3(3) common to the Geneva Conventions, remain of particular relevance 
in this context.
State practice and practice of armed opposition groups is a continuing matter of 
concern for any discussion on the protection of the environment in relation to armed 
conflicts. Practice is important, not only to confirm the existence of a rule as part of 
customary international law, but also to ensure compliance with and respect for exist-
ing rules. Yet it may be accepted that in international humanitarian law opinio juris 
deserves certain prominence, thus even shadowing state practice in its role for estab-
lishing a principle or rule of customary law. In international humanitarian law, distinct 
from other legal branches, the formation of a customary norm appears to be possi-
ble ‘even when there is no widespread and consistent State practice, or even no prac-
tice at all’. The late Antonio Cassese, developing this argument in due consideration of 
the impact of the laws of humanity and dictates of public conscience,44 convincingly 
37 See also Michael Bothe, Carl Bruch, Jordan Diamond, and David Jensen, ‘International Law Protecting 
the Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’ (2010) 92 International Review of the 
Red Cross 569– 92; Michael Bothe, ‘The Ethics, Principles and Objectives of Protection of the Environment 
in Times of Armed Conflict’ in Rayfuse (n 35) 91– 108.
38 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis 
Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Lincoln (24 April 1863).
39 Declaration (IV, 3)  concerning Expanding Bullets, signed at The Hague, 29 July 1899, 1 AJIL 
Supplement (1907) 155– 7.
40 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) 18 September 1997, 2056 UNTS 211.
41 Sivakumaran (n 8) 527, making this argument, also refers to an ad hoc Declaration of 21 March 2000 
against the use and production of landmines in the Philippines. It should not be overlooked, however, that 
in a post- conflict setting remnants of war may also protect the environment, as mined areas are no longer 
open for exploitation and further pollution.
42 See Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 3rd edn, 2013), Section 1201, commentary, para. 5.
43 See, for example, Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction. Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 735– 60, 736, 756.
44 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2005), 160– 1; see also 
Antonio Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’(2000) 11 European Journal 
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referred to the Martens Clause as a cornerstone of international humanitarian law, 
which was coined at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference and confirmed in Article 1(2) 
AP I and in the Preamble (para. 4) of AP II. Similarly, in critical reviews of the Study 
on CIHL, the dominating question remained whether and to what extent opinio juris 
could be established, rather than trying to match with the seminal work undertaken 
by the ICRC to collect and evaluate relevant practice.45 That many rules on means and 
methods of fighting and protection are likewise applicable in international and non- 
international armed conflicts is common coinage today.46 It clearly derives from opinio 
juris rather than practice. Deviating from practice is normally (and rightly so) taken 
as an example of breaches, but not as relevant for limiting or denying the existence of a 
customary rule of international humanitarian law.
9.2.3  National sovereignty and its limits
The existing law on the protection of the natural environment during armed conflict 
is a convincing example for the often- discussed limits to national sovereignty that do 
apply today. It forms an essential part for human security in a world characterized by 
global challenges. The rule of law, respect for the rights of others, and accountability 
of states and individuals for non- compliance with the law deserve particular atten-
tion when discussing state sovereignty and non- interference in the domestic affairs of 
other states. Ecological dangers are border- crossing by nature. They convincingly call 
for international commitments and acceptance of clear obligations under international 
law. This may well lead to the removal of old thinking, to a progressively developing 
opinio juris, and eventually to the adoption of relevant rules even for non- international 
armed conflict.
9.2.4  Criminal responsibility
Does individual criminal responsibility attach to breaches of pertinent prohibitions of 
international and/ or national law in armed conflict? While an affirmative answer will 
be necessary to prosecute such breaches, the exercise of jurisdiction may face prob-
lems that are not to be solved easily. National jurisdiction is one of states and it is only 
in exceptional cases that armed opposition groups themselves could exercise discipli-
nary or criminal justice in an effective manner. There will be difficulties for all war-
ring parties to ensure prosecution of crimes during the armed conflict. International 
jurisdiction on ecological crimes in non- international armed conflicts is factually non- 
existent today:  the 1998 Rome Statute47 addresses serious violations of the laws and 
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character (Art. 8(2), lit. 
International Law 187, reprinted in Antonio Cassese, The Human Dimension of International Law, Selected 
Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 39– 69.
45 See, for example, Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds.), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
46 See Fleck (n 42) Section 1212.
47 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3.
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c and e ICC Statute), which protect civilians and other persons hors de combat, but the 
Statute does not mention the natural environment. Pillaging a town or place is listed 
here as a war crime also in non- international armed conflicts (Art. 8(2), lit. e (v) ICC 
Statute), whereas pillaging natural resources is not, despite the fact that no such limita-
tion applies under Art. 4(2)(g) AP II.
9.2.5  Reparation for environmental damage
State responsibility requires reparation for victims of armed conflict,48 which may take 
the form of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction (Art. 34 ARSIWA49). While it 
is difficult to implement this principle under wartime situations, victimized states and 
individuals do have a right to demand reparation and to pursue this right post- conflict. 
There should be no doubt that the right for reparation includes losses and damage 
caused by breaches of environmental obligations in bello. Is this right limited to wrong-
ful acts or may states (including states represented by former rebel groups) be held 
liable also for injurious consequences of acts not prohibited by international law? The 
2006 ILC Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising out of Hazardous Activities50 underline that there must be ‘prompt, adequate 
and effective remedies’ in the event of transboundary damage caused by hazardous 
activities (Principles 4 and 6), which may have occurred despite compliance by the 
relevant state with its obligations concerning prevention of such damage. But the com-
mentary explains that:
liability is excepted if, despite taking all appropriate measures, the damage was the 
result of (a) an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection; or (b) the 
result of a natural phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable, unforeseeable and irresist-
ible character; or (c) wholly the result of compliance with a compulsory measure of a 
public authority in the State of injury; or (d) wholly result of a wrongful intentional 
conduct of a third party.51
To prove this argument, the Rapporteur Dr. P.S. Rao referred to exceptions under rel-
evant treaty law on liability for nuclear damage and the EU Directive 2004/ 35 on envi-
ronmental liability,52 examples which may not be fully convincing, as these conventions 
are limited to nuclear damage and the EU Directive applies between EU Member States 
48 Art. 3 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 
1907) 2 AJIL Supplement 90– 117 (1908); Art. 91 AP I. See International Law Association, Declaration of 
International Law Principles on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict (Substantive Issues), adopted 
at the seventy- fourth ILA Conference (The Hague, 2010), and Procedural Principles for Reparation 
Mechanisms, adopted at the seventy- sixth ILA Conference (Washington DC, 2014).
49 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts— ARSIWA— (ILC, 2001).
50 2006 Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of 
Hazardous Activities, with commentaries, UN Doc. A/ 61/ 10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
2006, Vol. II, Part Two, at <http:// legal.un.org/ ilc/ texts/ instruments/ english/ commentaries/ 9_ 10_ 2006.
pdf> accessed 14 August 2017.
51 ibid. 161 and 434, para. 2.
52 1997 Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, repro-
duced in INFCIRC/ 566, Art. IV (3); 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, repro-
duced in INFCIRC/ 500 with Add. 1- 5, Art. IV (3); 2004 Protocol to amend the 1960 Convention on Third 
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, at <http:// www.oecd- nea.org/ law/ brussels_ supplementary_ 
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only. Such conditions will hardly exist in any non- international armed conflict. Hence 
a clarification would be useful to make that understanding more acceptable, or further 
adapt the 2006 Principles to existing principles of state responsibility as necessary.
Reparation issues deserve more attention today in the jus in bello, even if it will be 
difficult to adopt appropriate general principles and procedures prior to the end of hos-
tilities and even considering that during the conduct of hostilities there are notorious 
implementation problems for all parties to the conflict. Effective measures for avoidance, 
limitation, and reparation of environmental damage are of key importance in this con-
text. No exception for environmental devastation caused in non- international armed 
conflicts could convincingly be construed here. A clear commitment to a responsible 
settlement will be essential for post- conflict peacebuilding. Hence a well commented 
set of rules on the subject appears necessary to enhance international awareness for the 
protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts as a means to accept and 
ensure good governance.
9.3 Environmental Obligations Post- Conflict
While a systematic interdisciplinary assessment of the impact of environmental recon-
struction and a dialogue with policy- makers are still in a fairly early stage,53 it should 
be clear that cooperation for the use of shared natural resources may help to prevent 
armed conflicts and support peacebuilding. To provide meaningful advice to political 
and military decision- makers and support them in efforts to move towards ‘environ-
mental peacebuilding’, an integrated approach by environmentalists, peace researchers, 
and international lawyers is required. Scientific and social factors need to be explored 
in a case- specific manner and forms and processes for transboundary environmen-
tal cooperation need to be regulated in a spirit of showing advantages to participants 
rather than providing one- sided restrictions.
9.3.1  Environmental projects and peacebuilding
UNEP, working to further develop UN capacities for early warning and early action in 
countries that are vulnerable to conflicts over national resources and ecological exploi-
tation, has issued policy recommendations to integrate pertinent measures in peace-
building processes.54 The aim is to identify problem areas and support opportunities 
for environmental cooperation to complement and reinforce peacebuilding activities.
More efforts at larger scale will be necessary to make environmental peacebuild-
ing projects more effective. Very practical tasks need to be performed and further 
developed to achieve certain complementarity between humanitarian assistance and 
convention.pdf> accessed 14 August 2017, Art. 9; 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage Convention, reproduced in INFCIRC/ 567, Annex Art. 3(5); EU Directive 2004/ 35 on 
environmental liability, Art. 4(1) and (6).
53 See Alexander Carius, ‘Environmental Peacebuilding: Conditions for Success’ (2006) Environmental 
Change and Security Report No 12, 59– 75.
54 UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding. The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (UNEP, 2009).
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development activities and ensure continuity of these efforts for a sustainable post- 
conflict peacebuilding. Typical examples, which will be essential to overcome insecu-
rity and ensure post- conflict recovery, may be found in the fields of water management 
and agriculture.55 Other tasks should follow suit: environmental and health monitoring 
will be necessary to ensure acceptable living conditions. Professional services should 
be provided over a longer period to ensure the removal of unexploded ammunition 
and toxic remnants of war. Reconstruction of infrastructure will be essential for eco-
nomic recovery. None of these measures is without direct impact on the protection of 
the natural environment. Hence it is safe to conclude that to ensure peacebuilding and 
economic recovery, nature conservation may not be neglected.
A few legal principles and rules for post- conflict peacebuilding may be identi-
fied according to timeframes and geographical reach of particular challenges that are 
to be faced. As prioritization is essential for meeting the many post- conflict tasks, 
a certain freedom of approach must be accepted. Concentration on a few commit-
ments will be necessary to ensure effective results step by step and engage state and 
non- state actors for participation. Hence pragmatic limitation, conciliation, and 
participation— principles this author has advocated for a discussion of the jus post 
bellum in general56— may be of particular value for an effective environmental res-
toration post- conflict. Furthermore, transboundary effects of environmental damage 
must be considered, but it is to be accepted that a ‘polluter pays’ principle will not fully 
work post- conflict. Hence the implementation of multilateral environmental agree-
ments may not be possible without exceptions post- conflict. For the sake of clarity 
and effectiveness relevant provisions ought to be revised or suspended in this respect. 
Neighbouring states are inevitably bound to participate in protection and restora-
tion activities, but their engagement may not suffice to face the challenge, so that the 
international community at large will be called for, even if the damage as such would 
remain limited to regional scale.
9.3.2  Special reparation principles post- conflict
For post- conflict peacebuilding to be effective, full- scale efforts of the international 
community are required within a short time- frame, to be followed by long- term activi-
ties under different (i.e. peacetime) conditions thereafter. First activities may not pro-
vide a full remedy for a burden that under normal peacetime conditions would require 
sustainable efforts over a longer period. Enormous starting endeavours will be nec-
essary, well exceeding existing legal obligations. Yet in a longer perspective meeting 
such challenge may be more effective and also more economic than any more cau-
tious approach. It is in that sense that it will be necessary to prioritize peacebuilding 
55 See Emmy Simmons, ‘Harvesting Peace:  Food Security, Conflict, and Cooperation’ Environmental 
Change and Security Program Report, Vol. 14 Issue 3 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, 2013).
56 Dieter Fleck, ‘Jus Post Bellum as a Partly Independent Legal Framework’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. 
Easterday, and Jens Jensen (eds.), Jus Post Bellum. Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 43– 57, 56– 7.
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over retribution57 and implement environmental restoration in an effort to serve wider 
interests.
The 2001 Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities58 may pose specific, albeit different challenges for sending states of peace 
operations and for their host states. Highly developed states with prospering econo-
mies will be in a different position than other states to discern, and effectively avoid, 
a potential disruption of ecological systems. Their military contingents operating in 
the host state should use environmental standards they have to comply with at home, 
unless there are convincing reasons to authorize an exemption. The role of peacekeep-
ing contingents from developing countries may be different, but the UN or the regional 
organization involved may, and should, offer advice and support for meeting appro-
priate environmental standards, even if national laws and regulations of the host state 
are not (yet) available. Foreign armed forces participating in a peace operation should 
realize that any negligence in meeting those standards would be counterproductive 
to the task they have to perform. Finally, the host state of a peace operation should 
receive advice and support from the international community to develop and imple-
ment an environmental protection agenda as part of its peacebuilding efforts and adapt 
its national laws and regulations accordingly.
Liability for ecological disruption is a matter not to be neglected in post- conflict 
peacebuilding. State responsibility for wartime damage caused to neighbouring states 
must be honoured in addition to a great many other burdens in the reconstruction 
phase after an armed conflict. States must ensure civil liability of private contractors. 
The question whether responsibility is to be accepted in this context also for injuri-
ous consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law deserves to 
be addressed as well. It is not altogether theoretical, as even best- practice conduct in 
the armed conflict may have caused immense harm, not only within the own coun-
try, but also in neighbouring states. The Principles adopted in 200659 may be useful 
to direct international cooperation post- conflict. But they are not directly binding; 
wartime damage may be formally excluded in their implementation; and full com-
pensation will hardly be possible. It remains important for international and regional 
organizations involved in post- conflict reconstruction processes to support parties 
to the former armed conflict in meeting their responsibilities. Together with sending 
states of peacekeeping contingents such organizations are challenged here to exert 
their influence and set good examples themselves by fully meeting their own obliga-
tions as far as reparation for wrongful acts committed during peace operations are 
concerned.
57 Cymie R.  Payne, ‘The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict Legal Regimes’ in Stahn, 
Easterday, and Iverson (n 57) 502– 18, 518.
58 See Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities with Commentaries 
(n 27).
59 See 2006 Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of 
Hazardous Activities, with commentaries (n 50).
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9.4 Conclusions
Legal protections of the natural environment in relation to armed conflict derive from 
different branches of international law and are characterized by the continuing rele-
vance of peacetime obligations during armed conflicts. A few general conclusions may 
be drawn here:
(1) While a lex specialis role of international humanitarian law is to be recognized 
in armed conflict, this role is limited in practice as far as the protection and 
preservation of the natural environment is concerned. This is due to the absence 
of meaningful specific treaty provisions on the subject. ENMOD and Articles 
35(3) and 55(1) AP I are of extremely limited impact on modern armed conflicts 
and they do not affect other obligations relevant for the protection of the natural 
environment in the conduct of hostilities.
(2) Treaty and customary rules on the protection of civilian objects in armed con-
flict fully apply to the protection of the natural environment.
(3) For the development of customary law in international and non- international 
armed conflict opinio juris has certain prominence, thus even shadowing state 
practice in its role for identifying and establishing a customary principle or rule.
(4) Protection standards applicable in international armed conflict are more and 
more recognized today as being applicable also for the behaviour of states and 
non- state actors in non- international armed conflicts.
(5) The obligation of parties to an armed conflict to show due regard/ due diligence 
for the natural environment is an obligation of conduct to show concern for 
environmental effects of military operations, and to minimize such effects 
not only in view of transboundary damage, but also in view of damage within 
the territory of operations. It is an objective standard of behaviour calling for 
responsible planning and precautions in attack, taking into account the techni-
cal, economical, and financial capacities available at the time
(6) The right to claim reparation for losses and damage caused by breaches of the 
jus in bello includes damage caused by breaches of environmental obligations. 
Liability for injurious consequences of acts not prohibited by international law 
may be limited or excluded during armed conflicts. Conditions and standards 
for such limitation or exclusion deserve further consideration.
(7) While the jus post bellum requires pragmatic limitation, conciliation, and par-
ticipation as general attitudes to ensure post- conflict peacebuilding and secure 
sustainable recovery from wartime devastations, the need for prioritization must 
be accepted. This may entail specific consequences for forms, amounts, and time 
schedules for retribution. It should not lead, however, to limiting or avoiding 
necessary measures towards a sustainable recovery of the natural environment.
(8) International and regional organizations involved in post- conflict reconstruc-
tion processes should support former parties to the armed conflict in meet-
ing their responsibilities. They should assume responsibility for the national 
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contingents under their command and support third parties in their search for 
compensation.
On 5 November 2001 the UN General Assembly declared 6 November of each year as 
the International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and 
Armed Conflict.60 UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan has underlined in 2003:
Ensuring environmental sustainability is not a luxury; it is a prerequisite for the future 
peace and prosperity of our planet.61
States and international organizations remain challenged to fully act according to this 
conviction. Indeed, since ENMOD and AP I were adopted, opinio juris has come a long 
way to endorse this conviction. Principles and rules on protecting the environment in 
armed conflict are now clearer than one generation before. The role of academia was 
not the least important in achieving this progressive normative development.
60 UN General Assembly Resolution 56/ 4, see <http:// www.timeanddate.com/ holidays/ un/ day- 
preventing- environment- exploitation- in- war> accessed 9 June 2017.
61 Annan calls for expanded laws against environmental damage in war (6 November 2003), see <http:// 
www.un.org/ apps/ news/ story.asp?NewsID=8800&Cr=environment> accessed 9 June 2017.
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10.1 Introduction
As armed conflicts continue to flare up around the world, the spectre of serious dam-
age to the environment is a recurring and growing threat. Conflict disrupts and often 
disables the regulatory authorities that typically enforce environmental protections, 
such as national and local governments, forestry rangers, and factory inspectors. As 
domestic regulatory systems break down, international criminal law presents an alter-
native mechanism that may potentially be used to address serious environmental harm. 
This chapter examines the provisions of international criminal law that are applicable 
to prosecute environmental harm, particularly during non- international armed con-
flicts (‘NIAC’), which have grown increasingly prevalent since the end of the Second 
World War.1
The analysis begins by instantiating environmental harm caused during armed 
conflicts. It then surveys the law applicable to environmental harm during NIACs, 
which has traditionally been less developed and articulated than the law appli-
cable during international armed conflicts (‘IAC’).2 The exegesis adheres to the 
* PhD Candidate at Leiden University, currently researching the prosecution of environmental destruc-
tion under international criminal law while also working as an international prosecutor of cases of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The views expressed herein reflect those of the author and 
not necessarily those of the UN.
1 In the Tadić Jurisdictional Decision of 2 October 1995, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY observed that 
internal armed conflicts, or civil wars, have become increasingly prevalent, cruel, and protracted and that 
NIACs increasingly impact on third states; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, (IT- 94- 1- A, 2 October 1995) (‘Tadić Jurisdiction 
Decision’), paras. 96– 7.
2 In Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the ICTY could exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over crimes committed during NIACs, reflecting an apparent trend towards removing the dis-
tinction between IAC and NIAC; Tadić Jurisdiction Decision (n 1) paras. 97, 137. See also Jean Allain and 
John R.W.D. Jones, ‘A Patchwork of Norms: A Commentary on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind’ (1997) 1 European Journal of International Law 100– 17, 116. The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court has reversed this trend— using the dichotomy between IACs 
and NIACs as the primary organizational principle of its war crimes provision (Art. 8); Antonio Cassese 
and Paola Gaeta, International Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2008) 96.
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International Law Commission’s call for the examination and clarification of this 
area of the law.3
After assessing the various potentially applicable provisions of international crimi-
nal law, the analysis examines the basis for extending to NIACs the protection against 
military attacks causing excessive environmental harm (set out in Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) of 
the Rome Statute), which is currently only applicable in IACs. This provision pro-
hibits causing widespread, long- term, and severe damage to the natural environment 
excessive in relation to any concrete and direct anticipated military advantage (‘dis-
proportionate environmental attacks’). The study primarily focuses on the provisions 
applicable at the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), as this is the only international 
criminal tribunal of potentially unlimited geographic jurisdiction.
While this study concentrates on circumstances of armed conflict, the ambit is not 
restricted to the limited period of active hostilities, but also looks to the aftermath of 
hostilities, including post- conflict peacebuilding efforts, to discern means of redress for 
serious environmental harm.4 Traditionally, international law applicable to armed con-
flict has been bifurcated into jus ad bellum, concerning the principles governing the ini-
tiation of hostilities, and jus in bello, concerning the conduct of warring parties during 
hostilities. There has been only limited analysis and development of the application of 
the international law of armed conflict to address the transition to peace, referred to as 
jus post bellum.5 In the context of NIACs, which are even less regulated by international 
law than IACs, the traditional view remains well entrenched that international criminal 
and humanitarian law diminish in relevance as hostilities end.
Contrasting with the traditional view is the increasing awareness of the continuing 
relevance of aspects of international law concerning armed conflict in the aftermath of 
conflict. The various principles, provisions, and practices of international law of armed 
conflict that apply in the wake of hostilities are grouped under the label jus post bellum, 
which can be defined as the ‘laws and norms of justice that apply to the process of end-
ing war and building peace’.6 This study takes into account jus post bellum as it applies 
3 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty- sixth session 5 May– 6 June and 
7 July– 8 August 2014, ILC Report, A/ 69/ 10, 2014, chap. XI, paras. 186– 222 (concerning protection of the 
environment during armed conflict), paras. 192, 199, 201. See also Third report on the protection of the 
environment in relation to armed conflicts, Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, ILC Doc. A/ CN.4/ 700, 
3 June 2016.
4 Environmental harm also occurs outside of the context of any armed conflict, but that harm is not 
addressed in this analysis.
5 Pointing out that only recently the jus post bellum has begun to get attention, see Larry May, ‘Jus Post 
Bellum, Grotius and Meionexia’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post 
Bellum:  Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2014), 15 (with further 
references).
6 Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus 
Post Bellum: An Introduction’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (ibid.) 1. See also Eric de Brabandere, ‘The 
Concept of Just Post Bellum in International Law: a Normative Critique’ in Stahn. Easterday, and Iverson 
(ibid.) (‘Jus post bellum may be viewed as a normative set of principles rather than substantive rules which 
would give guidance in the application of the existing rules governing post- conflict reconstruction. Such 
principles may for example include the principle of proportionality, or the accountability of foreign actors.’).
222 Eco-Struggles
to NIACs, in order to give a full account of the legal regime applicable to the cycle of 
war and peace.
10.2 Environmental Harm During and  
After Armed Conflicts
It is an unfortunate truism that the environment is jeopardized, and often harmed, dur-
ing armed conflict.7 This concern was echoed in Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration on 
the Environment and Development, whereby the collected states recognized that:
warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore 
respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed 
conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.8
Based on a study of the impact of armed conflict on the environment, the United 
Nations Environment Programme (‘UNEP’) concluded in 2009 that ‘armed conflicts 
have continued to cause significant damage to the environment— directly, indirectly, 
and as a result of a lack of governance and institutional collapse’.9
Environmental harm caused by military activities has been documented by inter-
national organizations in several conflicts, including in the Vietnam War,10 the first 
Gulf War in 1991,11 the Israeli Defence Force operations in Lebanon in 2006,12 and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (‘NATO’) bombing campaign against Serbia 
in 1999.13 Armed activities have caused the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (‘UNESCO’) to list several national parks in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (‘DRC’), including the famed Virunga National Park, home of the 
mountain gorillas, as being in danger.14
7 For an historical overview, see Tara Weinstein, ‘Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: 
Environmental Crimes or Humanitarian Atrocities?’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental 
Law Review 699– 700.
8 General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
de Janeiro, 3– 14 June 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 12 August 1992.
9 UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International 
Law (UNEP, 2009), 8. Armed conflict can have unintended benefits for the environment, by rendering areas 
effectively out of bounds for human populations; UNEP, Our Environment, Our Wealth (UNEP, 2006), 395. 
However, that incidental possibility should not overshadow the demonstrated risks of armed conflict result-
ing in serious environmental degradation.
10 Ines Peterson, ‘The Natural Environment in Times of Armed Conflict: A Concern for International 
War Crimes Law?’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 331– 2; Aaron Schwabach, ‘Environmental 
Damage Resulting from the NATO Military Action Against Yugoslavia’ (2000) 25 Columbia Journal of 
Environmental Law 117, 126.
11 UN Security Council Resolution 687, adopted on 3 April 1991, para. 16; UNEP (2009) (n 9) 8.
12 See Third report on the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, (n 3) para. 79 
citing General Assembly Resolution 69/ 212, paras. 4 and 5.
13 See Office of the Prosecutor Press Release, Prosecutor’s Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign, 
The Hague, 13 June 2000, PR/ P.I.S./ 510- e; Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established 
to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (‘Final Report on 
NATO’), at <http:// www.icty.org/ sid/ 10052> accessed 16 October 2015. Views on the final recommenda-
tions of the report are mixed. See, for example, Paolo Benvenuti, ‘The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of 
the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (2001) 12(3) European Journal 
of International Law 503– 29.
14 See UNESCO website, at <http:// whc.unesco.org/ en/ danger/ > accessed 8 January 2016.
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Illegal exploitation of, and damage to, the environment can both intensify con-
flict during active hostilities and reignite hostilities in the aftermath of conflict. 
Environmental harm feeds a vicious cycle of resource depletion, increasingly violent 
inter- group clashes, and environmental expropriation (the assertion of ownership 
rights or the spoliation of environmental features without lawful right). At the ICC, 
the Court determined in the Lubanga Judgment that exploitation of natural resources 
in the Ituri region of the DRC fed the protracted armed conflict.15 More recently, the 
ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s charges against Bosco Ntaganda allege that ‘The dis-
trict of Ituri is rich in natural resources, including gold, diamonds, coltan, timber and 
oil . . . Competition over these resources has, in many ways, fanned the flames of con-
flict in the area.’16
Exploiting the natural environment is an increasingly prevalent means of financ-
ing armed conflict.17 The UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo con-
cluded that paramilitary groups remaining in the Congo after the larger conflicting 
parties left had ‘built up a self- financing war economy centered on mineral exploita-
tion’.18 The UN Security Council recognized in Resolution 1856, which extended the 
UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘MONUC’), that
the link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade in such 
resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms is one of the major factors fuel-
ling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and in particular in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.19
The incidental effects of armed conflict can also seriously harm the environment. In 
the Central African Republic (‘CAR’), for example, the influx of small arms from the 
conflicts in Chad and Sudan resulted in a transition to more deadly hunting practices, 
which in turn contributed to a reported reduction of the elephant population by around 
90 per cent between the 1970s and 1990s, and the virtual extinction of the rhinoceros 
population.20 Similar incidental effects are being felt in the DRC,21 and CAR, where 
the elephant population, which numbered up to 10,000 thirty years ago, has now been 
reported to have essentially disappeared.22
15 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber I, 
(ICC- 01/ 04- 01/ 06- 2842, 14 March 2012) (‘Lubanga Article 74 Decision’).
16 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Public redacted version of ‘Prosecutor’s Pre- Trial Brief ’, Trial Chamber VI, (9 
March 2015, ICC- 01/ 04- 02/ 06- 503- Conf- AnxA), (1 September 2015, ICC- 01/ 04- 02/ 06- 503- AnxA- Red2), 
para. 7.
17 Karen Hulme, ‘Environmental Security: Implications for International Law’ (2009) 19(1) Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 3, 15; Daniëlla Dam- de Jong, ‘From Engines for Conflict into Engines 
for Sustainable Development:  The Potential of International Law to Address Predatory Exploitation of 
Natural Resources in Situations of Internal Armed Conflict’(2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 
155– 77, 155– 6.
18 Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms 
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/ 2002/ 1146, 16 October 2002, para. 12.
19 UN Security Council Resolution 1856, S/ RES/ 1856 (2008), 22 December 2008.
20 UNEP (2006) (n 9) 395.
21 UN Security Council Resolution 1856, S/ RES/ 1856 (2008), 22 December 2008.
22 U. C. Jha, Armed Conflict and Environmental Damage (New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2014), 103.
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Systems of natural resource exploitation continue after the termination of conflict. 
Post- conflict rebuilding efforts must address serious environmental damage that has 
occurred, or that is continuing to occur, in order to allow for people to access resources 
needed to earn their livelihoods. The continuity of environmental harm during and 
after armed conflicts necessitates efforts to identify legal mechanisms to address such 
harm in the rubric of jus post bellum.
10.3 The Application of International Criminal Law 
to Environmental Harm During Non- International  
Armed Conflicts
With the recent flourishing of international courts and the increasing distillation of 
substantive and procedural rules, the field of international criminal law constitutes a 
potential means of addressing environmental harm. The following discussion assesses 
the capacity of the international criminal law, in its current state, to address serious 
environmental harm, particularly during NIACs.
The relevance of international criminal law is not limited to situations of interna-
tional conflict. Indeed, international criminal law has a proven track record of applica-
tion to the context of NIACs. At the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’), and more 
recently at the ICC, convictions have been entered for crimes, including war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide, committed during NIACs.23
However, international criminal law should not be seen as a panacea for the envi-
ronmental degradation that is occurring throughout the world, often in the context of 
armed conflict. Due to jurisdictional constraints, international criminal law does not 
automatically apply to all situations.24 The utility of international criminal law in rela-
tion to environmental harm is also restricted by the lack of jurisdiction over corporate 
entities.25 Given that environmental harm is often carried out by groups acting for a 
profit motive, the limit on personal jurisdiction to natural persons is significant.
23 See for example:  (ICC) Prosecutor v.  Lubanga Article 74 Decision (n 15); Prosecutor v.  Germain 
Katanga, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II, (ICC- 01/ 04- 01/ 07, 7 March 
2014); (ICTY) Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski, Trial Chamber, Judgment, (IT- 04- 82- T, 10 July 2008); (ICTR) 
Prosecutor v.  Ferdinand Nahimana, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, (ICTR- 99- 52- T, 3 December 2003). No 
genocide convictions have been entered at the ICC to date.
24 The ICTY, ICTR, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’), and Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (‘STL’) are self- evidently limited to specific geographic areas, and the ICC only has jurisdiction 
over the territory and nationals of state parties unless another state voluntarily accepts the ICC’s jurisdic-
tion or the UN Security Council refers a situation to the court. Rome Statute, Arts. 12– 13. Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 38544), Art. 8, para. 2(f). See also Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 17513, Art. 1 (2).
25 None of the existing international tribunals currently have jurisdiction over corporations for substan-
tive crimes. At the STL, the Court has found that, for cases of contempt, it has jurisdiction over legal persons, 
which would include companies, non- governmental organizations, and other entities; In The Case Against 
New TV S.A.L. Karma Mohamed Tahsin Al Khayat, Decision On Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal 
Jurisdiction In Contempt Proceedings, (STL- 14- 05/ PT/ AP/ ARI26.1, 2 October 2014)  (‘STL Decision’), 
paras. 82– 83 (‘many corporations today wield far more power, influence and reach than anyone person’, ‘the 
prosecution of natural persons, rather than the legal persons that they serve, would fail to underline and 
punish corporate cultures that condone and in some cases encourage illegal behavior’).
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International criminal law is not a fail- safe mechanism even when it applies. 
International courts lack the security forces needed to assure the immediate enforce-
ment of arrest warrants. Evidence is sometimes corrupted by mistakes, improper influ-
ence, and the passing of time. And there is no iron- clad, indisputable evidence that 
international criminal law has any general deterrent effect against the future commis-
sion of atrocities.26 With respect to environmental harm, these problems exacerbate 
the difficulty of prosecuting perpetrators under the highly restricted definitions of the 
provisions addressing harm to the environment, as evidenced by the fact that no indi-
vidual has been convicted under international criminal law specifically for destruction 
of the environment.27
In light of these limitations, international criminal law provides a complemen-
tary, but not comprehensive, vehicle for redress.28 It is best considered as a branch 
of a multifaceted approach to environmental harm, incorporating other mechanisms, 
such as peacekeeping missions and Security Council sanctions,29 which will gener-
ally provide more immediate and contemporaneous means of confronting serious 
environmental harm.
10.3.1  The provisions of international criminal law capable 
of application to environmental harm
Running through the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC, there are 
very few environmental protections that apply during NIACs.
Genocide can be prosecuted irrespective of the occurrence of an armed conflict of 
any nature. There is a precedent for charging conduct involving environmental harm 
as a means of carrying out genocide under Article 6 of the Rome Statute to a situation 
that has been classified as a NIAC. The ICC Prosecutor indicted and charged President 
Omar Al- Bashir with genocide under Article 6(c), for ‘deliberately inflicting on [the 
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups] conditions of life calculated to bring about 
their physical destruction in part’.30 These conditions of life resulted from ruining or 
depleting natural and man- made resources that the named victim populations rely on 
for their survival.31
26 On the issue of the deterrent effect of international criminal proceedings, see Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice 
Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).
27 Weinstein (n 7) 698, 704.
28 Penal sanctions are necessary as civil sanctions have often proved insufficient to deter companies from 
polluting behaviour, see Timothy Schofield, ‘The Environment as an Ideological Weapon: A Proposal to 
Criminalise Environmental Terrorism’ (1998– 1999) 26 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 
639, 642.
29 See Dam- de Jong (n 17) 156 (noting that sanctions have been placed on commodities in the conflicts 
in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire).
30 Situation in Darfur, The Sudan, Summary of Prosecution’s Application under Article 58, (ICC- 02/ 05- 
152, 14 July 2008), para. 1.
31 ibid. 5– 7 (as related in the prosecutor’s application: ‘[The attackers] destroy all the target groups’ means 
of survival, poison sources of water including communal wells, destroy water pumps, steal livestock and 
strip the towns and villages of household and community assets. As a result of the attacks, at least 2,700,000 
people, including a very substantial part of the target groups attacked in their villages, have been forcibly 
expelled from their homes.’ ‘Militia/ Janjaweed and the Armed Forces repeatedly destroyed, polluted or poi-
soned these wells so as to deprive the villagers of water needed for survival.’).
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However, genocide is inherently anthropocentric, with the origins of the term aris-
ing from ‘genus’, meaning peoples, and ‘cide’, meaning killing. Genocide could only 
ever be used to prosecute environmental harm as an incidental occurrence related to 
efforts to destroy a protected group. Moreover, proving genocide requires showing the 
accused’s specific intent to destroy the targeted group in whole or in part, which is a 
heavy burden of proof, as reflected in the extremely limited number of convictions for 
genocide under international criminal law.32
Similar to genocide, crimes against humanity (Art. 7) apply irrespective of the exist-
ence of an armed conflict. Crimes against humanity may incidentally address envi-
ronmental harm, during peacetime and during armed conflicts, including NIACs. It 
is possible that certain crimes against humanity, such as other inhumane acts, which 
essentially concern acts causing serious bodily or mental injury, would cover serious 
environmental damage. This could occur, for example, if perpetrators poisoned natural 
water sources or removed natural food sources in local flora or fauna, in turn causing 
serious bodily and/ or mental harm.
The crimes against humanity of deportation and forcible transfer could also be perpe-
trated by or through serious environmental damage. Deportation and forcible transfer 
are sometimes referred to under the term forcible displacement.33 They involve the for-
cible expulsion of persons from places where they are lawfully present without grounds 
permitted under international law. These crimes have been charged before interna-
tional courts in connection with environmental damage. For example, in the Bashir 
case, referred to above, attacks impacting on the victims’ group’s means of survival, 
including natural resources, are charged as a means of displacing the population.34
Other crimes against humanity could also encompass aspects of environmental 
harm. Extermination, which essentially concerns the killing of large numbers of peo-
ple, can be committed through the infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring 
about the destruction of part of a population. Such conditions include depriving the 
victims of access to food or medicine, which could occur as a result of an attack on the 
environmental habitat of a people.35 For crimes against humanity to apply the damage 
would need to be committed in conjunction with a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population pursuant to a state or organizational policy.36
However, these crimes, in keeping with their labels (crimes against humanity and 
genocide) are conditioned on showing harm to humans and their property. They 
could only ever address environmental damage incidentally. Using these provisions to 
32 While there have been several convictions for genocide at the ICTR, the occurrence of the genocide 
there was so well established that it was taken judicial notice of as the Tribunal’s operations continued. At 
the ICTY only four individuals have been convicted for commission of genocide, at the time of writing, with 
convictions upheld on appeal: Ljubisa Beara, Vujadin Popovic, Radovan Karadzic, and Zdravko Tolimir.
33 Technically, the term forcible displacement is used when deportation or forcible transfer or both 
are charged as underlying forms of persecution. In Naletelić and Martinović the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
opined that for the purposes of a persecutions conviction it is irrelevant to distinguish between deporta-
tion and forcible transfer and that criminal responsibility is sufficiently captured by forcible displacement. 
Prosecutor v.  Mladen Naletelić and Vinko Martinović, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, (IT- 98- 34- A, 3 May 
2006), para. 154.
34 Situation in Darfur, The Sudan (n 30), paras. 14– 15.
35 See ICC Elements of Crimes, footnote 9.
36 Rome Statute Art. 7(1)(k); Statute of the ICTY Art. 5(i); Statute of the ICTR Art. 3(i).
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substitute for the direct prosecution of environmental harm would not signal the inter-
national community’s condemnation of environmental harm itself. This would lessen 
the declaratory impact and potential deterrent effect of any resulting conviction.
Before looking at the applicability of war crimes under Article 8 to environmental 
harm, it should be noted that the Rome Statute also contains the crime of aggression.37 
Aggression is defined in detail in Article 8bis of the Rome Statute, and can generally be 
said to refer to the ‘use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations’.38 A series of examples of acts of aggression are enumerated 
in article 8bis. These acts of aggression generally involve the use of armed force by a state 
against another state, and so would not naturally apply in the context of a NIAC.
Environmental degradation through military attacks could arguably qualify under this 
definition. For example, if a state were to send its forces to pollute the water supplies of 
another state in order to exact concessions from the targeted state, it could meet the defi-
nition of an act of aggression under Article 8bis(2)(a).39 Similarly, a nuclear attack on 
another state could readily qualify as an armed attack. Accusations of aggression that also 
concerned environmental harm were levelled at NATO during its 1999 bombing cam-
paign against Serbian security and military positions. Although no criminal case even-
tuated in the international courts, the initial enquiry into NATO’s acts conducted by the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY provides a limited form of precedent for investigat-
ing aggression.40
However, environmental harm through means other than military attacks, such as 
the ‘downstream’ polluting effects of environmentally harmful practices, would be dif-
ficult to qualify as aggression as they would not typically involve the use of armed force. 
Moreover, environmental degradation committed during a NIAC would not qualify as 
aggression, no matter how severe, because of the definition’s implicit reference to the 
use of force by a state against another state.
Liability for aggression will also be limited by the leadership requirement. This clause 
of Article 8bis restricts the pool of persons potentially liable for the crime of aggression 
to those in positions to effectively control or direct the political or military action of a 
state. There is an open question as to whether financiers, industrialists, lobbyists, and 
other individuals with considerable influence on politicians and military leaders would 
fall into this category.41 Given that environmental harm is frequently attributed to 
37 The crime of aggression was not yet operational at the time of writing this chapter and will be activated 
in 2017 at the earliest.
38 Art. 8bis.
39 ‘The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State . . .’
40 See Office of the Prosecutor Press Release, Prosecutor’s Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign, 
The Hague, 13 June 2000, PR/ P.I.S./ 510- e; Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established 
to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (‘Final Report on 
NATO’), at <http:// www.icty.org/ sid/ 10052> accessed 16 October 2015, para. 30.
41 Roger S. Clark, ‘Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered at 
the First Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 May– 11 June 2010’ (2010) 2 Göttingen Journal of 
International Law 696– 7. See also Stefan Barriga, ‘Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression’ in Stefan Barriga, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, and Christian Wenaweser 
(eds.), The Princeton Process on the Crime of Aggression:  Materials of the Special Working Group on the 
crime of Aggression, 2003– 2009 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, The Liechtenstein Institute on 
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corporate executives and directors, the leadership requirement may exclude an impor-
tant class of potential perpetrator of environmental harm from any indirect prosecu-
tion through the vehicle of the aggression amendments.
Looking at the applicability of war crimes to environmental harm, there are several 
provisions that could be used to address harm to the environment. The most directly 
relevant provision is Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. It is a partially 
ecocentric provision, which prohibits:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause inci-
dental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, 
long- term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. 
(emphasis added)
However, this provision only applies to international armed conflicts. There is no ana-
logue of this provision in the parts of Article 8 addressing NIACs. Given that many seri-
ous conflicts throughout the twentieth and twenty- first centuries have been NIACs,42 
the limitation of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) to IAC leaves a lacuna in the framework of interna-
tional criminal law applicable to environmental harm.43
Moreover, the elements of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) are exacting and would apply only in 
the most extreme circumstances of environmental damage. The three requirements 
for the extent of the damage— widespread, long- term, and severe, are cumulative and 
must all be met in order for criminal responsibility to arise. The terms, which are not 
defined in the Rome Statute, but have been subjected to commentary in negotiations 
over other international law instruments and in academic literature, are potentially 
extremely restrictive.
The term ‘widespread’ refers to the required geographical scope of the environmen-
tal damage. The specific threshold in terms of square kilometres remains undefined 
and could vary between several hundred square kilometres, as interpreted in relation 
to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques 1976 (‘ENMOD’) (discussed below),44 to thousands of square 
kilometres, as suggested in background materials concerning Additional Protocol 
I (‘AP I’) to the Geneva Conventions.45
Self- Determination at Princeton University, 2009), 8; Kevin J. Heller, ‘Retreat from Nuremberg:  The 
Leadership Requirement in the Crime of Aggression’ (2007) 18(3) European Journal of International Law 
477– 97.
42 UNEP Study (2009) (n 9) 4, referring to Uppsala Conflict Data Program Database, at http:// www.pcr.
uu.se/ gpdatabase/ search.php accessed 1 June 2017. See also Tadić Jurisdictional Decision (n 1) para. 97.
43 See, for example, Dr. Mohammed Wattad, ‘The Rome Statute & Captain Planet: What Lies Between 
“Crimes Against Humanity” and the “Natural Environment?” ’ (2009) 19 Fordham Environmental Law 
Review 265, 268.
44 Understanding I  of the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament (‘ENMOD Memorandum 
of Understanding’) reprinted in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Law of War 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 1989).
45 Ines Peterson, ‘The Natural Environment in Times of Armed Conflict: A Concern for International 
War Crimes Law?’(2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law, 331– 2.
 Matthew Gillett 229
The term ‘severe’ refers to the intensity of the damage caused to the environment 
independent of its geographic ambit or temporal duration. Severe environmental dam-
age denotes harm going beyond typical battlefield destruction.46
The criterion of ‘long- term’ refers to the temporal duration of the environmental 
damage. The specific minimum duration of ‘long- term’ remains undetermined, and 
could vary from a period of several months or a season, matching the interpretation 
of ‘long- lasting’ in Article 1 of ENMOD,47 to a period of decades, as has been some-
times ascribed to the interpretation of ‘long- term’ in Articles 35(3) and 55 of AP I.48 It 
is unclear how the element of ‘long- term’ could practically be measured in the context 
of a criminal prosecution, but it is clear that the perpetrator’s knowledge of the possi-
bility of such damage would have to be assessed on the basis of the knowledge available 
to him/ her at the time of the offence.49
The final clause of Article 8(2)(b)(iv)— ‘would be clearly excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’— introduces a balancing 
test into the evaluation of environmental damage caused by armed conflict. The ICC 
Elements of Crimes state that the ‘military advantage anticipated’ is assessed from the 
perspective of the perpetrator on the basis of the information available to him/ her at 
the time of launching the attack.50 This is a highly exacting standard for any prosecu-
tion to prove. According to Cassese and Gaeta, it provides belligerents with ‘a very great 
latitude’ which makes ‘judicial scrutiny almost impossible’.51 Because of these require-
ments, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) has been described as ‘a huge leap backwards’.52 The narrow 
formulation in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) implies not only that there are forms of environmen-
tal damage that are not excessive despite being widespread, long- term, and severe, but 
also that any environmental damage that does not conjunctively fill all the criteria of 
widespread, long- term, and severe could never be excessive.
At the same time, in at least one respect, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is potentially broad 
in its coverage. This is because it is not limited in terms of the types of attacks and 
means of warfare that it would cover. Accordingly, attacks carried out with nuclear 
weapons would be covered and potentially prosecutable if it could be shown that the 
expected incidental environmental damage was not justified by the anticipated military 
advantage.53
46 See travaux préparatoires to Article 35(3) of AP I, CDDH/ 215/ Rev.1, para.27, in 15 Official Records 
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflict, Geneva 1974– 77, 268– 9 (Bern: Federal Political Department, 1978).
47 See ENMOD Memorandum of Understanding (n 45).
48 Michael Schmitt, ‘Green War:  An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International Armed 
Conflict’ (1997) 22(1) Yale Journal of International Law 71, 107. See also, for example, Australia Department 
of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication, 06.4, 
Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, para. 7.14 (interpreting ‘long- term’ as meaning a period 
of decades).
49 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (n 36) footnote 37.
50 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (n 36) footnote 36.
51 Cassese and Gaeta (n 2) 96. 52 ibid.
53 In this respect, see, for example, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Judgment of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 226, at <http:// www.
icj- cij.org/ docket/ files/ 95/ 7521.pdf> accessed 8 January 2016.
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Despite its limitations, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) does directly address grave environmental 
harm and reflects at least a limited recognition of the need to protect the environment. 
It shows that the Rome Statute partially incorporates ecocentric values, albeit subject 
to anthropocentric values. There have been several calls to amend the provisions of 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) or even add an entirely new crime to the Rome Statute address-
ing environmental harm.54 Such amendments could see the restrictive terms of Article 
8(2)(b)(iv) reframed so that the terms need not be cumulative or so that the terms 
themselves were given understandings designed to lessen their restrictive formulation. 
However, these proposals may take many years to be adopted, if at all, and suffer from 
several theoretical and practical shortcomings. In light of these concerns, the state par-
ties may consider an interim measure whereby a corresponding version of Article 8(2)
(b)(iv) should be added to the war crimes applicable in NIACs (Article 8(2)(e)), as dis-
cussed in more detail below.
Several other provisions could incidentally address harm to the environment com-
mitted during NIACs, but are not squarely focused on condemning environmental 
harm. These include, for example:
• Article 8(2)(e)(xii)55 (destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war);56
• Article 8(2)(e)(v)57 (pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault);
• Article 8(2)(e)(xiii)58 (employing poison or poisonous weapons);
• Article 8(2)(e)(xiv)59 (employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices).60
The International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur on Protection of the 
Environment during Armed Conflict has suggested a broad- brush solution whereby 
the environment would simply be classified as civilian in nature, thereby render-
ing attacks on it unlawful absent its use for military purposes.61 However, some ILC 
54 See Steven Freeland, Addressing the Intentional Destruction of the Environment during Warfare 
under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Supranational Criminal Law: Capita Selecta, 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2015). See also Polly Higgins, ‘Eradicating Ecocide’, at <http:// eradicatingecocide.
com/ the- law/> accessed 14 August 2017, (seeking to encourage the adoption of a crime of genocide).
55 This provision mirrors Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii) but applies in non- international armed conflict.
56 It is required that the property was protected from that destruction or seizure under the international 
law of armed conflict; ICC Elements of Crimes (n 36) 26, 44. (See also Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) (Extensive destruction 
and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly).
57 This provision mirrors Art. 8(2)(b)(xvi) but applies in non- international armed conflict.
58 This provision mirrors Art. 8(2)(b)(xvii) but applies in non- international armed conflict.
59 This provision mirrors Art. 8(2)(b)(xviii) but applies in non- international armed conflict.
60 This provision is based on The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925).
61 ILC Report of its sixty- seventh session, held in July 2015, where it considered the second report of 
the Special Rapporteur, A/ CN.4/ 685, Chapter IX, Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, footnote 376 (‘The natural environment is civilian in nature and may not be the object of an 
attack, unless and until portions of it become a military objective. It shall be respected and protected, con-
sistent with applicable international law and, in particular, international humanitarian law’). See also Marie 
G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, ILC Doc. A/ CN.4/ 700, 3 June 2016.
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members expressed concerns over the wholesale categorization of the environment as 
civilian, and the ensuing implications for the principle of distinction.62
10.3.2  Pillage63
Pillage is often referred to as a relevant crime to address environmental damage in the 
form of misappropriation and consequent degradation.64 However, the crime of pillage 
under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) for IACs and Article 8(2)(e)(v) for NIACs, which is defined 
as the intentional appropriation of property for private or personal use,65 fits uneasily 
with environmental damage in three ways.
First, the provision’s focus on appropriation, as opposed to destruction or spolia-
tion,66 would exclude a significant portion of the damage done to the environment 
during armed conflict. Destruction of the environment is not necessarily conducted 
with a view to the exercise of ownership rights. For example, if an attack involves the 
contamination of an area through radiation it is difficult to conceptualize the attack as 
an appropriation of property.
Second, the idea of the environment constituting property is a contested notion. It is 
clear that in some cases, aspects of the natural environment can constitute property,67 
as would arise, for example, where a property happens to encompass a copse of native 
trees. However, questions arise concerning the extent to which the environment can be 
globally referred to as property. Did the forests and vegetation killed during Operation 
Ranch Hand in Vietnam constitute property? What body of law is used to determine 
who owns the property in question? What if severe damage to international waterways 
was caused during an armed conflict? The ‘property’ requirement means that pillage 
would not be likely to address the full extent of the environmental harm.
Third, the limitation of pillage in the Rome Statute to appropriation for private 
or personal use is a major restriction on the range of appropriations that occur dur-
ing armed conflict. Warring factions will regularly use misappropriated property to 
fund their military campaigns, rather than for personal ends, which will not always be 
identical.68
In Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 
the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) held that members of the Ugandan People’s 
Defence Force who carried out ‘looting, plundering and exploitation of natural 
resources in the territory of the DRC’ acted in violation of jus in bello,69 including the 
prohibition of pillage.70 However, it is unclear if the same conduct could be prosecuted 
62 ILC Report of its sixty- seventh session (n 62) Chapter IX, Protection of the Environment in Relation 
to Armed Conflicts, para. 154.
63 See, in connection with this section,  chapter 6 in this volume. 64 Dam- de Jong (n 17) 164.
65 Elements of Crimes (n 36), Art. 8(2)(b)(xvi). Aside from the nature of the conflict, the elements of pil-
lage in non- international armed conflict match those in international armed conflict.
66 Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofan and Alley Kondewa, Appeal Chamber, Judgment (SCSL- 04- 14- A, 28 May 
2008), para. 309.
67 Dam- de Jong (n 17) 162. 68 ibid. 165.
69 Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v.  Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, ICJ Reports 168, para. 245, generally paras. 222– 9.
70 ibid. paras. 222– 9, 245. The Court noted that both The Hague Regulations of 1907 (Art. 47) and Geneva 
Convention IV of 1949 (Art. 33) prohibit pillage, para. 245. Dam- de Jong (n 17) 165.
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as pillage at the ICC, as it would depend on whether the specific conduct was carried 
out for personal or private ends. In this respect, resource exploitation by rebel groups 
in order to finance their activities could be classified as having personal or private moti-
vations rather than public, and this question should not be considered in abstracto.71 
Conversely, governments will claim that any exploitation of the natural environment 
carried out on official instructions will be inherently public in nature and automatically 
excluded from constituting pillage. This potential insulation from liability may explain 
why governments were willing to include pillage committed in NIACs among the pro-
hibitions enunciated in the Rome Statute.
Any prosecution involving charges of pillaging natural resources is likely to see 
the accused party contending that the resources were utilized for the public purposes 
matching the aims of the governmental or rebel movement and not for private ends. 
Given that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to bring evidence to support its 
charges beyond reasonable doubt, and given the likelihood that any large- scale resource 
exploitation will involve reasonably large numbers of people, the requirement of pri-
vate or personal ends is likely to be difficult to prove. This considerably curtails the util-
ity of the prohibition against pillage to address serious environmental harm.
10.3.3  Starvation of civilian population
Starvation of the civilian population is also a war crime that overlaps with environ-
mental harm. In the context of IACs, Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute72 bans 
intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them 
of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies 
as provided for under the Geneva Conventions. This directly relates to methods such 
as razing and destroying crops and means of sustenance of people living off the land. 
The prohibition is broad as it does not contain the military necessity exception that is 
included in many other war crimes formulations such as destroying the enemy’s prop-
erty under Article 8(2)(b)(xiii).
However, there is no analogue of this provision in the parts of Article 8 addressing 
NIACs. The omission is particularly glaring as Article 14 of Additional Protocol II (‘AP 
II’), which applies to NIACs, prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to civilian popu-
lations, including ‘foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, 
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works’.73 Although 
the examples listed in Article 14 of AP II are primarily man- made objects, features of 
the natural environment could also fall within these categories. Many peoples’ food 
71 Dam- de Jong (n 17) 165.
72 See also AP I, Art. 54 (prohibiting attacks against ‘objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population’, meaning objects that are of basic importance to the population’s livelihood); AP II, Art. 14, 
which applies the prohibition to non- international armed conflict (prohibiting attacks on objects indispen-
sable to civilian populations, including foodstuffs, agricultural land, crops, livestock, drinking water instal-
lations and irrigation works); Michael Schmitt, ‘Humanitarian Law and the Environment’ (1999– 2000) 28 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 265, 301– 2; Aaron Schwabach, ‘Ecocide and Genocide 
in Iraq: International Law, the Marsh Arabs, and Environmental Damage in Non- International Conflict’ 
(2004) 15 Columbia Journal of International Law and Policy 1, 25.
73 See also Art. 54 AP I and Art. 14 AP II.
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sources include fruit, vegetables, cereals, animals, and fish that constitute part of 
the natural environment and many people source water from natural wells. Equally, 
many people caught up in armed conflicts rely on the natural environment for their 
livelihoods. For example, in the DRC, local populations rely on artisanal mining.74 
If warring factions were to take over those mineral or metal deposits and remove 
them or render them useless for the local population, the conduct would potentially 
breach Article 14 of AP II by depriving the population of its means of financing its 
survival.
Article 14 of AP II is designed as a form of safety net for civilian populations 
caught up in internecine conflict.75 Prohibiting the destruction, ruination, or removal 
of supplies and objects essential for the survival of the population is an important 
means of containing the impact of armed conflict on the civilian population. The 
omission of this prohibition from the Rome Statute provisions covering NIACs is 
concerning— the starvation of the civilian population would not necessarily be dir-
ectly prosecutable.
10.3.4  Destruction of property
Prosecuting environmental damage as a violation of Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) (destruction 
or seizure of enemy property) raises the awkward issue of the environment constitut-
ing property, which is discussed above. To the extent that the natural environment can 
constitute property, it is likely to vest in the state.76 Consequently, any destruction of 
the environment may suffer from an inherent asymmetry, applying to rebel forces but 
not to governments.
This provision also includes a military necessity exception clause, which would 
serve to filter out all but the most egregious examples of environmental harm. Dam 
posits that that the ‘burning of parts of a forest to clear mining sites or for large- scale 
timber extraction may fall within the ambit of the prohibition’.77 However, parties 
carrying out such harm may be able to link the operation to their military goals and 
thus squeeze the conduct into the imperative military necessity exception. If, on the 
other hand, a group such as ISIS78 started attacking the natural environment as part 
of its shock and scare propaganda tactics, such conduct could qualify under the pro-
vision subject to the additional elements being fulfilled.
The preceding survey shows that, at the world’s only international criminal court, 
there is no provision directly applicable to environmental harm committed in the con-
text of a NIAC. There are indirectly applicable provisions, particularly war crimes, but 
they are subject to restrictions that could significantly limit their utility for the prosecu-
tion of environmental harm.
74 Dam- de Jong (n 17) 163. 75 ibid. 76 ibid. 166. 77 ibid.
78 ISIS is the acronym commonly used to describe the so- called Islamic State, also known as Daesh.
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10.4 Extending Environmental Protections  
to Non- International Armed Conflicts
With the ICC having only one provision directly addressing environmental harm (Article 
8(2)(b)(iv)), and that provision only applicable in the context of IACs, the question arises 
as to whether the Rome Statute should be amended to add a mirror provision applicable 
to NIACs. While there have been several calls to amend the Rome Statute to address envi-
ronmental harm, including by adding a new crime, such as ecocide, to its provisions, these 
will require a huge groundswell of political will to be realized. As an intermediary and 
complementary step, the state parties may consider whether the crime of disproportionate 
environmental harm set out in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) should be added to the war crimes pro-
vision applicable to NIACs (Article 8(2)(e)). Some relevant considerations are as follows.
10.4.1  The symbolic value of prohibiting disproportionate 
environmental harm during NIACs
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) serves the purpose of directly addressing grave environmental 
harm and demonstrating that the Rome Statute is not limited to anthropocentric 
values but also has an ecocentric component. If a mirror provision were adopted 
addressing environmental harm in NIACs, prosecutors would have a basis to pros-
ecute environmental harm committed during NIACs. The symbolic value of such an 
amendment to the Rome Statute would be significant. Prohibiting conduct under 
international criminal law indicates that the international community considers the 
conduct to be a sufficiently serious threat to justify the elevation of proceedings to 
the international level. Because of the added notoriety, such proceedings send a cau-
tionary message to actors throughout the world engaging in environmentally harm-
ful activities.
Prohibiting conduct under international criminal law can lead to the prosecution 
of individual human beings, often high level political or military figures, and potential 
penal sanctions. Focusing proceedings on such individuals can serve a powerful sym-
bolic function, which reverberates amongst other high level individuals making deci-
sions that can lead to grave environmental harm.
10.4.2  Impact on future generations
Protecting the environment fits with the values under- girding the Rome Statute, par-
ticularly in protecting the interests of future inhabitants of planet earth. In its pream-
ble, the Rome Statute indicates that it is designed to protect the current population 
of the world and ‘future generations’.79 One of the most pressing concerns for future 
79 Rome Statute, Preamble, ‘Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future genera-
tions, to establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United 
Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole.’ (emphasis added).
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generations will be the state of the environment.80 In this sense, extending the protec-
tion against disproportionate environmental harm committed during NIACs would 
accord with the animating spirit behind the consensus reached in Rome in 1998.
10.4.3  Gravity
Environmental harm committed during NIACs can be of concern because of its sheer 
gravity.81 Such damage can reach sufficient proportions to jeopardize the feasibility of 
ongoing human occupation of the land, implicating the rights of future generations. 
The use of landmines, for example, is widespread in NIACs and kills not only human 
beings but also animals long after the conflict ends. UNEP reports that in Angola land-
mines have caused the deaths of thousands of animals including antelope and ele-
phants.82 During the conflict in Liberia, environmental harm escalated in keeping with 
the conflict. It was reported that, as the economy and infrastructure were devastated, 
GDP was halved and a third of the population caused to flee to neighbouring countries. 
Mains electricity was reduced by 99 per cent, resulting in far greater reliance on char-
coal, and a corresponding reduction in forest cover by 2 per cent per year.83 The trade 
in bushmeat (which means wild animals such as monkeys and apes, including endan-
gered species) rose exponentially. As prices increased, many farmers were reported to 
have switched to hunting as their primary means of earning a living.84
There are many other areas of the world where grave environmental harm has been 
caused in connection with NIACs. The sheer gravity of the harm that can be inflicted 
on the environment through unscrupulous practices militates in favour of interna-
tional attention.
10.4.4  Transboundary harm
Environmental harm, including when committed during NIACs, is a concern because 
it often results in transboundary harm.85 As concluded in a 2011 Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights report on human rights and the environment, ‘One 
country’s pollution can become another country’s environmental and human rights 
problem, particularly where the polluting media, like air and water, are capable of easily 
crossing boundaries.’86 Where individuals act to cause serious harm that traverses state 
boundaries, international criminal law provides a means of signalling the opprobrium 
of the international community.87 Given that environmental degradation requires 
80 See Sébastien Jodoin, ‘Protecting the Rights of Future Generations Through Existing and New 
International Criminal Law’ in Sébastien Jodoin and Marie- Claire Cordonier Segger (eds.), Sustainable 
Development, International Criminal Justice, and Treaty Implementation (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015).
81 See UNEP (2009) (n 9) footnote 9, part 2. 82 UNEP (2006) (n 9) 395.
83 ibid. 399– 400. 84 ibid. 85 ibid. 392.
86 OHCHR Report Analytical Study on the Relationship between Human Rights and the Environment, 
A/ HRC/ 19/ 34, 16 December 2011, para. 65.
87 Tadić Jurisdictional Decision (n 1) para. 58 (‘This organ is empowered and mandated, by definition, to 
deal with trans- boundary matters or matters which, though domestic in nature, may affect ‘international 
peace and security’).
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collective solutions,88 international criminal law presents itself as an appropriate 
vehicle by which the international community may take multilateral action. Although 
international criminal law is not limited to situations of transboundary harm, it has 
particular utility in such circumstances when the interests of multiple jurisdictions 
are concerned.
10.4.5  Environmental harm can exacerbate conflict and jeopardize 
economic and social recovery
Environmental harm committed during armed conflict exacerbates cycles of armed 
violence, as it entrenches the positions of the parties to the conflict as the available nat-
ural resources shrink.89 The depletion or destruction of environmental features preju-
dices a return to normalcy, as it removes a means of restarting the economy in order 
to enhance the chances for a successful transition to peace.90 Armed conflict typically 
leads to the large- scale displacement of the civilian population, which places increased 
strain on already stretched resources and makes environmental recovery programmes 
difficult to implement.91 There is no indication that these forms of harm are less preva-
lent or severe in NIACs than in IACs, which also militates in favour of an extension of 
the prohibition to NIACs.
10.4.6  The traditional reluctance to impose international law 
obligations concerning natural resources
Alongside the policy arguments for extending the provisions of the Rome Statute to 
protect the environment in NIACs, there are also competing interests that run counter 
to such an amendment.
The criminal prohibitions applicable during NIACs are more limited92 than those 
applicable during IACs, as mentioned above. This is primarily because of the strong 
state interest in retaining control over events occurring within the confines of the state’s 
territory. The state interest in exclusive control over its territory is likely to be particu-
larly fervent in relation to the natural environment. Underlying the reluctance of states 
to sign onto obligations constraining their use and misuse of the environment dur-
ing NIACs is the strong domestic imperative of retaining exclusive sovereignty over 
the natural resources within a state’s borders. The principle of sovereignty over natu-
ral resources is enshrined in several multilateral treaties, including Article 1(2) of the 
1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and was stated in the Declaration 
88 Robert Cryer, ‘The International Criminal Court and its relationship to Non- Party States’ in 
Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 116 (footnote 10).
89 UNEP (2006) (n 9) 393. 90 ibid. 395. 91 ibid. 394.
92 For example, apart from the environmental harm element of the provision discussed above, attacks 
entailing excessive civilian damage, including civilian objects, are criminalized in IACs under Art. 8(2)(b)
(iv). However, there is no corresponding provision in NIACs under Art. 8(2)(c) or (e). This has been also 
noted by the ICC in Mbarushimana: Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, (ICC- 01/ 04- 01/ 10- 465- Red, Pre- T.Ch. I, 16 December 2011), footnote 290.
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on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of the United Nations General 
Assembly.93 It also forms part of customary international law.94
State policy- makers are concerned about constraining their ability to exploit the nat-
ural environment when suppressing domestic threats. If excessive environmental harm 
were a crime during NIACs, government forces could face accusations of committing 
atrocities when responding to threats from rebel groups. The spectre of rebel groups 
charging members of the government with crimes against the environment would not 
be a palatable prospect for the state authorities.95 Moreover, many NIACs arise from 
resource scarcity and it is not difficult to imagine anti- statal forces focusing on govern-
mental exploitation of the environment as a rallying point to garner support for their 
struggles.
10.4.7  The practicalities of amending the Rome Statute  
to address environmental harm in NIACs
As set out above, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is highly exacting and would only apply to the most 
extreme instances of environmental damage. In this light, it must be asked whether 
there is any utility in extending Article 8(2)(b)(iv) to NIACs, or whether that would 
simply constitute window dressing with no real practical effect. Because Article 8(2)(b)
(iv) has not been tested, no definitive answer can be given to this question at this time. 
However, the blurred line between IACs and NIACs, with both forms of conflict often 
running in tandem,96 and the broad- ranging nature of environmental damage in most 
cases militate in favour of ensuring that the elements of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) are consist-
ent with the putative comparative provision applying to NIACs. To the extent the terms 
of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) are amended, the same adjustments should be reflected in the 
comparative provision applying to NIACs.97
Whereas the practical impact of amending the Rome Statute to prohibit dispropor-
tionate environmental harm in NIACs is hard to gauge, the extension of the prohibition 
on excessive environmental harm to NIACs would serve a symbolic function, indicat-
ing that the serious degradation of the environment is illegal within and without the 
confines of NIACs.
There is an analogous precedent for the creation of a mirror prohibition for Article 
8(2)(b)(iv) for NIACs. An extension was carried out at the Kampala Review Conference 
in 2010 with respect to articles in the Rome Statute addressing poison or poisoned 
weapons; asphyxiating gases, liquids, materials, or devices; and expanding bullets. At 
93 UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, adopted on 14 December 1962, in particular, paras. 1 and 5.
94 Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 70), para. 244.
95 To date, the impact of domestic legal provisions legitimizing the environmental harm is unclear in 
relation to international prosecutions.
96 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Article 74 Decision (n 23), Section on Nature of the Armed Conflict.
97 Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) is two- pronged and concerns not only environmental harm, but also concerns attacks 
with disproportionate effects on civilians. The discussion of the creation of a comparative provision con-
cerning NIACs would have to address the anthropocentric prong of Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) and whether it can 
readily be applied to NIACs, which is a subject going beyond the topic of this analysis.
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the time of the adoption of the Rome Statute, these acts had only been criminalized in 
the context of IACs, but were extended in 2010 in the same terms to NIACs.98
10.4.8  Environmental harm perpetrated during in NIACs is already 
criminalized under some sources of international law
It is apposite to note that some sources of international law already criminalize serious 
environmental harm in NIACs. Gathering state practice and the practice of non- state 
actors in NIACs has proved challenging.99 Nonetheless, various instruments of interna-
tional law provide guidance as to the direction and content of the law in NIACs.
In its Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law100 (‘ICRC’s Study’), the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’) surveyed the sources of interna-
tional law prohibiting this conduct101 in order to determine its status as customary 
international law.102 Although the ICRC did not restrict its survey to instruments that 
criminalize the conduct per se, its survey provides a useful repository of potentially rel-
evant sources of international law.103
98 Paras. 2(e)(xiii)– 2(e)(xv) were amended by Resolution RC/ Res.5 of 11 June 2010 (adding paras. 2(e)
(xiii)– 2(e)(xv)). See also Amal Alamuddin and Philippa Webb, ‘Expanding Jurisdiction over War Crimes 
under Article 8 of the Rome Statute’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1237.
99 Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts (n 62) para. 15.
100 Jean- Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald- Beck, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
101 ICRC Study 156– 7. Rule 45 of the ICRC Study on Customary International Law provides: The use of 
methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long- term and 
severe damage to the natural environment is prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment may not 
be used as a weapon. ICRC Rules, 151. See also, Rule 44, which provides ‘[m] ethods and means of warfare 
must be employed with due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural environment. In the 
conduct of military operations, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to mini-
mize, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientific certainty as to the effects on the environ-
ment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to the conflict from taking such precautions’. 
See ICRC’s Study, Vol I: Rules, Rule 44, 147. Rule 44 applies to IACs and ‘arguably’ also to NIACs. However, 
there is no corresponding provision of international criminal law in any form, and so the Rule could not be 
used to impose individual criminal responsibility under the current rubric of international law. In relation 
to Rule 45, it should be noted that Rule 45 is also not unlimited in application: the ICRC has acknowledged 
that it does not apply to nuclear weapons; Jean- Marie Henckaerts, ‘Customary International Humanitarian 
Law: A Response to US Comments’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 473, 482. Note that 
many treaties contain prohibitions against the use of nuclear weapons on specific vulnerable areas of the 
world; for example, 1959 Antarctic Treaty; 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere; 
1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco); 1971 Treaty 
on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction 
on the Sea- Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; cited in Neil Popović, ‘Humanitarian 
Law, Protection of the Environment, and Human Rights’ (1995– 1996) 8 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 67, 82– 3.
102 The standard for determining the existence of a rule of customary international law is well estab-
lished. The International Court of Justice has observed that ‘an indispensable requirement’ of customary 
international law is that ‘State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should 
have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; . . . and should moreo-
ver have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is 
involved.’: North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 3, 4, 43).
103 There is a long- standing dispute between the ICRC and the United States concerning the status under 
international law of the prohibition of environmental harm during armed conflict. The ICRC states that 
the prohibition of environmental harm during NIACs has crystallized as customary international law, and 
‘arguably’ applies to non- international armed conflict. The United States rejects the customary status of the 
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For present purposes, the dispute over the customary status of the prohibition on 
excessive environmental harm is not critical. Amending the Rome Statute to extend 
the prohibition against excessive environmental harm to NIACs is not dependent 
on the customary status of the prohibition, as the Rome Statute’s provisions on sub-
stantive offences are formulated without prejudice to customary international law.104 
Moreover, the ICRC assessment focused on whether the prohibition existed in custom-
ary humanitarian law and did not restrict the assessment to the criminalized version of 
the prohibition.105 Nonetheless, the survey provides a useful legal resource to inform 
the debate as to the existing status of the prohibition of excessive environmental harm 
during NIACs.
In its analysis, the ICRC cited five international treaties, several other instruments 
relevant to international law, a large number of military manuals and pieces of national 
legislation, and several statements made by representatives of states.106 The following 
analysis addresses the most relevant of these sources in order to identify the sources 
which apply this prohibition in NIACs. In keeping with the focus on provisions impos-
ing individual criminal responsibility, and in line with the fact that ICRC Rule 45 
largely overlaps with the grave breach of disproportionate environmental harm set out 
in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, the following survey pays particular atten-
tion to whether the relevant source of law entails individual criminal responsibility.
10.4.9  Additional Protocols I and II
First, the ICRC cited Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute itself and AP I.107 Both 
these sources are limited to IACs and therefore can be put aside for present purposes.108
prohibition of environmental harm in toto (in both IACs and NIACs) and criticizes the ICRC methodology, 
particularly in relation to the ICRC review of state practice. The United States argued that the ICRC’s Study 
‘places too much emphasis on written materials, such as military manuals and other guidelines published 
by States, as opposed to actual operational practice by States during armed conflict. Although manuals may 
provide important indications of State behavior and opinio juris, they cannot be a replacement for a mean-
ingful assessment of operational State practice in connection with actual military operations.’ John Bellinger 
and William Haynes, ‘A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study 
Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89(866) International Review of the Red Cross 445 and 
also 444 (as to the general grounds of its critique).
104 Rome Statute, Art. 10. In reality, the lex lata of the Rome Statute is likely to serve as a gravitational 
mass, pulling all customary definitions of crimes in the direction of its terms, particularly as the caseload of 
the Court increases and judgments and appeal judgments are issued.
105 Because the present analysis concerns the support for the prohibition being criminalized, it is impor-
tant to examine the sources of international law criminalizing environmental harm in NIACs, as well as 
the sources that limit the criminalization to IACs, in order to better understand how and when states have 
framed a legal basis to outlaw environmental harm in NIACs.
106 ICRC Study (n 101) Rule 45, Practice, 156– 7.
107 The most directly applicable IHL provision is Art. 35(3) of AP I, which prohibits causing widespread, 
long- term and severe damage to the natural environment. However, this only applies in IACs. Also in AP 
I, under the heading ‘Civilian Objects’, Art. 55 prohibits the use of methods or means of warfare which are 
intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long- term, and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population. This overlaps considerably with 
Art. 35(3), except that its reference to the population indicates that it is more of an anthropocentrically 
conceived prohibition. It also only applies in IACs.
108 Art. 56 prohibits attacking dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical power stations if the release of ‘danger-
ous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population’ might result. It also prohibits attack-
ing any surrounding military objective that might result in the release of dangerous forces; AP I, Art. 56(1). 
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As mentioned above, Article 35(3) AP I is the underlying humanitarian law prohibi-
tion of article 8(2)(b)(iv) Rome Statute, applicable in IACs. In explaining the reasons 
for the inexistence of a similar provision in AP II, the ICRC’s Study noted that, dur-
ing the negotiations on AP II to the Geneva Conventions in 1975, Australia proposed 
the addition of a provision (Article 28 bis) concerning the protection of the natural 
environment.109 Australia stressed that ‘destruction of the environment should be pro-
hibited not only in international but also in non- international conflicts’.110 However, 
this proposal was not successful.111 According to the ICRC’s Study, the reasons for the 
rejection ‘may have been linked to the simplification process undertaken in the last 
stages of the negotiations in order to ensure the adoption of Additional Protocol II’.112 
The rejection of this proposal indicates that the prohibition on disproportionate envi-
ronmental damage was not universally accepted in 1975.
10.4.10  The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
The UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980) brings together a 
number of treaties containing prohibitions of certain uses of conventional weapons 
(such as the indiscriminate use of landmines, explosive remnants of war, and incen-
diary attacks).113 In its preamble, the Convention refers to environmental underpin-
nings, stating that ‘it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are 
The fact that the dams, dikes, or power stations are military objectives does not remove this protection, 
unless they provide regular, significant, and direct support of military operations. In the case of dams, they 
must also be used other than in their normal manner: Art. 56(2). The launching of attacks against works 
or installations is listed as a grave breach in the context of IACs: ICRC Commentary, para. 2158 ‘It should 
be noted that launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces under certain 
conditions is condemned by Article 85 “(Repression of breaches of this Protocol),” paragraph 3(c), of the 
Protocol as a grave breach.’ Art. 56 of AP I is applied to non- international armed conflicts by Art. 15 of AP 
II. Although this rule has some potential to address environmental harm, it is relatively narrow in focus and 
is anthropocentrically formulated, being premised on harm, or risk of harm, to human beings.
109 The draft provision stated:  ‘[i] t is forbidden to employ methods and means of combat which are 
intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long- term, and severe damage to the environment.’ 
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XV, CDDH/ 215/ Rev. 1, Report of Committee III, Geneva, 3 February– 18 
April 1975, 324. Cited by the ICRC’s Study (n 101) Vol. II– Practice, Part 1, 877. See also Australia, Statement 
at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts (‘CDDH’) (Geneva 1974– 77), Official Records, Vol. XIV, CDDH/ III/ SR.20, 
14 February 1975, 176. Cited by the ICRC’s Study (n 101) Vol. II– Practice, Part 1, 877.
110 Australia (n 110).
111 The proposal was rejected in the plenary by twenty- five votes in favour, nineteen against and thirty- 
three abstentions. CDDH Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/ SR.51, 3 June 1977, 114. Cited by the ICRC’s 
Study (n 101) Vol. II– Practice, Part 1, 878.
112 ICRC’s Study (n 102) Vol. I, Rules, 156.
113 ibid. 154. See also Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 10 October 
1980 (‘Conventional Weapons Convention’). The preamble to the convention recalls that ‘it is prohibited 
to employ methods and means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, 
long- term and severe damage to the natural environment’. The prohibition on incendiary attacks on forests 
is ecocentric in the subject it is protecting: Protocol III (Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Incendiary Weapons), Art. 2(4) (‘It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of 
attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage 
combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives’); Schmitt, ‘Green War: An 
Assessment of the Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict’ (n 49) 89.
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intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long- term and severe damage to 
the natural environment’.114
Since its amendment in 2001, the provisions of the Conventional Weapons 
Convention apply to non- international and international armed conflicts.115 Although 
the stated purpose of this convention is to inter alia prohibit means and methods of 
warfare resulting in widespread, long- term, and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment, and although it has been adjusted to apply to NIACs, the obligation to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over its breaches is limited to cases of anthropocentric harm (wil-
ful killing or serious injury to civilians).116 Because of this, it does not serve as a general 
basis under which environmental harm could be prosecuted per se.
10.4.11  The African Convention on the Conservation  
of Nature and Natural Resources
The ICRC referred to the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources of 2003. Article XV of this instrument calls on states parties to 
‘refrain from employing or threatening to employ methods or means of combat which 
are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long- term, or severe harm to 
the environment and ensure that such means and methods of warfare are not devel-
oped, produced, tested or transferred’.117 This provision is not limited to situations of 
IAC and so could potentially cover NIACs as well. However, the convention addresses 
states’ obligations and does not explicitly refer to individual criminal responsibility.118 
114 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which 
may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects 1980, (‘Convention on certain 
Conventional Weapons’) as amended on 21 December 2001, preamble, para. 4.
115 Amended Art. 1 (to date eighty- two states parties have accepted this amendment, including the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France, and China).
116 In 2006, the states parties decided that ‘[e] ach High Contracting Party will take all appropriate steps, 
including legislative and other measures, as required, to prevent and suppress violations of the Convention 
and any of its annexed Protocols by which it is bound by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or 
control.’ It was further accorded that such other measures may include, where appropriate, penal sanctions, 
where in relation to an armed conflict a person violates one or more of the prohibitions of the Conventional 
Weapons Convention or its Protocols, and wilfully causes the death or serious injury to a civilian. At the 
Third Review Conference of the Convention, it was decided to establish a compliance mechanism. See 
Decision on a Compliance Mechanism Applicable to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
Indiscriminate Effects (adopted on 17 November 2006), numerals 7 and 8.
117 Art. XV of the 2003 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources pro-
vides ‘The Parties shall . . . refrain from employing or threatening to employ methods or means of combat 
which are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long- term, or severe harm to the environ-
ment and ensure that such means and methods of warfare are not developed, produced, tested or trans-
ferred’:  African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised Edition), 
adopted by the Second Ordinary Session of the African Union in Maputo, Mozambique, 11 July 2003, Art. 
XV(1)(b).
118 It is also unclear whether Art. XV has attained the required number of state ratifications to enter 
into force. It does not appear to be the case, as the latest ratification was deposited on 28 March 2014 by 
Angola, constituting the twelfth deposit of ratifications (the Convention requires a minimum of fifteen 
to enter into force). Source: AU website ‘List of countries which have ratified/ acceded to the Convention’ 
as of 7 April 2017, at https:// treaties.un.org/ pages/ ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ no=XXVI- 
2&chapter=26&lang=en accessed 1 June 2017. It should be further noted that Art. 15, of interest here, was 
incorporated in the 2003 revision of the 1968 Convention (which entered into force on 16 June 1969).
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Consequently, this instrument lends general support to the application of the prohi-
bition to NIACs, but does not lend support to the imposition of criminal liability for 
engaging in such conduct.
10.4.12  The Draft Code of Crimes Against  
the Peace and Security of Mankind
Another multilateral source referred to by the ICRC is the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind. This document, which was produced by 
the International Law Commission, includes a provision imposing individual criminal 
responsibility for using methods and means of warfare resulting in widespread, severe, 
and long- term damage to the environment.119 Significantly, the ILC stated that this 
prohibition would apply in NIACs, acknowledging that it was extending the applica-
tion of this substantive prohibition beyond the ambit of Article 35(3) of AP I, on which 
it was based. The ILC did not provide an explanation for the application to NIACs other 
than stating that it ‘considered that this type of conduct could constitute a war crime 
covered by the Code when committed during an international or a non- international 
armed conflict’.120 The ILC also acknowledged that there was some ambiguity as to 
whether this conduct already constituted a war crime, as opposed to a general prohibi-
tion, under existing IHL.121
The 1996 Draft Code is not a primary source of international law as it does not consti-
tute an international treaty or a source of customary international law.122 Nonetheless, 
the views of the ILC, as a body collecting together preeminent publicists, constitute 
a subsidiary means of determining the rules of international law.123 Although not a 
substantive instrument of international law, the ILC’s draft code provides a limited 
measure of support for the contention that there is a customary prohibition against 
disproportionate environmental attacks during NIACs that entails individual criminal 
responsibility.
119 Art. 20(g) reads: ‘In the case of armed conflict, using methods or means of warfare not justified by 
military necessity with the intent to cause widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment and thereby gravely prejudice the health or survival of the population and such damage occurs.’ The 
ILC also considered the inclusion of a crime of ecocide, which would have applied irrespective of the exist-
ence of an armed conflict. There was considerable support for this motion and only three states explicitly 
opposed it (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands). However, the provision was not 
ultimately included in the code: A/ CN.4/ 448 and Yearbook of the ILC 1993, Vol. II, Pt. 1. Documents of the 
forty- fifth session. A/ CN.4/ SER.A/ 1993/ Add.1 (Part 1) (includes A/ CN.4/ 448 and Add.1).
120 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries 1996; Report of 
the International Law Commission on the work of its forty- eighth session, 56.
121 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty- eighth session, 56 (‘the opening 
clause of this sub- paragraph does not include the phrase “in violation of international humanitarian law” 
to avoid giving the impression that this type of conduct necessarily constitutes a war crime under existing 
international law in contrast to the preceding paragraph.’).
122 ICJ Statute, Art. 38(1).
123 ICJ Statute, Art. 38(1)(d). It has been accepted that the ILC’s work falls under Art. 38(1)(d), ICJ 
Statute. See, for example, Thirlway (pointing out that, for instance, in the Case Concerning the Application 
of the Genocide Convention, the ICJ regarded Art. 16 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility as 
‘reflecting a customary rule’) in Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 18– 19.
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10.4.13  Agreement on the Application of International  
Humanitarian Law between the Parties to  
the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The ICRC referred to the 1992 Agreement on the Application of IHL between the 
Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Paragraph 2.5 of this agreement 
requires that hostilities be conducted in accordance with inter alia Articles 35(3) and 
55 of AP I  of 1977, which are the basis of the prohibition against disproportionate 
environmental attacks. The parties to this agreement included the Bosnian Serbs and 
their armed forces under Radovan Karadzic, which was in an armed conflict that 
could be classified as non- international vis- à- vis the Bosnian Muslim forces of Alija 
Izetbegović.124 According to the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, by undertaking to pun-
ish those responsible for violations of the substantive provisions in the agreement, the 
parties envisioned individual criminal responsibility as attaching to these prohibitions, 
including in relation to a non- international armed conflict.125 This agreement consti-
tutes an example of state practice accompanied by opinio juris by specifically affected 
states (or state- like entities) in which environmental damage was subjected to criminal 
prohibition. This agreement accordingly supports the notion of the war crime of dis-
proportionate environmental attacks applying during NIACs.
10.4.14  UN Secretary- General’s Bulletin Concerning Observance 
of International Humanitarian Law
In analysing the prohibition against excessive environmental damage, the ICRC referred 
to the 1999 UN Secretary- General’s Bulletin Concerning Observance of International 
Humanitarian Law by Forces under the command and control of the United Nations. 
Section 6.3 of this instrument provides:
The United Nations force is prohibited from employing methods of warfare which may 
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which are intended, or may be 
expected to cause, widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environment.
The prohibition applies to UN forces in IACs and NIACs.126 Although a statement of 
the Secretary- General does not constitute state practice per se, it is notable that the 
obligations set out in the Bulletin are imported into the memoranda of understand-
ing signed with troop- contributing countries for UN peacekeeping missions. In this 
way, the obligations including the requirement of avoiding causing widespread, severe, 
and long- term damage to the environment flow directly into state practice.127 The 
124 See Tadić Jurisdiction Decision (n 1) para. 73. 125 See ibid. para. 136.
126 UN Secretary- General’s Bulletin— Observance by the United Nations Forces of International 
Humanitarian Law, ST/ SGB/ 1999/ 13, 6 August 1999. Section 1.1: ‘United Nations forces when in situations 
of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their 
engagement.’
127 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group on the 2007, 
Resumed Session, 12 June 2007, Doc A/ 61/ 19 (part III) (directing that Annex H be included in memoranda 
of understanding with troop contributing countries: ‘We will comply with the Guidelines on International 
Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the applica-
ble portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the fundamental basis of our standards.’). 
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memoranda also include robust provisions requiring individual responsibility to be 
imposed for serious crimes committed. In this way, the accompanying memoranda 
(read together with the Bulletin) constitute state practice supporting the penal punish-
ment of excessive environmental damage committed during armed conflict.
The UN General Assembly Resolution 47/ 37 of 25 November 1992 also provides 
broad support for the illegality of grave harm to the environment and does not dif-
ferentiate between IACs and NIACs.128 However, it is unclear whether its reference 
to ‘destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
wantonly’ is a specific legal formulation or merely a means of referring to the existing 
prohibitions such as that reflected in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute.
10.4.15  ICRC Working Paper for the Preparatory Committee for  
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
In 1997, the ICRC submitted a working paper to the Preparatory Committee for the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. The working paper included Article 
3(viii), which made it a crime ‘to cause wilfully widespread, long- term and severe dam-
age to the natural environment’ in NIACs. No specific justification was given for the 
applicability of this crime to NIACs, apart from the general quotation of the Tadić 
Jurisdictional Decision that reasoned that ‘what is inhumane, and consequently pro-
scribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhuman and inadmissible in civil strife’.129 
As pointed out by the ICRC’s Study, an additional condition was added in the criminal-
ization of the conduct under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) Rome Statute, that is ‘which would be 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage antici-
pated’.130 Despite being proposed for application to both IACs and NIACs, the crime of 
disproportionate environmental attacks was not incorporated into the Rome Statute in 
the context of NIACs. Accordingly, extending the protection to the context of NIACs 
would require the states parties to adjust their prior position on this issue.
10.4.16  Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
The Convention on the Prohibition of Environmental Modification Techniques 
(‘ENMOD’) is also relevant to the assessment.131 ENMOD aims to exclude the use of 
Marten Zwanenburg states in the Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law United Nations and 
International Humanitarian Law (‘It can be argued that it is a unilateral act of the United Nations compa-
rable to unilateral acts of States in international law. In any event it is an administrative issuance of the UN 
Secretary- General, a subsidiary instrument elaborating the staff rules issued by the UN Secretary- General 
as the highest administrative authority of the organization.’).
128 UN General Assembly Resolution 47/ 37, 25 November 1992, Protection of the Environment in 
Times of Armed Conflict (‘Stressing that destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing international law.’).
129 Statement of the ICRC before the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, New York, 14 February 1997, quoting Tadić Jurisdictional Decision (n 1) para. 119.
130 ICRC’s Study (n 101) 153.
131 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques, 18 May 1977, 31 UST 333, TIAS No.9614.
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environmental modification techniques as a method or weapon of war.132 It prohibits 
state parties from using hostile environmental modification techniques that result, or 
could reasonably be expected to result,133 in ‘widespread, long- lasting or severe effects 
as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another state party’.134 It is envisioned 
to address misuses of the environment through techniques such as unnaturally induced 
earthquakes, tsunamis, or changes in weather patterns.135 ENMOD provides a sig-
nificantly wider protection for the environment than Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome 
Statute and Article 35(3) of AP I, due to the disconjunctive nature of the terms ‘wide-
spread’, ‘long- lasting’, and ‘severe’ in ENMOD. Significantly, ENMOD is not limited in 
application to international armed conflicts.
However, ENMOD is only of indirect relevance to the assessment of individual 
criminal responsibility, as there are no criminal sanctions for violations of its terms.136 
Rather, it relies on enforcement through political means.137 As an upshot, ENMOD is 
primarily useful as an interpretive aide for other provisions that do entail individual 
criminal responsibility.
10.4.17  Military manuals
The ICRC surveyed military manuals. Several military manuals apply the prohibition 
against causing widespread, long- term, and severe damage to the environment, or a 
substantively similar prohibition, to both IACs and NIACs, even where they distin-
guish between IACs and NIACs elsewhere in these instruments.138 According to the 
ICRC, some states’ military manuals have even more robust protections of the envi-
ronment that are expressly recognized as war crimes. For example, the Instructor’s 
Manual of Chad of 2006 states that ‘it is prohibited to cause “severe damage to 
the natural environment” and that to do so is a war crime’.139 This is relevant state 
132 Weinstein (n 7) 700.
133 While Art. 1(1) only employs the term ‘having’, the Understanding relating to Art. 2, that interprets 
the term ‘environmental modification techniques’, clarifies that prohibited use of environmental modifica-
tion techniques also extends to situations where widespread, long lasting, or severe environmental harm 
could reasonably be expected to occur. The Annex to ENMOD notes that while the Understandings were 
not incorporated into ENMOD, are part of its negotiating record.
134 ENMOD, Art. 1. 135 ENMOD, Understandings; UNEP Study (2009) (n 9) 12.
136 ILC, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court with commentaries 1994, Annex,.69. John 
Cohan, ‘Modes of Warfare and Evolving Standards of Environmental Protection Under the International 
Law of War’ (2002– 2003) 15 Florida Journal of International Law, 481 524.
137 Weinstein (n 7) 701.
138 See, for example, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 6.4— Law of Armed Conflict, June 2006, 
para. 5.50 (‘It is prohibited to employ methods or means of war which cause widespread, long term and 
severe damage to the environment or may be expected to cause such damage and prejudice the health or 
survival of the population’); Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) states:  ‘83. Care shall be taken in an armed 
conflict to protect the natural environment against widespread, long- term and severe damage. 84. Attacks 
which are intended or may be expected to cause damage to the natural environment that prejudices the 
health or survival of the population are prohibited’, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and 
Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, 4- 8, 4- 9, paras. 8– 84.
139 Chad, Droit internationale humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigeur dans les forces armées et 
de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat- major des Armées, 2006, 78.
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practice, indicating that several states prohibit their armed forces from causing long- 
term, severe, and widespread environmental damage in the context of any armed 
conflict.140
10.4.18  National legislation
The ICRC also surveyed national legislation. Many states criminalize serious harm 
to the environment. Some states criminalize environmental harm irrespective of the 
occurrence of armed conflict, under the label of ecocide.141 A large number of states 
have a criminal provision outlawing widespread, severe, and long- term damage to the 
environment (or a similar formulation) committed during armed conflict.142 Whereas 
some states refer to armed conflict generally, such as Spain,143 others expressly includ-
ing the context of NIACs.144 Many states’ legislation refers to AP I and incorporates by 
reference Article 8(2)(b)(iv), implying that the provision in question would be limited 
140 The United States disputes the relevance of these instruments, implicitly arguing that military manu-
als may include these prohibitions for political reasons rather than due to any legal obligation to do so; 
see Bellinger and Haynes (n 104) 447 (‘the United States long has stated that it will apply the rules in its 
manuals whether the conflict is characterized as international or non- international, but this clearly is not 
intended to indicate that it is bound to do so as a matter of law in non- international conflicts’). To the extent 
the United States asserts that it is not acting due to a legal obligation, but rather for political reasons, it is 
unclear whether other states would attempt to make the same distinction. The domestic criminalization of 
such conduct in several countries, as discussed below, suggests that the underlying conduct is considered 
criminal in nature and is not prohibited merely as a matter of political expediency.
141 See ICRC’s Study (n 101) referring to Armenia (Penal Code, 2003, Art. 394); Belarus (Criminal Code, 
1999, Art. 131); Kazakhstan (Penal Code, 1997, Art. 161); Kyrgyzstan (Criminal Code, 1997, Art. 374); 
Moldova (Republic of) (Penal Code, 2002, Art. 136); Russia (Russian Federation, Criminal Code, 1996, Art. 
358); Tajikistan (Criminal Code, 1998, Art. 400); Ukraine (Criminal Code, 2001, Art. 441); Vietnam (Penal 
Code, 1999, Art. 342— criminalizes ecocide as a crime against mankind). See also Mongolia (Criminal Code, 
entered into force in 2002, Art. 304. Causing Ecological Imbalance).
142 See ICRC’s Study (n 101) referring to Bosnia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation, Criminal Code, 
1998, Art. 154(2), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Criminal Code, 2003, Art. 173(2)(c)); Colombia (Penal Code, 
2000, Art. 164); Croatia (Criminal Code, 1997, Art. 158(2), Criminal Code, 1997, as amended in June 2006, 
Art. 158(2)); Estonia (Penal Code, 2001, Art. 104); Ethiopia (Criminal Code, 2004, Art. 270); Mali (Penal 
Code, 2001, Art. 31(4)); Serbia (Criminal Code, 2005, Art. 372(2)); Slovenia (Penal Code, 1994, Art. 374(2)); 
Uruguay (Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Art. 26(3)12). See also Swiss Criminal Code, Art. 264(g), 
as amended in 2002. See also Cape Verde (Criminal Code, approved by Legislative Decree 4/ 2003, 18 
November 2003— Art. 273); Montenegro (Republic of) (Criminal Code, 2004, Art. 428(2)); Philippines (Act 
on Crimes against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and other Crimes Against Humanity, 2009, 
Art. 4(c)(5)).
143 Art. 610 of the Spanish Penal Code provides: ‘Anyone who, in the context of an armed conflict, uses 
or orders the use of methods or means of combat that are prohibited or are intended to cause unnecessary 
suffering or superfluous injury, or that are designed to or can reasonably be expected to cause excessive, 
lasting and serious damage to the natural environment, thus compromising the health or survival of the 
population, or who orders that no quarter shall be given, shall be penalized with a term of imprisonment of 
10 to 15 years, without prejudice to the penalty imposed for the resulting damage.’
144 See ICRC’s Study (n 101) referring to Azerbaijan (Criminal Code, 1999, Art. 116.0.2); Peru (Code of 
Military and Police Justice, 2006, Art. 101), Peru, (Military and Police Criminal Code, 2010, Art. 97); Korea 
(Republic of), (ICC Act, 2007, Art. 13(3)); Spain (Penal Code, 1995, Art. 610), Spain, (Penal Code, 1995, as 
amended by Law 15/ 2003, 25 November 2003, Art. 610), Spain, (Royal Ordinances for the Armed Forces, 
2009, Art. 114). See also Greece (Law No. 3948/ 2011 on the adaptation of internal law to the provisions 
of the ICC Statute adopted by Law 3003/ 2002 (A’75), April 2011, Art. 12(1)(c)); Portugal (Adaptation of 
Criminal Legislation to ICC Statute, Law 31/ 2004, 22 July 2004, Art. 11(i)). See also Switzerland (Federal 
law introducing modifications to federal legislation by virtue of the implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, 18 June 2010, Art. 264(b) and (g)(a)); Panama, (Criminal Code, Law No. 14 of 18 May 2007, Art. 436).
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to the context of IACs.145 Other states expressly limit this criminal provision to circum-
stances of international armed conflict.146
This above survey of criminal legislation shows that the criminalization of environ-
mental damage caused during armed conflict is not uniform among states. As a base-
line, many states have incorporated the prohibition against causing widespread, severe, 
and long- term harm to the environment during armed conflicts. Several states have 
criminalized this conduct explicitly in NIACs or in sufficiently broad terms to cover 
the context of NIACs.
10.4.19  Statements of governments
In response to the work of the International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur 
on Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict, the Federated States of 
Micronesia stated that ‘intentional destruction of [the] natural environment for mili-
tary gain is a type of total warfare that is abhorrent under international law, particu-
larly in situations where the populations depend of that natural environment for its 
survival’.147
The US Department of Defense Law of War Manual of 12 June 2015 has explicitly 
reaffirmed its rejection to the customary law nature of Articles 35(3) and 55 AP I (with 
respect to both conventional and nuclear weapons), citing the US response to the ICRC’s 
Study which contested the customary law nature of Rule 45. It regards both provisions as 
‘overly broad and ambiguous’.148 In its response to the ICRC, the United States argued that 
Rule 45, as formulated in the ICRC Study, fails to take into account scenarios in which an 
attack will result in widespread, long- term, and severe damage to the natural environment 
but is nonetheless necessary because of the presence of a military target.149 Responding 
to the ICRC Study, the representative of the United States argued that Rule 45  ‘would 
145 See ICRC’s Study (n 101) referring to Belgium (Penal Code, 1867, as amended on 5 August 2003, 
Chapter III, Title I bis, Art. 136 quater, § 1(22)), Belgium, (Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches 
of International Humanitarian Law, 1993, as amended on 23 April 2003, Art. 1 ter, § 1(12)); Canada (Crimes 
against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000, Section 4(1) and (4)); Congo (Democratic Republic of the), 
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act, Law No. 8- 98, 31 October 1998, Art. 4(b)); 
Denmark (Military Criminal Code, 1973, as amended in 1978, § 25(1)), Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 
2005, § 36(2)); Georgia (Georgia, Criminal Code, 1999, Art. 413(d)); Ireland (Geneva Conventions Act, 1962, 
as amended in 1998, Section 4(1) and (4)); New Zealand (International Crimes and ICC Act, 2000, Section 
11(2)); Norway (Military Penal Code, 1902, as amended in 1981, § 108(b)); United Kingdom (ICC Act, 2001, 
Sections 50(1) and 51(1) (England and Wales) and Section 58(1) (Northern Ireland, Schedule 8)).
146 See ICRC Study (n 101)  referring to Australia (Criminal Code Act, 1995, as amended to 2007, 
Chapter 8, § 268.38, 327– 8), Australia, ICC (Consequential Amendments) Act, 2002, Schedule 1, § 268.38(2)); 
Burundi (Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 2003, Art. 4(B)(d)); Germany (Law 
Introducing the International Crimes Code, 2002, Art. 1, § 12(3)); Netherlands (International Crimes Act, 
2003, Art. 5(5)(b)); South Africa (ICC Act, 2002, Schedule 1, Part 3, § (b)(iv)). See also Comoros (Decret 
n°12- 022/ PR du 04 12 2011 portant promulgation de la loi n°11- 020/ AU du 13/ 12/ 2011 portant mise en 
oeuvre du Statut de Rome, Art. 20(2) (iv)).
147 See Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, (n 62), 
para. 58.
148 See Bellinger and Haynes (n 104).
149 ibid. 456 (‘An example illustrates why States— particularly those not party to AP I— are unlikely to 
have supported Rule 45. Suppose that country A has hidden its chemical and biological weapons arsenal 
in a large rainforest, and plans imminently to launch the arsenal at country B. Under such a rule, country 
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preclude States from taking into account the principles of military necessity and propor-
tionality’.150 The American view that military necessity is a necessary element of this pro-
hibition was essentially incorporated into Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, which 
essentially repeats Rule 45 with the added final clause ‘which would be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’.
10.4.20  Conclusion on the customary status of the criminal 
prohibition of disproportionate environmental harm
These islands of legal support for the criminalization of environmental harm during 
NIACs will allay possible concerns that the ICC would be entering completely unchar-
tered territory if its jurisdiction were to be extended to cover disproportionate harm 
committed during NIACs.151 While the analysis does not definitively show that there 
exists a virtually uniform practice among states of following this rule, the existence of 
precedents for this prohibition entailing criminal consequences should reassure the 
Assembly of States Parties of the ICC that such an extension would not be a radical 
departure from the existing legal framework, but instead would constitute an impor-
tant further development in the progression of the law protecting the environment.
Nonetheless, the ICRC’s claim that this support reaches the level to amount to cus-
tomary international law is not immune from criticism. Many of the cited sources do 
not impact on the analysis whereas the discussion of other sources does not sufficiently 
explore their impact, which is sometimes significant, on the status of the prohibition 
under customary international law. Moreover, the ICRC was not looking specifically 
at the issue of individual criminal responsibility. Accordingly, its conclusions can only 
be taken as indirect guidance for the customary international law support for a pro-
hibition of disproportionate environmental damage entailing criminal responsibility.
10.5 Accountability for Environmental Harm as  
a Facet of Jus Post Bellum
While international humanitarian law and the war crimes provisions of the Rome 
Statute apply during armed conflict, it is well documented that environmental damage 
B could not launch a strike against that arsenal if it expects that such a strike may cause widespread, long- 
term, and severe damage to the rainforest, even if it has evidence of country A’s imminent launch, and 
knows that such a launch itself would cause environmental devastation.’).
150 ibid. 456.
151 It is likely that such concerns or opposable views may attempt to be grounded on the general treaty 
rule regarding third states, as set out in Art. 34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969): ‘A treaty 
does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.’ It is accepted, however, 
‘that the consequences deriving from Art. 12 para. 2 have, arguably, little to do with an alleged third party 
effect of the Rome Statute.’ See Proels, ‘Art. 34— General Rule Regarding Third States’ in Oliver Dörr and 
Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary (Berlin: Springer, 
2012), 617, para. 22 (with reference to a different view). By the same token, if the situation is referred by the 
Security Council under Art. 13(b), the binding effect of a Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII 
UN Charter, may diminish the relevance of the role of the rule enshrined in Art. 34 Vienna Convention 
with respect to non- state parties to the Rome Statute. See, Mark Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 473, para. 13.
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often continues unabated when warfare ends.152 At this transitional time, prior to the 
full restoration of peace but after war, the applicability of the various laws relevant 
to serious environmental harm is an important consideration. States and the inter-
national community will have a strong incentive, and in some cases a legal responsi-
bility, to establish responsibility and provide redress for environmental harm caused 
during armed conflicts. At the same time, leaders of warring factions will often have a 
strong incentive to seek amnesties and thus insulate themselves from criminal respon-
sibility.153 Many treaties imposing liability for environmental harm have exceptions for 
damage caused by acts of war or exclusions for certain persons from liability for such 
acts.154 However, the existence and parameters of specific obligations fitting into the 
rubric of jus post bellum has only recently limited academic treatment and analysis.
It is a trite but important observation that the legal norms and provisions encour-
aging a just peace are of equal significance to the principles encouraging just war. Jus 
post bellum, which collects the laws and norms relevant to the transition from a state of 
armed conflict to peace, serves as a fulcrum for the creation of conditions amenable to 
a lasting and equitable end to hostilities.155
An area of jus post bellum of particular pertinence to the current analysis is that of 
accountability for atrocity crimes committed during armed conflict, and particularly 
NIACs.156 In the immediate aftermath of armed hostilities, the investigation and pros-
ecution of crimes, including environmental crimes, may seem precipitous and distract-
ing from the tenuous peace. However, it is an important aspect of the transition to a 
complete resolution of the cause and consequences of hostilities. Some peace agree-
ments even designate responsibility for the post- conflict detection and prevention of 
environmental harm.157
Larry May argues that ‘[c] losure is hard to achieve if there is not a public reckoning 
for those who used the war as an occasion to commit wrongs, or who chose to conduct 
war in a wrongful way’.158 Without closure, any peace that is agreed on may be fleeting 
and may simply suppress and fuel increased animosity between rival groups. In this 
respect, environmental harm is an important factor to address. The destruction of the 
environment imperils reconciliation as it removes a potential platform for cooperative 
endeavours. A ruined or degraded environment jeopardizes the success of post- conflict 
economic projects across sectarian divides. It means a smaller pool of resources to be 
used for societal reconstruction, including basic activities such as feeding and hydrat-
ing the population. With fewer resources, a return to conflict becomes all the more 
152 UNEP (2009) (n 9).
153 Charles Garraway, ‘The Relevance of Jus Post Bellum:  a Practitioner’s Perspective’ in Easterday, 
Iverson, and Stahn (n 5) 159.
154 See Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts (n 62), paras. 
110– 12.
155 See definition of jus post bellum above.
156 See Carsten Stahn, ‘The Future of Jus Post Bellum’ in Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner (eds.), 
Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace (Cambridge: TMC Asser, 2008), 236; 
Garraway (n 154).
157 Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts (n 62), 
paras. 155– 8.
158 Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius and Meionexia’ in Easterday, Iverson, and Stahn (n 5) 16.
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difficult to avoid. It also limits the possibility to enjoy features that can cross sectarian 
divides, such as rivers, rare or emblematic species of flora and fauna, and nature recrea-
tion areas.159
Reflecting the significance of environmental protection and rehabilitation in the 
wake of armed conflict, peace agreements between warring parties in NIACs have 
sometimes explicitly reflected the need to preserve the environment.160
Dieter Fleck advocates the prioritization of peacebuilding over retribution in a post- 
conflict setting.161 It should be noted that international criminal justice is not focused 
on pure retribution, but also seeks to encourage accountability, truth- telling, recon-
ciliation, and deterrence of atrocity crimes. In light of these broader goals, the oft- 
decried tension between peacebuilding and criminal justice is to a certain degree a false 
dichotomy. In many instances, justice and international peacebuilding can be mutually 
reinforcing, and ‘it is increasingly acknowledged that peace and justice are not contra-
dictory but complementary’.162
Establishing individual criminal responsibility for serious environmental harms, 
and imposing sentences, including custodial sentences, for perpetrators, may assist 
efforts to break cycles of offending and violence. Larry May argues that ‘it is hard to 
comprehend what jus post bellum justice would involve if it did not have some account-
ing for the wrongdoers during the war or armed conflict’.163 In doing so, he recognizes 
that while those seeking to rebuild states in such circumstances face a daunting array of 
challenges, and individual criminal responsibility should not displace the sociological, 
economic, and security imperatives in the wake of widespread violence and turmoil, 
rendering justice for grave crimes is a necessary (and sometimes arduous) component 
of a comprehensive transition to peace and reconciliation of sectarian groups, which is 
partly reliant on a healthy shared environment.
However, the form of justice that is required is a more nuanced question. Clarifying 
the relevant provisions and principles that impact this sphere of jus post bellum is an 
ongoing project, which will be informed by experience and retrospective analyses of the 
success of various justice models, from the well established international criminal tri-
bunal model, to the various forms of truth and reconciliation processes, to hybrid mod-
els of justice. For example, a landmark model of transitional justice is that undertaken 
by South Africa. During the 1990s, South Africa adopted a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to generate an account of the atrocities that had occurred in the apartheid 
era and a basis for moving towards reconciliation by placing primacy on truth- seeking 
159 See ibid. text accompanying footnote, 17 (discussing danger of environmental harm for the viability 
of a sustainable peace process and for the rejuvenation of the economy).
160 See, for example, El Salvador Peace Agreement (Chapultepec)— 1992, The Government of El Salvador 
and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), Arts. 13 and 17(12), available at <http:// 
theirwords.org/ ?title=&country=&ansa=&document_ type=&year=&_ _ keyword_ field=&keyword_ _ 0_ 
id=651&keyword_ _ 0_ type=keyword_ value> accessed 30 September 2015; Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement 
between the Government of Sudan and the Eastern Sudan Front, 2006, available at <http:// theirwords.org/ 
?title=&country=&ansa=&document_ type=&year=&_ _ keyword_ field=&keyword_ _ 0_ id=651&keyword_ _ 
0_ type=keyword_ value> accessed 30 September 2015.
161 See  chapter 9 in this volume.
162 Vincent Chetail, ‘Introduction, Post- conflict, Peacebuilding— Ambiguity and Identity’ in Vincent 
Chetail (ed.), Post- Conflict. Peacebuilding: a Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
163 May (n 159) 16.
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rather than criminal accountability. Former UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan has 
heralded the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.164 While valid 
concerns have been raised that the amnesties granted by the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission may have curtailed true accountability, the South African 
approach to transitional justice in 1994 remains an example of a transitional justice 
process which had a positive impact in a number of respects and provided a contribu-
tion towards societal reconciliation.
At the same time, when analysing obligations arising from and continuing after 
armed conflict, the differences between international criminal law and international 
humanitarian law and the overlapping field of jus post bellum must be borne in mind. 
Whereas the provisions of international criminal law are designed to be as precise, con-
sistent, and concretely enforceable as possible, the norms and principles that could be 
categorized as jus post bellum constitute a more fluid collection that are often norma-
tively framed and oriented to states rather than to inform individuals of their potential 
criminal responsibility. Suggestions such as creating protected zones of major ecologi-
cal importance as a facet of jus post bellum are important normative goals,165 but at 
present have not been formulated in a manner directly enforceable as a matter of inter-
national criminal law.
Following the question of whether to investigate allegations of atrocities, includ-
ing environmental harm, comes the question of who to investigate. Grotius asserted 
that ‘the soldiers that have participated in some common act, [such] as the burning 
of a city, are responsible for the total damage’.166 However, international criminal law 
seeks to determine not just which soldiers participated in crimes, but also which lead-
ers brought about those crimes through their common plans, orders, or other induce-
ments. To do so, and to differentiate the responsibility for specific crimes, investigation 
of reported atrocities is required, and the highly developed provisions of international 
criminal law can be of significant assistance as they distinguish between principle per-
petrators, acting individually or in common, those who order, solicit, or induce, those 
who aid and abet, and various other forms of responsibility, including superior respon-
sibility for military and civilian leaders.167
Where individual accountability is established in a post- conflict setting for crimes 
committed during the conflict, the question of compensation and damages naturally 
follows. It is well established that state responsibility requires reparation for victims 
of wrongful acts committed during armed conflict.168 Where criminal conduct is 
implicated, responsibility may be placed upon the authors of crimes in lieu of state 
164 See United Nations News Centre, at <http:// www.un.org/ apps/ news/ story.asp?NewsID=17800> 
accessed 8 January 2016.
165 Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts (n 62) paras. 
31, 50.
166 May (n 159) 17.
167 See, for example, Rome Statute of the ICC, Arts. 25 and 28; ICTY Statute, Arts. 7(1) and (3); ICTR 
Statute, Arts. 6(1) and (3).
168 Art. 3 of the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 
October 1907) 2 AJIL Supplement 90– 117 (1908); Art. 91 AP I; International Law Association, Declaration 
of International Law Principles on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict (2010); International Law 
Association, Procedural Principles for Reparation Mechanisms (2014).
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authorities, where possible. Article 12 of the United Nations Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law provides that perpetrators should provide compensation to victims and their fami-
lies or dependents, and if this is not possible states should provide compensation to 
victims suffering significant physical injury or impairment of mental health, and to 
the families or dependents of victims who have been killed or physically or mentally 
incapacitated.169
The Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission addressed post- 
conflict reparations for serious degradation of the environment during armed conflict 
in her third report on the prevention of environmental damage during armed con-
flict.170 While some instances of compensation orders in relation to destruction of peo-
ple’s environments were listed (particularly in human rights courts),171 there were no 
remedies given for convictions specifically concerning charges of environmental harm 
(as opposed to violations of human rights perpetrated through actions also causing 
environmental harm).
10.6 Conclusion
The preceding analysis shows that while environmental harm occurs in armed con-
flict and while such conflicts are increasingly sectarian and internal in nature, there are 
essentially no provisions of international criminal law that directly address harm to the 
environment occurring during NIACs. Contrastingly, there are several instruments of 
general international law supporting the application of the prohibition on dispropor-
tionate environmental damage to the context of NIACs. Moreover, in many domestic 
jurisdictions an individual causing serious harm to the environment without lawful 
grounds for doing so would find themselves charged with criminal responsibility for 
those acts. Between regular peace- time legal regimes in domestic systems and the rela-
tively well developed set of rules applying in IACs, sits the murkier regulatory frame-
work governing NIACs. The gap in coverage over NIACs for environmental harm in 
the Rome Statute is notable and calls for redress.
Addressing environmental harm indirectly through prohibitions aimed at other 
crimes presents itself as an available and feasible means of progressing. Anthropocentric 
provisions, such as crimes against humanity, genocide, and other war crimes can apply 
during NIACs. This indirect method also has the practical benefit of relying on tested 
169 General Assembly Resolution A/ 60/ 509/ Add.1, 16 December 2005, Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, IX Reparation for Harm Suffered, 15. (‘[i] n 
cases where a person, a legal person or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such party 
should provide reparation to the victim or compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation 
to the victim.’).
170 ILC Report of its sixty- seventh session, held in July 2015, where it considered the Second Report 
of the Special Rapporteur, A/ CN.4/ 685, Chapter IX, Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, para. 165.
171 Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts (n 62), paras. 
198– 205.
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provisions that have formed the basis of robust trials in international courts previ-
ously. However, this is at best a temporary solution and is ultimately unable to fully 
address environmental harm. International criminal law has a strong symbolic com-
ponent. Prosecuting environmental damage indirectly under anthropocentric provi-
sions may result in convictions of limited symbolic impact vis- à- vis environmental 
values. This does not convey the opprobrium that serious environmental harm merits. 
Consequently, if the international community wishes to directly condemn harm to the 
environment during all armed conflict, the law must be further developed to directly 
and comprehensively address serious environmental harm in the context of NIACs.
One intermediate step to enhance the protection of the environment would be the 
adoption of a provision applicable in NIACs that prohibited the conduct set out in 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute. War crimes prohibitions have been similarly 
expanded to cover NIACs during previous ICC negotiations.172 The most appropriate 
vehicle to achieve this amendment would be the through a review conference of the 
ICC, where the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute could consider whether 
to adopt a provision prohibiting environmental harm in NIACs.173 Such an amend-
ment would not only allow the ICC to prosecute such activity if it occurred, but would 
also signal a symbolic step towards the international community’s recognition of such 
a prohibition forming part of customary international law, irrespective of whether the 
harm occurred during an IAC or a NIAC.
The adoption of a prohibition against environmental harm in the context of NIACs 
would also provide a valuable provision of jus post bellum. As the conflict resided and 
processes are designed to ensure lasting peace, it is important to have clear, a priori, 
markers as to the conduct that is broadly reproached at the international level, and 
which should result in prosecution. The ending of impunity for the most serious crimes 
against the environment would send a signal that certain boundaries should not be 
crossed, even when in the midst of fratricidal warfare. At the same time, care would 
have to be taken to ensure that the fluid and dynamic parameters of jus post bellum 
were not rendered less useful by the imposition of rigid legal definitions necessary to 
found fair criminal trials.
172 See Alamuddin and Webb (n 99) 95.   173 UNEP Study (2009) (n 9) 7.
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 Reparation for Environmental Damage  
in Jus Post Bellum
The Problem of Shared Responsibility
Ilias Plakokefalos*
11.1 Introduction
The problem of environmental damage caused during armed conflict has entered the 
international legal agenda fairly recently. Awareness over environmental protection in 
general has spurred an interest in the literature on the threats and harm to the envi-
ronment posed by armed conflict.1 It is not a coincidence that the International Law 
Commission (‘ILC’) has recently included in its agenda the topic of ‘Protection of the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’.2 Among the reasons cited by the ILC for 
including the topic in the agenda was that the perspective of jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, from which the issue was viewed, was too narrow.3
The aim of this chapter is to study the problems that environmental damage in 
armed conflict pose to the determination of shared responsibility, and especially the 
determination of reparation, in the context of the jus post bellum. When two actors are 
engaged in armed conflict, there arise no serious issues as to sharing responsibility for 
violations.4 But the fact that modern conflicts involve on many occasions more than 
two actors (e.g. Libya 2011) complicates the matters arising out of environmental harm 
(among others), as there may be two or more actors contributing to the same harmful 
event. This is a typical situation of shared responsibility. Shared responsibility provides 
that the problem of reparation for environmental harm is to be examined in situations 
* Assistant Professor, Utrecht University. I  would like to thank the organizers and participants of 
the conference on Peacebuilding and International Environmental Damage in Contemporary Jus Post 
Bellum: Clarifying Norms, Principles and Practices held in The Hague in June 2014. I would also like to 
acknowledge with thanks Cymie Payne, Antonios Tzanakopoulos, and Markos Karavias for their useful 
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Probably the first important piece of literature dealing with the issue was Falk’s article on environ-
mental warfare, see Richard A. Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare and Ecocide: Facts, Appraisal and Proposals’ 
(1973) Revue Belge de Droit International 1.
2 Report of the International Law Commission in its Sixty- fifth Session, UN Doc. A/ 68/ 10, 6 May– 7 
June, 8 July– 9 August 2013.
3 Report of the International Law Commission in its Sixty- third- ?Session, Recommendation of the 
Working Group on the Long- Term Programme of Work, UN Doc. A/ 66/ 10, 26 April– 3 June, 4 July– 12 
August 2011.
4 Except maybe for the issue of contribution to damage by both states, an issue that will be discussed in 
this chapter.
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where there is a multiplicity of actors that contribute to a single harmful outcome.5 
This definition covers the breach of obligations under jus ad bellum and jus in bello, 
as well as under international environmental law. The argument of this chapter will be 
developed by viewing jus post bellum regarding environmental harm through the lens 
of shared responsibility.
Jus post bellum refers to the post- conflict rules and processes that facilitate the transi-
tion from war to peace.6 Jus post bellum has been referred to as one of the three pillars 
of the law of armed conflict, the other two being jus ad bellum and jus in bello.7 The 
purpose of defining and refining the legal framework that applies in jus post bellum is to 
address legal challenges that arise after the termination of armed conflict.8 Nonetheless, 
there is significant disagreement over the precise definition of jus post bellum and 
moreover difficulties arise as to the integration of a variety of legal sources under an 
umbrella concept such as jus post bellum.9 The problem of definition is relevant in the 
context of shared responsibility because it contains two different approaches: a tempo-
ral approach (i.e. one that sees the relevant applicable jus post bellum rules as arising 
only after the conflict has ceased) and a functional approach (i.e. one that categorizes 
the relevant rules depending on whether they have a bearing in the post- conflict legal 
order).10 Depending on the approach one adopts certain rules fall within or outside the 
ambit of jus post bellum. This problem is particularly relevant in the context of state 
responsibility and reparation.
State (and shared) responsibility and its consequences, in particular the obligation of 
the responsible state to provide reparation, refer to an ex post facto determination that 
a state or an international organization (‘IO’) has breached an international obligation 
through its conduct (i.e. conduct that is attributable to that state or IO).11 This means 
that the conduct and the breach in question are situated, temporally speaking, at a time 
where the rules that permeate the jus post bellum are not applicable since the armed 
conflict has not ceased. This approach could place state responsibility outside the ambit 
of jus post bellum altogether since the latter is anchored to conduct that has taken place 
when jus ad bellum, jus in bello, or other obligations are in full operation.12 It has been 
argued however, that since the claims for reparation are handled only after the conflict 
has ceased to exist, at least this aspect of state responsibility (i.e. the question of repa-
ration) is in fact part of jus post bellum.13 Even if it is not, state responsibility remains 
5 Andre Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law:  A  Conceptual 
Framework’ (2013) 32 Michigan Journal of International Law 359, 360– 5.
6 Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Ad Bellum’, ‘Jus in Bello’ . . /‘Jus Post Bellum’? Rethinking the Conception of the 
Law of Armed Force (2007) 17 European Journal of International Law 821, 937.
7 Dieter Fleck, ‘Jus Post Bellum as a Partly Independent Legal Framework’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer.S. 
Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 43.
8 Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson, ‘Epilogue’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 
7) 542.
9 ibid. 545– 50. 10 ibid.
11 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001/ II 
(2) (ARSIWA), Art. 31.
12 Cymie R.  Payne, ‘The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict Legal Regimes’ in Stahn, 
Easterday, and Iverson (n 7) 502, 514.
13 ibid. See also Fleck (n 7) 44.
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important for jus post bellum since one of jus post bellum’s functions is to accommodate 
claims that arise from armed conflict thus contributing to the overall agenda of peace-
building and post- conflict arrangements. The latter form the basis of jus post bellum.14
It is therefore apposite to review the applicable primary obligations as the starting 
point of the research (Section 11.2). This is so because the breadth and depth of pri-
mary obligations as well as their diversity play a significant role in the determination 
of responsibility and, consequently, of any obligation to offer reparation. An analysis 
of the problems posed at the stage of apportioning reparation in shared responsibility 
scenarios follows (Section 11.3). Section 11.4 of the chapter sums up the main findings.
11.2 The Bundle of Primary Obligations and their Relevance 
to Shared Responsibility and Reparation
11.2.1  The primary rules
The obligations that bind participants in an armed conflict, and that may lead to respon-
sibility for environmental damage can be found in a variety of branches of international 
law. It is important to have at least a cursory look at these obligations. State and shared 
responsibility do not operate in a normative vacuum. Primary obligations are therefore 
the necessary starting point.
First and foremost, international environmental law is applicable during armed con-
flict. This conclusion is not seriously contested. On the contrary, the ILC reaffirmed 
the continued application of multilateral environmental agreements (‘MEAs’) during 
armed conflict in its articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties (‘AEACT’).15 
Article 7 provides that a number of treaties enjoy continued application in armed con-
flict due to their subject matter. The ILC Articles go on to provide an indicative list 
of such treaties in the Annex. The list includes treaties on the protection of the envi-
ronment. Despite the clear affirmation of the continued applicability of environmental 
protection treaties during armed conflict, there is some uncertainty as to whether they 
are all applicable as they stand and, if not, which parts of them continue to apply. No 
definitive answer has been given to this question so far. There are some MEAs that con-
tain explicit provisions excluding their application in times of armed conflict.16 Most of 
the MEAs however are silent on the topic.
The effort to find appropriate criteria for deciding which provisions of which trea-
ties are applicable during armed conflict is frustrated by the lack of guidance from the 
relevant authorities. The ILC, in its commentary on the AEACT, after quoting at length 
the International Court of Justice’s (‘ICJ’) advisory opinion on Nuclear Weapons,17 
14 Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum:  Mapping the Discipline(s)’ (2002) 23 American University 
International Law Review 311, 327.
15 Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties, UN Doc. A/ 66/ 10, para. 100, 2011.
16 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), adopted 10 December 1982, entered 
into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3, Art. 236. The LOSC is a good example of a treaty that explicitly 
excludes its application in armed conflict. Its provision that excludes the application of the convention on 
military vessels attests to this view. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the provisions of the treaty that are not 
applicable on vessels (e.g. Art. 207, that concerns land- based marine pollution) continue to apply.
17 Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Judgment of 8 July 1996, ICJ 
Rep 226.
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maintained that there is a ‘presumption’ of continued application18 of MEAs, despite 
the fact that there is no agreement on the issue.19 A study prepared by the Secretariat 
of the ILC in 2005 reached an even milder conclusion, stating that despite increas-
ing support from commentators, the view the MEAs continue to apply during armed 
conflict has received a mixed reaction from states.20 The United Nations Environment 
Programme (‘UNEP’) has not clarified things further in its report on environmental 
protection during armed conflict.21 The report suggests rather vague criteria for decid-
ing whether a MEA is still applicable, such as the original intent of the signatories, the 
type of the agreement, and the context within which it was concluded.22
The most realistic, and probably safest, guidance can be found in the ICJ‘s dictum in 
Nuclear Weapons. There, the ICJ struck a balance between competing views, holding 
that the real question was whether the obligations stemming from the MEAs are ‘obli-
gations of total restraint during armed conflict’ towards avoiding environmental dam-
age altogether.23 Necessity and proportionality should follow the assessments of states 
in respect of their activities in armed conflict that might harm the environment.24 The 
question then becomes whether the conduct of a state which violates a MEA during 
armed conflict can be seen as necessary and proportionate in order to achieve its mili-
tary objective.25 The link between this view and state responsibility has been eloquently 
described as follows:  ‘[e] ven if it is correct to contend . . . that environmental obliga-
tions continue to apply during armed conflict, a State will not be responsible for the 
non- performance of its obligations if there are circumstances precluding the wrongful-
ness of such non- performance’.26 Therefore, from the view of state responsibility, even 
if there is agreement on the applicability of international environmental obligations, 
the existence of a wrongful act would be subject to the exclusion of a circumstance pre-
cluding wrongfulness. This is, of course, true for every wrongful act irrespective of the 
content of the primary obligation that has been breached. In the case of armed conflict, 
self- defence and necessity seem to be the most relevant ones.27
The same rationale would apply to customary international environmental law. 
The truth is that the content of customary rules of environmental protection is more 
abstract and possibly also more lenient. An example of this is the prohibition of trans-
boundary environmental harm.28 This obligation is translated into a series of preven-
tion or procedural obligations (such as exchange of information or the conduct of an 
18 Commentary to the Annex, para. 55. 19 ibid.
20 Memorandum of the Secretariat, The Effect of Armed Conflict in Treaties: An Examination of Practice 
and Doctrine , UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ 550, 1 February 2005, 40, para. 63.
21 UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International 
Law, 2009.
22 ibid. 55. 23 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons (n 17) para. 30. 24 ibid.
25 Dapo Akande, ‘Nuclear Weapons, Unclear Law? Deciphering the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion 
of the International Court’ (1997) 68 (1) British Yearbook of International Law 165, 185.
26 ibid. 27 ibid.; ARSIWA, Arts. 21, 25.
28 Reflected in the Rio Declaration, Principle 3, see Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
UN Doc. A/ CONF.151/ 26. Affirmed by the ICJ in Pulp Mills, see Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, at <http:// www.icj- cij.org/ docket/ files/ 135/ 
15877.pdf> accessed 19 June 2017, para. 193.
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environmental impact assessment) that states need to fulfil.29 The obligation is an obli-
gation of conduct. If states have taken all preventive measures prescribed by the cus-
tomary rule then, despite the existence of harm, they are not responsible.30 If, in other 
words, states show due diligence with respect to their environmental obligations in 
the context of armed conflict they will not be responsible even if their conduct causes 
environmental damage. Whether the level of due diligence that states have to exercise 
during armed conflict is lower compared to any other hazardous activity, remains an 
open question.31
The rules of international humanitarian law (‘IHL’) pertaining to the protection of 
the environment are much more precise, at least when compared to the uncertainty 
surrounding the applicable rules of international environmental law. Articles 35(3) and 
55(1) of the first Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions32 are the key provi-
sions. Article 35(3) posits that it is prohibited to use methods or means that may cause 
‘widespread, long- term and severe damage to the environment’. Article 55(1) adds that 
care should be taken so as to avoid such damage while at the same time links the dam-
age to the environment with the consequences it may have on the population. The lit-
erature discussing the precise meaning of these provisions is vast and it has covered 
most, if not all, of the angles for interpreting the relevant provisions.33 Despite some 
differences in the various analyses, it can be generally inferred from the literature that 
these two articles are problematic from two points of view. First, the threshold of ‘wide-
spread, long- term and severe’ damage is almost impossible to reach and therefore lead 
to the breach of the obligations.34 Second, both obligations seem to be couched in terms 
that suggest that they are obligations of conduct.35 A way out of the conundrum could 
be to have recourse to customary international humanitarian law. According to Rule 
43 of the International Committee of the Red Cross study on customary humanitarian 
law no part of the environment can be attacked unless it is a military objective, nor can 
it be destroyed if such destruction is not required by ‘imperative military necessity’.36 
Rule 43 also posits that an attack that causes incidental damage to the environment that 
29 Ilias Plakokefalos, ‘Prevention Obligations in International Environmental Law’ (2012) 23(1) Yearbook 
of International Environmental Law 3.
30 ibid. 42.
31 For a discussion of the notion of care in jus in bello see Karen Hulme, ‘Taking Care to Protect the 
Environment Against Damage: A Meaningless Obligation?’ (2010) 92(879) International Review of the Red 
Cross 675, 679– 86.
32 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, adopted 8 June 1977, entered into 
force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 3.
33 See among many others, Betsy Baker, ‘Legal Protections for the Environment in Times of Armed 
Conflict’ (1993) 33 Virginia Journal of International Law 351, 368– 76; Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Green War: 
An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict’ (1997) 22 Yale Journal of 
International Law 1, 68– 81; Yoram Dinstein ‘Protection of the Environment in International Armed 
Conflict’ (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 523, 530– 5; Hulme (n 31); Michael Bothe, 
Carl Bruch, Jordan Diamond, and David Jensen, ‘International Law Protecting the Environment During 
Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’ (2010) 92(879) International Review of the Red Cross 579; 
Cordula Droege and Marie- Louise Tougas, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict- 
Existing Rules and Need for Further Legal Protection’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 21.
34 Hulme (n 31) 682; Droege and Tougas (n 33) 26. 35 Hulme (n 31) 679.
36 Jean- Marie. Henckaerts and Louise. Doswald Beck, Customary Humanitarian Law, ICRC 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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would be excessive in relation to the military advantage expected is also prohibited.37 
These customary rules contain no definition of environmental damage, rendering the 
possibility of their breach, at least prima facie, more plausible from this perspective. 
Nonetheless, the balancing between environmental protection and military objectives 
or advantage may make the protection of the environment take a back seat.
Besides the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention and customary IHL, 
a number of other treaties applicable as jus in bello are relevant. First and foremost the 
Convention on the Prohibition or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (‘ENMOD’)38 is a convention that deals directly with the manipulation of 
the environment during hostilities. The focus of the convention, while significant, is 
not of direct relevance here. ENMOD seems to apply to a very small group of situations 
with particularly narrow scope (i.e. when parties to the conflict use the environment 
so as to cause damage).39 Aside from ENMOD, there are other conventions indirectly 
linked to environmental damage in armed conflict but their primary focus lies in con-
trolling particular weapons whose use might have consequences on the environment, 
and not in protecting the environment as such.40
The third primary obligation relating to the protection of the environment in armed 
conflict is the prohibition on the use of force itself. This is admittedly a peculiar source 
of protection of the environment. The reason for this is that the prohibition on the use 
of force was not designed to tackle the effects of environmental damage. Nonetheless, 
in terms of state and shared responsibility it is as important as any other primary obli-
gation. This conclusion requires some elaboration.
According to the basic rules of state responsibility, the ‘responsible State is under an 
obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrong-
ful act’.41 The key phrase in this provision is ‘injury caused’. The question therefore 
is whether environmental injury can be seen as having been caused by the breach of 
the obligation. The United Nations Compensation Commission (‘UNCC’) has in fact 
awarded compensation for environmental damage.42 The legal basis for this award of 
compensation must be traced back to the UN Security Council resolution 687 that 
held Iraq responsible for the 1990– 1 Gulf War.43 The resolution reads that Iraq is ‘liable 
under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental dam-
age and the depletion of natural resources . . . as a result of its unlawful invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait’.44 Resolution 687 expressly included environmental damage in 
the definition of direct loss or damage, thus providing for a precedent to the effect that 
37 ibid.
38 Adopted 10 December 1976, entered into force 5 October 1978, 1108 UNTS 151.
39 Schmitt (n 33) 85.
40 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which 
may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, adopted 10 October 1980, 
entered into force 2 December 1983, 1342 UNTS 137; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, adopted 3 September 
1992, entered into force 29 April 1997, 1974 UNTS 45.
41 ARSIWA, Art. 31.
42 The UNCC awarded compensation for environmental damage under Category ‘F4’ of its compensation 
scheme.
43 UN Security Council Resolution, S/ RES/ 687, adopted 3 April 1991.. 44 ibid. para. 16.
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environmental damage caused by the violation of jus ad bellum is indeed compensa-
ble. If this conclusion is valid then every violation of jus ad bellum that directly causes 
environmental damage brings about as a consequence the obligation of the responsible 
state to make reparation for that damage.
The Eritrea– Ethiopia Claims Commission was faced with a claim by Ethiopia accord-
ing to which, because Eritrea was responsible under jus ad bellum, it should pay com-
pensation for damage to natural resources and the environment.45 The Commission 
rejected the claim because Ethiopia had not presented sufficient evidence to support its 
allegation of the environmental damage and had many errors in its calculation of dam-
ages.46 It is important that the Commission did not challenge at all the right of Ethiopia 
to present a claim for environmental damage caused by a violation of jus ad bellum.
It is submitted that, despite the limited practice available, a state that violates jus ad 
bellum is, in principle, under an obligation to make full reparation for the damage it has 
caused, including environmental damage. The ILC in its Articles on State Responsibility 
did not provide a list of the types of damage that would be permissible. At the same 
time it seems that environmental damage, at least after the Gulf War of 1990– 1, is con-
sidered compensable. Therefore the engagement of the secondary obligation to make 
reparation seems to depend only on two criteria: the determination of responsibility by 
a court, tribunal, or through an agreement, and causation which, in the case of mixed 
claims commissions, is usually referred to as the criterion of directness of damage.47 
The fact that environmental damage can be compensated for a jus ad bellum violation 
may be seen as having an overriding effect.48 It means that the claimant(s) will not have 
to prove a distinct violation of an obligation stemming from environmental law or from 
jus in bello in order for them to claim compensation.
11.2.2  Relevance of primary rules to shared responsibility  
and reparation
One problem with the presence of multiple wrongdoing actors in connection to com-
pensation for environmental damage is related to the threshold of the damage. It will 
be crucial to look back at the obligation breached in order to decide on compensation. 
If, for example, two parties to the conflict contribute to environmental damage but only 
one of them is bound by a MEA that remains applicable and sets ‘significant’ harm to 
the environment as a threshold, then the following problem arises: if the other party is 
not bound by the environmental obligations that bind the first party and the damage is 
45 Eritrea– Ethiopia Claims Commission, Damages Claim, Final Award- Ethiopia’s Claims, UNRIAA 
XXVI 2009, 631, para. 421.
46 ibid. para. 425.
47 See Hessel E. Yntema, ‘The Treaties with Germany and Compensation for War Damage’ (1924) 24 
Columbia Law Review 134, 139– 41; Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, Part 
I (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 225; Alexandros Kolliopoulos La Commission d’indemnisation des Nations 
Unies et le Droit de la Responsabilité International (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurispudence, 
2001), 389. See also Pierre d’Argent, Les Réparations de Guerre en Droit International Public (Bruxelles: 
Bruylant, 2002), 492, 650– 1.
48 Kolliopoulos claims that violation of jus in bello as a legal basis for compensation may be seen as having 
a residual role in certain circumstances, see Kolliopoulos (n 47) 380– 6.
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not ‘widespread, long- term and severe’ (which would breach its jus in bello obligations), 
even though both parties will have contributed to the harmful outcome, it seems that 
it will be only the second party that will have breached its obligations and therefore be 
under a corresponding obligation to make reparation. A similar problem would arise 
if two, or more, parties to the conflict contribute to a single instance of environmental 
damage, breaching the same obligation, but one of them could successfully rely on a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness. In case the damage would not have reached the 
threshold required absent the conduct of either party, but one party’s conduct is unlaw-
ful and the other’s is not, then only one party would be found responsible and would be 
under an obligation to make reparation, probably for the entire damage.
Some of these problems could be resolved through the adoption of a single threshold 
for damage resulting from armed conflict. Nonetheless, the problem described in the 
second example (i.e. one party to the conflict benefiting from a circumstance preclud-
ing wrongfulness) would remain, unless resolved through a causal analysis that would 
show that the damage is causally divisible.49
The problem of a single threshold of damage aside, the primary rules form the back-
drop for the engagement of state responsibility. The two necessary elements for the 
determination of responsibility, namely breach and attribution, can be highly problem-
atic in a shared responsibility situation. The identification of a breach of an obligation 
that can lead to shared responsibility for environmental damage can be problematic 
because of the diversity of the primary obligations. Not all applicable primary obliga-
tions bind all the participants in an armed conflict. Not all states have ratified the same 
MEAs and not all states are parties to the Geneva Protocols. All states are of course 
bound by the same customary rules but they may breach different obligations that lead 
to a single damage to the environment. State A might cause damage to the environment 
while there is no military necessity and state B may cause damage to the environment 
through its breach of jus ad bellum. Alternatively state A may breach its jus ad bellum 
obligations while it is being aided and/ or assisted by state B which breaches the prohi-
bition on aid and assistance in the commission of a wrongful act as laid down by the 
ILC.50 Whether states breach the same or different obligations is important because it 
may have consequences in the apportionment of reparation.51
The confusion caused by the presence of multiple actors also has a bearing on attri-
bution. The main issue is to decide which conduct can be attributed to which of the 
actors involved. If one accepts the possibility of multiple attribution in international 
law52 then a number of scenarios may be envisaged where the wrongful conduct can be 
attributed to a multiplicity of actors. Cases where a joint organ may breach jus in bello53 
49 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, General Commentary, ILC 
Yearbook 2001/ II (2) 31 (‘ARSIWA Commentary’) 93, para. 13.
50 ARSIWA Art. 16.
51 Pierre d’Argent, ‘Reparation Cessation, Assurances and Guarantees of Non- Repetition’ in André 
Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (eds.), Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law:  An 
Appraisal of the State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 209.
52 See Francesco Messineo, ‘Attribution of Conduct’ in Nollkaemper and Plakokefalos (n 51) 60.
53 An example could be the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq set up by the United States and the 
United Kingdom, see Stefan Talmon, ‘A Plurality of Responsible Actors:  International Responsibility for 
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or where two or more states, through military operations, breach either jus in bello or 
jus ad bellum54 fall under this category. Even when multiple attribution is not possible 
because one can identify two different courses of conduct which lead to the same harm-
ful outcome, it is not always clear whether this is a case of a single or multiple courses 
of conduct breaching an obligation that binds all states involved.
It is important to bear in mind the problems that shared responsibility poses with 
respect to breach and attribution throughout the discussion on reparation. Both breach 
and attribution, as constitutive elements of the wrongful act, must be taken into consid-
eration for the award of reparation. Nonetheless, they are fraught with problems that are 
outside the ambit of this chapter. They will be touched upon only in so far as they have an 
impact on reparation.
11.3 Shared Responsibility and Reparation
11.3.1  Fundamentals
Shared responsibility for environmental damage in jus post bellum refers to the scenario 
where multiple actors (in this case states or international organizations)55 breach an inter-
national obligation thus bringing about harm to the environment. Regardless of the pri-
mary obligation breached, the responsible actors will have to make full reparation of the 
injury they have caused.56 Full reparation requires the responsible actor to ‘wipe- out all 
the consequences of the illegal act and re- establish the situation which would, in all prob-
ability, have existed if that act had not been committed’.57 The form of reparation usually 
demanded for environmental damage is compensation. Restitution in environmental dam-
age is notoriously difficult to achieve and therefore compensation is seen as more appropri-
ate in most cases. At least this is the form of reparation the UNCC awarded the claimants 
under category ‘F4’ of the compensation award scheme. This was also the form of repara-
tion requested by Ethiopia before the claims commission in the Eritrea– Ethiopia dispute.58
The question is therefore what should compensation cover. In international environ-
mental law compensation usually covers reasonable clean- up costs as well as reason-
able costs of reinstatement of the environment.59 The UNCC awarded compensation 
Acts of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq’ in Phil Shiner and Andrew Williams (eds.), The Iraq War 
and International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 161.
54 The joint armed attack against Iraq in 2003, if qualified as illegal, may be such a case.
55 Of course IHL would be applicable to a non- state group that is recognized as belligerent. The problems 
the existence of these groups pose to the issue of reparation for environmental damage will be treated fur-
ther below in this chapter.
56 ARSIWA, Art. 31. This principle reflects the locus classicus of international law on the issue, the dictum 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów Factory case, where it held that ‘[i] t is a 
principle of international law that the breach of an agreement involves an obligation to make reparation in 
an adequate form’, see Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Jurisdiction, [1927] 
PCIJ Reports (Series A, No. 9), 21.
57 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Merits, Claim for Indemnity, Judgment 
No.13 [1928] PCIJ Reports (Series A, No.17), 47.
58 See Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission (n 45).
59 See, for example, Basel Protocol on Civil Liability to the Basel Convention on the Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes, adopted 10 December 1999, not in force, UN Doc. UNEP- CHW 
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to states, state agencies, and companies represented by states that engaged in clean- 
up and response measures but it went even further. According to the relevant UNCC 
Governing Council Decision, environmental damage also included damage to the 
environment per se as well as costs incurred for monitoring and assessing the damage 
that was caused to natural resources and, as a consequence, to the population.60
11.3.2  Apportionment of reparation
Given the complexities regarding the primary rules as well as breach and attribution it 
is not easy to identify the extent of reparation each of the multiple responsible states or 
each state participating in a joint organ will have to provide. The key to resolving this 
problem is to distinguish between a multiplicity that commits the same wrongful act 
and a multiplicity whose members each commit a separate wrongful act leading to a 
single injury. This solution must be combined with the basic approach of the ILC, which 
places independent responsibility at the centre of the system.61 Independent responsi-
bility means that if a state is found responsible then it should cover the whole extent of 
the damage regardless of the presence of other responsible states or other contributing 
causes.62 The ILC based its conclusion on the Corfu Channel case where Albania had 
to pay for the whole extent of the damage caused to the UK navy despite the fact that 
the mines causing the damage were probably placed there by a third state.63 Using this 
principle as the basic rule, the ILC went on to set an exception: whenever the injury 
caused by multiple states can be causally divisible, compensation may be reduced so as 
to reflect each state’s contribution.64
If two states have committed the same wrongful act, the solution seems to be that 
indeed each state, if found responsible, should pay full compensation.65 An example of 
two states committing the same wrongful act regarding armed conflict would be the 
United States and the United Kingdom breaching jus ad bellum both at the same time 
when bombing Iraq in 2003.66 The wrongful act, towards which both states have con-
tributed, must be seen as a singular causally relevant condition that cannot be separated 
1- WG- 1- 9- 2, Art. 2(c)(d); International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, adopted 
29 November 1969, entered into force 19 June 1975, 973 UNTS 3, as amended in 1992 by the Protocol to 
Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, adopted 27 November 
1992, entered into force 30 May 1996, 1956 UNTS 255, Art. 1(6). The problem with these definitions of 
recoverable damage is that they do not, usually, include damage to the environment per se (i.e. environ-
mental values). The ILC in its commentary to the ARSIWA noted that ‘[d] amage to such environmental 
values (biodiversity, amenity, etc. — sometimes referred to as “non- use values”) is, as a matter of principle, 
no less real and compensable than damage to property, though it may be difficult to quantify’ see ARSIWA 
Commentary 101, para15. Despite this broad statement it seems that in practice most MEAs do not provide 
for the ways such damage could be quantified.
60 Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission during its 
third session, at the eighteenth meeting, held on 28 November 1991, as revised at the twenty- fourth meeting 
held on 10 March 1992, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 1991/ 7/ Rev.1, 17 March 1992, para. 35(e).
61 ARSIWA Art. 31. 62 ARSIWA Commentary (n 49) 124, para. 3.
63 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania) Merits [1949] ICJ 
Rep 4, 23.
64 Third Report on State Responsibility by James Crawford Special Rapporteur, ILC Yearbook 2000/ II(1), 
para. 35
65 ibid. paras. 31– 4. 66 d’Argent (n 51) 242.
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quantitatively.67 The victim of the damage should be able to recover the whole of the 
compensation owed by either wrongdoing state since the responsibility of each wrong-
doing state cannot be diminished because another state has also contributed to the 
commission of the wrongful act.68
The principle of independent responsibility also prevails in cases where two states 
have committed different wrongful acts but the damage is causally indivisible. A num-
ber of examples can be presented that are related to armed conflict. A state might aid 
and assist (through logistical or financial support) another state so as to commit a 
wrongful act breaching jus ad bellum or jus in bello, or two states might breach jus ad 
bellum individually but, because their target is the same, cause a single environmental 
damage. It must be borne in mind that the ILC, while insisting that each responsible 
state should pay full compensation, left a window open by stating that when the injury 
can be causally divisible then reduced compensation may be offered.69 The question 
then is how to ascertain whether the injury is causally divisible and by which criteria. 
The safest way is to adopt a categorization of cumulative and complementary causa-
tion.70 Cumulative causation appears where neither of the two breaches (seen here as 
causes) would be in itself sufficient to bring about the injury.71 Complementary causa-
tion appears where each cause brings about an injury and when these injuries combine 
they bring about the totality of the injury at hand.72
The prevailing view is that in cases of cumulative causation each wrongdoing state 
must make full reparation.73 The reason for this is that the totality of the injury can-
not be broken down and apportioned to each of the wrongdoing states.74 Therefore 
each of them bears an obligation to pay for the totality and any apportionment should 
take place at a later stage if the right to recourse exists and it is successfully exercised.75 
In cases of complementary causation, on the other hand, each contribution can be 
assessed individually and therefore each wrongdoing state must pay for its own contri-
bution to the injury.76 This categorization however is extremely difficult to do in prac-
tice. Causation is one of the least studied and developed aspects of international law. 
No single, unified concept of causal analysis seems to have developed and the courts 
appear to employ different causal tests in different cases.77
11.3.3  The approach in practice
In interpreting the causal standard set by the Governing Council (direct loss), the 
UNCC has not developed a clear test.78 In some instances it has indicated that what is 
67 ibid. 239.
68 ibid.; ARSIWA Commentary (n 49) 124, para. 1.
69 ARSIWA Commentary (n 49).
70 This categorization has been propounded by Brigitte Bollecker- Stern in her work Le préjudice dans la 
théorie de la responsabilité international (Paris: Pedone, 1973), 267 et seq. The same categorization has been 
adopted by Pierre d’Argent (n 51) 15– 23.
71 d’Argent (n 51) 224. 72 ibid. 73 ibid. 228– 33. 74 ibid. 228. 75 ibid.
76 ibid. 226.
77 See Bollecker- Stern (n 70) 182– 3; Andrea Gattini, ‘Breach of International Obligations’ in Nollkaemper 
and Plakokefalos (n 51) 25, 29– 30.
78 See generally on the directness issue Ucheora Onwuamaegbu and Aïssatou Diop, ‘Directness of Claims 
by Foreign Companies in Remote Relations: Claims of Non- Kuwaiti Corporations’ in Timothy J. Feighery, 
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required is a ‘clear causal link’79 while in others that the condition in question (i.e. the 
wrongful act) must be a positive condition, sufficient in itself to bring about the injury.80 
In other instances it has favoured proximity as the applicable test.81 The UNCC also 
took a clear stance against the ‘but for’ test in the Egyptian Workers claim.82 When the 
UNCC dealt with the environmental claims (most falling under Category ‘F4’) it was 
equally unclear as to which causal test it applied, yet the reports do not suffer from a 
lack of homogeneity.83 Moreover, the UNCC offered a detailed account on its approach 
to the apportionment of compensation.
The UNCC included a heading ‘Parallel or concurrent causes’ in its reports without 
specifying the causal test that it employed in order to reach its conclusions. It posited, 
however, that ‘Iraq is not exonerated from liability for loss or damage that resulted 
directly from the invasion and occupation simply because other factors might have 
contributed to the loss or damage’.84 It went on to state that Iraq would ‘[n] ot be liable 
for damage that was unrelated to its invasion and occupation of Kuwait nor for losses 
or expenses that are not a direct result of the invasion and occupation’.85 The UNCC 
examined claims based on the evidence before it and was, for the most part, unclear as 
to the causal criteria it used. A glimpse of its attitude can be found in the Panel Report 
for the First Part of the Fourth Installment of ‘F4’ claims which held that when the dam-
age was a result of ‘[c]auses wholly unconnected with Iraq’s invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait, no compensation is recommended’.86 The picture becomes clearer through the 
Panel’s finding that in cases where other causes have contributed to the environmental 
damage, the level of compensation would be adjusted so as to reflect each contribution 
accordingly.87 Finally, the Panel held that when the proportion of Iraq’s participation in 
the damage cannot be accurately proven then it will recommend no compensation.88
Christopher S. Gibson, and Trevor M. Rajah, War Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 259– 88; and Timothy J. Feighery, ‘The Jurisprudential Legacy of 
the UNCC: Legal Issues Common to all Claims Categories’ in ibid. 187, 191– 4.
79 Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Third Instalment 
of Individual Claims for Damages Above US $ 100.000 (Category ‘C’ Claims), UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 1999, 24 
June 1999, 6, para. 16.
80 Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Individual Claims 
for Serious Personal Injury or Death (Category ‘B’ Claims), UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 1994/ 1, 26 May 1994, 25.
81 Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Third Instalment 
of Individual Claims for Damages Above US $ 100.000 (Category ‘C’ Claims), UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 1994, UN 
Doc. S/ AC.26/ 1994/ 3, 21 December 1994, 21.
82 Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Egyptian 
Workers’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 1997/ 3, 2 October 1997, para. 214.
83 For the view that the Panel dealing with environmental damage did not face serious problems with cau-
sation see José R. Allen, ‘Points of Law’ in Cymie R. Payne and Peter H. Sand (eds.), Gulf War Reparations 
and the UN Compensation Commission (|Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 141, 159– 61.
84 Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Second 
Instalment of ‘F4’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2002/ 26, 3 October 2002, paras. 25– 6.
85 ibid.
86 Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part One of the 
Fourth Instalment of ‘F4’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2004/ 66, 9 December 2004, para. 40. The Panel 
reduced, for example the amount of compensation payable by Iraq because other factors contributed to the 
damage, see ‘Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part One of 
the Third Instalment of “F4” Claims’, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2003/ 31, 18 December 2003, para. 147.
87 UNCC ‘F4’, Fourth Instalment (n 86). 88 ibid.
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These findings of the UNCC refer to causally relevant factors that, in principle, do 
not amount to a wrongful act of a third state or the contribution to the injury by a third 
state. The UNCC’s attitude on this issue is very important. Regarding contribution to 
the injury by the coalition forces that bombed the Iraqi army in Kuwait, the UNCC 
referred to the Governing Council decision on the matter. The Governing Council 
had decided that compensation would be payable by Iraq due to its unlawful invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait for any loss as a result of ‘[m] ilitary operations or threat of 
military action by either side’.89 Therefore, the environmental damage caused by allied 
bombing was to be compensated by Iraq.
The UNCC seems to have struck a middle ground between the general principle of 
the obligation to make full reparation laid down by the ILC and the exception accord-
ing to which reparation may be adjusted when it is shown that the damage can be caus-
ally divisible. The UNCC held that it would not recommend compensation in cases 
where it cannot be proven what proportion of the damage can be reasonably attributed 
to Iraq. This means that if the proportion of Iraq’s contribution can be shown and the 
other concurrent causes cannot be identified, then, it seems, that it would recommend 
the payment of compensation by Iraq, presumably for the whole damage, depending 
also on the contribution to the injury by third parties.
The UNCC‘s findings regarding contribution to the injury by the allied forces in the 
conflict raise a number of issues. The legal basis of the Governing Council decision is 
unclear. It could be that the acts of the coalition forces were seen as lawful since they 
took place under the authorization of the Security Council. In this case, however, the 
allied forces are still bound by the provisions of the first Additional Protocol or, alter-
natively, by customary IHL. It could also be that the Governing Council traced a causal 
connection to Iraq also for the damage caused by the coalition, since the damage would 
not have taken place had Iraq not invaded Kuwait. Under this explanation the acts and 
the effects of the acts of the coalition forces were a direct result of Iraq’s invasion and 
occupation and therefore causally linked to Iraq’s wrongful act. If the first explanation 
is true, then it might be argued that the UNCC should have examined which acts of 
the coalition forces were necessary so as to give effect to the Security Council resolu-
tion. It might be the case that the bombing of oil wells went beyond the scope of the 
authorization by the Security Council. Again, the bombing could violate IHL even if 
necessary and proportionate under jus ad bellum. If, on the other hand, the Governing 
Council considered the acts of the coalition as causally linked to the invasion of Iraq 
it means that the damage caused by these acts was seen as directly stemming from the 
invasion. The causal link between the invasion and the bombing of oil wells is tenuous 
at best. A number of political, legal, strategic, and tactical decisions were taken between 
the initial step of the invasion and the bombing of the particular target. It is doubtful 
that if the UNCC had employed any test other than a strict form of the but- for test that 
it would have found the Iraqi invasion as a cause of the bombing of the oil wells. Of 
89 Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission during its 
third session, at the eighteenth meeting, held on 28 November 1991, as revised at the twenty- fourth meet-
ing held on 10 March 1992, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 1991/ 7/ Rev.1, 17 March 1992, para. 21(a). See on this point 
d’Argent (n 47) 385.
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course, the explanation for the Governing Council’s decision is probably simpler: the 
practice of peace agreements shows that the aggressor must repair the damage caused 
by his opponents.90 There is nothing novel about such a decision if one looks at the 
practice of concluding peace agreements. The fact however that the UNCC followed 
that practice does not render its decision more reasonable, especially if it was to signify 
a step forward in the tradition of post- war determination of reparation.
The duty of mitigation of environmental damage that is incumbent upon the states 
that brought claims before the UNCC also had a bearing on reparation. The UNCC 
acknowledged that claimants had a duty to mitigate environmental damage to the 
extent that it was possible and reasonable.91 The relevant test, therefore, was that ‘the 
claimant acted reasonably having regard to all the circumstances with which it was con-
fronted’.92 The Panel has for example proposed modifications to the proposed clean- up 
and remediation plans of the claimant so as to render it reasonable, thus lowering the 
cost of compensation payable by Iraq.93
Despite its shortcomings the UNCC did in fact manage to handle a large number 
of environmental damage related claims. The Eritrea– Ethiopia Commission on the 
other hand, did not discuss the problem of reparation for environmental damage since 
it dismissed the Ethiopia’s environmental claim due to lack of evidence. The Eritrea– 
Ethiopia Commission also did not offer any guidance as to the causal test that it would 
generally apply to the rest of the claims. The Eritrea– Ethiopia Commission made a gen-
eral proposition that the prevalent test in international law is that of proximity, a prop-
osition that is problematic.94 A number of tests have been used in international law, 
including the but- for test.95 The test of proximity refers more to the part of the causal 
inquiry that is informed by policy and normative considerations, such as reasonable-
ness and remoteness, than to a factual causation test.96
Despite the undeniable merits of the work of the UNCC, it is true that it is fraught 
with some problems. The exclusion of the allied forces’ contribution to the damage was 
particular problematic. The unclear criteria for accepting or rejecting the existence of 
a causal link between invasion and occupation on the one hand and the injury on the 
other are also a point of concern.97 Its mandate also did not allow the UNCC to indi-
cate for each head of damage which particular obligation did Iraq breach so as to ren-
der a clear picture of the scope of the primary rules. Everything was decided upon on 
the basis of the UNSC Resolution 687 that did not offer much detail either. An overall 
assessment would of course consider the fact that the UNCC did in fact award com-
pensation for environmental damage as a positive step. This, however, is not enough. 
More steps must be taken so as to clarify further the law of reparation for environmen-
tal damage in cases of shared responsibility.
90 Kolliopoulos (n 47) 412– 13.
91 UNCC, ‘F4’ Third Instalment, para. 43. 92 ibid.
93 UNCC, ‘F4’ Third Instalment, para. 118.
94 Eritrea– Ethiopia Commission, Decision 7 (27 July 2007) Guidance Regarding Jus Ad Bellum Liability, 
para. 13.
95 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 43, para. 462.
96 Kolliopoulos (n 47) 387.
97 To be fair this is a problem that permeates most decisions of international adjudicatory bodies.
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11.3.4  Some further challenges for jus post bellum
The ILC articles are designed to apply to states and international organizations. The 
articles do not capture the conduct of non- state groups that are becoming more and 
more important in armed conflict. This is of course not a problem of the articles them-
selves but rather of the majority of primary obligations that are simply not applicable 
on non- state actors. Even if an analogy could be drawn so as to engage the responsibil-
ity of non- state actors for breach of jus in bello, this would be possible only because IHL 
is indeed applicable to belligerent non- state actors.98 MEAs do not impose any obliga-
tions to non- state actors and it would be challenging to construct an obligation to make 
reparation stemming from a violation of jus ad bellum. Moreover, since in most cases 
non- state belligerents are engaged in combat in non- international armed conflicts it 
is somewhat awkward to demand from them reparation for environmental damage. 
In case they prevail and they take control of the state in question then the damage has 
been inflicted on the state itself. In the case of a successful separatist movement the 
obligation to provide reparation would make more sense but it would still be fraught 
with the above- mentioned problems.
Another question relates to the procedural aspects of awarding reparation. States 
have historically favoured claims commissions and arbitration over the ICJ for the 
award of reparation in post- conflict situations.99 While these commissions have man-
aged successfully numerous claims, with the UNCC being a prominent example of this 
practice, they pose some problems. First, their legal basis, as well as their competence 
and jurisdiction could be challenged.100 Second, they tend to devise procedural rules 
that in some instances, such as the UNCC, provide for limited rights for the defeated 
party in the conflict. These, of course, are wider problems of jus post bellum but they 
have a significant impact on reparation. Unless the process of administering justice in 
jus post bellum is streamlined so as to reflect a more fair attitude towards the defeated 
side, the law of state responsibility will not be able to be applied so as to effectively 
resolve most problems. Finally, states seem to refuse to take advantage of the ad hoc 
nature of the tribunals and commissions that award reparation:  they do not extend 
their jurisdiction so as to cover non- state actors and IOs that are excluded from the 
ICJ’s jurisdictional ambit.
One final question is whose perspective should prevail in assessing reparation for 
environmental damage. Environmental damage is qualitatively different from other 
types of harm occurring in armed conflict:  its impacts can be felt outside the geo-
graphical limits within which armed conflict takes place, therefore the victims might 
98 Marco Sassóli, ‘Taking Armed Groups Seriously:  Ways to Improve their Compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 1(1) Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 5, 46– 
50; Cedric Ryngaert and Anneleen van de Meulebroucke, ‘Enhancing and Enforcing Compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law by Non- State Armed Groups: An Inquiry into Some Mechanisms’ (2011) 
16(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 443, 464– 6.
99 The US– German Mixed Claims Commission as well as numerous other commissions awarding repa-
ration for damage incurred in insurrections (Venezuela, US– Mexico) support this finding.
100 For a discussion on the UNCC see Andrea Gattini, ‘The UN Compensation Commission: Old Rules, 
New Procedures on War Reparation’ (2002) 13(1) European Journal of International Law 161.
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be unrelated to the conflict both in terms of participation and in terms of geographic 
proximity.101 If one of the principles of jus post bellum is to avoid imposing ‘victor’s jus-
tice’ and to reach a humane apportionment of reparation,102 then the contribution to 
environmental harm of all participants should be taken into account. It is simply not 
satisfactory to exclude contribution to the damage on the basis of jus ad bellum and 
even jus in bello criteria.
11.4 Concluding Remarks
The problem of reparation in international law is complex. When armed conflict, envi-
ronmental damage, and a multiplicity of responsible states are added to the equation 
the problem becomes even more complex. Nonetheless a number of observations that 
might contribute towards clarity can be made.
The law of state responsibility, and consequently of reparation, does not operate 
in a vacuum. In order for responsibility to be engaged a primary obligation must be 
breached. This is a major source of confusion in the realm of jus post bellum repara-
tion for shared responsibility. There is no harmonization among the primary rules and 
there is not a customary rule that can unify the various environmental protection obli-
gations. This means that different actors are bound by different rules regarding the pro-
tection of the environment when they engage in armed conflict. The application of jus 
ad bellum could be seen as providing a limited solution to this problem, in the sense 
that its breach will engage the responsibility of the relevant actors and therefore they 
will bear the duty to make reparation for the damage they have caused. This solution 
is limited however since it might apply only to one side of the conflict and it does not 
account for the discrepancies that might occur if either side may benefit from a circum-
stance precluding wrongfulness.
Given the fragmented picture of primary rules, the law of responsibility can be of 
assistance only to the extent that some of these rules have been breached by all parties 
to the conflict. Then, the duty to make reparation will depend on whether the multi-
plicity of wrongdoing actors has breached the same or different obligations. In prin-
ciple if they have breached the same obligation then each member of the multiplicity 
will be under an obligation to make reparation for the whole damage. The same is true 
whenever the members of the multiplicity have committed separate wrongful acts con-
tributing to a single harmful outcome. The exception to this rule is when the damage 
can be causally divisible. In this case the apportionment of reparation should reflect 
each actor’s contribution. Nonetheless, this is easier said than done. The requirements 
for the establishment of a causal link are not clear in the jurisprudence and therefore 
it is hard to deduce a unified practice of courts and tribunals regarding this problem.
The practice regarding reparation for environmental damage in armed conflict is 
also limited. In reality it is only the UNCC that has provided for some insights as to 
101 In the 1990– 1 Gulf War the damage caused to the oil wells as well as the oil fires affected a large 
number of states either because they were geographically close, or because they committed resources to the 
containment of the damage, see UNCC Report ‘F4’ First and Second Installments.
102 Stahn (n 14) 338.
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how this damage can be compensated. Nonetheless, the UNCC, due to its mandate 
devised by the Security Council, could not delve into the problem of shared responsi-
bility. It also did not offer much in the limited cases of contribution to the harm by the 
claimant.
A more in- depth study of the primary rules and an attempt to deduce a unified 
body of rules relating to environmental protection in armed conflict would be a first 
step towards resolving some of these problems. The constituent instruments of ad hoc 
claims commissions should have a wider mandate relating to the number of wrongdo-
ing parties that can be brought before them. A wider mandate would be also useful 
regarding the applicable law before these judicial or quasi- judicial bodies. At the same 
time they should develop the appropriate causal standards as well as broader, and more 
appropriate, secondary rules that can capture the participation of all parties that are 
engaged in armed conflict. If such, rather improbable, progress is made, then the jus 
post bellum regarding shared responsibility and reparation for environmental damage 
in armed conflict might indeed better reflect fairness and justice.
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Conflict, Cash, and Controversy
Protecting Environmental Rights in Post- Conflict Settings
Jennifer S. Easterday and Hana Ivanhoe*
12.1 Introduction: Sustainable Development, Environmental 
Protection, and Jus Post Bellum
It is widely accepted that armed conflict can lead to a number of alarming environ-
mental problems.1 There is also a growing consensus that environmental degradation 
and mismanagement can lead to, or exacerbate, armed conflict.2 This is especially true 
where a country relies on the extractive industry for a significant portion of its revenue, 
and where large parts of the population depend on land and renewable resources for 
their livelihoods.3
The focus of this chapter is on the risks that environmental degradation and mis-
management pose in the post- conflict phase, during the transition from conflict to 
peace. During this phase, a failure to adequately respond to environmental challenges 
can lead to a renewal of armed conflict and generally undercut important peacebuild-
ing processes such as reconciliation, establishing strong political institutions, economic 
development, and creating trust in the government.4 Severe environmental degrada-
tion also poses a threat to people’s enjoyment of their basic human rights (e.g. right 
to life, water, and self- determination, among others). The deprivation of these human 
rights can then in turn serve as a destabilizing force to any new government, particu-
larly those of post- conflict countries.
In addition to mitigating a risk of return to conflict, natural resource and envi-
ronmental management can provide building blocks and opportunities for fostering 
* Jennifer S. Easterday is Co- founder and CEO of JustPeace Labs, a peacebuilding and technology 
NGO, and is a PhD Researcher in Law at Leiden University, Netherlands. Hana Ivanhoe is a Lecturer at UC 
Berkeley School of Law.
1 See, for example, UNEP, Sierra Leone: Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding Assessment of Sierra 
Leone (February 2010), 2 (finding that the conflict there had significantly damaged natural resources such 
as water and agricultural land).
2 See, for example, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development 
(UNDESA SD), Developing National Sustainable Development Strategies in Post- Conflict Countries (June 
2011), 20 (arguing that ‘Violent conflict can be detrimental to the environment, which can, in turn, exacer-
bate poverty and have ripple effects on the livelihoods of local populations.’).
3 David Jensen and Steve Lonergan, ‘Natural Resources and Post- Conflict Assessment, Remediation, 
Restoration, and Reconstruction: Lessons and Emerging Issues’ in David Jensen and Steve Lonergan (eds.), 
Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (London: Earthscan, 2012), 416.
4 Ken Conca and Jennifer Wallace, ‘Environment and Peacebuilding in War- Torn Societies: Lessons from 
the UN Environment Programme’s Experience with Post- Conflict Assessment’ in Jensen and Lonergan 
(n 3) 63.
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sustainable peace.5 Natural resources provide opportunities to develop sustainable live-
lihoods and are critical for the return and integration of refugees and displaced per-
sons. Moreover, high- value natural resources, such as mineral deposits, are used to 
generate quick income and restart the economy, providing a critical revenue stream 
for the government.6 In many post- conflict situations, there is a severe lack of gov-
ernment institutions that can deal with environmental protection or natural resources 
management.7 The institutions are often non- existent or significantly decimated. The 
strengthening or establishment of legitimate institutions involves capacity building, 
bureaucratic reform, and reforming legislative and policy frameworks.8
According to UNEP:
Managed well, natural resources can support economic development, create employ-
ment and revenues for the government thus supporting peacebuilding and sustainable 
development. Environmental management can be, for example, perceived as a low 
profile sector and create opportunities to foster multi- level and multi- group engage-
ment, cooperation and reconciliation.9
The pursuit of sustainable development is key to ensuring a peaceful and prosperous 
transition from conflict. According to the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (the Brundtland Commission), sustainable development is ‘development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs’.10 It aims to achieve a balance between three pillars that 
are critical in peacebuilding contexts: the need for economic recovery, sources of liveli-
hoods, and long- term environmental and social protections.
Sustainable development is a legal concept that has not achieved the status of bind-
ing hard law, but has been reflected in many sources of hard law. These sources include 
many treaties and conventions (such as the EU treaty, the Climate Change Convention, 
and the Biodiversity Convention) as well as the jurisprudence of international courts 
and tribunals. Sustainable development is also frequently invoked in soft law sources, 
including the Rio Declaration and policy papers of international organizations, such 
as the International Law Commission’s ‘Preliminary Report on the Protection of the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’.11 Moreover, it is increasingly found 
in national constitutions and legislation.12 Therefore, while it is still too vague and 
uncertain to be recognized as customary international law, it should be accepted as a 
5 UNDESA SD (n 2) 13 (Arguing that ‘Integrating environment and peacebuilding into national strate-
gies and planning processes fosters the creation of synergies and more effective policies to help prevent 
relapses into conflict. Especially in countries in which natural resources play a major role in conflict, sus-
tainable development can help overcome legacies of conflict. In other post- conflict countries, sustainable 
development folds in key elements of building a stable state and helps to identify policies, actions, and 
strategies that combine economic, social, and environmental goals and at the same time build peace.’).
6 UNEP, Integrating Environment in Post- Conflict Needs Assessments (UNEP, 2009), 14.
7 Conca and Wallace (n 4) 70– 1. 8 UNEP (n 6) 14.
9 UNDESA SD (n 2) 35. Internal citations removed.
10 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (United Nations, 1987) 
41, at <http:// www.un- documents.net/ our- common- future.pdf > accessed 7 May 2015.
11 Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ 674, 30 May 2014, paras. 125– 32.
12 Christopher Jeffords, ‘Constitutional Environmental Human Rights:  A  Descriptive Analysis of 142 
National Constitutions’ (2011) Working Paper 16, University of Connecticut Economic Rights Working 
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principle that can influence the development of international law and how it is inter-
preted and applied.
Sustainable development and environmental protection also provide opportunities 
to establish dialogue and create inclusive development processes. Effective manage-
ment of natural resources and environmental protection depend on the participation 
and buy- in from local populations. Those communities that are directly affected by 
pollution or the degradation of arable land from extractive industries, for example, 
should be brought into the debate about how to effectively manage and share the bene-
fits from the use of natural resources. This provides an opportunity to enhance dialogue 
between the general population and the government, build confidence and reconcil-
iation between divided communities, and mitigate other underlying grievances that 
might have contributed to the conflict.13
Economic stabilization and the regeneration of income are often top priorities of 
post- conflict states. Peacebuilding is expensive, and donors cannot cover all of the costs 
for very long. Peace processes related to the economy often focus on structural adjust-
ments and neoliberal reforms, and rely on natural resources— especially the extrac-
tive industry, where applicable— as a fast and easy revenue source.14 However, these 
reforms are not necessarily undertaken sustainably, especially with regards to environ-
mental quality. Environmental concerns are not a top priority, and as a result there may 
be inadequate environmental planning in aid and development schemes. In fact, it is 
often, at least in part, the lack of legislative and regulatory environmental protections 
in post- conflict countries that incentivizes the very rapid investment by multinational 
corporations (‘MNCs’). This, some argue, is a critical flaw.15
This chapter argues that sustainable development should be a key element of the 
jus post bellum normative framework. Jus post bellum focuses on the laws, norms, and 
practices applied during the transition from conflict to peace. Its goal is to foster a 
just and sustainable peace, and the concept can take on several different functions to 
that end. Jus post bellum is comprised of various international norms and also includes 
principles of interpretation for how to adopt these norms to particular post- conflict 
contexts and peacebuilding practices.16 The concept of sustainability links economic 
development with environmental protection, and requires that economic programmes 
be undertaken hand in hand with environmental governance in order to protect peo-
ple’s livelihoods and ensure long- term stability.17
Specifically, this chapter will examine issues of environmental protection as they 
relate to resource intensive economic development (e.g. via investment in the extractive 
Paper Series 22 (noting that the key words ‘future, generation, and sustainable development’ occurred in 
thirty- five different constitutions). See also Canada’s Federal Sustainable Development Act (S.C. 2008, c 33).
13 UNEP (n 6) 14. 14 Conca and Wallace (n 4) 75. 15 ibid.
16 For more on the concept of jus post bellum, see Carsten Stahn, ‘Mapping the Discipline(s)’ in Carsten 
Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace (The 
Hague:  TMC Asser, 2008), 93, 105; Inger Österdahl and Esther van Zadel, ‘What Will Jus Post Bellum 
Mean? Of New Wine and Old Bottles’ (2009) 14 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 175, 178; but see 
Kristen Boon, ‘Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of Jus Post Bellum’ (2009) 31 Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 57, 76 (defining jus post bellum more narrowly to ‘apply 
to the exercise of governmental and public powers by external entities such as IOs and foreign states’.).
17 Conca and Wallace (n 4) 75; UNDESA SD (n 2) 97.
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industry) post- conflict. It analyses the use of soft law norms in addressing the nexus 
between environmental challenges and economic development so as to include pri-
vate actors, such as multinational investors and corporations, in the peacebuilding pro-
ject. Section 12.2 discusses the connections between corporate social responsibility and 
environmental degradation. The following section examines the role of private cor-
porations during the transition from conflict to peace. It outlines several normative 
frameworks governing extraterritorial corporate behaviour and non- judicial forms of 
enforcement. Section 12.4 discusses how the UN and international financial organi-
zations can incorporate these voluntary frameworks into their peacebuilding projects 
and loans to organizations working in post- conflict situations. Section 12.5 discusses 
challenges and gaps in the existing normative frameworks. The chapter concludes by 
proposing that peacebuilders incorporate soft law norms and standards, in particular 
corporate social responsibility frameworks, as a part of a holistic jus post bellum to meet 
the challenges of post- conflict sustainable development and environmental protection.
12.2 Corporate Social Responsibility  
and Environmental Degradation
Given the potential for long- term damage resulting from environmental exploitation 
and poor natural resource management, it is vital that environmental management 
standards be part of any large- scale project involving natural resources, particularly 
those in post- conflict countries. Immediately post- conflict, resource- rich countries 
often rely on natural resource exploitation to rapidly restart the economy.18 Effective 
natural resource management early in the post- conflict transition can help build con-
fidence in the government and the peacebuilding project in general by providing reve-
nues to support peace dividends and create strong, legitimate government institutions. 
However, it is usually private corporations that undertake large development projects 
that rely on natural resources. Therefore, it is important for governments to have strong 
regulations in place to ensure these corporations adhere to sustainable development 
policies and provide environmental and social safeguards. With weak state institutions, 
potentially out- of- date legislation, and competing post- conflict priorities, however, this 
is difficult to guarantee in practice.
There is a need for increased regulation that balances sustainability with develop-
ment needs. According to UNEP:
The private sector can be a force for development, inject needed capital, and be less 
constrained than donors and governments. But an under- regulated, low- competition, 
post- conflict environment can give entrepreneurs significant power which they can 
misuse. It is important that corporate responsibility takes seriously the legacy of con-
flict and accompanying social divisions, inequities, and fears. A  balance has to be 
18 Oli Brown, Morgan Hauptfleisch, Haddijatou Jallow, and Peter Tarr, ‘Environmental Assessment as a 
Tool for Peacebuilding and Development: Initial Lessons from Capacity Building in Sierra Leone’ in Jensen 
and Lonergan (n 3) 332.
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achieved between private sector opportunities to maximize economic growth and 
ensure that regulation is equitable and sustainable.19
This regulation needs to be multipronged, coming from both international and domes-
tic law and incorporating both soft and hard law norms. This chapter will focus on the 
importance of including soft law norms such as corporate social responsibility, in addi-
tion to hard law, in post- conflict normative frameworks such as jus post bellum.
Corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’) generally refers to the overall contribution of 
businesses to sustainable development through measures that ensure that business is 
operated as sustainably, equitably, and ethically as possible.20 Some references to CSR 
focus on legal obligations or standards such as ‘do no harm’. Others call for a more pro-
active role, asking businesses to positively contribute to sustainable development or 
to align their business goals with societal goals.21 According to many definitions, CSR 
requires that companies do more than what is legally required of them by the laws of 
the countries in which they operate.22
CSR has a great deal to contribute to the jus post bellum framework. In particular, it 
captures the responsibilities of non- state actors (beyond armed groups) in the peace-
building phase in these countries in a way that other jus post bellum principles and 
standards are unable to. As discussed above, MNCs are important players in the post- 
conflict context, and to be fully holistic, jus post bellum cannot be limited to states, 
armed groups, and international organizations.
CSR initiatives are usually driven by investors, companies, interest groups (including 
NGOs), and consumers in developed countries. CSR is often transferred to develop-
ing countries through trade, investment, or development assistance.23 For example, in 
international trade, there are rising international environmental standards that must 
be met for export to OECD markets, such as the EU. In other cases, companies might 
require specific environmental certifications for their suppliers.24 With direct invest-
ment, some countries (such as Nigeria) might have legislation requiring foreign com-
panies to hire local workers or rely on local services. In addition, some companies 
initiate partnerships or capacity- building projects aiming to transfer knowledge and 
expertise to smaller, local companies.25
Many companies have shown great initiative in the area of CSR, but relying solely 
on private corporations to adopt sustainable procedures would likely be insufficient in 
the post- conflict context. There have been myriad efforts to promote CSR and develop 
19 UNDESA SD (n 2) 77.
20 This is notably distinct from corporate philanthropy, which encompasses contributions in cash or kind 
by corporations to local charitable causes in the communities in which they operate. For a more compre-
hensive definition of CSR and description of the economic factors at play in its development, see John 
F. Kennedy School of Government, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative: Defining Social Responsibility, 
at <http:// www.hks.harvard.edu/ m- rcbg/ CSRI/ init_ define.html> accessed 21 November 2014.
21 Halina Ward, Tom Fox, Emma Wilson, and Lyuba Zarsky, ‘CSR and Developing Countries:  What 
Scope for Government Action?’ (February 2007) UN Sustainable Development Innovation Brief 1.
22 See, for example, Abigail McWilliams, Donald S. Siegel, and Patrick M. Wright, ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility:  International Perspectives’ (March 2006), Working Papers in Economics, Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute, at <http:// www.economics.rpi.edu/ workingpapers/ rpi0604.pdf> accessed 20 
June 2017.
23 Ward et al. (n 21) 1. 24 ibid. 4. 25 ibid. 3.
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productive relationships with private corporations operating in post- conflict soci-
eties.26 Other ways to engage with CSR include by incorporating CSR requirements 
into overarching policy frameworks related to trade, investment, the use of natural 
resources, and environmental protection. As this chapter will attempt to show, these 
roles and tools are important not just for the post- conflict government itself but also for 
international organizations, aid agencies, and donors. To be sure, there are significant 
implementation challenges, competing priorities, and risks to this approach. However, 
these are critical connections to foster under a truly holistic conception of jus post 
bellum.
12.3 Ensuring Corporate Social Responsibility  
and Respect for Human and Environmental Rights  
in Post- Conflict Countries
This chapter will now turn to an examination of the role of the private sector (primarily 
MNCs) in post- conflict countries in the peacebuilding and development stage. As the 
trend towards globalization continues, MNCs consider constant expansion into new 
and emerging markets as an increasingly necessary component of any successful busi-
ness model. It is also seen as a necessary tool for development.27 As discussed above, 
bringing MNCs into the post- conflict development plan has the potential to serve as a 
positive force for both investors and investees, provided any such investment is made 
responsibly. Those who deny the role of private sector investment in the development 
of post- conflict countries notably tend to fail to propose viable alternatives for provid-
ing the necessary capital for such investment and development.28
Unfortunately, private sector companies can also, through their actions, degrade the 
environments of the fragile post- conflict countries in which they operate in a manner 
that itself contributes to a resurgence of conflict. And while domestic and international 
stakeholders clamour for increased commercialization and heightened private- sector 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to support this commercialization, competing voices 
point to sometimes violent forced evictions, allegations of indigenous land rights viola-
tions, and environmental degradation resulting from the effects of mining, oil and gas 
extraction, and agro- industrialization.29 Private FDI in post- conflict countries is now 
26 See, for example, Juliette Bennett, ‘Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict’ 
(2002) 55 Journal of International Affairs 393.
27 For example, many academics and government officials within Africa are calling loudly for such pri-
vate sector investment. At a 2013 meeting of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, 
the vice president of the Pan African parliament, honorable Roger Nkodo Dang of Cameroon, argued for 
foreign investment in the ‘industrialization of agriculture’ in Africa. Ruth Hall, Stop Selling off African 
land— Invest in Farmers Instead, The Guardian (23 January 2014), at <http:// www.theguardian.com/ global- 
development- professionals- network/ 2014/ jan/ 23/ land- deals- africa- farming- investment> accessed 20 
June 2017.
28 See, for example, Klaus Deininger and Derek Byerlee with Jonathan Lindsay, Andrew Norton, Harris 
Selod, and Mercedes Stickler, ‘Rising Global Interest in Farmland— Can it Yield Sustainable and Equitable 
Benefits?’ (Agriculture and Rural Development, The World Bank, 2011).
29 For a more thorough analysis of this debate, see Lorenzo Cotula, Sonja Vermeulen, Rebeca Leonard, 
and James Keeley, Land Grab or Development Opportunity? Agricultural Investment and International Land 
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occurring at an increasing rate and as a result it is necessary to examine the environ-
mental effects of that investment.
Post- conflict countries also tend to lack a well established rule of law and are often 
grappling with a somewhat tenuous government infrastructure— the legitimacy of 
which could even be in question at the time new FDI is initiated. Domestic legislation 
may be out of date or may not include CSR or relevant environmental regulations. This 
makes it necessary to look for other sources of regulation to help mitigate the risks of 
a return to conflict from MNC- caused environmental degradation, including interna-
tional CSR soft law norms.
12.3.1  Normative frameworks governing adverse impacts 
of extraterritorial corporate behaviour
As discussed, post- conflict countries often lack an established rule of law and therefore 
fail to legislatively protect against corporate malfeasance or sufficiently enforce such 
legislation. This is due to a combination of factors, including but not limited to insuf-
ficient financial resources and endemic corruption.
It is the prevailing view that existing international legal standards and frameworks 
governing the protection of environmental and human rights, as well as the courts and 
tribunals that might ensure the enforcement of those rights, are fairly ineffectual at pro-
viding legal remedies in these areas because they impose legal obligations exclusively on 
states, not corporations.30 These treaties and international courts and tribunals are gen-
erally not considered to bind corporations because corporations are not state actors.31
The last decade, however, has marked the emergence of a number of voluntary nor-
mative frameworks seeking to govern the behaviour of private sector actors in for-
eign jurisdictions. These normative frameworks share many of the same central 
tenants which are primarily derived from the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights:  Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework (the ‘Ruggie Framework’ or the ‘Framework’), the first of the standards to 
be discussed below:
• Corporate duty to respect human rights extra- territorially
• Human rights due diligence
• Non- judicial grievance mechanisms
Deals in Africa (FAO, IIED and IFAD, 2009), 100– 02, at <http:// www.fao.org/ 3/ a- ak241e.pdf> accessed 20 
June 2017.
30 David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, ‘From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities 
for Corporations at International Law’ (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931, 937.
31 Emeka Duruigbo, ‘Corporate Accountability and Liability for International Human Rights 
Abuses: Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges’ (2008) 6 Northwestern Journal of International Human 
Rights 222. It should be noted that instances in which corporations are complicit in violations of interna-
tional criminal law as well as certain other occurrences may constitute exceptions to this general rule. The 
limited scope of this chapter does not allow for a thorough examination of whether corporations may be 
held liable for violations of international human rights laws in US courts under the Alien Tort Statue or 
for aiding and abetting human rights violations that amount to a violation of international criminal law. 
These discussions are beyond the scope of this piece. For a thorough evaluation of these questions, see, 
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Given their voluntary nature, all such frameworks proposed to date lack judicial 
enforcement mechanisms and (in many instances) any form of grievance body. As a 
result, they tend to serve primarily as suggested standards and perhaps lend themselves 
to efforts at the establishment of agreed upon principles, but do not fulfil the more tra-
ditional role of enforceable law. Moreover, none of these standards specifically address 
the matter of corporate intervention in jus post bellum contexts. As will be discussed at 
length later in this chapter, this represents a significant governance gap in the applica-
bility and coverage of these standards.
The normative frameworks that are most effective and relevant to environmental 
degradation are discussed below.
A.  UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Framework
In the spring of 2008, John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the Secretary- 
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises (the ‘SRSG’) proposed a new approach to understanding and 
enforcing a corporation’s duty to respect human rights throughout its global supply 
chains. Three years later, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed the SRSG’s three- 
pronged Framework.32
The Framework is premised on three basic tenets: protect, respect, and remedy.33 
Specifically, states have a duty to protect human rights, corporations have a responsi-
bility to respect human rights, and victims of human rights violations have a right to 
access remedies.34
The linchpin of the Framework, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, 
originates from a solid and meaningful foundation.35 It does not create new human 
rights obligations, but instead articulates existing duties within a cohesive template:
The Guiding Principles’ normative contribution lies not in the creation of new inter-
national law obligations but in elaborating the implications of existing standards and 
practices for states and businesses; integrating them within a single, logically coherent 
for example, Doug Cassel, ‘Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the 
Courts’ (2008) 6 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 304.
32 See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the SRSG:  Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights:  Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework. A/ HRC/ 17/ 31, 21 
March 2011.
33 UN Office Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: a 
Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General 
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. A/ HRC/ 8/ 
5, 7 April 2008.
34 ibid.
35 See, for example, David Bilchitz, ‘The Ruggie Framework: An Adequate Rubric for Corporate Human 
Rights Obligations?’ (2010) 7 Sur International Journal on Human Rights 199; Robert C. Blitt, ‘Beyond 
Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate 
Human Rights Compliance’ (2013) 48 Texas International Law Journal 34, 52– 6; UN Office Human 
Rights Council, Promotion of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human 
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and comprehensive template; and identifying where the current regime falls short and 
how it could be improved.36
The duty borne by all businesses to respect human rights means that they must (i) avoid 
infringing on human rights, and (ii) address adverse human rights impacts in which 
they are involved in any way.37 These duties to respect and address human rights apply 
not only to the direct acts of the parent company, but also to the acts and actions of all 
of its subsidiaries, suppliers, and employees. This is the case even where the company 
has not directly contributed to the adverse impacts, thereby effectively requiring that 
a company take proactive and preventative responsibility for affirmatively respecting 
human rights throughout its supply chain.38
Although the corporate respect requirement codified in the Framework is often 
viewed as a ‘do no harm’ standard, it also gives rise to a number of active duties. Among 
these, the due diligence requirement by which companies must ‘manage human rights 
harm with a view to avoiding it’ is perhaps most noteworthy.39 The due diligence duty 
requires that companies take tangible and measurable steps to ‘become aware of, 
address and prevent human rights impacts’.40 It may also be deemed to mandate the 
adoption of grievance mechanisms by which affected parties can lodge complaints and 
seek redress for rights infringements.41
While there are still significant governance gaps in the protection of human rights 
vis- à- vis MNC behaviour, under the Framework corporations are complying with 
human rights standards in a way that they were not doing before the introduction of 
the Framework’s guidelines.42 The Framework has also influenced the drafting of sev-
eral similar normative guidelines, which are discussed below.
B.  Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure
In 2012, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization endorsed the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (the ‘Tenure Guidelines’).43 
Similar to the Ruggie Framework, the Tenure Guidelines are not hard law and are 
entirely voluntary. Additionally, the Tenure Guidelines refer exclusively to matters of 
land tenure and therefore are limited in their application to protecting human and 
Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, A/ HRC/ 11/ 13, 22 April 2009, para. 46.
36 John Ruggie, ‘Presentation of Report to United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva’ 30 May 2011, 
at http:// business- humanrights.org/ media/ documents/ ruggie- statement- to- un- human- rights- council- 30- 
may- 2011.pdf accessed 7 March 2014.
37 ibid. para. 11. 38 ibid. para. 13.
39 UN Office Human Rights Council (n 35) para. 59; UN Office Human Rights Council (n 33) para. 25.
40 UN Office Human Rights Council (n 35) para. 56.
41 UN Office Human Rights Council (n 35) para. 59.
42 For a more in depth discussion of the argument that voluntary private sector regulations of corporate 
conduct are not a sufficient substitute for state- based regulatory enforcement, see David Vogel, ‘The Private 
Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct: Achievement and Limitations’ (2010) 49 Business & Society 68.
43 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (2012).
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environmental rights to instances in which such rights are threatened as a result of land 
misuse or management.
They are, however, significant in that they address ‘non- state actors’ generally and 
MNCs specifically.44 While referencing ‘non- state’ actors eleven times, the Tenure 
Guidelines primarily focus on what states can and should do to ensure adherence 
to proper tenure practices in land acquisitions. ‘Business enterprises’ are explicitly 
addressed only once:
3.2 Non- state actors including business enterprises have a responsibility to respect 
human rights and legitimate tenure rights. Business enterprises should act with due 
diligence to avoid infringing on the human rights and legitimate tenure rights of oth-
ers. They should include appropriate risk management systems to prevent and address 
adverse impacts on human rights and legitimate tenure rights. Business enterprises 
should provide for and cooperate in non- judicial mechanisms to provide remedy, 
including effective operational- level grievance mechanisms, where appropriate, where 
they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts on human rights and legitimate 
tenure rights. Business enterprises should identify and assess any actual or potential 
impacts on human rights and legitimate tenure rights in which they may be involved.
As one author has observed, there is a tension inherent in the Tenure Guidelines’ pro-
visions constraining corporate actors: the Guidelines have been drafted so as to both 
maximize foreign investment in developing countries as well as ensure the protection 
and valid use of the land and resources and safeguard against environmental damage.45
The provisions prescribed in the Tenure Guidelines and the application of the cor-
porate duty to respect strongly echo the Ruggie Framework. The references to due 
diligence, risk management systems, and (non- judicial) grievance mechanisms are par-
ticularly noteworthy in this regard. In fact, in many ways the Tenure Guidelines excerpt 
and apply more specifically to matters of land use the corporate responsibilities already 
outlined in the Ruggie Framework.
C.  Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment in the Context of Food 
Security and Nutrition
Much like the Tenure Guidelines, the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment 
in the Context of Food Security and Nutrition46 (the ‘Principles for Responsible Ag’) 
include provisions prescribing the behaviour of business enterprises that clearly draw 
upon the concepts and principles of the Ruggie Framework. Again, like with the 
Tenure Guidelines, and as indicated by the highly specified name, the Principles for 
Responsible Ag are limited in scope to agricultural companies and sustainability. They 
too seem to take the language of business’ responsibility to respect introduced in the 
44 ibid.
45 Jared Wigginton, ‘Large Scale Land Investment in Africa: an Issue of Self- Help and Self- Determination’ 
(2013) 20 UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 105.
46 Committee on World Food Security, FAO, Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) in 
the context of food security and nutrition Zero Draft (2013).
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Ruggie Framework and apply it in a more specified context. They also build on and sup-
plement the Tenure Guidelines.47
The Principles for Responsible Ag outline the explicit role and responsibilities of 
business enterprises (as compared to other stakeholders) with respect to foreign agri-
cultural investment advising that businesses ‘apply the Principles with a focus on miti-
gating and managing risks to maximize positive and avoid negative impacts on food 
security and nutrition’ which are threatened in the long- term by the propagation of 
unsustainable farming practices.48
The language, however, is not particularly strong. It requires MNCs to comply with 
the domestic laws of the countries in which they are doing business, which is of course 
already required as a matter of basic compliance and is additionally legally enforce-
able, and ‘any applicable international law’. It is entirely unclear what this would refer to 
since the question of whether and which international law(s) apply to business enter-
prises is highly debated and largely undecided.
Like the Tenure Guidelines, the Principles also restate companies’ responsibility 
to act with due diligence to avoid human rights violations first posited in the Ruggie 
Framework.49 The Principles also ‘encourage’ companies to transact their operations 
equitably and transparently and ‘support efforts to track the supply chain’.50
Very little has been written to date regarding the effect or effectiveness of the 
Principles for Responsible Ag. This is primarily because the Principles were only very 
recently (15 October 2014) finalized and approved by the Committee on World Food 
Security of the FAO (CFS), demonstrative of the evolving nature of the field of business 
and human rights.51
D.  OECD Guidelines
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (the ‘OECD Guidelines’) again adopts much of the same lan-
guage as the Ruggie Framework. In particular, the OECD Guidelines encourage MNCs 
to respect human rights throughout their supply chains regardless of the laws of the 
jurisdictions in which they operate, conduct risk- based due diligence, and prevent or 
mitigate an adverse impact where that impact is ‘directly linked to their operations, 
products or services by a business relationship’ even when they have not caused that 
impact.52
With respect to environmental responsibility, the OECD Guidelines state that MNCs 
should contribute to economic progress ‘with a view to achieving sustainable develop-
ment’.53 Even more rigorously, the OECD Guidelines encourage companies to establish 
47 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Principles for responsible agriculture 
and food investments are approved (2014), at <http:// www.fao.org/ news/ story/ en/ item/ 260518/ icode/ > 
accessed 20 June 2017.
48 Committee on World Food Security, FAO, Principles (n 46) para. 50. 49 ibid.
50 ibid. para. 51.
51 Smita Narula, ‘The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights and the Politics of Food’ (2013) 49 Stanford 
Journal of International Law 101.
52 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing, 2013). 53 ibid.
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and maintain systems of environmental management and formulate plans for the pre-
vention, mitigation, and control of serious environmental damage resulting from their 
operations with the goal of avoiding adverse environmental impacts where possible.54 
The OECD Guidelines also encourage environmental impact assessments.55
The OECD Guidelines, as compared to the other normative frameworks discussed in 
this section, are particularly noteworthy for the manner in which they seek to establish 
an independent monitoring and implementation mechanism in the form of the OECD 
National Contact Points (‘NCPs’). The NCPs provide a ‘mediation and conciliation plat-
form’ for resolving disputes under the Guidelines as they arise.56 Upon hearing com-
plaints from interested parties, the NCP seeks advice from informed stakeholders and 
mediates the dispute. The NCP then produces a report with the terms of the agreement 
if the parties agree or with recommendations for resolution of the dispute if the parties 
do not agree.57 Unfortunately, there is no mechanism for legal enforcement of the agree-
ment or the NCP’s recommendations, so it is up to the parties to voluntarily determine 
whether they will constrain themselves by the terms of the agreement or recommenda-
tions. The NCPs, however, still present a more robust mechanism for hearing human and 
environmental rights grievances than exists under any of the other frameworks to date.
There is, however, a good deal of uncertainty as to the NCPs’ accountability and trans-
parency. The NCPs are housed in the respective nations’ party to the OECD Guidelines, 
but as international legal bodies, they are not governed by those nations’ governments. 
In addition, the NCPs do not provide universal or comprehensive coverage; only par-
ties to the OECD Guidelines have NCPs and many if not most of the developing coun-
tries effected by environmental degradation resulting from MNC investment are not 
parties to the OECD Guidelines. By way of example, only two African nations have 
NCPs: Egypt and Morocco.58
12.3.2  Non- judicial enforcement of these frameworks
Precisely because the various normative frameworks discussed above lack sufficient 
enforcement mechanisms, the CSR movement has emerged as a viable, if not ideal, alter-
native to traditional legal or judicial enforcement. CSR plays an important role here not 
only for the potential that it offers to improve the level of environmental sustainability of 
MNCs’ operations in foreign jurisdictions, but because, for better or worse, it’s all there is.
As discussed above, companies have many reasons (including profit motivation) for 
acting in a responsible manner.59 In the absence of an enforceable, hard- law framework 
for preventing and, where necessary, adjudicating instances of corporate aggression or 
complicity in the perpetration of environmental degradation and related human rights 
abuses, therefore, CSR may be viewed as a potential tool or mechanism for non- judicial 
enforcement of the voluntary normative frameworks for protecting human and envi-
ronmental rights in investee countries outlined above.
54 ibid. 55 ibid. Chapter VI, para. 3. 56 ibid. Chapter I, para. 1.
57 Wigginton (n 45). 58 ibid.
59 See, for example, Archie B. Carroll and Kareem M. Shabana, ‘The Business Case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice’ (2010) International Journal of Management 
Reviews 85.
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In the four years since its endorsement, the Ruggie Framework has become widely 
known and subscribed to, in large part as a result of voluntary compliance by some of 
the world’s largest and most powerful companies.60 Companies are increasingly creating 
human rights policies that heavily draw on the recommendations in the Framework.61
Indeed, many feel that the UN consensus around the Framework, combined with 
the tacit agreement by certain (if not the majority of) major multinational firms to 
comply with and operationalize its principles, is giving rise to the emergence of rec-
ognized ‘global standards on business and human rights’ whereby companies have an 
affirmative duty to respect human rights through appropriate due diligence measures 
that include some sort of grievance mechanism.62
The same trend has been observed, albeit to a lesser degree, specifically in the realm 
of environmental impact. In 2014, the New York Times highlighted the ‘greening’ of 
major US companies’ manufacturing facilities in Vietnam and throughout Asia.63 
Foreign corporations operating in the region have begun voluntarily adopting more 
stringent standards than required by domestic law for a range of environmental indi-
cators, including water consumption, wastewater management, energy efficiency, and 
carbon dioxide emissions offsets.64 The companies credit economic efficiencies, risk 
mitigation, and public relations considerations (i.e. consumer image) for the chang-
ing trend.65 The article demonstrates the increased recognition and awareness of the 
Framework’s duty to respect human rights (including the due diligence and grievance 
mechanism requirements) as applied to environmental matters and the different ways 
in which the duty has been operationalized at the corporate level.
As mentioned above, none of the existing voluntary frameworks governing corpo-
rate malfeasance in extraterritorial environmental degradation address instances of 
such degradation in specifically post- conflict contexts. Similarly, NGOs and activists 
monitoring and effectively regulating this space have to date failed to sufficiently draw 
attention to the special circumstances of corporate investment in post- conflict con-
texts. This topic will be further taken up in the next section.
12.3.3  Corporate social responsibility and normative  
frameworks governing corporate behaviour in recently  
post- conflict settings
Given that the focus of this chapter is primarily on duties when actors are intervening in post- 
conflict countries, it is important to examine the application of these normative frameworks 
60 For one prominent illustrative example of voluntary corporate compliance by a large multinational 
company, see the Coca- Cola example. Coca- Cola Company, Human and Workplace Rights, at <http:// 
www.coca- colacompany.com/ our- company/ human- workplace- rights> accessed 7 March 2014.
61 Ilse Griek, ‘UN Forum on Human Rights:  Assessing the Ruggie Framework’ (February 
2013) Sustainalytics Reporter, Issue No. 13.
62 See, for example, Chris Jochnick and Nina Rabaeus, ‘Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New 
UN Framework Meets Texaco in the Amazon’ (2010) 33 Suffolk University Law Review 413.
63 Mike Ives, ‘Slowly, Asia’s Factories Begin to Turn Green’ (New  York Times, 7 January 2014), at 
http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2014/ 01/ 08/ business/ international/ asian- factories- see- sense- and- savings- in- 
environmental- certification.html accessed 20 June 2017.
64 ibid. 65 ibid.
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to instances of environmental rights violations in recently post- conflict settings. As one 
author aptly surmised, ‘while governments have the primary concern in preventing vio-
lent conflict, businesses and financial institutions have an important role to play in avoid-
ing or resolving conflicts that are associated with economic production’.66 Unfortunately, 
as noted throughout the previous section, very few of the existing frameworks for business 
and human and environmental rights provide for conflict- specific measures.
The Ruggie Framework acknowledges the uniquely high- stakes circumstances pre-
sented by conflict and post- conflict settings for the protection of human rights, but 
considers the effects of conflict only in the context of state, not corporate duties.67 The 
Framework states in pertinent part ‘because the risk of gross human rights abuses is 
heightened in conflict- affected areas, States should help ensure that business enter-
prises operating in those contexts are not involved with such abuses’.68 Although this 
protection references the role of business in high- risk conflict- affected areas, it fails to 
establish a corporate duty to protect against such abuses in line with the other more 
explicit corporate duties outlined in the Framework, given that the language is directed 
exclusively towards state actors. In addition, the due diligence requirement could also 
come into play in operationalizing the respect duty in conflict settings. As explored 
above, companies should complete basic due diligence (e.g. complete environmen-
tal risk assessments) before they enter new markets to ensure that their investment 
and operations there will not adversely affect the environment. However, although not 
specified in the Framework, these assessments should explicitly address risks specific 
to the transition from conflict to peace.
At least in part because the framework fails to comprehensively address the issue of 
the corporate duty to respect in post- conflict settings, voluntary standards designed 
to address these issues have begun cropping up. These voluntary standards, however, 
more closely resemble public- private sector (or just private sector) multi- stakeholder 
initiatives than normative frameworks. Multi- stakeholder initiatives (‘MSIs’) can be 
any sort of collaborative initiative that brings together (often disparate) interests with a 
shared objective. Such initiatives may draft sets of standards/ provisions that guide the 
actions of their members (i.e. a corporate code of conduct), but they are just as likely to 
be loose affiliations of stakeholders that meet on a regular basis to debate and deliberate 
about a chosen subject. The most successful MSIs generally include members of both 
the for- and not- for- profit communities. MSIs in the area of responsible supply chains 
and business operations abroad may or may not give rise to independent third- party 
certification schemes that serve as assurance mechanisms. But many do not, in which 
case their utility for constraining corporate malfeasance is highly questionable.69 Two 
relevant MSIs are discussed below.
66 Juliette Bennett, ‘Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict’ (2002) 55(2) Journal 
of International Affairs Columbia University 393– 414.
67 John Ruggie, ‘United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,’ 21 March 2011, para. 
11, at http:// www.business- humanrights.org/ media/ documents/ ruggie/ ruggie- guiding- principles- 21- mar- 
2011.pdf accessed June 2017.
68 ibid.
69 See generally Justine Nolan, ‘With Power Comes Responsibility:  Human Rights and Corporate 
Accountability’ (2010) University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 2010, Working Paper 
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A.  The Equator Principles
Drafted by a group of commercial banks engaged in project finance, the Equator 
Principles is a framework for ‘determining, assessing and managing environmental and 
social risk in projects’ with the objective of setting a minimum baseline for due dili-
gence and responsible decision- making.70
The Equator Principles contain a number of sustainable development standards. 
For example, they require development project sponsors for high- risk (e.g. conflict- 
affected) projects to conduct and publically disclose, in a culturally appropriate man-
ner, an environmental and social impact assessment (‘ESIA’); demonstrate effective 
stakeholder engagement; establish a grievance mechanism for complaints by affected 
communities; and openly and transparently submit public reports on the ESIA and 
Equator Principle financial transactions.71 These voluntary standards are applicable 
to projects in any sector and have gained significant traction since their creation.72 
Although the standards are voluntary, some commercial banks have made compliance 
a condition of project loans.73
The standards can ensure that predictable risks associated with natural resource 
use, including environmental damage and social harm, are identified and mitigated. 
Adopting and adhering to these types of soft law standards could help to improve the 
companies’ reputations and bottom lines or trigger a cultural change within them.74 
Due to their voluntary nature, however, the extent to which they are able to promote 
meaningful environmental and social change is fully dependent on the discretion of the 
banks and is therefore suspect.
B.  The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (the ‘Voluntary Principles’) 
are a voluntary set of standards and guidelines for extractives industry companies 
11, 589– 90. Some supplier codes of conduct are legally enforceable against the supplier parties (i.e. where 
those codes are incorporated into the contracts between company and supplier). See also, Muhammad 
Azizul Islam and Ken McPhail, ‘Regulating for Corporate Human Rights Abuses:  The Emergence of 
Corporate Reporting on the ILO’s Human Rights Standards within the Global Garment Manufacturing and 
Retail Industry’ (2011) 22 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 790, 806.
70 Equator Principles Website, at <http:// www.equator- principles.com> accessed 1 May 2015.
71 The Equator Principles, June 2013, at <http:// www.equator- principles.com/ resources/ equator_ princi-
ples_ III.pdf> accessed 31 August 2014.
72 For example, as of 2014 there were eighty Equator Principles Financial Institutions in thirty- four coun-
tries, covering an estimated 70 per cent of project finance debt in emerging markets. Equator Principles 
website, at <http:// www.equator- principles.com/ index.php/ about- ep/ about- ep> accessed 31 August 2014. 
See also Christopher Wright, ‘Global Banks, the Environment, and Human Rights:  The Impact of the 
Equator Principles on Lending Policies and Practices’ (2012) 12 Global Environmental Politics 56, 62; Bank 
Track, ‘Close the Gap: Benchmarking Credit Policies of International Banks (June 2010).
73 Jill Shankleman, ‘Mitigating Risks and Realizing Opportunities: Environmental and Social Standards 
for Foreign Direct Investment in High- Value Natural Resources’ in Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad, High- 
Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding (Abingdon, UK: Earthscan, 2012), 49, 50.
74 Cynthia A. Williams, ‘Regulating the Impacts of International Project Financing:  the Equator 
Principles’ (2013) 107 American Society of International Law Proceedings 303, 306.
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created by an industry MSI. Among other things, the Voluntary Principles require rig-
orous and comprehensive risk assessments for potential security risks, human rights 
violations, and violence.75
The Voluntary Principles are particularly noteworthy in that they refer explicitly to 
conflict scenarios and related security issues. However, the emphasis of the Voluntary 
Principles is on corporate use and employment of security forces to protect their 
investments and staff safety; human rights protections related to their operations are 
addressed only secondarily in the Voluntary Principles. For example, the Voluntary 
Principles provide that companies should support government transparency regard-
ing their security forces and ‘communicate their policies regarding ethical conduct and 
human rights to public security providers’.76
Perhaps most relevantly, the Voluntary Principles encourage companies to promote 
the following principles:
(a) individuals credibly implicated in human rights abuses should not provide security 
services for Companies; (b) force should be used only when strictly necessary and to 
an extent proportional to the threat; and (c) the rights of individuals should not be vio-
lated while exercising the right to exercise freedom of association and peaceful assem-
bly, the right to engage in collective bargaining, or other related rights of Company 
employees as recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.77
The Voluntary Principles are certainly notable in that they address the interaction 
between corporate investment on the one hand and conflict and security on the other, 
but they are severely limited in that they (i) apply exclusively to extractive companies, 
and (ii) are oriented around the protection and security of the MNCs’ interests as their 
primary objective.
C.  The International Finance Corporation Social and Environmental  
Performance Standards
The International Finance Corporation Social and Environmental Performance 
Standards (‘IFC- PS’) were established in 2006 by the IFC in consultation with MNCs, 
donor countries, donor agencies, and other entities. They create a comprehensive sys-
tem for identifying social and environmental risks of IFC projects. The IFC- PS require 
a four- step process of assessment, defining actions, monitoring, and reassessment.78 
The assessment requires identification of the potential impacts of the project, risks to 
the environment and local communities, and risks that the environment and social 
situation pose to the project. The IFC- PS also incorporate elements of dialogue and 
consultation:  recipients of IFC financing must engage with affected communities 
through consultation and disclosure, and must develop and implement a Stakeholder 
75 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Website, at http:// www.voluntaryprinciples.org/ 
what- are- the- voluntary- principles/ accessed 1 May 2015.
76 ibid.   77 ibid.   78 Shankleman (n 73) 59.
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Engagement Plan.79 Further, companies must establish a monitoring and measure-
ment programme and provide periodic progress reports to affected communities, and 
in some circumstances, compensate or offset risks and impacts to affected communities 
and the environment.80 The IFC- PS place responsibility for some aspects of the assess-
ment and management of environmental and social risks on the government or other 
third parties, where the recipient of the financing does not have control or influence.81 
Although the standards address several possible conflict triggers, such as acquiring 
land, pollution, natural resource access, and community safety, they do not require 
proactive steps to improve projects’ benefits to local communities. 82
12.4 UN and International Financial Organizations
Beyond international normative (but voluntary) frameworks and domestic legal 
reform incorporating CSR standards (but often lacking sufficient resources or will for 
enforcement), there are several methods to ensure sustainable development and envi-
ronmental protection in the post- conflict phase. We propose that international actors— 
specifically the UN and international financial organizations (IFOs)— incorporate an 
expanded application of the CSR standards discussed above into their peacebuilding 
policies and loan agreements with MNCs and domestic governments.
Sometimes the UN can provide a critical entry point for CSR— for example, through 
a UN multi- donor trust fund or UN work plans. Sensitizing UN agencies working in a 
variety of sectors, including the extractive industries, agriculture, and livelihood recov-
ery, about CSR can lead to positive results and future effects, although they also depend 
on the political will of the domestic government to carry them forward. In addition, 
increased environmental awareness can impact UN development assistance frame-
works, priorities, and budgets.
According to one study, successfully incorporating CSR into the work of UN agen-
cies requires:
1. Consistent categorization of environmental impacts from the outset, including 
a clear allocation of responsibility. The categorization of environmental issues 
should, whenever possible, be undertaken directly by project implementers as 
opposed to third parties.
2. Environmental screening applied to all projects, including humanitarian and 
development. This will help identify sectors that pose the biggest risks to the 
environment.
3. Project information records should include more data, including geographic 
locations, in order to facilitate review and analysis of environmental impacts and 
cumulative effects.
79 IFC, ‘Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability’ (2012) 13 (Performance 
Standard 1).
80 ibid. 3. 81 ibid. 5. 82 Shankleman (n 73) 60.
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4. Capacity- building assistance should be provided as appropriate to domestic 
stakeholders in order to support the identification and mitigation of environ-
mental threats in particularly risky sectors.83
Beyond the UN and other large donor and aid agencies, there are other opportuni-
ties to enforce standards of sustainable development and environmental protection. 
International pressure, including through UN Security Council sanctions, to meet 
minimum standards is one. International programmes that give privilege to export 
markets that comply with minimum standards is another option. Financial institutions 
provide another option for requiring minimum CSR standards, and will be the focus 
of this section.
One scholar has noted that:
While financial institutions have tended to oppose new financial regulations that 
restrict or impose costs on their own financial activities, many have issued public sup-
port for international environmental policies and regulations that aim to regulate the 
activities of the companies they are invested in. This suggests that long- term investors 
represent a nascent environmental policy constituency that could play an increasingly 
influential role in shaping global environmental governance through their financing 
activities and engagement with policy- makers and standard- setters.84
Indeed, many aid agencies and financing institutions have developed environmen-
tal and social standards as requirements for funding.85 The World Bank, for example, 
required countries to develop National Environmental Action Plans in order to receive 
soft loans, although this policy was later relaxed. These helped identify and prioritize 
environmental problems and specified different solutions, whether institutional, pol-
icy, or investment- related.86 Unfortunately, however, many environmental and human 
rights advocates have criticized the World Bank’s policies as inconsistently applied and 
inadequate for the protection of environmental and human rights.87
Financial institutions can influence both the public and private sectors. For example, 
national debts can be cancelled or reduced to relieve pressure on post- conflict govern-
ments to hastily generate income through natural resource exploitation.88 Financial 
institutions can also implement minimum standards in loan agreements both with 
states and with private companies. Through donor conditionality agreements, donors 
83 Jensen and Lonergan (n 3) 440– 1.
84 Christopher Wright, ‘Global Finance and the Environment’ in Robert Falkner (ed.), The Handbook of 
Global Climate and Environmental Policy (Hoboken: Wiley, 2013), 428, 442.
85 Siri Aas Rustad, Päivi Lujala, and Philippe Le Billon, ‘Building or Spoiling peace? Lessons from the 
Management of High- value Natural Resources’ in Lujala and Rustad (n 73) 571, 604; Shankleman (n 73).
86 UNDESA SD (n 2) 104– 5.
87 See, for example, ‘OXFAM, World Bank Safeguards Review— Oxfam Submission to Phase 1,’ at 
<https:// consultations.worldbank.org/ Data/ hub/ files/ oxfamsubmissiontoworldbanksafeguardsreview_ 
phase1_ final.pdf > accessed 3 May 2015; Peter Bosshard, Janneke Bruil, Korinna Horta, Shannon Lawrence, 
and Carol Welch, ‘Gambling with People’s Lives: What the World Bank’s New “High- Risk/ High- Reward” 
Strategy Means for the Poor and the Environment’ (Report, Environmental Defense, Friends of the 
Earth and International Rivers Network, 2003), at <http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/ CSO/ Resources/ 
EDhighrisk.pdf> accessed 3 May 2015.
88 Rustad et al. (n 85) 593.
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can exert significant policy influence on post- conflict states that are dependent on 
aid. This might include pressure to review existing extractive industry contracts; take 
steps to increase transparency, accountability, and public participation; or may include 
direct assistance to government institutions. As the government starts to earn greater 
revenues by natural resource exploitation, however, the leverage these donors possess 
might start to decline.89 It is therefore important for donor conditionality to focus on 
long- term goals and provide assistance for the government to undertake legal reforms 
and institution building.90 The conditionality must also be neutral, and not favour pri-
vate corporations from the donor state. This last issue is complicated by the differing 
approaches of various donor states, which might compete among each other depending 
on their commercial interests or have distinct approaches to local governance issues, 
such as China’s non- interference policy.91
Because of the high cost of natural resource extraction in particular, private com-
panies often require external financing (equity investors and/ or loans) to begin opera-
tions. The loans often come from a mix of multilateral or bilateral development banks 
and commercial banks. These banks undertake extensive due diligence to ensure the 
viability of the proposed project. The due diligence often includes assessment of envi-
ronmental and social risks, based on the recognition that environmental damage and 
social conflict can pose risks to projects and the banks. This puts banks in a key posi-
tion to promote higher environmental and social standards for natural resource extrac-
tion projects in post- conflict situations.92
Financers of the private sector have implemented various voluntary standards in 
loan condition agreements, including the IFC- PS and the Equator Principles, both 
discussed above. Although these standards are voluntary as such, they can become 
enforceable when compliance is a condition of project loans.93
The good practices developed by the implementation of these standards can have 
positive influence on developing standards in other sectors, amongst small- and 
medium- sized businesses, and on developing government policies.94 The standards 
could also ensure that predictable risks associated with natural resource extraction, 
including environmental damage and social harm, are identified and mitigated. But in 
actuality the standards are seldom sufficiently robust to result in meaningful changes 
in corporate behaviour.95
One author notes that:
On the one hand, the standards are a useful tool for helping to make foreign direct 
investment in the natural resource sector a stronger contributor to post- conflict peace-
building: they provide a framework that enables firms to be more aware of the com-
plexities of post- conflict environments and to behave more responsibly than might 
otherwise be the case. On the other hand, because of their voluntary nature and the 
absence of requirements for systematic follow up on implementation, the standards 
89 ibid. 599.
90 ibid. 600 (noting that ‘Although bilateral agencies have large budgets, little of that money is directed 
toward strengthening government: in Sierra Leone, for example, less than 10 percent of the US$13 million 
spent by US and UK aid agencies on diamond reform was used to directly improve government capacity.’).
91 ibid. 600. 92 Shankleman (n 73) 55. 93 ibid. 50. 94 ibid. 64– 5.
95 ibid. 64.
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have not been as effective as they might otherwise have been. In order to have greater 
impact, the standards should be revised to require companies to publish regular and 
detailed progress reports. Further, environmental regulations in most developing 
countries, especially those emerging from conflict, need to be revised and updated to 
incorporate the social, labor, health, and security requirements included in the volun-
tary standards.96
The standards are limited to the extent that they are voluntary and not all banks or 
financers require their application. Given that environmental and social conditions are 
generally viewed as secondary to the bottom line (i.e. likelihood of the loan recipient to 
pay back in full), they are often not allocated sufficient financial and human resources 
by the banks to ensure robust compliance. They are also not created specifically for 
post- conflict situations, and therefore do not directly address important post- conflict 
issues such as reintegration of soldiers, sensitive conflict triggers, or community- 
specific development needs.97 This suggests a need to broaden the standards for post- 
conflict situations and/ or to apply them in a way that is consistent with the goal of 
achieving sustainable peace. This would require cooperation between governments, 
financers, and other donors and aid agencies working across sectors during the transi-
tion to peace. These stakeholders will need to understand, apply, and enforce these and 
other post- conflict standards for private companies.
12.5 Challenges and Gaps in Existing Frameworks 
Addressing Environmental Degradation Resulting 
from External Involvement in Post- Conflict Settings
There are many important challenges to consider with an approach to sustainable 
development and environmental protection that relies on external actors, in particu-
lar MNCs and the financial industry. This section will discuss some general practical 
challenges to relying on voluntary standards as well as gaps in the current normative 
framework. Practical challenges include limited resources and time; working in unsta-
ble environments; corruption; political considerations; deciding on a normative frame-
work; and ensuring local ownership while also supporting fair negotiations between 
governments and MNCs. Gaps in current normative frameworks include a lack of 
enforcement and a failure to explicitly or acutely address environmental harms or post- 
conflict contexts.
12.5.1  Practical challenges
Practical challenges to addressing sustainable development and environmental protec-
tion during the transition to peace include tight deadlines and limited resources for 
conducting due diligence and ESIAs. Adequately understanding the conflict context 
as well as the environmental and social dynamics of development projects requires in- 
depth consultation with a wide range of stakeholders. It also requires understanding 
96 ibid. 50. 97 ibid. 65.
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current good practices and new or developing standards, as well as a consensus among 
stakeholders for the best approach in a given situation. This is time and labour inten-
sive, and a disincentive for adhering to voluntary standards or other good practices for 
external actors working in post- conflict situations.
Soft law norms for corporations rely on a level of trust and good faith on the part of 
the corporation. However, immediately post- conflict, the instability of the state and the 
chaotic environment may even attract companies that generally have lower standards 
for corporate responsibility.98 Combined with low pay rates, complicated bureaucracy 
for businesses, and high levels of corruption, accountability and transparency are at 
risk.99 Indeed, according to UNEP, it is easy for corruption to become the norm in these 
situations. As a result, this attracts companies that ‘thrive under conditions of poor 
transparency, corruption, non- competitive bidding, and so on’.100 Other, more socially 
responsible and above- the- board companies are driven out, sometimes through threats 
and intimidation. This creates a systemic lack of transparency and accountability, 
which can then allow natural resource revenues to feed into other illicit activities, such 
as drugs or smuggling.101
Political considerations are also a significant challenge. Often, contracts with large 
corporations working in the extractive industry will include certain social provisions, 
such as provision of education and health services. However, if corporations take over 
the provision of these services, this can undermine the legitimacy of the government 
and trust in its ability to provide necessary services.102 The UN and other international 
agencies depend on government support and buy- in, which raises its own set of chal-
lenges. Implementing programmes and policies that will ultimately be later overturned 
due to a future lack of government support is a waste of time and resources. Therefore, 
in drafting assistance agreements or creating country assistance plans, such organiza-
tions might be torn between using discreet language— which might pacify government 
stakeholders and ensure their buy- in— and stronger language that will ensure more 
attention and support from the donor community.103 The result might be a balance 
between the two that does not adequately capture the attention or support of either.
Striking the right balance can be exacerbated in situations where there is little trust 
between domestic entities. In such environments, suspicion and exclusion are com-
mon, leading to challenges in developing agreements and collecting the necessary 
information to monitor implementation.104 International organizations must be strate-
gic in order to avoid increasing these tensions and distrust. This can lead to such organ-
izations taking neutral or technical approaches and avoiding contentious policy issues. 
This, for example, has often been the approach taken by UNEP.105 Providing neutral, 
reliable, scientific information about the environment can fill an important knowledge 
gap. But it can also mean missing an opportunity to strengthen institutions and policies 
98 Note that this is not a general rule and in fact is not always the case. See, for example, Coca- Cola’s 
entry into Myanmar and the anticipatory, preventative measures they were required to take in order to do 
so. The Coca- Cola Company, ‘Responsible Investment in Myanmar Report’ (2013).
99 Brown et al. (n 18) 332– 3. 100 UNEP (n 1) 60. 101 ibid.
102 Brown et al. (n 18) 332. 103 UNDESA SD (n 2) 94. 104 Conca and Wallace (n 4) 73.
105 ibid. 74.
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when it is necessary to decide what to do about environmental risks. In addition, as one 
study has noted:
In divided societies ravaged by violent conflict, actors will bring to the table many 
different ways of knowing and historical reference points; the technical- rational dis-
course of modern science will be inaccessible to a wide swath of the population; and 
‘facts’ will be widely understood to be political things. Under these circumstances, 
efforts to depoliticize knowledge entail a clear trade- off: they make it more feasible to 
work under very difficult circumstances but at the risk of reducing the scope of poten-
tial ownership in the results.106
Given the need for coordination between the large body of domestic and interna-
tional stakeholders involved in peacebuilding, these trade- offs and politics will become 
increasingly complicated and burdensome. It could risk stagnating efforts for positive 
change.
There are other important trade- offs as well. International organizations will have 
to decide between relying on national legal frameworks or following international best 
practices. While the national legal framework might in some ways be inadequate to 
effectively deal with sustainable development and environmental protection, relying 
on it could ensure greater domestic buy- in and increase the legitimacy of the interna-
tional intervention. On the other hand, this approach could slow progress as capacity 
is built.107
As with any international intervention, it is important to have the approval and sup-
port of domestic authorities. Such interventions depend on local input and ownership, 
and should not be viewed as imposed or self- serving. This is important to ensuring the 
effectiveness of programmes in the long term as well as promoting better handover 
when, as inevitably happens, donors and aid organizations leave the country.108
In addition to including the views and positions of the domestic government in 
approaching environmental integrity in post- conflict situations, the approaches of 
international organizations need to include MNCs. As a country transitions to peace, 
donors will often promote foreign investment to help restart the economy so that 
MNCs can become active players in post- conflict economies.109 It is therefore neces-
sary to include such actors in discussions about natural resource management. In addi-
tion, there should be measures put in place to ensure that negotiations between MNCs 
and post- conflict governments are fair and transparent. In the aftermath of conflict, 
states are typically weak and therefore at a disadvantage when negotiating with MNCs. 
If the resulting agreements are unfair or do not require adequate environmental and 
social safeguards, there could be longstanding negative repercussions.
12.5.2  Gaps in existing frameworks
The most significant gap in the existing frameworks for ensuring that corporations pro-
tect the environments in which they are operating is the enforcement gap. As discussed 
106 ibid. 75.   107 ibid. 78.   108 Rustad et al. (n 85) 592.
109 ibid. 601.
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at length above, even where domestic legislation exists for these purposes, it is fre-
quently insufficiently enforced. In addition, the non- binding international frameworks 
in place fail to specifically proscribe corporate acts that damage the environment and 
distinguish such acts from violations of human rights. The private sector MSIs designed 
for these purposes also lack mechanisms for independent enforcement. Assuming that 
one normatively believes that corporations should have the same or similar duties and 
responsibilities when operating in a foreign jurisdiction as they would when operating 
in their home country, therefore, it is necessary to envisage an approach for ensuring 
such duty or responsibility is met that is both effective at providing harmed individu-
als some sort of (even indirect) recourse and practically feasible. This is necessary to 
ensure not only justice for those harmed, but also to encourage compliance such that 
those harms might be avoided in the first place. We argue that the extent to which 
companies feel the threat of recourse in the form of some sort of enforcement mecha-
nism effectively determines whether normative guidelines will have any preventative 
influence.
The greatest potential source of enforcement therefore seems to be in the form of 
media and NGO naming and shaming. Taking advantage of the momentum behind 
the global CSR movement in recent years, human rights and environmental NGOs 
and activists have begun treating the principles codified in the Ruggie Framework and 
other normative frameworks as concrete standards by which to hold companies and 
governments accountable, thereby creating a unified baseline. This allows concerned 
stakeholders to be more cohesive and directed in their efforts at naming and shaming 
companies that fail to abide by recognized standards for business and environmental 
and human rights, making them more effective watchdogs.110 As a result, the media 
and the activist/ advocacy NGO community now effectively constitute an enforcement 
mechanism for the normative frameworks that lack a judicial court or tribunal.111
In addition, the voluntary frameworks discussed here fail to explicitly or acutely 
address environmental wrongs and adverse environmental impacts of corporate mal-
feasance on local populations— this is a second gap in the existing frameworks in this 
area. The majority of the language used is instead focused on human rights abuses. 
Although there is now arguably consensus around the concept of environmental rights 
which must be protected by the international community at the same level as human 
rights, and that certain environmental harms in fact effectively constitute deprivations 
of human rights (i.e. the right to health and a healthy environment, the right to food 
and water, among many others), it would likely be advantageous to efforts at increasing 
corporate environmental responsibility to expand existing soft law frameworks for the 
enforcement of international norms via corporations such that those norms come to 
explicitly and acutely incorporate environmental issues.
Third and finally, with the exception of the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights, the frameworks and initiatives explored here seldom mention the need 
110 Jochnick and Rabaeus (n 62) 438.
111 For more on this, see Hana Ivanhoe, ‘The Next Generation of “Fair Trade”:  A  Human Rights 
Framework for Combating Corporate Corruption in Global Supply Chains’ in Bård A. Andreassen and Võ 
Khánh Vinh (eds.), Duties Across Borders. Advancing Human Rights in Transnational Business (Intersentia, 
forthcoming 2017).
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for heightened scrutiny regarding human rights violations and protections in post- 
conflict countries. The Ruggie Framework references the need for such heightened 
scrutiny, but only in the context of the state duty to protect such human rights; it fails 
to couch this requirement explicitly in terms of additional obligations for human (and/ 
or environmental) rights protections to be borne by companies when entering newly 
post- conflict markets.
We therefore propose a more robust application of the principles enshrined in the 
Ruggie Framework and related normative frameworks and private sector guidelines, 
in a manner that explicitly and acutely addresses issues of environmental degradation 
in post- conflict settings. NGOs and activists could then use such an expanded applica-
tion of the Framework and its standards, in concert with the growing CSR movement, 
to provide some sort of means of enforcement. This would pull MNCs into the jus post 
bellum framework and offer an accountability mechanism for currently un- or under- 
regulated MNCs operating in fragile post- conflict states.
Requiring MNCs to adhere to these norms and good practices in their operations 
in post- conflict states could also have a spillover effect as they incorporate them into 
their business practices more generally. As part of the jus post bellum framework, these 
norms could also contribute to a more holistic approach to peacebuilding and sus-
tainable peace. Moreover, incorporating soft law standards into peacebuilding plans 
and priorities could strengthen their normative value and enforceability and establish 
good practices following the Frameworks. If they are incorporated into the domes-
tic legislation of post- conflict states, they could eventually become part of customary 
international law.
MNCs should also be encouraged to see the business gain from complying with vol-
untary standards and government legal frameworks. Voluntary standards that include 
environmental and social safeguards can assist the MNCs and their financers to play a 
constructive post- conflict role and ensure the success of their venture. MNCs have been 
motivated to comply with such standards when there are (1) requirements imposed by 
financial institutions or their home- country legislation and (2) an impetus to ensure 
long- term profitability by developing a reputation as a ‘reputable’ company.112
12.6 Conclusions
Addressing environmental concerns in a post- conflict setting is a difficult undertaking; 
yet addressing these concerns is vital to ensuring that post- conflict countries develop 
sustainably. Given the inadequacy of existing post- conflict country domestic and inter-
national hard law governing environmental protections, voluntary and soft law norms 
and the corporate social responsibility movement are critical to ensuring that multi-
national investment in post- conflict countries is in line with sustainable development 
principles and the long- term economic and environmental prosperity of those coun-
tries. Thus, they constitute an important source of norms for a holistic jus post bellum 
framework.
112 Rustad et al. (n 85) 602.
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Peacebuilders must take the opportunity to work with private corporations to secure 
environmental and social safeguards in development projects that could otherwise lead 
to resurgence of conflict. This should be done through both domestic and international 
regulation. One part of this is an expansion and imposition of soft law norms for the 
protection of human and environmental rights by MNCs, specifically in post- conflict 
countries. This will require the expansion of the Ruggie Framework so as to explicitly 
refer to peacebuilding environments— or at the very least— its expanded application 
as well as effective enforcement (by monitoring NGOs and media). CSR standards as 
codified in international soft law should also be more comprehensively included in 
international loan and financing agreements where the recipient is or is operating in a 
recently post- conflict country. Such initiatives and standards also need to be adapted 
to be context and conflict specific.113 Any agreements related to land acquisition or use 
must also be made with the consensus of the affected community.
At a minimum, these norms must include the following fundamental tenants 
of corporate responsibility, as articulated in the Ruggie Framework and subsequent 
guidelines:
• Corporate duty to respect human rights extra- territorially;
• Human rights due diligence; and
• Non- judicial grievance mechanisms.
The study of environmental protection and sustainable development shows important 
challenges for jus post bellum. In particular, it shows the need to incorporate soft law 
norms and standards as a part of a holistic jus post bellum. These standards provide a 
critical opportunity to harness the power of private corporations and direct investments 
to ensure sustainable development in post- conflict states, resulting in a smoother and 
more durable transition to peace.
113 Additional research will evaluate existing standards and propose areas for potential improvement 
with respect to post- conflict situations.
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13.1 Introduction
The need for better environmental protection has been highlighted as a key issue 
within the regulation of armed conflict, particularly at the jus post bellum1 stage. As 
Payne notes, ‘[i] nternational legal instruments do not address the normal operational 
damage to the environment that is left after hostilities cease, from sources such as the 
use of tracked vehicles on fragile dessert surfaces; disposal of solid, toxic, and medi-
cal waste; depletion of scarce water resources; and incomplete recovery of ordnance.’2 
Nevertheless, the issue of environmental protection in jus post bellum including chal-
lenges associated with ‘toxic remnants of war’ (‘TRW’), is gaining prominence. TRW 
describes ‘any toxic or radiological substance resulting from military activities that 
forms a hazard to humans and ecosystems’.3 The term was coined to facilitate greater 
awareness of the impact of military pollution and conflict- based activities on the envi-
ronment and public health.
Another challenge to environmental protection as part of the jus post bellum frame-
work is the huge rise in the use of private security companies, private military secu-
rity contractors, and private security service providers (collectively, ‘PSCs’)4 in recent 
years. PSCs have, in recent conflicts, played a key role, not only during conflict, but 
* Onita Das is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of the West of England, Bristol, UK. Aneaka 
Kelly is a researcher for the TRW Project, Manchester, UK.
1 ‘[T] he set of norms applicable at the end of armed conflict— whether internal or international— with 
a view to establishing sustainable peace.’ See Vincent Chetail, ‘Introduction: Post- Conflict Peacebuilding— 
Ambiguity and Identity’ in Vincent Chetail (ed.), Post- Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 18.
2 Cymie Payne, ‘The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict Legal Regimes’ in Carsten 
Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 511.
3 TRW Project, ‘Pollution Politics: Power, Accountability and Toxic Remnants of War’ (2014) accessed 
at <www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ report- pollution- politics- power- accountability- and- toxic- remnants- of- 
war> accessed 9 February 2017.
4 This abbreviation PSC encompassing private security companies and private security service providers is 
adopted by the 2010 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC). We use the 
abbreviation PSC to include the terms Private Security Companies and Private Military Companies as well.
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also during the withdrawal phase of official troops, in managing the disposal of huge 
amounts of military waste and conflict debris. This stage sees the prominent presence 
of PSCs in fragile states like Iraq and Afghanistan,5 undertaking training and recon-
struction work.6 There is also a trend for states involved in international conflicts seek-
ing to maintain a presence in unstable regions, utilizing the services of PSCs in the face 
of waning domestic support for providing troops and supplies. It is at this transitional 
phase that PSCs are most prominent and their activities raise environmental concerns.
During the US- led occupation of Iraq (2003– 11) for example, significant operational, 
logistical, and reconstruction work was outsourced to companies like Halliburton and 
former subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root (‘KBR’). Much of this work involved the han-
dling and disposal of hazardous waste, reconstruction work, and the disposal of con-
flict debris. Controversy around the use of open burning techniques such as burn pits 
by Halliburton and KBR7 as a primary means of waste disposal on US bases in Iraq 
and Afghanistan has brought to light issues on the environmental implications of PSC 
activity. Environmental implications that can have a negative effect on the war- torn 
country achieving sustainable peace. However, a detailed assessment of the regula-
tion of PSCs in specific reference to their environmental responsibilities is yet to be 
conducted. This chapter reviews this topical area with a focus on PSC activities post- 
conflict.8 Using the recent Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts as examples, with a focus on 
US use of PSCs, this chapter first explores the growth of PSCs and their influence on 
the creation and management of environmental issues, including TRW, and secondly 
reviews the applicable legal and policy frameworks within which this takes place. The 
current regulation of PSCs is explored, alongside the question of whether the existing 
framework is adequate to the task of protecting the environment during the transition 
from conflict to sustainable peace.
13.2 PSCs and Environmental Issues: An Overview
13.2.1  The rise of PSCs
PSCs are defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’) as ‘pri-
vate business concerns that provide military and/ or security services’.9 During the Cold 
5 Nicholas Tsagourias and Nigel White, Collective Security:  Theory, Law and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 138.
6 Scott Hickie, Chris Abbott, and Raphaël Zaffran, ‘Trends in Remote Control Warfare’ in ‘New Ways of 
War: Is Remote Control Warfare Effective?’ The Remote Control Digest (October 2014), at <http:// oxfordre-
searchgroup.org.uk/ sites/ default/ files/ Remote%20Control%20Digest.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
7 A majority of contracts since 2001 have been implemented by KBR (a subsidiary of Halliburton until 
2007). This chapter refers only to KBR in relation to these contracts.
8 Jus post bellum covers the post- conflict phase. See, for example, Roxana Vatanparast, ‘Waging 
Peace:  Ambiguities, Contradictions, and Problems of a Jus Post Bellum Legal Framework’ in Stahn, 
Easterday, and Iverson (n 2) 144 (argues that ‘a legal jus post bellum framework can consolidate the current 
piecemeal approaches to the post- conflict phase in international human rights law, international criminal 
law, and international humanitarian law, fill in any gaps, and define the way these various laws ought to 
interplay with each other’ (footnote omitted).
9 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and Private Military/ Security Companies (ICRC, 2013), 
at <https:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ resources/ documents/ faq/ pmsc- faq- 150908.htm#header> accessed 9 
February 2017.
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War, there was a realization in the United States that despite its economic and military 
strength, it would not be able to respond to multiple large threats simultaneously.10 
A key issue was US ability to sustain supply lines across the world. Out of this con-
cern, the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (‘LOGCAP’) emerged.11 LOGCAP 
awarded contracts for logistical work to civilian contractors, which allowed the army’s 
influence to extend without significantly expanding recruitment.
It is widely recognized that the global war on terror, particularly US foreign pol-
icy in Iraq and Afghanistan, has a strong correlation with the post- 9/ 11 growth in 
the private security industry.12 The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts over the last two 
decades saw the most significant use of PSCs yet, with a majority of support ser-
vices13 outsourced to KBR, DynCorp, and Fluor.14 While exact figures are difficult 
to establish, Avant and Nevers note that during the 1991 Gulf conflict, the ratio of 
troops to contractors was approximately ten to one, and in the 2003 Iraq conflict 
the ratio was approximately one to one.15 In April 2014, the ratio of private con-
tractors to US soldiers in Afghanistan was two to one.16 As we are witnessing the 
drawdown of troops in Afghanistan at present, it is likely that significant numbers 
of PSCs will remain.17 While popular support for the Iraq and Afghanistan con-
flicts has waned, the use of PSCs allows the United States to maintain a strong pres-
ence in both countries.
The subsequent section explores PSC activities at the post- conflict phase and their 
impact on the environment and human health.
10 Pratap Chatterjee, Halliburton’s Army: How a Well- Connected Texas Oil Company Revolutionized the 
Way America Makes War (New York: Nation Book, 2010).
11 ibid.
12 Nikolaos Tzifakis, ‘Contracting Out to Private Military and Security Companies’ (2012) Centre for 
European Studies 1; Sam Perlo- Freeman and Elisabeth Sköns, ‘The Private Military Services Industry’ 
(2008) 1 SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 1.
13 ‘Contractors provide a wide range of services, from transportation, construction, and base support, to 
intelligence analysis and private security. The benefits of using contractors include freeing up uniformed 
personnel to conduct combat operations; providing expertise in specialized fields such as linguistics or 
weapons systems maintenance; providing a surge capability, quickly delivering critical support capabili-
ties tailored to specific military needs. Because contractors can be hired when a particular need arises and 
released when their services are no longer needed, contractors can be less expensive in the long run than 
maintaining a permanent in house capability.’ See Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church, ‘Department of 
Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues of Congress’ 
(2013) CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service), Summary.
14 LOGCAP III (2001– 2007) was awarded to KBR. LOGCAP IV (2007– present) was awarded to three 
companies: KBR, DynCorp, and Fluor.
15 Deborah Avant and Renée de Nevers, ‘Military Contractors & the American Way of War’ (2011) 140(3) 
Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 1, at <http:// www.academia.edu/ 2870854/ Military_ 
Contractors_ and_ the_ American_ Way_ of_ War> accessed 9 February 2017.
16 61,452 contractors and 30,000 US troops. See Ian Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Afghanistan 
Index’ (Brookings, 2014), at <https:// www.brookings.edu/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2016/ 07/ index20150210.
pdf> accessed 9 February 2017. In 2016, there were roughly 25,197 contractors to 9,800 US troops. See Ian 
Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Afghanistan Index’ (Brookings, 2016), at <https:// www.brookings.edu/ 
wp- content/ uploads/ 2016/ 07/ 21csi_ 20161031_ afghanistan_ index.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
17 Hickie, Abbott, and Zaffran (n 6). See also Leo Shane III, ‘Report: Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops 
in Afghanistan 3- to- 1’ (Military Times, 2016), at <http:// www.militarytimes.com/ articles/ crs- report- 
afghanistan- contractors> accessed 9 February 2017.
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13.2.2  PSCs and environmental harm
There are many situations in which environmental harm occurs during the transition 
from conflict to peace. These instances, which take place outside the period of violent 
conflict, occur as a result of poor environmental management practices or the break-
down of environmental governance. These incidents differ from most environmental 
damage that takes place during violent conflict, which is usually the result of targeting 
decisions of military forces or armed groups. In contrast, post- conflict environmental 
harm can result for example from the mishandling and improper disposal of hazardous 
military waste or the mismanagement of war debris.
PSCs undertake a variety of work that supports the back end of military operations 
during this transitory jus post bellum period. The services that are of most relevance 
to post- conflict environmental issues are waste management, munitions, and military 
materials disposal. Military operations produce huge amounts of waste, including: des-
ignated hazardous waste— batteries, fuels, oils and solvents as well as ‘domestic’ waste 
generated from military bases and general conflict detritus such as building rubble, 
damaged vehicles, abandoned munitions, landmines, and other unexploded ordinance 
(‘UXO’). According to one military source there were an estimated 11 million pounds 
of hazardous military waste in Iraq in 2008.18 HALO Trust, a demining agency, esti-
mates that up to 640,000 mines have been laid in Afghanistan since 1979.19 There is 
also a substantial UXO problem, in both battle areas and on abandoned International 
Security Assistance Force (‘ISAF’) ranges. In addition, a substantial volume of ex- 
regime arms and munitions have been destroyed in Iraq. The US Army and its PSCs 
are said to have disposed of 215,000 tonnes with a further 92,000 stockpiled.20 Given 
the vast amounts of harmful materials involved, the careful management of waste is of 
central importance after the cessation of hostilities, particularly for the effective transi-
tion to sustainable peace.
Unfortunately there are numerous reports of PSC malpractice in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.21 The fast- growing and largely unregulated PSC industry has allowed for 
contractor malpractice in three ways: the sector has overwhelmed the US Department 
of Defense’s (‘DoD’) capacity to adequately oversee and manage contractors; the pro-
liferation in sub- contractor use has widened the management and accountability gap; 
and the use of prime contractors and no- bid contracts has encouraged a culture of 
impunity within the PSC industry.
According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
number of contract specialists (critical for the proper management of contracts) only 
18 David Botti, ‘The Challenge of Making Iraq and Afghanistan’s Battlefields Green’ Newsweek (10 March 
2008), at <http:// www.newsweek.com/ challange- making- iraq- and- afghanistan- battlefields- green- 223158> 
accessed 9 February 2017.
19 The Halo Trust, ‘Afghanistan’, at <http:// www.halotrust.org/ where- we- work/ afghanistan> accessed 9 
February 2017.
20 UNEP, Assessment of Environmental ‘Hot Spots’ in Iraq (UNEP, 2005) 50.
21 See, for example, Blake Mobley, ‘Outsourcing in Post- conflict Operations:  Designing a System for 
Contract Management and Oversight’ (2004) 15 Journal of Public and International Affairs 21, 29– 30; 
David Mosher et al., ‘Green Warriors: Army Environmental Considerations for Contingency Operations 
from Planning through Post- conflict’ (2008) RAND Corporation 2008, 132– 3.
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rose by 3 per cent across the US government between 1992 and 2009, while the use of 
PSCs increased enormously, outpacing contract specialists in the same period.22 This 
lack of contract management in Washington, alongside the lack of contracting officers 
managing PSCs on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to an extremely unreg-
ulated environment. This failure to oversee contracts involving PSCs has led to waste, 
fraud, and abuse.23
Secondly, the common use of sub- contractors or local contractors, without restric-
tion on the contract chain and the lack of transparency surrounding such sub- 
contracting,24 has made it harder to ensure proper oversight over their activities. The 
hiring of local contractors by larger companies such as KBR to undertake waste dis-
posal services, has had both positive and negative effects. While hiring local companies 
is seen as beneficial in efforts to develop positive local relations as well as making use of 
local knowledge, in a number of cases, local sub- contractors have mishandled harmful 
waste products.25
Thirdly, the structure in which PSCs operate, is one in which there are a small num-
ber of very large corporations such as Halliburton, KBR, and DynCorp, who domi-
nate the market and have repeatedly been offered no- bid contracts through the DoD’s 
LOGCAP policy. The DoD is fully reliant on these companies for any overseas military 
operations which leads to a dangerous dynamic in which it is easy for companies to act 
without regard for contractual agreements or the law, as the following testimony from 
a former KBR logistics contract manager illustrates:
management would brag that they could get away with doing anything they wanted 
because the Army could not function without them. KBR figured that even if they did 
get caught, they had already made more than enough money to pay any fines and still 
make a profit.26
These problems have resulted in a number of reported cases where PSC conduct has 
led to environmental damage that has endangered the health of contracted workers, 
soldiers, and civilians.
The issue that first brought environmental and health concerns to light was the con-
troversy around the misuse of burn pits by KBR in Iraq and Afghanistan.27 Burn pits 
are open- air waste combustion pits in which waste is burned, creating high levels of 
air pollution that may result in harmful health impacts on those exposed.28 Particular 
problems arise when prohibited items such as plastic, batteries, oil products, and 
22 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime 
Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, Final Report to Congress (2011).
23 Avant and de Nevers (n 15).
24 UN Human Rights Council, Second Session of the Open- Ended Intergovernmental Working Group 
to Consider the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory Framework on the Regulation, 
Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of Private Military and Security Companies, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 
15/ 25, UNGA, 2 July 2010, 6.
25 Mosher et al. (n 21) 133.
26 Jobes v KBR, United States District Court for the District of Maryland (5 April 2010) 7, para. 23.
27 US Government Accountability Office, ‘Afghanistan and Iraq, DoD Should Improve Adherence to Its 
Guidance on Open Pit Burning and Solid Waste Management’ (US Government, 2010), 1.
28 ibid.
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medical waste are burned, emitting toxic aerial compounds and particulates into the 
surrounding environment. While burn pits are only meant to be used during military 
operations when no other means of waste disposal are available, their use was extensive 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US Central Command (‘CENTCOM’) estimates that in 
August 2010 there were 251 burn pits in Afghanistan and twenty- two in Iraq.29 A US 
Government Accountability Office investigation reveals that burn pits had been used 
throughout the conflicts due to their ‘expedience’.30 US base Joint Base Ballad in Iraq, is 
suspected of having burned 240 tonnes of waste a day at its peak of operations.31 While 
many Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have returned to the US and reported ill health 
and death as a result of burn pit exposure,32 as of yet, there has been little information 
available as to the impact of burn pits on civilians and the surrounding environment.
Another key issue is the management of hazardous waste. The spillage or improper 
disposal of hazardous waste is identified as one of the most common environmen-
tal incidents in military operations.33 Problems related to the lack of facilities in host 
countries for hazardous waste disposal and the difficulties associated with transport-
ing waste across borders means that waste often builds up.34 Reports note the improper 
disposal of hazardous waste in Iraq.35 In one case, an unsubstantiated report states that 
several hundred thousand lead- acid batteries were sold for lead, whilst the acid was 
improperly discarded.36 While accurate information is hard to find, a US government 
funded think tank the RAND Corporation, has reported similar incidents. It notes that:
[o] n more than one occasion in recent operations, contractors have removed hazard-
ous wastes from base camps and, without Army knowledge, dumped them along the 
side of a road or in other inappropriate locations, sometimes to avoid disposing of 
them properly or to sell the drums that hold the wastes.37
Such harmful environmental practices not only cause environmental damage but also 
cause harm to the civilian population.
Alongside the cases of PSC malpractice, there are also questions about whether 
commercial imperatives can be a driver of environmentally harmful practices. For 
example, in Iraq, a substantial volume of ex- regime arms and munitions have been 
destroyed. UNEP found that many commonly used disposal practices ensure that 
‘contamination of munitions disposal sites is inevitable’.38 Where financial constraints 
29 ibid.   30 ibid.
31 Kate Kurera, ‘Military Burn Pits in Iraq and Afghanistan: Considerations and Obstacles for Emerging 
Litigation’ (2011) 28(1) Pace Environmental Law Review 288.
32 Matthew Gault ‘The Human Cost of the Military’s Toxic Burn Pits:  Taxpayers Wasted Millions to 
Replace Open- air Burning, but the Damage was Done’ War is Boring (12 February 2015), at <https:// war-
isboring.com/ the- human- cost- of- the- militarys- toxic- burn- pits- d9111eb3e2cc#.e4be3ojcd> accessed 9 
February 2017.
33 Mosher et al. (n 21) 24. 34 ibid.
35 See, for example, Botti (n 18); Adam Levine, ‘Halliburton, KBR Sued for Alleged Ill Effects of “Burn Pits” ’ 
CNN (28 April 2009), at <http:// edition.cnn.com/ 2009/ US/ 04/ 28/ burn.pits/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
36 Ms Sparky ‘US Army Recycling Program is Destroying Iraq Environment Claim Iraqis’ (1 December 
2009), at <http:// mssparky.com/ 2009/ 12/ us- army- recycling- progam- is- destroying- iraq- environment- 
claim- iraqis/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
37 Mosher et al. (n 21) 7– 8
38 UNEP (n 20) 50.
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and to a degree the security of stockpiles require massive destruction of munitions, 
the most common method of disposal is controlled explosion or burning.39 This form 
of disposal creates environmental pollution, primarily as a result of the incomplete 
detonation of energetic materials and the dispersal of particulate, which may also con-
tain heavy metals.40 Detonation causes soil compaction and explosive compounds and 
metals result in soil and air pollution. Contaminants can be reduced through techni-
cal measures aimed at ensuring the complete detonation of compounds but these may 
not be properly implemented. Similarly, guidelines41 have been developed to reduce 
the impact of mine clearance operations on the environment but these represent best 
practice and are not legally binding. The extent to which PSCs follow best practice 
guidelines on munitions disposal and landmine clearance depends on their weight-
ing of financial, strategic, and humanitarian concerns. As Bolton notes, ‘strategic’ as 
opposed to ‘humanitarian’ demining as is often undertaken by PSCs (as opposed to 
non- governmental organizations (‘NGOs’)) has typically emphasized speed and cost- 
efficiency over quality and safety.42
It is clear that a lack of oversight and regulation combined with the cost- efficiency 
concerns of PSCs have led to a situation where environmental diligence has not been 
prioritized, resulting in environmental and human harm. Problems that could have 
been avoided were not, illustrating a failure in PSC governance. Thus strengthening 
environmental governance, particularly in relation to PSCs, is a key aspect of increasing 
post- conflict environmental protection and contributing effectively to the transition 
from conflict to sustainable peace. The extent to which PSCs and their environmental 
responsibilities are covered by existing international law is explored in the remainder 
of this chapter.
13.3 PSCs: Law and Policy and its Relevance 
to Environmental Protection— an Overview
Assertions have been put forward that PSCs lack control, transparency, and account-
ability.43 Many commentators argue that such problems are consequences of a lack of 
domestic and international regulation of PSCs.44 In addition, there have been various 
incidents involving PSCs and their personnel over the years, allegations of operating 
outside the law— from reports of excessive use of force on civilians to other human 
rights abuses.45 To combat these issues, regulatory efforts have taken place at various 
39 ibid.   40 ibid.
41 IMAS 10.70, First Edition, Safety & Occupational Health— Protection of the Environment, United 
Nations Mine Action Service (1 October 2007).
42 Matthew Bolton, Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance: Governance, Politics and Security in Afghanistan, 
Bosnia and Sudan (London: I.B.Tauris & Co, 2010), 174
43 Elke Krahmann, ‘Private Military Services in the UK and Germany:  Between Partnership and 
Regulation’ (2005) 14 European Security 277.
44 ibid. 277.
45 Irene Pietropaoli, ‘Private Military & Security Companies and their Impact on Human Rights’ (2013) 
5 PMSC Bulletin 1, 1– 2.
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levels within the international community— from international, national, to industry.46 
Because these efforts have taken place at multiple levels, with no cohesion, this has led 
to a fragmented regulatory framework for the governance of PSCs.47 In addition, regu-
lations differ from country to country, further contributing to the disorganized and 
decentralized PSC regulatory framework.48
This section explores regulations governing PSCs, focusing on international law, and 
assesses whether these international frameworks are adequate to the task of protecting 
the environment during the transition to sustainable peace.
13.3.1  PSCs and IHL
In armed conflict, the underlying premise of international law is ‘that states are the 
primary actors on the battlefield’.49 In modern conflicts, PSCs have changed the status 
quo— challenging primary international law principles in this field.50
The ICRC confirms that the status of PSC personnel is determined by International 
Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) in armed conflicts ‘on a case- by- case basis, in particular 
according to the nature and circumstances of the functions in which they are involved’.51 
Unless PSC personnel ‘are incorporated in the armed forces52 of a state or have combat 
functions for an organized armed group belonging to a party to the conflict, the staff 
of PMSCs are civilians’.53 The ICRC also states that ‘[i] f PMSCs are operating in situ-
ations of armed conflict the staff of PMSCs must respect IHL and may be held crimi-
nally responsible for any violations they may commit’.54 This is the position regardless 
of whether PSCs and their personnel are hired by states, international organizations 
(‘IOs’), or by private companies.55 Therefore any activities or actions by PSC person-
nel relevant to armed conflict are governed by IHL. It is worth making clear however, 
that while PSC employees as individuals working for the company could be bound by 
IHL depending on their role in the conflict,56 as companies, PSCs per se are not legally 
bound to respect IHL ‘which is binding only on parties to a conflict and individuals, 
not corporate entities’.57 However, PSCs are obliged to comply and uphold IHL if such 
46 Daphné Richemond- Barak, ‘Regulating War: A Taxonomy in Global Administrative Law’ (2011) 22(4) 
European Journal of International Law 1027, 1027– 8.
47 ibid.
48 Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti, ‘Introduction’ in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti 
(eds.), War by Contract:  Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and Private Contractors (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 2.
49 Chia Lehnardt, ‘Private Military Companies’ in Nigel White and Christian Henderson, Research 
Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law:  Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello, and Jus post Bellum 
(Cheltenham : Edward Elgar, 2013), 422.
50 ibid. 51 ICRC (n 9).
52 Many military manuals (citing military manuals from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Netherlands, etc.) and scholars recognize ‘that the armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all 
organised armed groups which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its sub-
ordinates’. See Jean- Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law: Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14 (footnote omitted).
53 ICRC (n 9) . 54 ibid. 55 ibid. 56 ibid.
57 Montreux Document (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs/ ICRC 2009), 36 (in reference to 
Statement 22).
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laws are integrated into national law. This obligation extends to all national law,58 which 
would include domestic environmental law of the host state.
While scholarship in this area focuses primarily on the regulation of PSCs dur-
ing conflict, there appears to be a dearth of research on how PSCs are regulated post- 
conflict. As one commentator aptly notes, ‘[a] rmed conflict is the easy part  . . .  [i]
nternational humanitarian law at least provides a framework for addressing the armed 
conflict settings’.59 However, what happens when armed conflict is in the grey area of 
not quite having ceased or when it is in the post- conflict stage.
According to Jinks, the general rule under the Geneva Conventions is that IHL 
applies until the ‘general close of military operations’.60 Jinks also notes that:
many commentators have suggested that the ‘general close of military operations’ 
standard is distinct from the ‘cessation of active hostilities’ standard. The latter refers 
to the termination of hostilities— the silencing of the guns— whereas the former refers 
to the complete cessation of all aggressive military maneuvers. On this reading, an 
‘armed conflict’ might persist beyond the ‘cessation of active hostilities.’ 61
In fact, the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) argues that IHL ‘is also applicable 
before and after an armed conflict since it contains rules relating to measures taken 
before and after an armed conflict’.62 If this is the case, it could be argued that PSC per-
sonnel have to respect IHL even at the post- conflict stage that is, at least until the gen-
eral close of military operations and if the relevant IHL is incorporated into domestic 
law, so does the PSC as a company. However, it would still be problematic to determine 
when the general close of military operations is in many conflict situations.
Nevertheless, if IHL is still applicable after an armed conflict, this could mean that 
PSCs would have some obligation to protect the environment post- conflict. This could 
include protection from IHL rules such as Articles 35(3) and 55 of the First Additional 
Protocol (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (‘AP I’)—specifically formulated to 
protect the environment63 as well as other rules under the 1949 Geneva Convention 
that are relevant to PSC activities. For example, Article 147 considers grave breaches 
to include ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by mili-
tary necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’. In the context of occupation, 
Article 53 provides that ‘any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal 
58 ibid.
59 Ian Ralby, ‘Regulation of Private Military Security Companies’, Meeting Summary: International Law 
Programme (Chatham House, 7 October 2011), 12.
60 Derek Jinks, ‘The Temporal Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law in Contemporary 
Conflicts’ Background Paper prepared for the Informal High- Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation 
and Development of International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, 27– 29 January 2003), 3.
61 ibid.
62 See UN, Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty- third Session (26 April– 3 June and 4 
July– 12 August 2011), Annex E, ‘Protection of the Environment in relation to Armed Conflicts’ Supplement 
No. 10, A/ 66/ 10, 357.
63 Although there is voluminous literature on the weaknesses and difficulties of actually implement-
ing these particular rules. See, for example, Onita Das, Environmental Protection, Security and Armed 
Conflict:  A  Sustainable Development Perspective (Cheltenham:  Edward Elgar, 2013), 132– 42; UNEP, 
Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict:  An Inventory and Analysis of International Law 
(UNEP, 2009).
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property belonging individually or collectively to individuals, or to the state, or to other 
public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where 
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations’.64 These pro-
visions could therefore extend to PSC activities that destroy property and subsequently 
cause harm to the environment and civilians. For example, it could be argued that 
dumping toxic waste into a river which leads to the contamination of a water source 
could be interpreted as destroying civilian property. However, it is worth pointing out 
that these direct and indirect environmental protection provisions within IHL are dif-
ficult to apply in relation to regular state armed forces, and that it is unlikely that apply-
ing these provisions to PSCs would be any easier.65
13.3.2  PSCs and IHRL
As with IHL, PSCs as companies and therefore non- state actors, are not bound by 
internation human rights law (‘IHRL’), only states are.66 However, PSCs are obliged to 
comply and uphold IHRL if such laws are integrated into national law.67 The Montreux 
Document68 and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers (‘ICoC’),69 are international instruments that provide guidance on regula-
tion and best practices for PSCs globally. Both documents provide that PSCs and their 
personnel should respect IHRL in conduct of their activities.70
IHRL is relevant in the context of protecting the environment as damage to the 
environment could adversely affect the human rights of affected populations. As UN 
Special Rapporteur on Toxic Waste, Ibeanu notes, ‘[a] lthough war has always had an 
adverse effect on the environment, the voluntary or incidental release of toxic and 
dangerous products in contemporary conflicts has an important adverse effect on the 
enjoyment of human rights.’71 Harm and ‘contamination of the environment, through 
soil, water, air or the food chain can lead to the denial of enjoyment of basic rights, such 
as the right to life, to health, to food, to safe and decent housing, etc’.72 Such effects on 
the environment and population creates additional problems to achieving sustainable 
peace. Ibeanu goes on to argue that, ‘corporations must be held liable for their direct 
involvement in the violation of human rights, or for supplying toxic or dangerous prod-
ucts in the knowledge that their use will lead to a violation of human rights’.73
64 This provision provides a similar scope of protection to property as Article 55 of the Hague Regulations.
65 Michael Bothe et al., ‘International Law Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps 
and Opportunities’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red Cross 569 (on gaps of IHL environmental 
protection in armed conflict).
66 Montreux Document (n 57) 36 (in reference to Statement 22) . 67 ibid. 68 ibid.
69 ICoC website, ‘About the ICoC Association’, at <https:// icoca.ch/ en/ icoc- association > accessed 10 
February 2017.
70 See, for example, Art. 22, Section E, Montreux Document; Arts. 3, 4, 6, Preamble and Art. 21, Section 
E, ICoC.
71 Okechukwu Ibeanu, Special Rapporteur, Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping of 
Toxic and Dangerous Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights UNGA, A/ HRC/ 5/ 5, 5 May 
2007, 1
72 ibid. 11.
73 ibid. 18.
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There are a number of IHRL principles that may be relevant to PSC post- conflict 
activities that causes harm to the environment. For example, individuals may be able to 
invoke the ‘right to life’ under Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) ‘in 
cases in which death results from the release of toxic products into the environment, 
as long as responsibility of the state is established’.74 This could include cases where 
PSC post- conflict activities cause environmental harm from toxicity released into the 
environment which as a result, causes serious injury or death. This right could thus be 
invoked against the state and possible PSC and its employees— the state by virtue of 
state responsibility and the PSC, if the relevant IHRL principle is already part of the 
national law of the state.75 Even though the state may not be responsible for the activi-
ties that caused the release of toxic chemicals into the environment, leading to harm 
to the population, it could be argued that state responsibility may be established in 
that ‘the state may be subject to an obligation to take all possible measures to ensure 
the safety of the local population in the aftermath of the incident. These may include 
inter alia evacuation, assessment of contamination and a clean- up and remediation 
programme’.76 In a post- conflict situation however, establishing the responsibility of 
the host state (in particular) for violations committed by the PSC may be difficult as the 
war- torn host state may be in a weak and vulnerable position.77 The responsibility of 
states and other organizations hiring PSCs is considered later in this chapter.
The state could also be found in violation of the right to life by harm to the environ-
ment itself. For instance, the state could be found liable via state responsibility for PSC 
activities that cause such harm and extensive damage to the environment, that as a con-
sequence it violates the right to life of the affected population, adversely affecting their 
living environment and livelihood resources. This is illustrated by the Ogoni case78 
where action by Nigerian military forces and oil companies resulting in destruction of 
the environment and living resources of the Ogoni community in Nigeria was found by 
the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (‘AComHPR’) to be a violation 
of right to life.79 According to AComHPR:
Given the widespread violations perpetrated by the government of Nigeria and private 
actors (be it with its blessing or not), the most fundamental of all human rights, the 
right to life has been violated  . . . The pollution and environmental degradation to a 
level humanly unacceptable has made living in Ogoniland a nightmare. The survival 
of the Ogonis depended on their land and farms that were destroyed by the direct 
involvement of the government. These and similar atrocities not only persecuted 
74 ibid. 14.   75 Montreux Document (n 57) 36 (in reference to Statement 22).
76 Ibeanu (n 71) 14.
77 Iraq for example, does not regulate PSCs operating in its territory. See Emanuela- Chiara Gillard, 
‘Private Military/ Security Companies:  the Status of their Staff and their Obligations under International 
Humanitarian Law and the Responsibilities of States in Relation to their Operations’ ICRC Third Expert 
Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities (Geneva, October 2005), 1.
78 Communication No 155/ 96, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for 
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria (AHRLR 60, 27 October 2001).
79 See also Frederico Lenzerini and Francesco Francioni, ‘The Role of Human Rights in the Regulation of 
Private Military and Security Companies’ in Francioni and Ronzitti (n 48) 62– 3 (for a discussion on PSCs 
and right to life).
310 PSCs and Environmental Protection
individuals in Ogoniland but also the Ogoni community as a whole. They affected the 
life of the whole of the Ogoni society.80
This case demonstrates that severe environmental destruction, where a community’s 
access to resources and living space is disrupted―from a health, livelihood, and envi-
ronmental perspective, could be considered a violation of right to life and in the post- 
conflict context, negatively affecting the transition to sustainable peace. Unfortunately, 
the Ogoni case, as per traditional IHRL liability, only established liability for the state, 
Nigeria, and not private actors involved. Therefore, PSCs conducting activities such as 
uncontrolled dumping of toxic post- conflict waste, for example, that could cause the 
environment to become significantly hazardous in that it interferes with the ‘right to 
life’ of the local population, would require the victims to look towards the state for lia-
bility. This demonstrates the difficulty of non- state entities being held responsible for 
potential violations of IHRL.
Another relevant IHRL right is the right to health which the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’) has recognized as being interrelated to 
other IHRL rights.81 In its General Comment no 14 (2000) on Article 12, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (‘ICESR’), the CESCR recognized 
that realizing the right to health requires states to:
refrain from unlawfully polluting air, water and soil, e.g., through industrial waste 
from state- owned facilities, from using or testing nuclear, biological or chemical weap-
ons if such testing results in the release of substances harmful to human health.82
With regard to PSCs, it is the state that would be liable under IHRL if it fails to ensure 
that non- state actors do not violate the populations’ right to health. As Lenzerini and 
Francioni state, ‘[f] rom this perspective, the PMSC operations might well interfere 
with the enjoyment of the right to health, given that the types of interferences to this 
right listed by the CESCR— or at least some of them— can certainly be committed by 
these companies in carrying out their usual mandate’.83 In the context of PSCs and 
environmental protection within the jus post bellum framework, this means the state 
must take appropriate measures to limit or prevent post- conflict activities that release 
toxic substances into the environment that could adversely affect the health of the 
human population. For example, activities such as burn pits and other forms of waste 
disposal that releases harmful toxins into the environment, leading to serious health 
risks, may interfere with the ‘right to health’ of the local population and PSC personnel 
involved. Mitigating such activities to realize the right to health could indirectly protect 
the environment.
Other IHRL principles that may be applicable to PSC activities at the peacebuilding 
stage include the right to food which could tie in with PSC activities that contaminate 
the environment as a consequence of toxic exposure and disrupt the food chain as a 
80 Communication No 155/ 96 (n 78) para. 70. 81 For example, right to life, right to food, etc.
82 See General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/ C12/ 2000/ 4, 11 August 
2000, para. 34.
83 Lenzerini and Francioni (n 79) 65.
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result. Contaminated soil and water could ‘render agricultural goods unsafe for human 
consumption’.84 Also, Article 17 of the ICCPR ‘has been interpreted as prohibiting envi-
ronmental damage that negatively affects family and home life’.85 PSC actions causing 
such environmental damage could thus be prohibited by the state. Failure to do so may 
attach liability to the state for the PSC’s violation of IHRL.
Although IHRL is a useful framework of guidance in the context of PSCs and protec-
tion of the environment that is, guidance as to what environmentally harmful activities 
may violate IHRL, the flaw is that IHRL only binds states. This limits environmental 
protection in such situations as respecting IHRL is discretionary on the part of PSCs. 
International soft law regulation on PSC best practices require the respect and adher-
ence to IHRL86 but again, it is not binding. Therefore the only way PSCs as a non- state 
entity would be bound by IHRL is if the relevant IHRL laws were part of the domes-
tic law of the host state.87 This illustrates the difficulties in holding non- state entities 
accountable for IHRL breaches and as a result, ‘PMSCs are rarely held accountable for 
violations of human rights’.88
13.3.3  PSCs: International efforts on binding legislation and soft law
At international level there have been significant developments regarding PSC regu-
lation. These efforts have involved attempts to develop binding legislation as well as 
soft law. The strongest attempt at creating binding legislation was put forward by the 
UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights 
and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self- determination (‘Working 
Group’).89 Their efforts led to the formulation of a Draft of a Possible Convention on 
Private Military and Security Companies (‘UN Draft’),90 which was presented to the 
Human Rights Council (‘HRC’) in July 2010.
This work, while significant, needs development in regard to its environmental pro-
tection provisions. In its current form the document reflects IHL’s weak form of envi-
ronmental protection, noting Article 35 of AP I, which prohibits means and methods 
of warfare which causes ‘widespread, long- term and severe’ damage to the natural envi-
ronment. This IHL provision has been widely criticized for its high threshold of harm 
which permits a majority of environmental damage in conflict.91 The UN draft docu-
ment is also limited in its call for a limitation on weapons that might cause harm, as 
opposed to taking a wider view of military activity, including military waste disposal 
that can also cause severe harm to civilians and combatants alike. For example, Article 
10(2) provides that each state party should take the necessary measures ‘to prevent 
PMSCs and their personnel from using weapons likely to adversely and/ or irreversibly 
84 Ibeanu (n 71) 15 (referring to CESCR, General Comment No. 12 (1999), para. 8).
85 UNEP (n 63) 48.
86 See, for example, Art. 22, Section E, Montreux Document; Arts. 3, 4, 6, Preamble and Art. 21, Section 
E, ICoC.
87 See Montreux Document (n 57) 36 (in reference to Statement 22). 88 UNHRC (n 24) 6.
89 HRC Res 2005/ 2. See UN Working Group website, at <http:// www.ohchr.org/ EN/ Issues/ Mercenaries/ 
WGMercenaries/ Pages/ WGMercenariesIndex.aspx> accessed 10 February 2017.
90 UNHRC (n 24). 91 UNEP (n 63) 11.
 
312 PSCs and Environmental Protection
damage the environment on a massive scale’. On the other hand, Article 10(3) sets out 
that states parties should take necessary measures ‘to ensure that PMSCs and their 
personnel under no circumstances use, threaten to use and/ or engage in any activi-
ties related to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological and toxin weapons, their 
components and carriers’. This could be interpreted to include PSC post- conflict activi-
ties that engage in military waste and conflict disposal involving the disposal of such 
toxic weapons and its components. However, this provision is still narrow in that it 
does not cover non- weapon- related toxic materials.
By not taking a wider view of military activity, this document missed the oppor-
tunity to create more specific legislation that could provide environmental protec-
tion within the jus post bellum framework. The Draft does however, state that ‘the 
Convention applies to all situations whether or not the situation is defined as an 
armed conflict’.92 This could be interpreted to apply to all stages of a conflict includ-
ing in- and post- conflict. Unfortunately, the draft convention was not adopted by the 
HRC. Instead, the HRC passed a resolution establishing ‘an open- ended intergovern-
mental group’ to assess and ‘consider the possibility of elaborating an international 
regulatory framework, including, inter alia, the option of elaborating a legally binding 
instrument’.93
International efforts are also evident in the formulation of various soft law instru-
ments to provide guidance on PSC regulation. The Montreux Document On Pertinent 
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations 
of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict (‘Montreux 
Document’) sets out guidance on pertinent international legal obligations and good 
practices for states related to operations of PSCs during armed conflict.94 The Montreux 
Document, produced in 2008, is widely regarded as a template for acceptable practices 
in engaging and monitoring PSC services. It is the first document of international sig-
nificance to define how international law applies to PSCs operating in an armed con-
flict zone. The document also specifies that the existing obligations and good practices 
contained within it may also provide guidance to PSCs on activities in post- conflict 
situations.95
The good practices set out in the document are also designed to help states take 
measures nationally in order to fulfil their obligations under international law.96 It aims 
to address legal questions raised by PSC activities without creating new obligations. 
It has been criticized that the provisions are very broad, setting out that states must 
respect IHL and adhere to their obligations under IHRL without explicitly specifying 
which provisions within IHL and IHRL.97 It is not a legally binding instrument and 
although the Montreux Document is only a best practice guide, it can be helpful to 
hiring parties in formulating their own internal policies relating to PSCs. Moreover, 
though directed to states, the document can provide guidance to non- state actors (IOs, 
private companies, NGOs) hiring PSCs.
92 Art. 3 (3), Draft of a Possible Convention on Private Military and Security Companies.
93 UNHRC, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ RES/ 15/ 26, adopted 1 October 2010.
94 Montreux Document (n 57). 95 ibid. 9. 96 Ralby (n 59) 10.
97 Part 1, Section E, Montreux Document (n 57).
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Du Plessis sums this up, stating that
[t] he list of best practices in the Montreux Document includes recommendations that 
clients determine which services they want to outsource and they clearly set out how 
they will select and contract companies, including the criteria they will apply in mak-
ing their selection. There are also recommendations regarding clauses that should be 
included in contracts and ways that clients can monitor compliance with the contract 
and ensure that companies are held accountable for any breaches.98
Therefore the Montreux Document provides additional guidance on the formulation 
of contracts between the hiring party and PSC. However, how it works in practice dif-
fers, with reports99 showing that state efforts to adhere to the commitments within 
the document are mixed, with some states finding the document of value in develop-
ing the relevant laws and policies while others finding it of limited relevance.100 These 
reports include evidence that the human rights impact of PSC activities are often not 
adequately addressed,101 illustrating a failure to respect IHRL obligations as required 
by the document.
Although the title of the Montreux Document indicates it applying ‘during armed con-
flict’, it has been suggested that the document can also be used to provide post- conflict 
guidance on PSC regulation. As Beerlie notes, ‘[t] hough the Montreux Document 
explicitly focuses on armed conflict situations, it can serve to guide and inspire States 
in the development of regulations and policies aimed at preventing violations of inter-
national law by PSCs in post- conflict and in other, comparable situations’.102 Therefore 
guidance for post- conflict PSC activities can be found in this document.
Though welcomed by key NGOs involved in the process, there have been criti-
cisms levelled at the document— one being ‘that some relevant and well- established 
propositions of IHRL were not fully reflected in the text, including the state’s obliga-
tion to protect and apply the standard of due diligence’.103 Such gaps in the guidance, 
where important IHRL principles are relevant to post- conflict PSC activities could fur-
ther lead to a lack of respect of IHRL and as a consequence, contribute to adverse 
human rights impacts and indirectly, negative environmental impacts, of PSC post- 
conflict activities.104 Another criticism is that there is no specific guidance on any 
98 André du Plessis, ‘The Global Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies:  Why It Matters 
to Humanitarian Organisations’ 47 Humanitarian Exchange (June 2010), at <http:// www.odihpn.org/ 
humanitarian- exchange- magazine/ issue- 47/ the- global- code- of- conduct- for- private- security- companies- 
why- it- matters- to- humanitarian- organisations> accessed 10 February 2017.
99 For a review of the Montreux Document in practice, see Rebecca De Winter- Schmitt (ed.), ‘Montreux 
Five Years On: An Analysis of State Efforts to Implement Montreux Legal Obligations and Good Practices’ 
(Washington College of Law, 2013).
100 ibid. 19. 101 ibid.
102 ‘Private Military/ Security Companies: Rules Should be Implemented’ Keynote address by Christine 
Beerli, Vice- president of the ICRC, Montreux +5 Conference, Montreux, Switzerland, 11– 13 December 
2013, at <http:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ resources/ documents/ statement/ 2013/ 12- 11- privatization- of- war- 
montreux- plus- 5- beerli.htm> accessed 10 February 2017.
103 Scott Jerbi et al., ‘The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Academy 
Briefing No. 4 (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 2013) 6 (footnote 
omitted) (referring to a statement by Amnesty International).
104 ibid. 6– 7 (for further discussion on the lack of reflection of pertinent human rights principles in the 
Montréaux Document).
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environmentally- related obligations. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Montreux 
Document has been gaining acceptance. Originally supported in 2008 by seventeen 
states and the EU, currently fifty- four states, the EU, and two additional international 
organizations (NATO and OSCE) participate in the process.
Another relevant international soft law document is the ICoC, a multi- stakeholder ini-
tiative following on from the Montreux Document. By 2013 the ICoC had 708 signato-
ries.105 The code is considered the next step in international PSC regulation. The code sets 
out human- rights- based principles for more accountable provision of PSC services.106 For 
example, the first section of the code sets out the norms and standards PSCs should adhere 
to. This covers a range of issues from the use of force to defend people and property, to 
requiring PSCs to adopt and implement broader management policies to ensure that they 
are operating in compliance with IHRL, including appropriate training for PSC person-
nel. This section also includes an undertaking by PSCs to set up both personnel and third- 
party complaint and grievance procedures. The next section of the code aims to establish 
an international accountability mechanism (‘IAM’) to ensure that the standards set out in 
the first section are met. Du Plessis comments that, ‘it is anticipated that this will include 
some form of international certification of private security companies, and a complaints 
mechanism for third parties’.107 Du Plessis further notes that the overall aim of the ICoC 
‘is to clarify the standards according to which private security companies should operate, 
thereby encouraging an overall improvement in the quality of services they provide and 
minimising any adverse human rights impacts’.108
Though limited, the relevant sections which could contribute towards environ-
mental protection in light of PSC duties within the jus post bellum framework include 
for example, Article 62 which provides guidance on policies and procedures for the 
management, storage, and proper disposal of hazardous materials and munitions— 
including adhering to principles of ‘due care’.109 Article 64 requires a safe and healthy 
working environment and Article 69 addresses the requirement that PSCs have suffi-
cient financial capacity to meet potential liabilities arising from death, personal injury, 
and damage to property. Though not specifically environmental, these guidelines on 
regulating such activities could indirectly provide some protection to the environment, 
civilian population, and PSC employees involved.
With regard to international soft law efforts by the international community as a 
whole, Richemond- Barak argues that ‘multi- stakeholder initiatives of this kind offer 
highly promising avenues in enhancing the regulation of the industry— in particular 
in terms of participation, transparency, and harmonization’.110 Although these soft law 
instruments do not provide specific guidance for environmental best practices, the best 
practice provisions within these documents that are based on human rights obligations, 
105 ICoC, ‘Signatory Companies’, at <http:// www.icoc- psp.org/ uploads/ Signatory_ Companies_ - _ 
September_ 2013_ - _ Composite_ List_ SHORT_ VERSION- 1.pdf> 18 August 2015.
106 James Cockayne, ‘Private Military and Security Companies’ in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2014), 654.
107 du Plessis (n 98) . 108 ibid.
109 Art. 62, ICoC. For commentary on the Articles, see Jerbi (n 103) 47– 8.
110 Richemond- Barak (n 46) 1055– 6.
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could perhaps be used by hiring parties or PSCs themselves to provide some guidance 
on acceptable PSC activity that is, guidance on avoiding or mitigating PSC activity that 
could cause harm to human health and indirectly, the environment.
As these documents are non- binding, parties cannot be held liable for breach of any 
best practice provision. Regardless, these documents do have some effect, as evidenced 
by the increasing number of states, IOs, and PSCs that have signed up to them which 
illustrates their voluntary intentions to use these best practices. Although some argue 
that voluntary soft law agreements such as the ICoC have undermined UN efforts 
to create binding legislation,111 overall, these soft law documents, though in need of 
improvement and clarity, are welcome achievements in filling the gaps of PSC regula-
tion in conflict- related situations, making the situations they operate in less opaque and 
in the context of jus post bellum, assisting in the transition to sustainable peace.
13.4 Law and Policy in Practice: Attaching Liability  
for PSC Wrongdoing
Having explored international regulations applicable to PSC activities, particularly at 
the post- conflict stage, noting that international law can be difficult to enforce and that 
PSC specific regulation at present is predominantly soft law, the next question is, how 
can such regulation attach liability to PSC and PSC personnel wrongdoing that may 
harm the environment? We explore contract litigation, corporate liability, and respon-
sibility of states and other non- state actors in hiring PSCs in this context.
13.4.1  Contract litigation
This section covers two aspects: first, how stronger environmental provisions could be 
included into PSC contracts, and second, how contract litigation can been utilized to 
hold PSCs accountable for environmental harm as well as human health impacts as a 
result of such harm.
In the case of LOGCAP contracts,112 broad environmental protection provisions 
were written into the ‘Statement of Work’, ‘Task Orders’, and Standard Operating 
Procedures which dictate the parameters of how PSCs fulfil their responsibilities. 
These provisions in the LOGCAP contracts note that contractors must adhere to the 
US Environment Protection Agency and host nation guidelines,113 that KBR ‘take all 
possible and reasonable actions to protect human health and preserve the environ-
ment’,114 and that while in contingency operations the environment is subordinate to 
the mission, ‘this does not mean the preservation of the environment is ignored in the 
execution of orders’.115
111 ‘Charity Slams Conduct Code for Private Military and Security Companies’ War on Want (19 
September 2013), at <http:// www.waronwant.org/ media/ charity- slams- conduct- code- private- military- 
and- security- companies> accessed 10 February 2017.
112 See Section 13.3.1 above. 113 Jobes (n 26) 4, para. 15. 114 ibid. para. 16.
115 ibid. 4, para. 17.
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While these broad provisions are useful and have provided the basis of legal chal-
lenge to PSC practice that have caused harm to the environment and human health, 
the inclusion of more specific environmental responsibilities within contracts has thus 
far been limited and complicated by structural factors and expertise gaps. Throughout 
the Iraq and Afghan wars there were no standard contracts for base camps.116 Each 
camp drafted its own.117 Drafting an environmentally sound contract requires specific 
expertise on the part of engineering officers and base camp staff, which in most cases 
has been lacking. This has meant that contracts have not been clearly drafted to include 
standards of conduct that would ensure environmental protection.118 The lack of envi-
ronmental guidelines within PSC contracts has been a part of a wider problem within 
the US military in which there is no comprehensive approach to environmental consid-
erations within contingency operations.119 It is illustrative that it was only after wide-
spread media attention over the burn pit controversy in 2009, leading to PSC waste 
mismanagement becoming a political problem, did the DoD develop comprehensive 
guidance for burn pit management.120
One means of improving environmental protection in relation to PSC activities is to 
encourage PSCs to sign up to ICoC (which does provide indirect environmental pro-
tection)121 and integrate the ICoC into their contracts. Although the ICoC is a non- 
binding code, Creutz argues that it has the possibility of becoming legally binding via 
incorporation into service contracts.122 Moreover, by signing up to the ICoC, signatory 
companies make general commitments to operate in accordance with the principles 
within the code, ‘mak[ing] compliance with this Code an integral part of contractual 
agreements’123 and adhering to the code even when it is not included in service con-
tracts.124 As Rosemann (a government representative involved in drafting the ICoC) 
aptly notes:
[s] uggesting that these codes of conduct are “soft law” wrongly indicates that they are 
not binding on those involved and that violations have no consequences . . . Once the 
ICoC is included into a contract, the violation of human rights becomes a reason for 
contract litigation.125
Ultimately, this means that IHRL violations by PSCs and their personnel could consti-
tute a breach of contract and result in contract litigation. This includes IHRL breaches 
resulting in or from TRW- related activity or environmental damage in general at both 
the in- conflict and post- conflict stages. Opportunity can also be taken to incorporate 
specific environmental obligations in these service contracts. With regard to the ICoC, 
it is worth noting that in addition to the UK and the United States having stated their 
intention to incorporate ICoC provisions into their own PSC service provider agree-
ments, the ICoC has gained credibility by being signed up to by major PSC providers 
116 Mosher et al. (n 21) 107. 117 ibid. 118 ibid. 119 ibid.
120 US Government Accountability Office (n 27).
121 See, for example, Arts. 62, 64, and 69, ICoC.
122 Katja Creutz, ‘Law versus Codes of Conduct: Between Convergence and Conflict’ in Jan Klabbers 
and Touko Piiparinen (eds.), Normative Pluralism and International Law:  Exploring Global Governance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 195.
123 Arts. 16 and 17, ICoC. 124 Art. 19, ICoC, paras. 16, 18, 19.
125 Cited in Creutz (n 122) 195.
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in the industry ‘making it look and feel like law, despite not being law, formally speak-
ing’.126 Such laws incorporated into PSC contracts providing some form of environ-
mental and human rights protection could go a long way to assisting the transition to 
sustainable peace.
On the question of how contract litigation can be utilized to hold PSCs accountable 
for environmental harm, Jobes v. KBR 127 is explored. In this case, over 200 former mili-
tary and contractor personnel (who died allegedly from exposure to burn pit fumes) 
and their families filed lawsuits in a US district court in 2010 against KBR and its for-
mer parent company Halliburton. The plaintiffs claim that exposure to burn pit fumes 
‘are causing a host of serious diseases to Plaintiffs, increased risk of serious disease in 
the future, and death’.128 The plaintiffs argued that KBR has contractual agreements that 
include protecting human health and the environment within the confines of opera-
tional requirements and that these agreements were breached by KBR’s actions.129
KBR argued that it is entitled to derivative sovereign immunity under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act’s (‘FTCA’) discretionary function exemption. The United States is gen-
erally immune from lawsuits130 and KBR argued that as an agent of the state carrying 
out the will of the state, it too should be immune from suit. In 2013, the US District 
Court for the District of Maryland ruled in favour of KBR and dismissed the burn pit 
lawsuit concluding that:
The critical interests of the United States could be compromised if military contractors 
were left “holding the bag” for claims made by military and other personnel that could 
not be made against the military itself. The ability of the military to recruit contractors 
and their willingness to assist the military in time of war could be called into serious 
question if they did not enjoy the same protections as does the United States for com-
bat activities.131
However in 2014 the US Court of Appeals overruled the District Court, stating that 
KBR was only entitled to derivative sovereign immunity if it had adhered to the terms 
of its contract. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s judgment on the 
grounds that the Court did not have enough evidence to judge whether KBR had kept 
to its original contract with the government.132 Six years since filing suit, the case is 
ongoing, with a full hearing yet to take place.133
126 ibid. 127 Jobes (n 26) 7, para. 23. 128 ibid. para. 1. 129 ibid. para. 1.
130 The US Federal government is immune from lawsuits unless it waivers that immunity or a case 
is bought forward by an individual through the Federal Tort Claims Act. ‘Sovereign immunity’, Legal 
Information Institute, Cornell University Law School, at <http:// www.law.cornell.edu/ wex/ sovereign_ 
immunity> accessed 10 February 2017.
131 Re: KBR, Inc. Burn Pit Litigation, United States District Court for the District of Maryland, No. 8:09- 
md- 02083- RWT 8 September 2010, 32.
132 KBR, Inc. Burn Pit Litigation, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, No. 13- 143, 
Judgment of 7 March 2014, 39– 40.
133 Patricia Kime, ‘Burn- Pit, Electrocution Lawsuits to Continue’ Military Times (27 January 2015), at 
<http:// www.militarytimes.com/ story/ military/ pentagon/ 2015/ 01/ 22/ kbr- iraq- lawsuits- supreme- court/ 
22158399/ > accessed 10 February 2017. See also Jon L. Gelman, ‘Burn Pit Lawsuit Hearing Rescheduled to 
March 2017’ (Burn Pit Claims Blog, 8 February 2017), <http:// burnpitclaims.blogspot.co.uk/ 2016/ 12/ burn- 
pit- lawsuit- hearing- rescheduled- to.html> accessed 10 February 2017.
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This case shows that contract litigation has the potential to provide a forum for 
accountability for PSC misconduct. The general environmental protection and human 
health provisions in existing contracts (before initiatives such as the ICoC) have been 
useful in making the case for contractor misconduct. Nevertheless, increased environ-
mental and human health provisions in contracts is still crucial in transforming PSCs 
into environmentally responsible actors. Contract litigation also has value in acting as 
a deterrent to PSC malpractice,134 which may eventually lead to a change in norms of 
acceptable behaviour in wartime.
In addition, recent US court proceedings reveal that while PSCs fall within the ambit of 
US state immunity from lawsuits, they lose this immunity if they breach their contracts. 
Thus the onus of responsibility for contractor malpractice is on PSCs themselves. Yet, as 
noted earlier, PSCs are aware that they can ‘get away with doing anything they want’135 and 
pay any fines that result from their malpractice. Malpractice that has been encouraged by a 
weak regulatory setting. Thus, the question is whether accountability for PSC malpractice 
should not be left to PSCs alone but also sought from hiring or home states, who are respon-
sible for wider regulatory settings that PSCs act within. Finally, while contract litigation 
can provide accountability for people impacted by environmental damage, the environ-
ment by itself is not protected. Stronger, more environmental specific regulatory restraint 
and an alternative form accountability is needed, to better protect the environment and 
affected population as well as contribute to the establishment of sustainable peace.
13.4.2  Corporate liability
Modern PSCs are generally companies with individuals employed to work for them, 
thus they are like any other corporation. They are registered corporate entities ‘with 
legal personalities and hierarchical management structures’.136 Therefore, the question 
arises whether PSCs can be found liable through corporate civil liability.
Although traditionally international law exclusively addressed states and their agents, 
the rise of non- state actors and the evolution of IHL and international criminal law in 
particular have demonstrated that international law also applies to non- state entities 
and individuals. This essentially means that ‘[t] he idea that international law applies to 
non- state actors, and hence to companies, and that they have duties and responsibili-
ties under that law consequently does not pose a conceptual problem’.137 Therefore, a 
company could in theory be found liable for its own actions as demonstrated after the 
Second World War in the US Nuremberg Military Tribunal judgment of I.G. Farben138 
134 Heath Druzin, ‘Supreme Court Allows Lawsuits Over Burn Pits, Electrocutions’ (Stars and Stripes, 
20 January 2015), at <http:// www.stripes.com/ news/ us/ supreme- court- allows- lawsuits- over- burn- pits- 
electrocutions- 1.324782#.VMDh6kmQaQ8.twitter> accessed 10 February 2017.
135 Jobes (n 26) 7, para. 23.
136 Hannah Tonkin, State Control over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 2.
137 Eric Mongelard, ‘Corporate Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 
88 International Review of the Red Cross 665, 670 (Mongelard also sets out conventions that explicitly cre-
ate obligations for companies in specific areas of international law).
138 The I.G. Farben Trial, Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty- two Others, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
14 August 1947– 29 July 1948, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X, 1– 68.
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where twenty- three board members of the German chemical and pharmaceutical 
company were accused of various war crimes, including plundering public and pri-
vate property in occupied territory. A number of the Tribunal’s findings were based on 
Farben as a corporate body. Moreover, the Tribunal held that the company itself was 
responsible for specifically violating Article 47 of the Hague Regulations, which pro-
hibits pillage and, although the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over legal persons, it 
did come to the conclusion that the war crime of pillage could be directly imputed to IG 
Farben as a company. This case demonstrates that companies can commit and poten-
tially be held responsible for violations of IHL.139
In more recent cases, civil claims for violations of IHL and IHRL seem to be brought 
under US law via the US Alien Tort Claims Act (‘ATCA’) by application of the ‘aiding 
and abetting standard’.140 In Doe v. Unocal Corp,141 Myanmar citizens sued the com-
pany Unocal for aiding and abetting Myanmar military forces in committing grave 
human rights violations, ‘in the context of oil and gas extraction operations and build-
ing of a pipeline’.142 In Talisman,143 the New  York District Court applied the aiding 
and abetting standard, where a Canadian oil company, Talisman, was sued by the 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan for collaborating with the Sudanese government in vio-
lation of human rights and war crimes committed in the context of international armed 
conflict in Sudan. While the US Court of Appeals in Talisman dismissed the case on 
the grounds that the plaintiffs had not ‘established Talisman’s purposeful complicity 
in human rights abuses’,144 the Court of Appeals in the Unocal case on the other hand, 
found that on grounds of the aiding and abetting theory and the fact that Unocal had 
knowledge of the human right breaches committed by the government of Myanmar 
before becoming a party to the joint venture between Unocal and the Myanmar gov-
ernment, that there was sufficient evidence to hold Unocal liable under ATCA. These 
recent cases further confirm the possibility of holding companies liable for violations 
of IHL as well as IHRL but also highlight the legal complexities in achieving such 
accountability.145
Corporate civil liability may therefore be a good route for victims of PSC violations 
during and post- conflict as they may be able to hold PSCs accountable as well as have 
the possibility of obtaining financial compensation for their suffering.146 Arguably 
139 See also The Krupp Trial, Trial of Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and Eleven 
Others, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 August 1947– 29 July 1948, Law Reports of the Trials of War 
Criminals, Vol. X, 69– 181. For detailed analysis on this case, see Mongelard (n 137) 674– 6.
140 Mongelard (n 137) 681.
141 Doe v. Unocal Corporation, US Federal District Court, 110F. Supp. 2d. 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) Judgment 
of 31 August 2000.
142 Mongelard (n 137) 679– 80.
143 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, US District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, 224 f. Supp. 2d289, 19 March 2003.
144 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 582 
F.3d 244, 2 October 2009, 2.
145 See Mongelard (n 137) 678– 81 (for detailed analysis of these cases).
146 ibid. 667. See also UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Corporations Must 
be Held Accountable for Human Rights Violations’ (20 February 2012), at http:// www.ohchr.org/ EN/ 
NewsEvents/ Pages/ CorporationsMustBeHeldAccountableForHRViolations.aspx accessed 10 February 
2017 (High Commissioner Pillay argues that ‘holding corporations liable for human rights violations is 
fully consistent with international law’).
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this could also apply in situations where PSC activities generate TRW or environ-
mental damage that causes harm to the environment and human health. Moreover, as 
Mongelard points out,
[i] f civil actions are brought against companies and the courts award large sums of 
money in damages and interest against them, this could make them more accountable 
and induce them to change their corporate culture; shareholders, too, would become 
more aware of their responsibilities on seeing their profits thus dwindle and fearing 
the loss of their investments.147
In theory, national law provides the possibility of enforcing corporate liability for IHL 
breaches.148 However, in practice, domestic judges ‘are rarely open to cases based on 
international humanitarian law’.149 Thus the reality is that while corporate civil liability 
exists, it is difficult to enforce.
13.4.3  International legal obligations of states and non- state actors 
in relation to PSCs
State responsibility is another way to attach accountability for PSC actions.150 Essentially, 
‘States have legal obligations to control PSCs and ensure that they are held accountable 
for misconduct.’151 States that are identified as having possible responsibility (regard-
less of being party to a conflict) are categorized as either the hiring state (state that 
hired the PSC), the host state (state on whose territory the PSC is operating in), or the 
home state (state where the PSC is registered and based). Out of the three categories, 
host states that is, states where the conflict has taken place, are generally considered 
weak and vulnerable. As one commentator notes, ‘one cannot realistically rely on the 
effective control of PSCs by the host state, whose inability or incapacity to provide secu-
rity and governance is the reason d’etre [sic] of the resort to private contractors’.152 Thus, 
using principles of state responsibility153 to hold the hiring state or home state respon-
sible is particularly useful when the host state is unable or unwilling to hold the PSC 
accountable for violations of international law. For example, the hiring state could be 
held responsible if the PSC was an agent of that state, therefore any misconduct by the 
PSC is attributable to the hiring state.154 The home state has particular relevance in try-
ing to attach accountability for PSC activities, particularly ‘because of the paramount 
importance attributed by international law to the exclusive territorial control exercised 
147 Mongelard (n 137) 666– 7 148 ibid. 691. 149 ibid. 691.
150 Lindsey Cameron and Vincent Chetail, Privatizing War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 134.
151 Tonkin (n 136) 6.
152 Francesco Francioni, ‘The Responsibility of the PSC’S Home State for Human Rights Violations 
Arising from the Export of Private Military and Security Service, s EUI Working Papers, AEL 2009/ 18, 
Academy of European Law, PRIV- WAR Project (2009) 2.
153 See Arts. 4, 5, and 8, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(2001).
154 Tonkin (n 136) 7.
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over the company by the state where the company has been legally created or where the 
centre of gravity of its management and operations’.155
Commentators argue that states (including states not party to a conflict)156 have 
‘positive obligations to control PSCs and ensure accountability’ under IHL and 
IHRL.157 International law imposes clear obligations on states to ensure respect for 
IHL; this includes protecting the civilian population and preventing IHL breaches. It 
follows that states, through state responsibility, also have a duty to ensure that PSCs 
comply with IHL rules as well as to ‘take action to prevent and punish misconduct by 
PSCs’.158 Tonkin argues that there are also positive obligations for states under IHRL, 
from obligations ‘to plan and control security operations to minimise risk to life’159 to 
an ‘obligation to protect individuals whose lives are at risk’.160 Arguably, these positive 
obligations could apply in situations in which there is a risk of TRW generation or any 
PSC action in violation of IHL, IHRL, or other international law obligations leading to 
environmental damage that could also in turn cause harm or the risk of harm to human 
health. Such violations by PSCs could interfere with States’ positive obligations under 
international law and thus incur state responsibility.161 State responsibility therefore 
provides some form of control and deterrent for PSC behaviour, which at the post- con-
flict stage could greatly contribute to the establishment of sustainable peace.
While hiring states not party to a conflict can incur responsibility if the PSC’s viola-
tion of international law can be attributed to the state, with regard to non- state actors 
(IOs, corporations, NGOs) hiring PSCs on the other hand, there are limits to the reach 
of responsibility under international law. For example, the position of IOs regarding 
responsibility for violations by PSCs hired is still uncertain. As Lehnardt notes,
[w] hile it is accepted that international organizations can in principle incur interna-
tional responsibility, the efforts of the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) to for-
mulate rules on the responsibilities of international organizations are complicated by 
the facts that there is much less case law and practice from which principles can be 
drawn than in the context of state responsibility.162
However, Lenhardt argues (in the context of the UN), that an IO may be responsible if 
the PSC personnel hired can be considered agents of the IO that is, an agent being ‘any 
official and other persons or entities through whom the organizations acts’.163 Therefore 
PSC violations of IHL, IHRL, or international law obligations that causes harm to the 
155 Francioni (n 152) 2. See also Ibeanu (n 71) 17– 19.
156 ICRC confirms that the obligation to ‘ensure respect’ of IHL is not limited parties to a conflict. See 
ICRC Customary IHL, ‘Rule 144’, at <https:// www.icrc.org/ customary- ihl/ eng/ docs/ v1_ rul_ rule144> 
accessed 10 February 2017.
157 Tonkin (n 136) 6– 8. 158 ibid. 6– 8. 159 ibid. 7. 160 ibid.
161 For further discussion on state responsibility for PSC actions, see Cameron and Chetail (n 
150) 134– 287.
162 Chia Lehnardt, ‘Peacekeeping’ in Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher (eds.), Private Security, 
Public Order: The Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
210 (footnote omitted).
163 Art. 4(2), Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, ILC, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ 
L.648, 27 May 2004.
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environment or wellbeing of the population jus post bellum could in theory incur the 
responsibility of the hiring IO. Interestingly, further guidance can be found in the UN 
Draft Convention which goes beyond responsibility of states and also addresses the 
obligations of IOs exercising their due diligence under international law with regard to 
hiring PSCs.164 Unfortunately, the UN Draft makes no mention of any responsibility or 
obligations on the part of corporations or NGOs hiring PSCs.
As discussed above, it is difficult to hold corporations liable for breaches under inter-
national law as the ILC Articles of Responsibility do not apply to them nor are there 
any rules under international law for the attribution of private actor wrongdoing to 
other private entities.165 As Perrin points out, ‘[i] n many national jurisdictions, there 
are legal barriers to holding corporate clients criminally liable for the conduct of pri-
vate security and military companies they hire’166 However, as mentioned earlier, cor-
porate clients hiring PSCs could theoretically be held civilly liable for PSC violations 
of IHL or IHRL for example, under ATCA, but it is not easy to do so. As Perrin notes, 
‘there has yet to be a case of a corporation being held liable under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act for the violations of a private military and security company that it has hired’.167 
Obligations to prevent or redress violations of IHL or IHRL in this case would fall not 
on the hiring party (corporation) but on the host and home states.168 This is similarly 
the case for NGOs hiring PSCs. The ILC Articles of Responsibility also do not apply to 
NGOs, and international law does not provide for the attribution of PSC wrongdoing 
to NGOs. This poses a problem for accountability of PSC actions when hired by non- 
state actors. Nevertheless, while there are no legally binding obligations at international 
level, non- state actors do have the option to look towards non- binding guidance in the 
form of the Montreux Document and ICoC in hiring PSCs and in that vein, ensure PSC 
responsibility through contracts that is, incorporating the soft law guidance or inter-
national law provisions protecting the environment into the service contracts between 
the hiring NGO and the PSC.
Due to the difficulties in attaching responsibility to PSCs for environmental dam-
age including violations under IHL and IHRL, and the even more complex nature of 
attaching responsibility to hiring non- state actors for PSC violations, an alternative 
solution may be to look towards the principle of shared responsibility. According to 
Plakokefalos, shared responsibility for environmental damage could be triggered when 
environmental harm is brought about by a breach in an international obligation by mul-
tiple actors— requiring the responsible actors to make full reparation for the damage 
164 Art. 3(1), Draft of a Possible Convention on Private Military and Security Companies.
165 Leonard Stenner, ‘Private Military and Security Companies: Security Actors Without Accountability’ 
Occasional Paper No. 36 (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, July 2014), 11, at 
<http:// www.kaiptc.org/ Publications/ Occasional- Papers/ Documents/ Stenner- KAIPTC- Occasional- Paper- 
2014.aspx> accessed 10 February 2017.
166 Benjamin Perrin, ‘Promoting Compliance of Private Security and Military Companies with 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 88(863) International Review of the Red Cross 613, 623 (footnote 
omitted).
167 ibid. 626.
168 Giulia Pinzauti, ‘Adjudicating Human Rights Violations Committed by Private Contractors in 
Conflict Situations before the European Court of Human Rights’ in Francioni and Ronzitti (n 48) 167.
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caused.169 In this case, it is the PSC and not multiple actors breaching an international 
obligation. However, in light of the difficulty in establishing liability to PSCs for viola-
tions in international law, it is argued that in the spirit of shared responsibility, multiple 
actors in a situation of PSC violation could be interpreted to include the hiring party 
(state or non- state), host state, and home state if the PSC violation could be attributed 
to either or all parties. Therefore, in the absence of holding the PSC responsible, shared 
responsibility provides an avenue for other responsible actors to take responsibility in 
mitigating or fixing the environmental damage caused.170 This ensures that the PSC 
violation causing damage does not go unheeded and will go a long way towards con-
tributing to the jus post bellum aim of achieving sustainable peace. However, shared 
responsibility is not without its problems— one of the downsides being that ‘interna-
tional law provides little or no guidance as to exactly how responsibility (or reparation) 
is to be allocated between multiple actors’171 and with regard to hiring non- state actors, 
the issue of attribution of PSC wrongdoing to non- state actors under international law 
arises. Illustrating once again the complexities associated with holding PSCs and other 
parties associated with them accountable for PSC violations in international law.
13.5 Conclusion
The increasing use of PSCs particularly during the peacebuilding stage poses significant 
challenges to transparency, oversight, and accountability. It is clear that a lack of PSC 
oversight and regulation have led to situations where environmental diligence has not 
been prioritized, resulting in environmental and human harm. Unfortunately, PSCs do 
not fall neatly into the existing legal framework. An examination of international law 
reveals that the basis for some environmental protection exists within both IHL and 
IHRL— from environmentally specific provisions within IHL to indirect environmen-
tal protection through human centred concerns under IHRL. However, IHL and IHRL 
are laws primarily applicable to states, making it very difficult to apply to PSC actions.
In terms of PSC regulation specifically, there has been some movement to create 
binding and non- binding legislation. These documents, primarily the UN Draft, ICoC, 
and Montreux Document, include aspects (to varying degrees) that could be inter-
preted or tailored to reflect environmental issues. However, there is space to take a 
stronger stance on environmental protection. In addition, while soft law instruments 
such as the ICoC have merit in their wide acceptance by states and PSCs, and particu-
larly in their contribution to creating norms around responsible PSC behaviour, there 
is an argument for whether these norms could be strengthened if states supported UN 
efforts to create binding legislation.
169 See  chapter 11 in this volume.
170 See ibid. (for analysis of reparations for environmental damage under international law).
171 André Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’ in André Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (eds.), Principles 
of Shared Responsibility in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 13 (footnote 
omitted). See also  chapter 11 in this volume (on problems of shared responsibility with regard to breach 
and attribution).
 
324 PSCs and Environmental Protection
Whilst regulatory frameworks have been developed, contract litigation, corporate 
liability, state and shared responsibility are viable avenues by which victims of PSC 
violations could hold PSCs or other relevant parties accountable for their actions. 
However, contract litigation only works if the relevant law violated is incorporated into 
the PSCs’ contracts, while corporate liability can be difficult to enforce in situations 
involving PSCs. In addition, through contract litigation and corporate liability, there 
have been parallel attempts to hold PSCs liable for malpractice within US courtrooms. 
This has proved to be a difficult route in most cases. It remains to be seen how these 
cases before the US courts will develop and whether successful outcomes for the plain-
tiffs may shift norms around PSC practice to better respect IHL and IHRL in conflict- 
related situations. With regard to accountability for PSC violations by hiring non- state 
actors, the position under international law remains unclear. While in theory IOs could 
bear some responsibility for violations by PSCs hired, in practice this position is still 
uncertain under international law and with regard to other hiring non- state actors like 
corporations and NGOs, there are no rules under international law for the attribu-
tion of private actor (PSC) wrongdoing to other private entities. Therefore, in situa-
tions involving PSC violations of international obligations and in the absence of PSC 
responsibility under international law, state responsibility though not easy to achieve, 
remains the most promising avenue to providing some accountability for PSC wrong-
doing. Whilst shared responsibility for PSC violations is another avenue to provide 
accountability, it too can be problematic to apply.
It is obvious from the discussion above that there is a lack of clear regulations relat-
ing to PSC obligations as well as PSC misconduct for not only PSCs but also state and 
other hiring non- state parties. The international community (states, NGOs, PSC indus-
try) thus has a part to play in creating clearer accountability and liability options. These 
could work as a deterrent to PSCs with regard to violating IHL, IHRL, other interna-
tional law obligations, or even breaching their contractual obligations. For example, 
more stringent fines— fines that could be turned into compensation, contributed to a 
PSC compensation fund that is used for restitution, that is, to restore the environment 
or mitigate the damage done or provide compensation for victims harmed due to PSC 
actions. The PSC compensation could perhaps be administered through the ICoC, in 
that each signatory to the ICoC pays into a global PSC compensation fund. In addi-
tion, to enhance accountability for PSC actions in breach of IHL and IHRL, criminal 
accountability for PSC personnel could be developed further that is, enforcing criminal 
consequences for grave breaches of international law by its personnel.
Further work must also be done to ensure transparency of PSC activities, to ensure 
that they are respecting the laws during and after conflict as well as to make it easier 
to hold them accountable for any violations of those laws. This could also prove to be 
a preventative measure to signal that PSCs are not above the law. Finally, the envi-
ronmental protection issues explored here have relevance for wider questions around 
environmental protection and conflict. Should more be done to address the diverse 
nature of conflict pollution events that occur throughout the life cycle of conflict and 
are related not only to military targeting decisions but also to military base waste man-
agement, contaminated conflict debris, and more? Environmental protection will be 
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limited if current IHL provisions are used as a guide. Therefore, the jus post bellum 
framework that applies during the transition from conflict to peace should integrate 
key principles enshrined in IHRL as well as other legal frameworks such as interna-
tional criminal law and international environmental law into regulations (binding or 
non- binding) for PSCs. This could contribute to a more rigorous protection of the envi-
ronment in relation to PSC activities. Without adequately addressing the challenges 
associated with PSCs and environmental protection, sustainable peace in a war- torn 
society would be that much harder to achieve.
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of Environmental Reparations
A Case Study of the UN Compensation Commission
Cymie R. Payne*
14.1 Introduction
The United Nations Compensation Commission (‘UNCC’) is a unique model for liabil-
ity and compensation of environmental damage in an international context, influenc-
ing both jus in bello and jus post bellum. The 1990– 1 Gulf War to evict Iraq from Kuwait 
was a public spectacle of environmental damage. It was followed by the UNCC’s more 
discreet legal process that catalogued, assessed, and awarded money to pay to clean 
and repair the damaged soil, water, coastal ecosystems, and other harms. The UNCC’s 
contributions include integration of environmental law principles into the reparations 
process; use of advanced techniques for assessment of environmental damage; and use 
of a multilateral process in a way that balanced confidentiality and transparency.
The UNCC environmental programme advanced international law most signifi-
cantly by serving notice that environmental damage caused in relation to an armed 
conflict can be a culpable offence. In 1995, it was said that environment is a new con-
cept and that ‘new’ environmental delicts will be subject to the Nuremberg defendants’ 
claim that they are ex post facto and therefore illegitimate.1 Participants in conflicts 
today cannot make that claim. In fact, many other bodies now allow legal claims for 
environmental losses.2 The Eritrea– Ethiopia Claims Commission, established in 2000 
* Associate Professor at Rutgers University, New Jersey.
1 Richard J. Grunawalt et  al. (eds.), Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict (Newport 
RI:  International Law Studies, Naval War College, 1996), 515 (Theodor Meron comments). The UNCC 
stands out from other historical and modern claims commissions as the first whose mandate recognized the 
importance of protection of the environment to peacebuilding. UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The 
Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (UNEP, 2009) 6, at <http:// postconflict.unep.ch/ publica-
tions/ pcdmb_ policy_ 01.pdf> accessed 7 June 2017. UNEP has recommended establishing a permanent 
UNCC- like body to monitor violations and address compensation for environmental damage. The Toxic 
Remnants of War project has called for a permanent review body on conflict and the environment, albeit 
one that would emphasize post- conflict assistance and assessment of the impacts of particular military 
practices. Manfred Mohr and Alexander Stöcker, ‘Workshop Report: Exploring a legal framework for Toxic 
Remnants of War’ (2012), at <http:// www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2012/ 09/ TRW- 
Legal- WS- Report_ final.pdf> accessed 7 June 2017.
2 See also, UNEP comment on the Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclu-
sive societies, A/ RES/ 70/ 1, that ‘A better understanding of the links between environment and human secu-
rity is vital for effective conflict prevention, post- conflict reconstruction and promotion of peaceful and 
inclusive societies.’ UN Environment Assembly of the UNEP, Delivering on the Environmental Dimension 
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development— a concept note, UNEP/ EA.1/ INF/ 18 (2016), para. 87.
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by a treaty between the belligerents to settle claims for loss, damage, or injury of either 
government and its nationals, accepted environmental claims.3 The UN Register of 
Damage, established in 2009, can receive claims for environmental damage in its public 
claims category.4 The UN General Assembly adopted resolutions calling for compensa-
tion of coastal cleaning and remediation costs for oil spill damage resulting from the 
Israeli Air Force strikes on oil storage tanks in the vicinity of the Lebanese Jiyeh elec-
tric power plant in 2006, which posed potential harm to human health, biodiversity, 
fisheries, and tourism in Lebanon.5 A UN Development Programme study ordered in 
relation to the Lebanese oil spill referred to the UNCC as a ‘precedent major oil spill 
compensation regime for spills arising from armed hostilities’ and it was even sug-
gested that the UNCC might be used to ‘secure the relevant compensations’.6
Environmental liability resulted from Iraq’s violation of jus ad bellum. After 
Iraq invaded the neighbouring state of Kuwait on 1 August 1990, the UN Security 
Council condemned its actions as a breach of international peace and secu-
rity under the UN Charter7 and took note that Iraq was liable for any loss, dam-
age, or injury.8 When Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait, a coalition of states, 
authorized by the Security Council, brought military force to bear on Iraq.9 A  few 
months of sharp warfare ensued, until the Iraqi government accepted the terms 
of a ceasefire that included the formation of a boundary demarcation commis-
sion and the establishment of an international civil tribunal to assess repara-
tions payable by Iraq to states harmed by Iraq’s aggressive acts, the UNCC.10 The 
3 Agreement, Eritrea– Ethiopia, 12 December 2000, 2138 UNTS 94, 40 ILM 260. Ethiopia claimed com-
pensation for losses of gum Arabic and resin plants, and damage to terraces in the Tigray region for a value 
of approximately US$ 1 billion and for loss of wildlife. It failed to provide evidence of harm beyond the 
claim forms, with no details and no supporting evidence, and the Commission rejected the claims on that 
basis; the wildlife claim was withdrawn. See Sean D. Murphy, Won Kidane, and Thomas R. Snider, Litigating 
War: Arbitration of Civil Injury by the Eritrea- Ethiopia Claims Commission (New York: Oxford University 
Press New York, 2013), 146.
4 UN Register of Damage, Rules and Regulations Governing the Registration of Claims, Article 11(1) 
(19 June 2009).
5 A/ 65/ 278, UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary- General: Oil Slick on Lebanese Shores, A/ 62/ 
343, 17 September 2007; Report of the Secretary- General: Oil Slick on Lebanese Shores, A/ 63/ 225, 8 June 
2008. At its second session, the UNEP Environment Assembly adopted the resolution: Protection of the 
Environment in Areas Affected by Armed Conflict, UN doc. UNEP/ EA.2/ L.16, May 2016, co- sponsored 
by Ukraine, Jordan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, South Sudan, Norway and Lebanon, Canada, 
and the EU.
6 A/ 65/ 278, para. 7. This was not a suggestion that could be effectuated, given the UNCC’s limited man-
date and the fact that its claims review functions were fully terminated at the time this proposal was made. 
The resolution also noted that all of the relevant conventions in force between the parties were inapplicable 
‘during armed hostilities’. ibid. para. 7.
7 Security Council Resolution 660, UN Doc. S/ RES/ 660, 8 February 1990. See also Security Council 
Resolution 661, S/ RES/ 661, 6 August 1990 (sanctions).
8 Security Council Resolution 674, S/ RES/ 674, 29 October 1990 (Iraq’s liability for any loss, damage or 
injury).
9 Andrew Rosenthal, ‘War in the Gulf: The Overview— U.S. and Allies Open Air War on Iraq’ N.Y. Times, 
New  York ed., A1 (17 January 1991) (‘Rosenthal’); Alberto Bin, Richard Hill, and Archer Jones, Desert 
Storm: A Forgotten War (Westport CT: Praeger, 1998).
10 Security Council Resolution 686, 2 March 1991; UN Security Council Resolution 687 (3 April 1991), 
ILM 30 (1991) 846; UN Doc. S/ 22559 (1991); Letter dated 10 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative 
of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/ 22480, 11 
April 1991)  (‘The National Assembly has decided at its session held on 6 April 1991 to agree to United 
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boundary commission completed its task and the results were accepted by the 
parties.11
The UNCC was established in 1991, completed its review of claims in 2005, and in 
2015 began winding down its operations.12 Iraq paid nearly US$ 48 billion in compen-
sation as of October 2015, for all claims categories.13 Of this, awards were made for 
a total of over US$ 5.26 billion for environmental assessment, remediation, restora-
tion, and response activities; nearly US$ 85 billion had been sought for environmental 
damage in 168 claims.14 For comparison, the US Government reached a settlement to 
resolve BP’s liability for natural resource injuries from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
whereby BP would pay up to US$ 8.8 billion for restoration.15
The environmental damage from the 1990– 1 conflict was varied and widespread. An 
estimated 10.8 million barrels of oil that was intentionally dumped in the Persian Gulf 
by Iraqi forces contaminated over 600 kilometres of the Saudi Arabian coastline, with 
toxicity that will likely persist for decades more.16 In Kuwait, over 1 billion barrels of 
oil was released when Iraqi forces detonated over 600 oil wells, contaminating ground-
water and desert ecology.17 Further damage to Kuwait’s desert was caused by ‘the con-
struction of military fortifications, including ditches, berms, bunkers, trenches, and 
Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991)’); Identical Letters dated 6 April 1991 from the Permanent 
Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed Respectively to the Secretary- General and the 
President of the Security Council, S/ 22456, 6 April 1991.
11 Richard Schofield,‘The United Nations’ Settlement of the Iraq- Kuwait Border, 1991– 1993’ (1993) IBRU 
Boundary and Security Bulletin.
12 UNCC, Press Release, PR/ 2015/ 1, 8 June 2015.
13 UNCC, Press Release, PR/ 2015/ 4, 28 October 2015 (referring to US$ 4.6 billion outstanding compen-
sation owed to Kuwait); UNCC website, Summary of Awards and Current Status of Payments, at <http:// 
www.uncc.ch/ summary- awards- and- current- status- payments> accessed 7 March 2016 (referring to US$ 
4,629,324,488 in outstanding award amounts and US$ 47,704,258,660 compensation paid). The Governing 
Council, with decision 274, S/ AC.26/ Dec.274 (3 November 2016), continued to postpone Iraq’s obligation 
to deposit 5 per cent of the proceeds of export sales of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products in the 
Compensation Fund until 1 January 2018; as a result, no compensation has been paid since 2014. UNCC, 
Press Release, PR/ 2017/ 2, 24 April 2017.
14 UNCC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fifth 
Instalment of ‘F4’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2005/ 10, 30 June 2005 (‘Fifth ‘F4’ Report’) Table 26, para. 784.
15 Consent Decree Among Defendant BP Exploration & Production Inc. (‘BPXP’), The United States 
of America, and the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, MDL No. 2179 (US 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 2015), at <https:// www.justice.gov/ enrd/ file/ 838066/ 
download> accessed 7 June 2017.
16 Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Third Instalment 
of ‘F4’ Claims (‘Third ‘F4’ Report’), paras. 170– 8; 43 ILM 704 (2004); Adriana C. Bejarano and Jacqueline 
Michel, ‘Large- Scale Risk Assessment of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons in Shoreline Sediments from 
Saudi Arabia: Environmental Legacy After Twelve Years of the Gulf War Oil Spill’ (2010) 158 Environmental 
Pollution 1561– 9, 1561.
17 Third ‘F4’ Report (n 16) paras. 61, 86– 99, 106– 11, 121– 5, 134– 8. Regarding the attribution of damage 
to oil wells, Kuwait claimed that ‘out of a total of 914 operational wells in Kuwait, 798 wellheads had been 
detonated by the Iraqi forces, of which 603 were on fire, 45 were gushing oil but not on fire, and 150 although 
damaged were neither on fire nor gushing oil’. Iraq denied any responsibility; it submitted evidence that, 
inter alia, stated ‘KOC executives were quoted as saying that allied bombing had set fire to as many as 34 
wells’. However, the same source also stated ‘but the vast majority had been blown up by occupying Iraqi 
forces’. Based on the evidence submitted by Kuwait and Iraq, the panel found that the majority of the dam-
age was directly caused by Iraq, and that the relatively small amount that may have been caused by Allied 
bombing was also attributable to Iraq under Governing Council decision 7. Report and Recommendations 
made by the Panel of Commissioners Appointed to Review the Well Blowout Control Claim (the ‘WBC 
Claim’), S/ AC.26/ 1996/ 5/ Annex, 18 December 1996, paras. 36– 86.
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pits; the laying and clearance of mines; and the extensive movement of military vehi-
cles and personnel’.18 Iran, Jordan, and Turkey experienced the passage of hundreds of 
thousands of refugees and their livestock from Iraq and Kuwait, damaging vegetation 
and water resources.19 After the conflict, ‘over 1.6 million mines and more than 109,000 
metric tons of other unexploded ordnance were scattered in cities and towns, oil facili-
ties, beaches, coastal waters and desert areas of Kuwait’.20 Claimants generally sought 
compensation to clean up pollution, restore damaged ecosystems, and monitor public 
health and the environment.
Almost certainly three factors shaped the choice of requiring state responsibility- 
based reparations from Iraq and the inclusion of environmental losses in the scope:
• There was a clear violation of the UN Charter:  the invasion of a neighbouring 
state, upon which even Iraq’s supporters agreed;21
• There was highly visible, region- wide, intentional environmental damage; and
• The respondent state, Iraq, had the potential to generate sufficient wealth with its 
oil resources.
International civil tribunals, one of the most familiar features of jus post bellum, have 
long been used to provide compensation for civilians harmed by armed conflicts,22 a 
process that is thought to hasten recovery and reconciliation between the belligerents 
and to re- establish the rule of law.23 The basic justice theory that requires a wrongdoer 
to compensate the victim of wrongful action finds expression in international law in 
this doctrine.24 This was certainly a goal of the UNCC. Reports of harms inflicted by 
Iraq included, besides the environmental damage discussed here: summary execution, 
18 Third ‘F4’ Report (n 16) paras. 62, 64– 74.
19 Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part One of the 
Fourth Instalment of ‘F4’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2004/ 16, 9 December 2004(‘Part One Fourth ‘F4’ 
Report’), paras. 68, 70– 1, 105– 8.
20 UNCC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Second 
Instalment of ‘F4’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2002/ 26, 3 October 2002 (‘Second ‘F4’ Report’), para. 85.
21 Marc Weller, ‘The United Nations and the Jus ad Bellum’ in Peter Rowe (ed.), The Gulf War 1990– 91 
in International and National Law (New York: Routledge, 1993), 29 (mentioning China and Yemen in this 
connection); Weller’s chapter provides remarkable details, such as the statement of Iraq at the UN, claiming 
that it was merely supporting a popular overthrow of the government by the Free Provisional Government 
of Kuwait, and a close analysis of activities at the UN.
22 David Bederman, ‘Historic Analogues of the UNCC’ in Richard Lillich (ed.), The United Nations 
Compensation Commission: Thirteenth Sokol Colloquium (Irvington NY: Transnational Publishers, 1995); 
Margery M. Whiteman, Damages in International Law (Washington DC: US Govt. Printing Office, 1937). 
The new twist here is, as Jens Iverson observes, the inclusion of environmental law, ‘particularly with respect 
to the rights and obligations relating to repairing and rebuilding the environmental damage from the con-
flict’— Iverson’s second branch, ‘resource disputes related to the conflict’, was addressed through the bound-
ary commission mentioned above. See also Jens Iverson, ‘The Foundations of Transitional Justice and Jus 
Post Bellum’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the 
Normative Foundations (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), 93– 4.
23 Michael J. Matheson, International Civil Tribunals and Armed Conflict (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012).
24 ILC Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its fifty- third session UN Doc. A/ 
56/ 10, 10 January 2001, A/ 56/ 10/ Corr.1, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, 
Part Two, as corrected (Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries). Indeed, ‘[t] he mixed commission, to many international lawyers, is synonymous with the 
origins of their discipline’ and such tribunals ‘were significant in the development of the rules of state 
responsibility’. Murphy, Kidane, and Snider (n 3) xv.
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rape, torture, taking of hostages, forcible conscription, beatings, organized pillage, loot-
ing, and damage to property.25 In the few years between the resolution of the majority 
of the claims and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, reconciliation appeared to be progress-
ing through re- establishment of commercial and diplomatic relations, at least with 
respect to injured states outside the region. While the UNCC provided redress in the 
aftermath of a conflict that had been ended by the overwhelming military force of one 
side, it stands in contrast to the Ethiopia– Eritrea Claims Commission which helped to 
displace the conflict from the battlefield to the tribunal.26
All such tribunals have the potential to create a historical documentation of what 
occurred. Despite the brevity of the panel reports, the UNCC did create a remarkable 
record of the many harms and costs of war. The environmental claims review is detailed in 
six reports that summarize the parties’ factual and legal arguments and the commission-
ers’ evaluations of evidence and law.27 The UNCC also made procedural and substantive 
innovations that advanced the law of reparations in ways that have been noted by scholars 
and followed by practitioners.28
The remainder of this chapter describes the UNCC as a case study of the only jus post 
bellum institution to date to look at a broad scope of environmental harms for armed con-
flict and to fashion a remedy. The emphasis is on the institutional and procedural choices 
made and the innovations and adaptations adopted to process the environmental damage 
claims while achieving the substantive goal of environmental restoration.
14.2 Constitution of the UNCC and Choice  
of Civil or Criminal Law
UN Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 692 were the constituent instru-
ments for the UNCC.29 The Security Council acted under its UN Charter, Chapter VII, 
authority to take measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.30 All 
25 Françoise J. Hampson, ‘Liability for War Crimes’ in Rowe (n 21) 248– 51.
26 Murphy, Kidane, and Snider (n 3) 397– 9.
27 See Cymie R. Payne, ‘Guidance for Researchers’ in Cymie R. Payne and Peter H. Sand (eds.), Gulf War 
Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission: Environmental Liability (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011).
28 Bederman (n 22); David Caron, ‘The Profound Significance of the UNCC for the Environment’ in 
Payne and Sand (n 27) 267– 72 (explaining that some aspects of environmental claims are profoundly dif-
ferent from property claims, and that ‘a claims process addressing the environment inevitably seeks rep-
resentation of a community’s interest in the environment’.); Stacie I. Strong, Class, Mass, and Collective 
Arbitration in National and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Cymie R. Payne, 
‘Argentina’s ICSID Arbitrations and the UNCC Experience: Consistency and Capability in Mass Claims’ 
(2012) 6 World Arbitration and Mediation Review 427– 62.
29 Twelve 1990 resolutions related to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait including:  resolution 660 (2 August 
1990)  (condemning the invasion demanding Iraq’s immediate withdrawal); resolution 661 (6 August 
1990)  (imposing an arms embargo and economic sanctions; establishing a Sanctions Committee); reso-
lution 674 (29 October 1990) (stating Iraq’s legal responsibility for damage and loss to Kuwait and other 
states); and resolution 678 (29 November 1990) (setting 15 January 1991 as deadline for Iraq to withdraw 
and authorizing Kuwait and cooperating states to use ‘all necessary means’ if Iraq did not). UN Security 
Council Resolution 686 (1991), inter alia, called on Iraq to accept its liability for loss and damage; Iraq 
agreed, UN Doc. S/ 22320, 3 March 1991.
30 Although some have disputed the Security Council’s authority to establish a subsidiary organ 
with judicial functions, see Bernhard Graefrath, ‘Iraqi Reparations and the Security Council’ (1995) 55 
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parties to the conflict were parties to the UN Charter. Through its resolution 687, the 
Security Council confirmed Iraq’s liability and the scope of losses for which Iraq owed 
reparations by stating it:
Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising 
prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is 
liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental 
damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, 
nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait.
Iraq had breached its primary international law obligations— peaceful settlement of 
disputes and refraining from the threat or use of force— and therefore the secondary 
obligations of state responsibility required Iraq to provide reparations.31
In resolution 687 the Security Council also set the UNCC’s institutional mandate by 
deciding ‘to create a fund to pay compensation . . . and to establish a Commission that 
will administer the fund’ and by directing the Secretary- General to develop recom-
mendations to the Security Council for
administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq’s 
contribution to the fund . . . arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the 
fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate pro-
cedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving 
disputed claims in respect of Iraq’s liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the 
composition of the Commission.32
The UNCC thus established was the only international judicial body established for the 
Gulf War.
In the months after the invasion of Kuwait, the Republic of Iraq and individual Iraqi 
perpetrators of offences were threatened with both criminal and civil legal sanctions. 
Taxonomically, war crimes would be violations of jus in bello related to illegal activities 
in fighting the war. The alternative model that was actually adopted was to find Iraq 
liable for violations of jus ad bellum, the illegal act of going to war in the first place. 
Zeitschrift fu ̈r ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (Heidelberg Journal of International Law 
1– 68), the general view, evidenced in participation by nearly 100 nations in the UNCC as claimants, agrees 
with Veijo Heiskanen that ‘there is ample precedent and legal authority for the view that, subject to certain 
conditions, the Council does have the authority to establish a subsidiary organ invested with such judi-
cial powers’. Veijo Heiskanen, ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission’ (2002) 296 Recueil des 
Cours: Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law 259– 397, 308– 9. Jeremy P. Carver 
argues that Iraq’s letter accepting the terms of ceasefire conferred jurisdiction on the UNCC in ‘Dispute 
Resolution or Administrative Tribunal: A Question of Due Process’ in Richard. Lillich (ed.), The United 
Nations Compensation Commission: Thirteenth Sokol Colloquium (Irvington NY: Transnational Publishers, 
1995), 70, referring to Letter dated 10 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/ 22480, 11 April 1991.
31 IL.C Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (n 24)  Arts. 1, 2, 
and 31.
32 The Compensation Fund was thus created by para. 18 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) 
and established by para. 3 of Security Council Resolution 692 (1991) in accordance with section I of the 
Secretary- General’s Report, S/ 22559, 2 May 1991.
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Breaches of international environmental law could, less plausibly, also have been the 
basis for legal proceedings, depending on the specific instrument.33
No international criminal tribunal was established, however. Saddam Hussein con-
tinued as President of Iraq, and Iraqi prisoners of war were quickly repatriated with-
out being charged as war criminals.34 Some of the acts committed during the conflict, 
such as abuse of prisoners of war and the civilian population, were clear violations of 
the law of war and would likely have qualified as war crimes. The serious, intentional 
environmental damage that was ordered by the Iraqi leadership might have qualified 
as a war crime.35 The US president suggested that, inter alia, ‘the environmental terror’ 
could be a basis for a war crimes prosecution against Saddam Hussein.36 According to 
Mark Weller, the February 1991 land war was at least in part the result of a breakdown 
in negotiations over the question of immunity from war crimes trials and reparations.37 
Speculation about the reason why criminal prosecutions were not pursued ranged from 
opposition by governments in the region to the impossibility of seizing the potential 
defendants. The purpose of criminal law as a deterrent is a common thread running 
through analysis of President George H.W. Bush’s threats of criminal sanctions— 
intended, some say, to intimidate Saddam Hussein— and the subsequent relinquish-
ment of criminal charges.38
In 1991 the international community would have had to establish an ad hoc crimi-
nal tribunal if domestic tribunals were not competent or capable of trying war crimes; 
the standing forum for war crimes prosecutions, the International Criminal Court, did 
not begin functioning until 2002. Criminal prosecution would have been based on cus-
tomary and treaty law in force with respect to the parties in 1990 and 1991. The Rome 
Statute, which might be considered a statement of the customary international law at 
that time, considers intentional, severe violations of the environmental integrity norm 
a war crime.39 However, some scholars have argued that the stringent threshold for the 
severity of damage considered a war crime, ‘widespread, long- term and severe damage 
33 See  chapter 15 in this volume.
34 Hans- Peter Gasser, ‘Comment’ in Grunawalt et al. (n 1) 513– 14. Brian Orend criticized the decision 
not to hold jus in bello war crimes tribunals for both sides in respect for the principle of even- handed 
accountability. Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ (2000) 1(1) Journal of Social Philosophy 117, 127– 8, 132.
35 Michael Bothe, ‘Criminal Responsibility for Environmental Damage in Times of Armed Conflict’ in 
Grunawalt et al. (n 1) 473– 78; Paul M. Barrett, ‘U.S. Backs off Iraqi War Crimes Trials Due to Logistic, 
Political Considerations ’ (25 March 1991) Wall Street Journal, 13– 14.
36 George H.W. Bush, ‘Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference’ (16 April 1991), 
available at George Bush Presidential Library. See also, Hampson (n 25) 257.
37 Weller (n 21) 43 (some of the destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure was ‘necessary . . . to try its members 
for crimes against peace and for war crimes’.).
38 Charles Krauthammer, ‘. . . And Stumbles’ The Washington Post A25 (5 October 1990) (‘the whole prem-
ise of American policy has been that aggression cannot get any reward— hence Thatcher’s insistence on 
reparations and war crimes trials— or it will be repeated’); John Norton Moore and Robert Turner, ‘Saddam, 
War Crimes and the Rule of Law’ Jerusalem Post (Israel) (21 January 1991); Barrett (n 35).
39 The Rome Statute, Art. 8(b)(iv), defines an attack that is intentionally launched, knowing that it will 
cause ‘widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’ as a war crime within the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Not long after, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia was established in this context: a felt need to establish accountability where there was 
no pre- existing forum or international criminal code. Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, ‘International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1994) 5 European Journal of International Law 360, 361.
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to the natural environment’, would not have been met even by the terrible destruc-
tion intentionally caused by the Iraqi military forces.40 Customary international law, 
as reflected in Hague Convention IV of 1907, Regulations Article 23(g), and Geneva 
Convention IV of 1949, Article 147 could have provided a basis for an action claiming 
grave breach.41 Such claims would have been subject to Iraq’s defence that the oil well 
fires and oil spills were defensive measures that satisfied the customary international 
law principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality.42 Fact- finding to disprove 
Iraq’s defence would have been difficult if not impossible, given the ‘fog of war’ problem 
and the novelty of the claims.
These challenges aside, international criminal law is not likely to achieve peacebuild-
ing goals with respect to environmental harms. Had a criminal prosecution against 
Saddam Hussein and his officers succeeded, it would not have resulted in restoration of 
the environmental damage that resulted from the Gulf War. Imprisoning guilty individ-
uals might have had a deterrent effect on future belligerents; it might have been under-
stood by the international community to re- establish the rule of law; there might have 
been satisfaction in bringing the perpetrators to account.43 But that alone would not 
have protected Kuwait’s groundwater or restored Saudi Arabia’s coastal ecosystems.44
Yet another alternative approach could have been based on Iraq’s breach of inter-
national humanitarian law in its conduct of the war, resulting in obligations under a 
theory of state (rather than individual) responsibility.45 This would have provided a 
restrictive scope for claims against Iraq, and might have entirely excluded claims for 
environmental damage. Iraq and Kuwait were parties to some of the relevant conven-
tions at the time of the conflict,46 but not to Additional Protocol I, which has specific 
provisions prohibiting environmental harm. A report prepared for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in relation to claims of Yugoslavia against 
NATO forces for the 1999 Kosovo bombing observed that Article 55 of Additional 
Protocol I  might be considered customary international law and thus applicable to 
non- parties.47 Even had a similar conclusion been reached regarding the Gulf War, 
Additional Protocol I imposes the same threshold requirement that applies to the Rome 
Statute— ‘widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environment’— and 
40 UNEP (n 1) 8; see also, José R. Allen, ‘Points of Law’ in Payne and Sand (n 27) 156; Thilo Marauhn, 
‘Environmental Damage in Times of Armed Conflict— not ‘Really’ a Matter of Criminal Responsibility?’ 
(2000) International Review of the Red Cross 840, 1029– 36 (criticizing the report for creating further ambi-
guity). The Committee advising the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Prosecutor 
decided that ‘the environmental damage caused during the NATO bombing campaign does not reach the 
Additional Protocol I threshold’. Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor (applying law of armed conflict princi-
ples of necessity and proportionality) paras. 14– 25.
41 Hampson (n 25) 254. 42 ibid. 250– 1, 254.
43 Hampson argues that these are, in fact, more effective remedies than compensation. ibid. 258– 9.
44 See  chapters 6 and 10 in this volume.
45 See, for example, Erik V. Koppe, The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment 
during International Armed Conflict (Groningen: Rijksuniveriteit, 2006).
46 Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949.
47 Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor, paras. 14– 25 (applying law of armed conflict principles of neces-
sity and proportionality) at <http:// www.icty.org/ x/ file/ About/ OTP/ otp_ report_ nato_ bombing_ en.pdf> 
para. 15, accessed 7 June 2017.
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that would likely have precluded successful claims. It is an open question whether the 
dramatic oil well fires and oil spills would have challenged this perception.48
Instead, the UN Security Council members decided to focus on accountability 
through civil proceedings, based on theories of treaty law and state responsibility. In 
this framing, reparations claims for environmental losses did not need an independent 
legal basis in the Law of Armed Conflict.49
14.3 Structure, Procedures, and Substantive Law
The UNCC Governing Council made policy and took the ultimate decisions on 
awards.50 The Governing Council comprised representatives of the fifteen Security 
Council member states, which generally maintain missions in Geneva to work with the 
many international agencies based there. The commissioners, responsible for review-
ing the claims and recommending awards, came to Geneva as often as monthly to work 
with the secretariat and to deliberate.
When ad hoc tribunals are established, their location can be a sensitive issue. The 
secretariat was sited at the UN Office at Geneva, Switzerland,51 for several reasons. The 
conflict had affected a large number of states outside the region, nearly 100 of which 
made claims. It was also necessary to work in English, because the computer systems 
that were used to manage over 2 million individual claims could only be programmed 
in English.52 And, given the ongoing tension between the parties, it would not have 
been feasible to locate the commission in any of the principal states in the region.
14.3.1  Jurisdiction
The UNCC was an ad hoc reparations body with jurisdiction limited to claims against 
Iraq stemming from its invasion and occupation of Kuwait, based on Security Council 
resolution 687.53 The UNCC’s jurisdiction was not exclusive; claims could have been 
brought in other fora, such as domestic courts, therefore the UNCC took careful meas-
ures to prevent multiple recoveries.54 The commission was to resolve disputed claims 
‘in respect of Iraq’s liability as specified in paragraph 16’, that is, for:
any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural 
resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of 
Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.55
48 Richard Falk, ‘The Environmental Law of War: An Introduction’ in Glen Plant (ed.), Environmental 
Protection and the Law of War: A ‘Fifth Geneva’ Convention on the Protection of the Environment in Time of 
Armed Conflict (London: Belhaven Press, 1992), 93– 4.
49 See  chapter 9 in this volume. 50 See  chapter 2 in this volume.
51 UN Security Council Resolution 692, S/ RES/ 692 (1991) at para. 3.
52 UNCC Governing Council decision 10, S/ AC.26/ 1992/ 10, Art. 6 (1992).
53 UN Security Council Resolution 687, S/ RES/ 687 (1991).
54 UNCC Governing Council decision 1, S/ AC.26/ 1991/ 1 (1991); decision 7, S/ AC.26/ 1991/ 7/ Rev.1 
(1992); decision 13, S/ AC.26/ 1992/ 13 (1992); Category D, E, and F claim forms; Heiskanen (n 30) 318– 21.
55 UN Security Council Resolution 687 (n 53) paras. 16– 19.
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UNCC Governing Council decision 7 provided additional detailed criteria for the juris-
diction of different categories of claims, discussed below.56 A jurisdictional exclusion rel-
evant to the environmental claims was ‘the costs of the Allied Coalition Forces, including 
those of military operations against Iraq’.57 Although the environmental panel specified 
that where military personnel and equipment had been used to respond to environmen-
tal damage, threat of damage to the environment, or threat to civilian public health, such 
costs could be compensable, it did reject some claims as costs of Allied Coalition Forces.58
Under resolution 687 and UNCC Governing Council decisions 7 and 10, all states, 
their nationals and corporations, and international organizations, could claim against 
Iraq. The Republic of Iraq could not bring claims against Coalition forces for violations 
of jus in bello.59 Iraqi citizens, unless they had bona fide dual nationality, could not 
bring claims against Iraq.60 Governing Council decision 7— intended to guide claim-
ants in preparing their claims— categorized compensable losses into categories A– F, 
identified claimant standing for each category, and stated the evidentiary standard for 
the category.61 The first three categories, A, B, and C, were for individual ‘humanitar-
ian’ claims; D, E, and F were for larger claims by, respectively, individuals, corpora-
tions, and governments and intergovernmental organizations. Environmental claims 
were assigned to category F, claims of governments and international organizations, 
and subcategory F4, environmental claims.
The F4 public health claims revealed a tension in the approach— Iraq argued that 
individuals had already been allowed to claim for personal injury and mental pain and 
anguish in categories B, C, and D.62 The UNCC rejected this view. The F4 panel stated 
that ‘Where a claim is brought by a State in such a case, the State is not acting on 
behalf of the injured national but rather is asserting its own right to ensure compliance 
with the rules of international law in respect of its nationals.’63 It therefore considered 
such claims compensable in principle and undertook a careful case- by- case analysis 
to ensure that there was no double compensation and that other relevant rules were 
observed— such as the criteria for compensating mental pain and anguish.64
56 UNCC Governing Council decision 7 (n 54).
57 UNCC Governing Council decision 19, S/ AC.26/ Dec.19 (1994).
58 Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20) para. 29. Examples of category F4 claims that were rejected under decision 
19 include: a claim of the Netherlands for the cost of tugboats to provide emergency firefighting, towing, 
rescue, and salvage services, UNCC (n 57) para. 274; and US claims for studies of the health risks to military 
personnel from oil well fires and hazardous materials, UNCC (n 57) para. 291, 335. The panel determined 
that decision 19 was intended to exclude ‘economic costs incurred by the Allied Coalition in undertaking or 
supporting military operations against Iraq’; accordingly it found that the expenses for remediation of dam-
age resulting from military encampments, fortifications and roads constructed by Allied Coalition Forces in 
Saudi Arabia would be compensable. Part One Fourth ‘F4’ Report (n 19) paras. 247– 91.
59 For a discussion of the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and the principle of equal 
application, see Koppe (n 45) 253– 8.
60 UNCC Governing Council decision 1 (n 54) (‘Claims will not be considered on behalf of Iraqi nation-
als who do not have bona fide nationality of any other State.’); Governing Council decision 10 (n 52) Art. 
5; UNCC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Sixth 
Instalment of Claims for Departure from Iraq or Kuwait (Category ‘A’ Claims), S/ AC. 26/ 1996/ 3, paras. 
27– 31 (1996) (interpreting ‘bona fide’).
61 UNCC Governing Council decision 7 (n 54). 62 Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) para. 62.
63 ibid. para. 70. 64 ibid. paras. 70– 1.
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States alone sought compensation for damage to the environment and damage 
caused by environmental harms. This approach is consistent with the public trust doc-
trine, which considers government as the trustee of elements of the environment on 
behalf of the community interest.65 Other bodies that succeeded the UNCC followed 
this approach, notably the Eritrea– Ethiopia Claims Commission and the UN Register 
of Damage.66 At the UNCC, no claims were brought on behalf of the international 
community, though arguably such claims would have been receivable by the UNCC 
and could perhaps have been made by an international organization such as the UN 
Environment Programme. An appropriate case would have been a claim to restore 
damage to marine areas beyond national jurisdiction, where no state would be likely 
to bring a claim. The experiment could not be made, since the entire Persian Gulf lies 
within national maritime boundaries.
The UNCC interpreted its temporal jurisdiction, from the date of the invasion on 
2 August 1990, to the end of the war on 2 March 1991, with a certain flexibility. For 
example, the F4 panel recognized that refugees from the conflict continued to flow into 
Jordan after 2 March and therefore accepted claims for review where the cause of the 
environmental damage occurred as late as 1 September 1991.67
Neither resolution 687 nor any Governing Council decision addresses the question 
of location of the damage.68 The environmental panel followed the approach taken by 
other UNCC panels, concluding that ‘expenses resulting from reasonable monitoring 
and assessment of loss or damage that may have occurred outside Iraq or Kuwait are, 
in principle, compensable’.69
65 Peter H. Sand, ‘Environmental Principles Applied’ in Payne and Sand (n 27) 174; David D. Caron, 
‘The Place of the Environment in International Tribunals’ in Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds.), The 
Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 250, 257; Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations:  International 
Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (Tokyo: UN University Press, 1989); Catherine 
Redgwell, Intergenerational Trusts and Environmental Protection (Manchester:  Manchester University 
Press, 1999); Mary Turnipseed, Raphael Sagarin, Peter Barnes, Michael C. Blumm, Patrick Parenteau, 
and Peter H. Sand, ‘Reinvigorating the Public Trust Doctrine: Expert Opinion on the Potential of a Public 
Trust Mandate in U.S. and International Environmental Law’ (2010) 52(5) Environment 6.
66 See notes 2 and 3 above.
67 Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the First Instalment 
of ‘F4’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2001/ 16, 22 June 2001, (‘First ‘F4’ Report’), paras. 292, 304 (‘For the pur-
poses of its monitoring and assessment claims, Jordan defines “refugees” as “all those people, of whatever 
nationality, who entered Jordan from Iraq and Kuwait as a direct result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait, between 2 August 1990 and 1 September 1991”, having left Iraq or Kuwait on or before 2 March 
1991. Jordan defines “involuntary immigrants” as people who were “refugees” initially, but who were still 
resident in Jordan after 1 September 1991.’).
68 UNCC Governing Council decision 7 (n 54) para. 34. Heiskanen observes that the Governing Council 
and panels decided that location was not relevant to jurisdiction. Heiskanen (n 30) 332.
69 ibid. paras. 53– 4; Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the 
Second Instalment of ‘E2’ Claims, S/ AC.26/ 1999/ 6, 19 March 1999, para. 54; Report and Recommendations 
made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fifth Instalment of ‘F1’ Claims, S/ AC.26/ 2001/ 15, 22 
June 2001, para. 18; Report and recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning the 
first instalment of “F1” claims, S/ AC.26/ 1999/ 23 (1999) para. 22.
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14.3.2  Applicable law
As a subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council, the applicable law for the UNCC was 
international law and decisions of the UN Security Council.70 UN Security Council reso-
lutions, such as resolution 687, are generally considered binding as international law.71 
Security Council resolution 687 established Iraq’s liability,72 the direct causation require-
ment, the scope of harms covered, and the remedy.73
While this provided the framing rules for the UNCC, its internal law specified 
the procedural and additional substantive rules that were applied to analysis of the 
claims. These rules were issued as decisions of the Governing Council, whose legal 
authority derived from the UN Charter and international law; its political authority 
derived from its membership: the fifteen Security Council member states. Governing 
Council decision 10 set the UNCC’s procedural rules.74 The procedural rules, Article 
31, directed the panels to apply ‘Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and other rel-
evant security Council resolutions, the criteria established by the Governing Council 
for particular categories of claims, and any pertinent decisions of the Governing coun-
cil [and] other relevant rules of international law’. Under the procedural rules, Article 
43, the commissioners had the option of also relying ‘on the relevant UNCITRAL 
[UN Commission on International Trade Law] Rules’ or seeking direction from the 
Governing Council.
14.3.3  Due process
The UN Secretary- General described the UNCC’s nature and task:
The Commission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before which the parties appear; 
it is a political organ that performs an essentially fact- finding function of examin-
ing claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing payments and resolv-
ing disputed claims. It is only in this last respect that a quasi- judicial function may 
be involved. Given the nature of the Commission, it is all the more important that 
70 Heiskanen (n 30) 333.
71 Philippe Sands, Pierre Klein, and Derek W. Bowett, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edn, 2009).
72 On the question of the Security Council’s authority to make a legal determination of Iraq’s liability and 
to establish the UNCC, see Veijo Heiskanen and Nicolas Leroux, ‘Applicable Law’ in Christopher S. Gibson, 
Timothy John Feighery, Trevor M. Rajah, War Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission: Designing 
Compensation After Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2015). The issue was rendered moot by the follow-
ing statement communicated to the UN Security Council President by the Iraqi government: ‘The National 
Assembly has decided at its session held on 6 April 1991 to agree to United Nations Security Council reso-
lution 687 (1991).’ UN Security Council, Letter dated 10 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of 
Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/ 22480 (1991).
73 Domestic environmental law was not used either as a rule of decision for the UNCC proceedings or, 
to my knowledge, as an alternative forum for environmental claims. A UNDP report on the 2006 oil spill 
resulting from the conflict between Lebanon and Israel presents both Lebanese law and international law 
(including the UNCC) as avenues for claims. [No author given], Report for UNDP– Lebanon on the meas-
urement and quantification of the environmental damage of the oil spill on Lebanon (2014), at <http:// 
www.undp.org/ content/ dam/ lebanon/ docs/ Energy%20and%20Environment/ Projects/ 222.pdf > accessed 7 
June 2017.
74 UNCC Governing Council decision 10 (n 52).
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some element of due process be built into the procedure. It will be the function of the 
Commissioners to provide this element.75
As every claim was disputed by Iraq, the commissioners had a substantial amount of 
‘quasi- judicial’ work to do.
The Secretary- General’s mandate to the commissioners to provide ‘some element 
of due process’ was implemented within the framework of rules established by the 
Governing Council. Of the range of procedures used in international courts and tribu-
nals and in claims resolution processes, the UNCC set in place a number of measures 
with the goal of balancing fairness, due process, and rapid review of the claims.76
Structurally, the commissioners and their fact- finding function were strictly segre-
gated from the political branch, the Governing Council.77 Commissioners were selected 
to be impartial, distinguished experts in law and other fields who served in their per-
sonal capacity, having been recommended by the executive secretary, nominated by the 
Secretary- General, and appointed by the Governing Council.78 Commissioners served 
in panels of three, each member being of a different nationality.79 The commissioners 
had the ability to request supplemental evidence from Iraq and other parties, and made 
findings of fact and law on which they based award recommendations.
Iraq and claimant governments were provided information about the number and 
nationality of claimants, the amount of compensation sought, and significant legal and 
factual issues raised by the claims through ‘Article 16 reports’, which also invited Iraq 
and other governments to provide views and information to the UNCC.80 Iraq was 
not always given the full claim files in the earlier phase of the UNCC but cooperation 
between the environmental panel, the legal officers working with the panel, and the 
Governing Council led to a change. Extensive, crucial information from monitoring 
and assessment studies funded by the first instalment of environmental claims was being 
sent to the UNCC; all agreed that it was necessary for Iraq to have this information.
The commissioners and teams of lawyers and accountants from the UNCC secretar-
iat worked together on instalments of claims.81 A typical environmental panel meeting 
75 Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution 687(1991), 
S/ 22559, 2 May 1991, para. 20.
76 For varied perspectives, compare Michael E. Schneider, ‘How Fair and Efficient is the United Nations 
Compensation Commission System?’ (1998) 15 Journal of International Arbitration 15– 26; John Crook, ‘The 
UNCC and Its Critics’ in Richard Lillich (ed.), The United Nations Compensation Commission: Thirteenth 
Sokol Colloquium (Irvington NY: Transnational Publishers, 1995); Julia Klee, ‘The Process’ in Payne and 
Sand (n 27); David D. Caron and Brian Morris, ‘The UN Compensation Commission: Practical Justice, 
Not Retribution’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 183; John P. Gaffney, ‘Due Process in 
the United Nations Compensation Commission’ (2000) 15 Mealey’s International Arbritration Report 13; 
Elyse J. Garmise, ‘The Iraqi Claims Process and the Ghost of Versailles’ (1992) 67 NYU Law Review 840; 
Lalanath de Silva, ‘Reflections on the United Nations Compensation Commission Experience’ and Cymie 
R. Payne, ‘Legal Liability for Environmental Damage: The United Nations Compensation Commission and 
the 1990– 1991 Gulf War,’ both in Carl Bruch, W. Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols (eds.), Governance, 
Natural Resources, and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (London: Earthscan, 2016).
77 Allen (n 40) 148– 9. Heiskanen (n 30) 313– 14, reviews arguments that the appointment and award 
approval functions of the Executive Secretary and Governing Council, respectively, negate the supposed 
independence of commissioners.
78 Governing Council decision 10 (n 52) Arts. 18– 27. 79 ibid. Art. 28.
80 ibid. Art. 16; Heiskanen (n 30).
81 Norbert Wühler, ‘Causation and Directness of Loss as Elements of Compensability before the United 
Nations Compensation Commission’ in Lillich (n 76) 70; Klee (n 76).
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would involve the three commissioners and the F4 team reviewing the written sub-
missions of claimants, the comments of Iraq and claimant states on the legal and fac-
tual issues identified in so- called ‘Article 16 reports’, claimant responses to clarifying 
‘Article 34 questions’ developed by the secretariat, the reports of expert consultants 
retained by the UNCC including reports from verification site missions, Iraq’s com-
ments on the full claim file (the claims as supplemented with information requested 
by the UNCC from claimants and the claimants’ reports of data and analysis from the 
monitoring and assessment projects), and submissions made by Iraq and claimants at 
oral proceedings.82 The panel and team assigned to an instalment prepared a report to 
the Governing Council on the panel’s findings and recommendations. The Governing 
Council then voted whether to adopt the panel report. Approved awards were then 
put into the queue for payment. Governing Council decisions could not be appealed, 
although corrections for computational, clerical, typographical, or other errors were 
possible.83
While emphasis was initially placed on speedy review, it became clear that the envir-
onmental claims would need more time than the A, B, and C categories. Given their 
high value, complexity, and novelty, more procedural access for Iraq was requested 
by the environmental panel and team, and was deemed appropriate by the Governing 
Council. Indeed, speed was a central justification for the initial procedural restrictions 
on Iraq’s ability to challenge claims, based on the negative experience at the Iran– US 
Claims Tribunal of procedural delays used by the respondent and that tribunal’s fail-
ure to prioritize and rapidly address humanitarian claims.84 Matheson observed that 
‘respondent states are likely to raise jurisdictional objections at every available oppor-
tunity’85 and Iraq’s obstreperous approach bore this out in the first years86 and even 
up until the first oral proceeding held for the environmental claims. The effect was for 
the UNCC to limit Iraq’s participation in order to maintain the pace of claims review. 
Another consideration was that the UN sanctions regimes restricted the funds available 
to hire counsel and experts.87 On the other hand, Iraq was still being run by Saddam 
Hussein, the man who ordered the invasion, and tensions remained high.88
82 Panels for most other claims categories reviewed considerably less information.
83 Governing Council decision 10 (n 52) Art. 41.
84 Michael F. Raboin, ‘The Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure of the United Nations Compensation 
Commission:  A  Practical Approach to Claims Processing’ in Lillich (n 76)  70. See also Hazel Fox, 
‘Reparations and State Responsibility’ in Rowe (n 21) 46. Requests from panels for additional review time 
had to be made formally to the Governing Council which had the option of discharging a panel and trans-
ferring the claims to another panel. Governing Council decision 10 (n 52) Arts. 38, 39.
85 Matheson (n 23) 66.
86 See, for example, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the 
Fourth Instalment of ‘E1’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2000/ 16, 29 September 2000, para. 21: ‘The Panel notes 
with some disappointment, however, that Iraq chose not to address the Panel on the issues presented by 
the claims, as specifically requested by the Panel, but rather chose to address its comments solely to matters 
over which the Panel has no control and not to address the substance of the claims. The Panel, therefore, 
terminated the oral proceedings following Iraq’s presentation.’
87 Michael Schneider, ‘How Fair and Efficient is the United Nations Compensation Commission?’ (1998) 
15 Journal of International Arbitration 15; Larraine Wilde, ‘Scientific and Technical Advice: The Perspective 
of Iraq’s Experts’ in Payne and Sand (n 27).
88 Paul Lewis, ‘Immovable Object; Granite Regime of Saddam Hussein Seems Little Worn by Political 
Storm’ New York Times (31 July 1992).
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Over time, Iraq was gradually reintegrated politically and commercially into the 
international community and Iraq shifted from an uncooperative stance with respect 
to the UNCC to a more constructive approach.89 Almost ten years into the UNCC work 
programme, as the environmental claims review was beginning, the Governing Council 
revised its procedures, extending its own time to review panel reports before voting on 
adoption from thirty days to three months.90 The Governing Council directed the pan-
els reviewing high- value, complex, or novel claims ‘to provide it in their reports, to the 
extent possible, with non- confidential factual and technical information that served as 
the basis of the panels’ recommendations’.91 The discussion of the evidence reviewed, 
the parties’ arguments and counter- arguments, and the F4 panel’s reasoning are set out 
for each of the claims. While not given in the level of detail found in the judgments 
of standing international tribunals, there is sufficient information to allow a reader to 
understand how the award recommendations were reached based on the panel’s assess-
ment of the evidence presented, expert views, and Iraqi and claimant arguments.
In roughly the same time period, a Governing Council decision approved the pro-
cedures used by the environmental programme, which included sending all claim files 
(claim form, statement of claim, and all of the documents provided by the claimant as 
attached to the statement of claim) to Iraq, allowing Iraq additional time to review and 
respond to the information, providing oral proceedings, and urging the environmental 
panel ‘to use its experts to ensure the full development of the facts and relevant techni-
cal issues, as well as to obtain the full range of views including those of the claimants 
and Iraq’.92
The instalments of environmental claims took an average of nineteen months each 
to complete; considerably longer than the six months allowed under the procedural 
rules.93 This illustrated both the tradeoff of efficiency for procedural access by the par-
ties and the significant size and complexity of the 168 environmental claims. Even with 
the extensions of time, when compared to tribunals like the International Court of 
Justice, the work was done at lightning speed.
14.3.4  Technical assistance for Iraq
The Governing Council realized that the environmental claims posed exceptional dif-
ficulties for Iraq, from both a legal and a scientific perspective. Additionally, the sanc-
tions programme restricted Iraq’s ability to hire experts on its own. At the same session 
in which it approved the first environmental awards, the Governing Council decided 
to provide up to US$ 5 million from the Compensation Fund for Iraq to retain appro-
priate assistance ‘to facilitate the promotion of legitimate interests of Iraq with respect 
89 Allen (n 40); Wilde (n 87).
90 UNCC, Governing Council decision 114, S/ AC.26/ Dec.114, 7 December 2000.
91 ibid. para. 13. 92 UNCC, Governing Council decision 114 (n 90). Klee (n 76) 53– 6.
93 The time from submission of the instalment by the team to the panel to the approval of the report and 
recommendations by the Governing Council was as follows: F4(1) one year, four months months (February 
2000– June 2001); F4(2) one year, seven months (March 2001– October 2002); F4(3) one year, nine months 
(March 2002– December 2003); F4(4) one year, nine months (March 2003– December 2004); F4(5):  one 
year, seven months (November 2003– June 2005).
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to “F4” claims, which give rise to particular questions due to their complexity and the 
limited amount of relevant international practice’.94 Eventually a total of US$ 14 million 
was authorized.95 Iraq was able to obtain world- class legal and technical consultants to 
assist with its response to the environmental claims.96
14.3.5  Transparency and confidentiality
All panel reports and Governing Council decisions were published on the UNCC web-
site shortly after they were translated into the official UN languages. They provide a rich 
source of information about the nature of the environmental claims, the arguments of 
Iraq and the claimants, the evidence submitted, and the reasoning of the commission-
ers.97 However, the published documents are the tip of the iceberg. A vast amount of 
information was subject to a rule of confidentiality, including: original claim files, often 
amounting to hundreds of pages; reports from the UNCC’s experts; Iraq’s submissions; 
transcripts of oral proceedings; internal policies; financial tracking of claims, awards, 
and payments; and more.98
There are strong arguments for a high level of transparency, especially for envir-
onmental matters, where transparency and public participation are considered to be 
obligations, supported by Rio Principle 10 and the Aarhus Convention.99 Some of the 
scientific and technical expert consultants to the environmental panel have stated that 
‘an open process and a public record builds confidence in the integrity of decision- 
making and allows all parties to learn and respond as the process moves forward’.100 
They recommended the example of US procedures for Natural Resource Damage 
Assessment, ‘where a public administrative record is created to document both tech-
nical and legal findings in detail’.101 This view was fully supported by the environmental 
commissioners and team.102
94 Governing Council decision 124, S/ AC.26/ 2001/ 124 (2001), para. 2.
95 Governing Council decision 226, S/ AC.26/ 2004/ 226 (2004), para. 2.
96 Wilde (n 87); Michael Schneider, ‘The UNCC and Future International Claims Practice,’ (2005) 99 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 332– 9.
97 For information on how to research the reports, see Cymie R. Payne, ‘Guidance for Researchers’ in 
Payne and Sand (n 27).
98 Governing Council decision 10 (n 52) Art. 30.
99 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, done at Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998, entry into force on 30 October 2001.
100 Michael T.  Huguenin, Michael C.  Donlan, Alexandra E.  Van Geel, and Robert W.  Paterson, 
‘Assessment and Valuation of Damage to the Environment’ in Payne and Sand (n 27) 92.
101 Huguenin, et al. (n 100) 92. It should be noted that, partly due to considerations of litigation by the 
government against responsible parties, the full administrative record may not be published for many years, 
although some information is made available immediately. For example, the Final Programmatic Damage 
Assessment and Restoration Plan for the Gulf of Mexico, assessing impacts of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill on natural resources in the Gulf of Mexico, on the services those resources provide, and determin-
ing the restoration needed to compensate the public for those impacts was not published until February 
2016, 81 FR 8483 (2016), at <https:// federalregister.gov/ a/ 2016- 03299>; see also <http:// www.gulfspillres-
toration.noaa.gov/ restoration- planning/ gulf- plan/ > accessed 7 June 2017.
102 Concern about the lack of publication of the expert reports has also been expressed by commenta-
tors. Jean- Christophe Martin, La pratique de la Commission d’Indemnisation des Nations Unies pour l’Irak 
en matiere de reclamations environnementales, in Le droit international face aux enjeux environnementaux 
(Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 2010) 268. The UN Request for Expression of Interest, briefly laying out the 
requirements for consulting services, is provided in Payne and Sand (n 27), 359.
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However, there are also strong claims for confidentiality in certain stages of judi-
cial and quasi- judicial proceedings, based on the need for free deliberation between 
decision- makers and risks to parties. The latter is particularly a concern for reparations 
proceedings, where the claimant and respondent have already engaged in violence. An 
additional justification was offered by a UN archivist when I queried the need for con-
tinued confidentiality of all claim documents:  the protection of individual claimants 
from retaliation, which he said was a standard UN practice in human rights cases. Even 
in dispute settlement proceedings unrelated to armed conflict a measure of confidenti-
ality is expected. Thus, while the Aarhus Convention, Article 9(4), states that decisions 
of courts shall be publicly accessible, it makes no reference to transparency with respect 
to pleadings, oral proceedings, or judicial deliberations. Restrictions on participation 
and transparency need to be evaluated in light of the circumstances when an institu-
tion is established, UN practice, and the concerns of states participating in the repara-
tions commission.
Two factors appear to weigh heavily in the calculus made by states when a repara-
tions programme is designed. First, those who have been damaged by conflict are likely 
to have concerns about sharing information identifying damaged sites for security and 
other reasons, which will inhibit transparency mechanisms and activities. Second, per-
petrators of environmental damage do not want to be labelled wrongdoers, even if they 
are willing to pay compensation. The history of ex gratia payments between states, 
which are generally opaque, is much older and more robust than the modern claims 
commission approach. For example, when the United States hit the Chinese Embassy 
during the Kosovo bombing, it offered an ex gratia payment to China without acknowl-
edging wrongdoing. This process allows both aggressors and victims to retain more 
control over information than in proceedings with third party decision- makers like the 
UNCC, where a reasoned written decision explains the factual findings of the commis-
sioners, albeit in a limited fashion.
14.3.6  Evidentiary standard
It remained for the commissioners to make findings of fact and to apply law to the 
facts, particularly: the existence, nature, and extent of damage; the causal link between 
the claimed harm and Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait; and the monetary 
value of the loss. The UNCC procedural rules, Article 35(1), established the evidentiary 
requirements for all claims:
Each claimant is responsible for submitting documents and other evidence which 
demonstrate satisfactorily that a particular claim or group of claims is eligible for com-
pensation pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
More specifically, government claims, including the environmental claims, had to be 
supported ‘by documentary and other appropriate evidence sufficient to demonstrate 
the circumstances and amount of the claimed loss’.103 The kind of evidence was further 
103 UNCC Governing Council decision 7 (n 54)  para. 37; UNCC Governing Council decision 10 (n 
52) Art. 35.
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elaborated in Governing Council decision 46, which asserted that ‘no loss shall be com-
pensated by the Commission solely on the basis of an explanatory statement provided 
by the claimant’.104
Thus, although ‘there is evidence in the published literature that a large number of 
refugees passed through Turkey after having departed from Iraq or Kuwait between 2 
August 1990 and September 1991’,105— which would provide a causal link between the 
presence of some refugees in Turkey and Iraq’s illegal acts— Turkey’s claims for damage 
to its forest resources from the impacts of refugees failed due to insufficient evidence. 
Specifically, the environmental panel explained that Turkey had not supplied ‘the dates 
on which the refugees arrived in Turkey, the duration of their stay or the details of the 
damage that they are alleged to have caused’.106 That is, Turkey failed to provide the 
critical information that would show that the refugees who caused the claimed damage 
were also those reported in the literature to have been fleeing the conflict. Additional 
examples of the kinds and amount of evidence relied on by the environmental panel are 
discussed below in the context of fact- finding and causation.
14.3.7  Fact finding
In determining the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of the evidence 
submitted, the UNCC availed itself of expert consultants, site visits, its own legal and 
actuarial staff, responses to interrogatories sent to the claimants, submissions by Iraq, 
and submissions by the claimants.107 Mojtaba Kazazi, in his position as Secretary of 
the Governing Council, observed in 1999 that ‘the limited participation of the parties 
and particularly Iraq has resulted in the Commissioners and the Secretariat assuming 
an active investigative and fact- finding role in reviewing claims, with the assistance of 
outside expert consultants’.108 When the environmental programme began a couple of 
years later, although there was greater participation of Iraq, the UNCC fact- finding role 
remained dynamic.
Matheson points to the need for members of international civil tribunals to possess 
appropriate experience in fact- finding and— where necessary— expertise in battlefield 
conditions.109 The three commissioners for environmental claims— Thomas Mensah, 
Peter Sand, and José Allen— had between them a remarkable store of expertise in inter-
national law, fact finding, natural resource damages, international compensation for oil 
spill damage, and more. Understanding of battlefield conditions and military strategy 
would certainly be important for tribunals applying the law of armed conflict, where 
determinations of issues like military necessity are central to the decision- making pro-
cess. That was not the case at the UNCC, which drew on state responsibility, jus ad bel-
lum, and international environmental law.
104 See generally, Mojtaba Kazazi, ‘An Overview of Evidence before the United Nations Compensation 
Commission’ (1999) 1 International Law Forum 219, 223.
105 Part One Fourth ‘F4’ Report (n 19) para. 354. 106 ibid.
107 Klee (n 76); Huguenin, Donlan, van Geel, and Paterson, ‘Assessment and Valuation of Damage to 
the Environment’ (n 100); Wilde, ‘Scientific and Technical Advice: The Perspective of Iraq’s Experts’ (n 87).
108 Kazazi (n 104) 220. 109 Matheson (n 23) 150.
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14.3.8  Causation: Direct losses and damage
Causation and damage were to be proved by the claimants.110 Security Council resolu-
tion 687 refers to Iraq’s liability for ‘direct’ losses, as does Governing Council decision 
7: this was therefore the causation standard for compensable claims. It became a source 
of discussion. According to the legal representative for some of the claimants, the use 
of ‘direct’ was a well- meaning error of the Security Council, intending to restrict those 
with only a remote causal link to Iraq from the claimant pool.111 Heiskanen described 
the efforts of the Governing Council to provide clarity about what ‘direct’ meant 
through decisions defining specific loss types as direct or not; as he noted, ‘the tradi-
tional rules of the international law of claims are not particularly clear on the subject’.112
There has been debate over whether the UNCC truly hewed to a standard of ‘direct’ 
causation or whether, in practice, it used ‘proximate’ causation. Some consider direct 
causation to be a civil law standard, also common in international claims, which con-
siders that a direct loss is one where no intervening event breaks the chain of causa-
tion.113 Proximate causation, on the other hand, is held to be a common law standard, 
which distinguishes proximately caused harms from those too remote to be compen-
sable and— according to some— results in policy- based decisions.114 From this per-
spective, using a proximate causation test tends to erode claims that the UNCC was a 
judicial body and places the emphasis on the Governing Council’s role as political and 
as the determinant of the causation standard applied.115 Given the diversity of tests 
used by UNCC panels that Heiskanen subsequently describes, it does not appear that 
the Governing Council exercised much influence after all. Rather, it looks as though 
panels from mixed traditions worked through the problem as best they could.
A better analysis would not make a sharp distinction between direct and proxi-
mate causation.116 Marjorie M. Whiteman describes many international claims where 
the distinction was not made and others where both terms are used, in her compre-
hensive 1943 study of damages in international law.117 The Eritrea– Ethiopia Claims 
Commission considered a range of prior practice, including the UNCC, and settled 
on a ‘proximate cause’ test that considered whether the ‘particular damage reasonably 
should have been foreseeable to an actor committing the international delict in ques-
tion’, while noting that the particular verbal formula used was likely to make little dif-
ference to outcomes.118
A.  Complex causation
A common feature of environmental damage that can make it difficult to prove caus-
ation is that the damage often results from a chain of events flowing from an initial 
110 ibid. 111 Carver (n 30) 70. 112 Heiskanen (n 30) 331– 2; see also 333– 56.
113 ibid. 337. 114 ibid. 115 ibid. 338, citing Dworkin.
116 This appears to be the approach advised by Hazel Fox, ‘Reparations and State Responsibility’ in Rowe 
(n 21) (‘Sometimes both the civil law criterion of causality as well as the common law test of predictability 
have been employed . . . In the present circumstances these criteria provide some help in identifying heads 
of war damage which are too remote or indirect to be recoverable.’).
117 Whiteman (n 22) Vol. III, 1767– 9
118 Eritrea– Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision 7, paras. 7– 14 (27 July 2007).
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wrongful act. Whiteman quotes Grotius as saying that ‘the one who is liable for an act 
is at the same time liable for the consequences resulting from the force of the act’ and 
clarifying his meaning with a story.119 Grotius’s illustration is apt; he related that the 
King of Cappadocia was held liable to pay damages for the chain of events unleashed by 
his action blocking a river, which burst its dam, which caused the Euphrates to flood, 
which caused great damage to Galatia and Phrygia.120
Whiteman’s invocation of Grotius is appealingly relevant to causal chains for the 
UNCC’s environmental damage claims, notably the claims for damage that resulted when 
people fled Iraq and Kuwait as refugees, bringing their livestock and living off the land as 
they passed, discussed below.
B.  Intervening acts
In contrast, the environmental panel found that an intervening act did break the chain of 
causation in its review of Kuwait’s claim for expenses of remediation to be undertaken at 
sites where stored ordnance spontaneously detonated. Iraq argued that the damage was 
the result of negligent storage of ordnance at the sites. The panel concluded that, in the 
absence of evidence that appropriate management procedures were taken— and in one 
case, in light of evidence that they were not— mismanagement of the sites was the direct 
cause of damage and that broke the chain of causation, relieving Iraq of liability.121 The 
panel recommended no compensation for this claim. In a mundane example of injury 
to a crew member of a German oil spill response vessel, the panel found that the acci-
dent which caused the injury was not a direct result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait.122
C.  Refugees as intervening actors
Claims by Iran, Jordan, and Turkey for losses from the impact of refugees on their envi-
ronments also raised the issue of intervening acts that break the chain of causation.123 
Iraq contended that decisions of the refugees themselves and of the Government of 
Jordan were intervening acts.124 Therefore, Iraq argued, the environmental damage 
caused by the transit of refugees through Jordan was not a direct result of the conflict 
and the UNCC should reject the Jordanian claims, which stemmed from the influx of 
refugees (a situation which is distressingly repeating itself due to the conflicts in Syria 
119 Whiteman (n 22)  Vol. III, 1767, citing Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace trans. of 1646 ed., 1925) II, Chap. XVII, Sec. 12, 434.
120 Whiteman (n 22) Vol. III, 1767. 121 Part One Fourth ‘F4’ Report (n 19) paras. 197– 218.
122 ibid. para. 245.
123 The panel found that ‘the evidence provided by Turkey is not sufficient to enable the Panel to deter-
mine whether the damage alleged to have resulted from the presence of refugees in Turkey is eligible for 
compensation. In particular, no information is provided by Turkey regarding the dates on which the refu-
gees arrived in Turkey, the duration of their stay or the details of the damage that they are alleged to have 
caused. and accordingly received no compensation.’ Part One Fourth ‘F4’ Report (n 19) paras. 350 – 6.
124 First ‘F4’ Report (n 67) para. 302.
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and Iraq).125 Governing Council decision 7, defined ‘departure from or inability to 
leave Iraq or Kuwait (or a decision not to return) during that period’ as a direct loss.126 
The F4 panel applied decision 7 to Jordan’s claimed environmental damage and decided 
that, in principle, refugee impacts could have been a direct result of Iraq’s invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait; on that basis, it made awards for monitoring and assessment of 
Jordan’s environmental damage.127
Later, in reviewing the substantive claims for environmental damage from refugees 
brought by Jordan, Iran, and Turkey, the panel said that
it was necessary to consider whether the presence of the refugees occurred during 
the period specified in paragraph 34(b) of Governing Council decision 7, and also 
whether the stay of any of the refugees beyond that period was due to factors unrelated 
to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, such as intervening acts, including deci-
sions of the Claimants or other Governments.128
Applying this approach to Iran’s claims, the F4 panel found that there was ‘evidence 
that the presence of the refugees resulted in environmental damage to rangeland 
areas . . . that this damage is a direct result’ of the conflict, and on that basis it awarded 
compensation.129 However, Iran’s forest claims failed on the basis that Iran had failed 
to provide sufficient evidence that the refugees who allegedly caused damage to forests 
were the same as those who ‘departed from Iraq or Kuwait during the period 2 August 
1990 to 2 March 1991 stipulated in paragraph 34 of Governing Council decision 7’: ref-
ugees had also entered Iran in 1991 as a result of the rebellion of Iraqi Kurds.130 With 
regard to Jordan’s claims that refugees damaged water, agricultural, wetlands, and 
marine resources, the panel found that the evidence submitted failed to demonstrate a 
causal link between the damage and the presence of refugees from the conflict.131
D.  Mitigation
Mitigation is a potential problem for a strict interpretation of ‘direct’ causation as the 
act of mitigation clearly intervenes after the initial action triggering liability, but this 
is not a difficulty for a less dogmatic approach. In fact, the only way to reconcile an 
injured party’s legal obligation to mitigate damage, thereby reducing the harm, with 
direct causation is to recognize that mitigation is not an intervening act that breaks 
the causal chain.132 Accordingly, expenses of measures undertaken to prevent or abate 
harmful impacts of airborne contaminants on property or human health could qualify 
125 1.4 million Syrian refugees were estimated to be in Jordan in 2015. 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience 
Plan 2016– 2017, 8, at <http:// www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2015/ 12/ 3RP- Regional- 
Overview- 2016- 2017.pdf> accessed 7 June 2017.
126 UNCC Governing Council decision 7 (n 54) para. 34.
127 First ‘F4’ Report (n 67) paras. 297– 362. 128 Part One Fourth ‘F4’ Report (n 19) para. 46.
129 ibid. para. 71.
130 ibid. para. 80. Peter W. Galbraith, ‘Refugees from War in Iraq’ Policy Brief No. 2 (Migration Policy 
Institute, 2003), at <http:// www.migrationpolicy.org/ sites/ default/ files/ publications/ MPIPolicyBriefIraq.
pdf> accessed 7 June 2017.
131 Part One Fourth ‘F4’ Report (n 19) paras. 103– 55.
132 Heiskanen (n 30) 351– 4 (finding that this approach can only be proximate causation).
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as environmental damage, provided that the losses or expenses were a direct result of 
Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.133
E.  Parallel and concurrent causes
The UNCC had to carefully distinguish damage from oil spills caused by the conflict 
from those resulting from either natural oil seeps or other oil spills and extraction 
operations. As is often the case, baseline information demonstrating the environment’s 
pre- invasion condition was generally inadequate, a problem anticipated by the com-
missioners.134 The environmental panel said:
Iraq is, of course, not liable for damage that was unrelated to its invasion and occupa-
tion of Kuwait nor for losses or expenses that are not a direct result of the invasion 
and occupation. However, Iraq is not exonerated from liability for loss or damage that 
resulted directly from the invasion and occupation simply because other factors might 
have contributed to the loss or damage. Whether or not any environmental damage or 
loss for which compensation is claimed was a direct result of Iraq’s invasion and occu-
pation of Kuwait will depend on the evidence presented in relation to each particular 
loss or damage.135
Where there was not sufficient evidence to distinguish the cause of oil damage, as was 
the case for damage to the marine environment in Iran that might have been caused 
by either the 1991 war or by the 1983 Nowruz oil well blowout and other oil spills and 
seeps, the F4 panel recommended no compensation be awarded; Iran’s proffer of evi-
dence that included chemical and fingerprinting data was insufficient to distinguish oil 
spill damage attributable to Iraq from the other possible sources.136
However, multiple kinds of evidence showed that most of the very severe oil dam-
age to the Saudi and Kuwaiti coastal areas was caused by the 1991 oil spills.137 Saudi 
Arabia demonstrated that there was oil from the conflict still present and continuing 
to cause harm. The panel concluded that ‘evidence available from a variety of sources 
supports the conclusion that the overwhelming majority of the oil currently present 
in the areas which Saudi Arabia proposes to remediate resulted from Iraq’s invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait’.138 The totality of the evidence that was available to the 
UNCC in relation to Saudi Arabia’s oil spill claims included daily oil spill reports,139 
peer- reviewed scientific publications,140 field visits by independent experts con-
tracted by the UNCC to assess sites where damage was claimed,141 and the results of 
133 Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20) para. 23. 134 First ‘F4’ Report (n 67) para. 34.
135 Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20) para. 25. 136 Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) para. 212.
137 Third ‘F4’ Report (n 16); Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14). 138 Third ‘F4’ Report (n 16) para. 176.
139 Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20).
140 See, for example, Saleh Al- Muzaini and Mirza U. Beg (eds.) ’Special Issue:  The Long- term 
Environmental Effects of the Gulf War’ (1998) 24 Environment International 1– 248; Andrew R. G. Price 
and John H. Robinson (eds.), ‘Special Issue:  The 1991 Gulf War:  Coastal and Marine Environmental 
Consequences,’ (1993) 27 Marine Pollution Bulletin 1– 380.
141 Disclosure: the present author led the missions to verify Saudi Arabia’s marine oil spill damage claims. 
The UNCC‘s expert consultants identified locations that they wished to verify and we were able to have full 
access to observe those sites as well as sites identified by Saudi Arabia’s experts.
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a shoreline survey conducted by Saudi Arabia that examined more than 19,500 sam-
pling sites and chemical analysis (‘biomarker fingerprinting’) of over 3,000 sediment 
samples.142
Even though Saudi Arabia’s claimed oil spill damage was found attributable to Iraq, 
there were still further considerations. The F4 Panel recommended compensation for only 
the marginal cost of some activities, such as personnel expenses that would have been 
incurred regardless of Iraq’s actions.143 A claimant could overcome this presumption by 
showing that it incurred additional expenses. Thus, Saudi Arabia’s claim for the cost of per-
sonnel and equipment to assist in oil spill response was rejected because it failed to show 
that it had incurred any extraordinary cost beyond the normal.144 Similarly, the salaries of 
the German oil pollution control vessel were not compensated.145
Determining the causal link for the monitoring and assessment (‘M&A’) claims was 
problematic. Claimants, in general, had not pursued detailed, appropriate monitor-
ing and assessment of the damage on their own initiative. Where they had done so as 
part of the UNEP- led assessment in 1991,146 the results were out of date because the 
UNCC had decided to leave review of these claims to the end of its work programme, 
almost ten years later. But the damage claims— for oil spills, oil well fires, and so on— 
could not be substantiated without data and analysis. The M&A claims sought funding 
for various investigations to be undertaken in the future in order to ascertain whether 
damage occurred; to quantify the loss; and to assess methodologies to abate or mitigate 
the damage.147 Without evidence that damage had occurred, how could the claimants 
prove their claims for costs of collecting the evidence? Faced with the reality that a large 
number of the environmental claims lacked the kind of evidence necessary for their 
assessment, the environmental panel decided that:
it would be both illogical and inequitable to reject a claim for reasonable monitoring 
and assessment on the sole ground that the claimant did not establish beforehand that 
environmental damage occurred. To reject a claim for that reason would, in effect, 
deprive the claimant of the opportunity to generate the very evidence that it needs to 
demonstrate the nature and extent of damage that may have occurred.148
The panel required sufficient evidence to demonstrate a ‘nexus between the activity and 
environmental damage or risk of damage that may be attributed directly to Iraq’s inva-
sion and occupation of Kuwait’ using several factors, including evaluation of the plausi-
bility that effects of the invasion could have affected a claimant’s territory, examination 
of the possible pathways and media by which pollutants could have reached the affected 
resources, evidence of actual damage, and whether there was a reasonable prospect that 
142 Third ‘F4’ Report (n 16) paras. 172, 177. The shoreline survey was funded by a monitoring and assess-
ment award made in the first instalment of claims. First ‘F4’ Report (n 67) paras. 592 – 9.
143 Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20) para. 30. 144 ibid. paras. 194– 8. 145 ibid. 240– 8.
146 UNEP, Report on the UN Inter- Agency Plan of Action for the ROPME region, reprinted in Mark 
Weller (ed.), Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath (Cambridge: Grotius Publishers, 1993); 
UNEP, Updated Scientific Report on the Environmental Effects of the Conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, 
UNEP/ GC.17/ Inf. 9, Nairobi, March 1993.
147 First ‘F4’ Report (n 67) para. 28. 148 ibid. para. 29.
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the activity would produce results that could assist the panel in reviewing any related 
substantive claims.149
While some lawyers have been troubled by the UNCC’s willingness to award M&A 
funds in advance, the only alternative that would have been more fair to both par-
ties would have been to use another source of funds for the natural resource dam-
age assessment.150 Such a fund was not available (then or now), although it has been 
recommended.151
14.3.9  Remedy— funding compensation
The UNCC provided financial compensation administered through the Compensation 
Fund. Other remedies that post- conflict commissions offer include: determining dis-
puted boundaries; making declaratory statements of the legality or illegality of actors 
and activities; requirements that parties provide assurances and guarantees of non- 
repetition; and reparation in the form of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.152 
Some of these were addressed in other ways, such as Security Council resolution 687’s 
declaration that Iraq’s acts were illegal and the separate process to delineate the Iraq– 
Kuwait border. David Caron has noted that ‘the determination of the merits of claims, 
regardless of eventual satisfaction, is itself a form of satisfaction’.153
The UNCC followed the classic approach described by the International Law 
Commission in its work on state responsibility. The Permanent Court of International 
Justice set the measure:  ‘reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the conse-
quences of the illegal act and re- establish the situation which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that act had not been committed’.154 Of course, international civil tri-
bunals addressing damage from armed conflict may fail to satisfy full relief for many 
reasons— damage that is too profound to be restored, refusal of parties to comply, the 
limits of advisory jurisdiction, a lack of funds to pay compensation.155
149 ibid. para. 31. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea also referred to ‘plausibility’ as a 
standard when it said that the precautionary approach must be used ‘in situations where scientific evidence 
concerning the scope and potential negative impact of the activity in question is insufficient but where there 
are plausible indications of potential risks’. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons 
and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion), ITLOS Reports, 1 February 2011.
150 This conundrum has been a problem in domestic law. While the U.S. Oil Pollution Act allows state, 
tribal, and federal government trustees to draw on the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund for assessment costs 
which can then be used to support claims, the Superfund does not, which ‘has had the effect of placing trus-
tees in the unfortunate position of being forced to settle with one or more PRPs in order to obtain sufficient 
funds to perform a site assessment. . . . settling forecloses the possibility of filing suit against that PRP once 
the true extent of the damage it caused has been discovered. In fact, this lack of funding has often proved 
to be an insurmountable obstacle because agency budgets have historically authorized little or no funding 
for natural resource damage actions.’ Laura Rowley, ‘NRD Trustees: to what Extent are They Truly Trustees? 
(2001) 28(2/ 3) Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 459, 465 (citations omitted).
151 Klee (n 76).
152 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (n 24)  Arts. 30, 
31, 34– 7.
153 Caron and Morris (n 76) 189.
154 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) Merits, Claim for Indemnity, Judgment, 
PCIJ Reports (Series A No. 17, 47) 13 September 1928.
155 Matheson (n 23) 212.
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Environmental losses are challenging because, on the one hand, damage will rarely 
be fully reparable and, on the other hand, they require special techniques to monet-
ize. The UNCC environmental claimants most frequently sought compensation for the 
cost of response, monitoring, assessment, remediation, and restoration activities. Where 
remediation or restoration were not possible— for example, an oiled shoreline ecosys-
tem that was too fragile for active remediation— claimants used alternative approaches 
to render the value of lost ecosystem services in terms of financial compensation, further 
discussed below.
The UNCC has been called ‘unique’ because of the perception that Iraq’s oil wealth pro-
vided a source of funding for reparations that is unlikely to be repeated in most cases. 
However, in its first years Iraq’s government refused to cooperate and even the UNCC’s 
operating expenses were uncertain. Even after funding began to flow, it was not expected 
to be sufficient to pay all the claims and Governing Council decision 7 advised claimant 
governments that claims might be paid on a pro rata basis, with priority at the discretion 
of the Governing Council.156 Although nearly all UNCC claims— and all environmental 
claims— have now been fully paid, a pro rata approach might be a good strategy for future 
reparations programmes.
However, as the UNCC Governing Council contemplated the possibility that claims 
might not be fully paid, it recognized that the obligation to actually restore environmen-
tal damage with award funds posed a particular problem. While a commercial claimant 
might be asked to ‘take a haircut’ and accept only a percentage of its award as final pay-
ment, a percentage of an environmental award would not be sufficient to carry out the 
restoration project for which it was awarded. This would result in an impasse if the claim-
ant were unable or unwilling to make up the difference. While the UNCC did not have to 
face this problem, in other circumstances a judicial body would face the difficult decision 
to award nothing if restoration could not be achieved with the funds available or to award 
a lesser amount and relax the stricture that environmental awards must be used for the 
benefit of the damaged environment. In the latter case, an alternative environmental pro-
ject might be substituted or the claimant might be given full discretion to use the funds.
A final note on the source of the UNCC awards— they were funded from a percent-
age of Iraq’s oil revenues. Initially, 30 per cent of Iraq’s oil revenues went to the UNCC 
Compensation Fund, until this was reduced to 25 per cent through a political com-
promise, and eventually it was reduced to 5 per cent.157 In 2014, the Governing Council 
156 David. D. Caron, ‘Introductory Note’ (1992) 31 ILM 1009; Cymie R. Payne, ‘Environmental Claims in 
Context: Overview of the Institution’ in Payne and Sand (n 27) text at note 52; Garmise (n 76) 840, 841. The 
Governing Council prioritized payment of the monitoring and assessment awards; this allowed the start of 
projects that eventually provided useful information for the UNCC‘s review of other environmental claims. 
UNCC Governing Council decision 73, S/ AC.26/ 1999/ 73, 25 June 1999; Governing Council decision 100, 
S/ AC.26/ 2000/ 100, 19 June 2000, para. 1(e) concerning the ‘third phase of payment;’ Governing Council 
decision 256, S/ AC.26/ 256, 8 December 2005).
157 Letter Dated 30 May 1991 from the Secretary- General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, UN SCOR, Forty- sixth Session, para. 6, at 3, UN Doc. S/ 22661, 31 May 1991 (Secretary- General’s 
recommendation to UN Security Council of the percentage of the value of Iraq’s petroleum exports to be 
transferred to the UNCC Compensation Fund for satisfaction of UNCC awards); SC Res. 705, 15 August 
1991, 30 ILM 1715 (1991) (setting 30 per cent level); International Claims Litigation II: A Case Study of 
the UNCC, 99th Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 325, 334 (2005). UN Security 
Council Resolution 1483 (2003) reduced the percentage of Iraq’s oil revenues paid to the Compensation 
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decided to postpone Iraq’s obligation, in consideration of Iraq’s difficult financial situ-
ation and in 2015 it decided to continue the postponement, due to ‘extraordinarily dif-
ficult security circumstances in Iraq and the unusual budgetary challenges associated 
with confronting this issue’, noting Kuwait’s agreement to the arrangement.158 All of the 
claims were finally paid except for one, related to losses from Kuwait’s oil sector, which 
remains outstanding.
14.3.10  Compensable losses and damage
By specifying that environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources were 
compensable losses, Security Council resolution 687, paragraph 16, established a solid 
basis for a modern approach to reparations. Although this was the first time inter-
national claims included these heads of damage explicitly, there was certainly prec-
edent in previous claims commissions,159 the International Maritime Organization’s 
Civil Liability Conventions,160 EU law,161 and US law.162 The International Law 
Commission describes compensation as a financial transfer that can ‘cover any finan-
cially assessable damage’.163 Although Iraq agreed that reasonable costs of remedia-
tion or restoration were compensable, it argued that the loss of resources that are 
not traded in the market is not ‘financially assessable’,164 and that there is no legal 
justification for compensating such losses. Iraq’s argument ignores the International 
Law Commission’s further explanation that ‘the qualification “financially assessable” 
is intended to exclude compensation for . . . the affront or injury caused by a violation 
of rights not associated with actual damage to property or persons’.165 That is, ‘finan-
cially assessable’ is not intended to exclude losses to non- market resources, which are 
‘actual damage’. The environmental panel stated that ‘there is no justification for the 
Fund from 25 per cent to 5 per cent where it remains; it also established the Development Fund for Iraq 
(DFI), whose International Advisory and Monitoring Board assumed responsibility for the proceeds of 
petroleum sales and payments to the Compensation Fund. Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to 
paragraph 5 of Resolution 1859 (2008), S/ 2009/ 385, para. 8. SC Res. 1905, S/ RES/ 1905, 21 December 2009, 
para. 4.
158 Governing Council decision 272, S/ AC.26/ Dec.272 (2014); Governing Council decision 273, S/ 
AC.26/ Dec.273 (2015).
159 See  chapter 2 in this volume. See also, Whiteman (n 22), Vol. II, 1458.
160 Joe Nichols, ‘Scope of Compensation for Environmental Damage under the 1992 Civil Liability 
Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention’ in Frank Maes (ed.), Marine Resource Damage Assessment, 
Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 59– 66.
161 EU Council Directive 2004/ 35/ EC of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the pre-
vention and remedying of environmental damage (Environmental Liability Directive), OJ L143/ 56 (2004), 
as amended by Council Directive 2006/ 21/ EC, OJ L102 (2006) and Council Directive 2009/ 31/ EC, OJ L140, 
Preamble (14), Art. 2(1).
162 Huguenin, Donlan, Van Geel, and Paterson (n 100). UNCC Governing Council decision 7 (n 
54) para 35, was itself proposed in a working paper submitted by the United States, Criteria for Claims for 
Environmental Damage and the Depletion of Natural Resources, S/ AC.26/ 1991/ WP.20, 20 November 1991, 
based on the US natural resource damage legislation.
163 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (n 24), Art. 36; see 
also Case concerning the Gabčikovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 
1997, ICJ Reports 7 81, para. 152; Factory at Chorzów (n 154) 29.
164 Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) para. 46.
165 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States (n 24) 99.
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contention that general international law precludes compensation for pure environ-
mental damage’.166
Governing Council decision 7, paragraph 35, detailed examples of the kinds of losses 
contemplated under resolution 687:
These payments are available with respect to direct environmental damage and the 
depletion of natural resources as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait. This will include losses or expenses resulting from:
(a) Abatement and prevention of environmental damage, including expenses directly 
relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil in coastal and interna-
tional waters;
(b) Reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment or future 
measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to clean and restore 
the environment;
(c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage for the pur-
poses of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the environment;
(d) Reasonable monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings for 
the purposes of investigation and combating increased health risks as a result of 
the environmental damage; and
(e) Depletion of or damage to natural resources.
The environmental panel considered this an indicative, not exclusive, list of compen-
sable losses. Damage to environmental resources not traded in the market, emergency 
assistance costs, and cultural heritage were all considered compensable losses, in prin-
ciple. The panel observed that public health costs could be within the scope:
For example, expenses of measures undertaken to prevent or abate harmful impacts of 
airborne contaminants on property or human health could qualify as environmental 
damage, provided that the losses or expenses are a direct result of Iraq’s invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait.167
Public health monitoring costs related to risks from environmental damage were 
included explicitly in paragraph 35(d) of decision 7, but Iraq challenged substantive 
claims related to health impacts since they were not explicitly mentioned.168 The F4 
panel reasoned that it would be illogical to allow monitoring and screening for damage 
to health from the conflict but to disallow claims for costs of treating the health risks 
that would be revealed by the tests.169 Substantive public health claims received awards 
for costs of treating injuries from mines and ordnance, post- traumatic stress disorder, 
and medical treatment and public health facilities for refugees.170
166 Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) para. 58. 167 Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20) para. 23.
168 For a comprehensive discussion of the public health claims, see Peter H. Sand and James K. Hammitt, 
‘Public Health Claims’ in Payne and Sand (n 27).
169 Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) para. 67. This is consistent with the UNCC’s jurisdiction for broad scope of 
compensable losses. Although the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds excludes health risks, 
its compensation scheme is established within a very different context and has different goals. See also, Sand 
and Hammitt (n 168) 195.
170 Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14). However, a claim by the United States for compensation of US Army 
expenses to monitor health risks to US military personnel for exposure to pollutants from the oil well fires 
356 Developments in the Law of Environmental Reparations
Where countries outside the Persian Gulf region contributed funds or material aid 
as assistance to abate and prevent environmental damage, such costs were awarded 
compensation.171 For example, Germany received compensation for expenses related 
to sending oil pollution control equipment and personnel to assist with the response 
to the oil spills at the request of the governments of Bahrain and Qatar.172 Such costs 
fit squarely within Security Council resolution 687 and paragraph 35 of Governing 
Council decision 7. In analysing this question, the F4 panel also recollected that
specific appeals for assistance in dealing with the environmental damage caused by 
Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait were made by the United Nations General 
Assembly and by other organizations and bodies of the United Nations system as well 
as by the countries affected by environmental damage or threat of such damage result-
ing from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.173
In some cases, expenses of military equipment or personnel such as the cost of the 
German Ministry of Defence’s minesweepers were compensated. Although in appar-
ent contradiction to Governing Council decision 19, which provided that ‘the costs of 
the Allied Coalition Forces, including those of military operations against Iraq, are not 
eligible for compensation’, the F4 panel considered compensation appropriate ‘if there 
is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the predominant purpose of the activities 
was to respond to environmental damage or threat of damage to the environment or to 
public health in the interest of the general population’.174 In recommending an award, 
the F4 panel accepted the statement of the German government that ‘[s] ecure sea lanes 
in the gulf area are an indispensable prerequisite for starting the process of economic 
and other sources was rejected as non- compensable expenses for costs incurred for military operations 
under Governing Council decision 19. Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20) paras. 332– 5.
171 Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20) paras. 32– 5, 34; Thomas Mensah and Peter Sand have referred to these as 
‘solidarity’ costs. Thomas A. Mensah, ‘Foreword’ in Payne and Sand (n 27) xix; Sand (n 65). Solidarity is a 
concept rooted in Emer de Vattel’s argument that states have a legitimate expectation that others will assist 
them when they are threatened with ‘disaster and ruin’, although its modern meaning and status in interna-
tional law is much debated. Rudiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima (eds.), Solidarity: A Structural Principle of 
International Law (Berlin: Springer- Verlag, 2010).
172 Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20) paras. 240– 73.
173 ibid. (n 58) para. 34. The F4 panel referred to the following: General Assembly resolutions 46/ 216 (20 
December 1991) and 47/ 151 (18 December 1992) (both entitled, ‘General Assembly resolution concern-
ing international cooperation to mitigate the environmental consequences on Kuwait and other countries 
in the region resulting from the situation between Iraq and Kuwait’). See also the report of the United 
Nations Environment Programme entitled ‘Introductory report of the Executive Director: environmental 
consequences of the armed conflict between Iraq and Kuwait’, UNEP/ GC.16/ 4/ Add.1; Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
Assembly Resolution VXI- 14 (1991) entitled ‘Oceanographic Co- operation within the ROPME sea area’; 
decision 16/ 11/ A of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme at its sixteenth 
session entitled ‘The environmental consequences of the armed conflict in the Gulf area’, 31 May 1991; 
and International Maritime Organization Circular letter No. 1492, 5 March 1991. A number of interna-
tional agreements and declarations recognize the obligation to provide assistance to respond to environ-
mental emergencies. For example, principle 18 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro), 1992, A/ CONF.151/ 26, Vol. I, provides that ‘States shall 
immediately notify other States of any natural disasters or other emergencies that are likely to produce 
sudden harmful effects on the environment of those States. Every effort shall be made by the international 
community to help States so afflicted.’ See also Art. 194 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (1982), 10 December 1982.
174 Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20) para 29.
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recovery in the region’ and noted that the German minesweepers were deployed after 
the end of hostilities.175
Whether cultural heritage can be included within the scope of ‘environmental dam-
age’ has been questioned in theoretical debates.176 The UNCC received a number of 
public cultural heritage claims which it allocated to the F4 category. This included 
claims for damage to artefacts, monuments, and structures that might be considered 
cultural landscape. For example, Iran claimed compensation for assessment of damage 
from oil fire emissions to ‘stone relics in Persepolis; tilework in Esfahan and Kermân; 
wall paintings in Eşfahan, Fârs, and Yazd; construction materials at the Tchoga Zanbil 
Ziggurat in Khûzestân; and construction materials, archaeological sites and artefacts in 
Susa’; it was awarded US$ 1.4 million.177 Syria claimed US$ 1.2 billion for the costs of 
restoring damage from the oil well fires to cultural sites including the World Heritage- 
listed Temple of Bel at Palmyra; an Umayyad limestone castle at Qasr Al- Hayr East; 
and other structures at Dura Europos and Resafe. These claims failed due to lack of evi-
dence regarding the causal link to Iraq’s illegal acts.178
14.3.11  Valuation of damage
The environmental panel recognized that ‘there are inherent difficulties in attempting 
to place a monetary value on damaged natural resources, particularly resources that are 
not traded in the market’.179 But it observed that it was ‘entitled and required’ to deter-
mine appropriate compensation, while recognizing that putting a monetary value on 
non- market natural resources entails some uncertainties.180 The panel quoted the Trail 
Smelter case in support of its view that international law neither prescribes nor prohib-
its any particular valuation technique:
Where the [wrongful act] itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment 
of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental 
principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the 
wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may 
not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show 
the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the 
result be only approximate.181
For many claims, the award was the estimated value of the cost of remediating and/ 
or restoring the damaged resource. This is how Saudi Arabia’s award for oil spill dam-
age to its Persian Gulf coast was calculated.182 The limitations of remediation as a 
175 ibid. 265– 73.
176 For example, Julio Barboza, ‘Environmental Damage’ in Alexandre Timoshenko (ed.), Conclusions 
by the Working Group of Experts on Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage Arising from 
Military Activities, in Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage, Compilation of Documents 
(Nairobi: United Nations Environmental Programme, 1998), 97 (‘Some such elements as do not belong to 
the notion or [sic] “environment”, (human health), or to the notion of “natural environment” (cultural ele-
ments) should, therefore, be discarded.’).
177 First ‘F4’ Report (n 67) para 84; Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) para. 33.
178 Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) paras. 719– 43. 179 ibid. para. 81. 180 ibid. para. 80.
181 ibid. para. 80. 182 Claim No. 5000451, Third ‘F4’ Report (n 16) paras. 169– 89.
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surrogate were evident in this case, as some of the damaged wetlands were too sensitive 
for highly intrusive restoration and best environmental practice counselled that those 
areas should be left to recover through slower natural processes.183
To address the loss of ecosystem services that would not be fully compensated by 
that award, Saudi Arabia proposed constructing ten marine and coastal preserves. The 
panel instead used a valuation technique called habitat equivalency analysis (‘HEA’), 
which uses a more complex analysis that sets the value of the loss as the cost of environ-
mental projects designed to replace ecosystem services previously provided by irreme-
diably damaged natural resources.184 It considered that two preserves would sufficiently 
compensate for damage that had not already been addressed in the remediation award 
and recommended an award of approximately US$ 46.1 million.185
Jordan used HEA to calculate that damage to rangeland and wildlife reserves from 
vehicular traffic, overgrazing by refugees’ livestock, and refugees’ use of plants for fuel 
would require compensation of US$ 2.4 billion.186 However, implementing the project 
as proposed would have required more land than was available in Jordan. The envi-
ronmental panel accepted the HEA approach in principle, and, in consideration of the 
limited land available, awarded US$ 160.3 million. This amount reflected the costs of 
an alternative programme in which rangeland users and managers would cooperatively 
manage the resource.187 These and other examples of HEA demonstrate a valuation 
procedure for ecosystem services that can be relied on in future proceedings to protect 
and restore environmental resources that are not traded in the market.188
14.3.12  Nature of environmental loss and damage
Environmental claims were handled as public claims where the government stood in 
the role of a trustee189 with fiduciary responsible for ‘a community interest in full reme-
diation of the damage’.190 This is a bold characterization of a programme that did not 
183 Third ‘F4’ Report (n 16) para. 181, Annex VI.
184 Huguenin, Donlan, Van Geel, and Paterson (n 100) 78– 9 (providing extensive explanation of the 
valuation techniques used by the UNCC and their use in other legal systems).
185 Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) paras. 611– 36. 186 ibid. paras. 353– 66, Annex I.
187 The amount awarded also reflected a reduction to account for ‘inadequacies in the information pro-
vided by Jordan and also the fact that Jordan failed to take steps to mitigate the damage, particularly by 
failing to reduce grazing pressure on the rangelands’ Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) paras. 362 – 3.
188 See also Kuwait’s US$ 194.1 million claim for the disruption of ecological services and human activi-
ties in desert areas. Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) paras. 413– 75. Desert areas were damaged by tarcrete, windblown 
sand, dry oil lakes, wet oil lakes, oil- contaminated piles, oil- filled trenches, oil spills, military fortifications, 
and open detonation and open burning of ordnance. Ecological services that were harmed included soil 
stabilization, soil microcommunities, wildlife habitat, and vegetative diversity; human activities that were 
temporarily diminished included animal grazing and desert camping (a popular and culturally important 
form of recreation). Kuwait had submitted claims in the first instalment for the costs of assessing environ-
mental damage from oil lakes that had resulted from oil well fires and evaluating technology to remediate 
the damage. In the fourth instalment, the panel reviewed its claims for cleaning and restoring terrestrial 
damage from oil wells, pipelines, trenches, mines, and other remnants of war.
189 Sand (n 65) 174– 90; David D. Caron, ‘The Place of the Environment in International Tribunals’ in Jay, 
E. Austin and Carl, E. Bruch (eds.), The Environmental Consequences Of War: Legal, Economic And Scientific 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 253, 256.
190 Sand (n 65) 173. See David D. Caron, ‘Finding Out What the Oceans Claim: The 1991 Gulf War, the 
Marine Environment, and the United Nations Compensation Commission’ in David D. Caron and Harry N. 
Scheiber (eds.), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2004), 393, 394; Caron (n 28).
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explicitly endorse the public trust doctrine, however it fits well with the reality. The 
environmental panel described the environment as a common concern that ‘entails 
obligations towards the international community and future generations’.191 David 
Caron put the relationship in terms of a government acting ‘as an agent for the envi-
ronment, for a community’s interest in that environment’.”192
14.3.13  Oversight: Tracking and follow- up programmes
Two oversight measures underscore this. International law traditionally considered 
that reparations resulting from a breach of an international obligation were owed to 
the injured state. The UNCC Governing Council instead required each successful 
claimant state to provide reports that the funds it received were transferred to the 
real claimant in interest.193 In the case of humanitarian claims, this was an individ-
ual.194 In the case of the environmental claims, it was the relevant national agency 
that would be implementing the projects. The M&A tracking programme and the 
substantive claim Follow- up Programme were created to ensure that award money 
would not be used for any purpose other than the projects for which they were 
awarded.195
The Governing Council put in place additional measures for the first instalment of 
‘F4’ claims, ‘to ensure that funds are spent on conducting the environmental monitor-
ing and assessment activities in a transparent and appropriate manner and that the 
funded projects remain reasonable monitoring and assessment activities’.196 Under this 
M&A tracking programme, claimant governments submitted regular progress reports 
on their implementation of the environmental studies, and at the end, audited finan-
cial statements.197 They were thus directed to use award funds only for the monitor-
ing and assessment studies that they claimed were needed. As the environmental panel 
191 Third ‘F4’ Report (n 16) para. 42; Second ‘F4’ Report (n 20) para. 38; and Fifth ‘F4’ Report 
(n 14) para. 40.
192 Caron (n 28) 268. Caron ties this shift in perspective to an equivalent change from a government 
owning the claims of its citizens (and residents) to the UNCC approach where the government acted as 
an agent for the individual claimants. Reflecting the earlier practice, a British court found that the British 
government properly declined to pay a citizen money that it had received from the Chinese government 
‘on account of debts due to British subjects’, stating that the relationship was not ‘the duty of an agent to a 
principal, or of a trustee to a cestui que trust’. Rustomjee v The Queen, II QBD 74 quoted in Whiteman (n 
22) Vol. III, 2051– 2.
193 UNCC Governing Council, Distribution of Payments and Transparency, S/ AC.26/ Dec.18, 24 March 
1994. While traditionally international courts and tribunals have recognized only states as parties, states 
could espouse the claims of individuals as a matter of diplomatic protection; the advent of Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunals allowed resolution of disputes between individuals and states, and between nationals of differ-
ent states. Paul de Auer, ‘The Competency of Mixed Arbitral Tribunals’ (1927) Transactions of the Grotius 
Society xxvii– xxx.
194 Crook (n 76) 87: ‘prior to the UNCC, states’ decisions whether to seek compensation for war dam-
ages, and the amounts sought, typically rested on political considerations, not on law- based assessments of 
individuals’ injuries. . . . For the first time, a multilateral UN mechanism has been created to provide redress 
for the individual consequences of illegal state action.’
195 UNCC Governing Council decision 132, S/ AC.26/ Dec.132, 21 June 2001. 196 ibid.
197 Mojtaba Kazazi, ‘Environmental Damage in the Practice of the UN Compensation Commission’ 
in Michael Bowman and Alan Boyle (eds.), Environmental Damage in International and Comparative 
Law: Problems of Definition and Valuation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 129– 39.
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concluded its work in 2005, it recommended the return of remaining award funds for 
four projects that were, in its judgment, no longer necessary.198
Under the Follow- up Programme, instituted in 2005 after all environmental claims 
had been reviewed, governments were to provide periodic financial and technical 
reports on their progress to the Governing Council to ensure that ‘funds awarded 
for certain environmental remediation and restoration projects are spent in a trans-
parent and appropriate manner on implementing those projects’.199 The Follow- up 
Programme provided detailed guidelines for review of the very large remediation pro-
jects, a US$ 4.3 billion programme.200 Given that some of the projects were planned to 
continue for as long as twenty years into the future, it was not feasible for the Governing 
Council to maintain oversight, but it did not relinquish the principle that the environ-
mental awards were intended to be used for specific environmental remediation pro-
jects. In 2011, the Governing Council outlined a set of structural systems and controls 
to be adopted by Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, upon which the remaining award 
funds being held by the UNCC pending completion of the projects would be released 
to them.201 In 2013, the Governing Council declared that Iran had completed its envi-
ronmental projects and that Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia had satisfactorily put in 
place the necessary systems and controls; the final funds would be released; and the 
mandate of the programme had been fulfilled.202
14.4 UNCC Environmental Reparations and Jus Post Bellum
With the historical facts about the UNCC in mind, it becomes clearer how the pro-
gramme fits into the larger context of the post- conflict legal regime, jus post bellum. 
The UNCC environmental reparations programme has been presented here as an insti-
tution that applied international law to reparations for environmental damage in the 
transition from armed conflict to peace after the 1990– 1 Gulf War.203 First, this section 
describes some of the jus post bellum principles that have been advanced by various 
scholars. Then it discusses those principles in relation to the UNCC environmen-
tal programme and some steps towards reconciliation through environmental coop-
eration that followed. The questions to be answered are whether the UNCC fits the 
description of jus post bellum on its face; whether it serves the purposes of jus post bel-
lum; and how the concepts of jus post bellum can be further enriched by this case study. 
We will see that the inherently transboundary nature of the environment does in fact, 
create unique opportunities for cooperation at the end of conflict.
Brian Orend pointed out that ‘as we can imagine a war justly begun being fought 
unjustly, so too we can imagine a war justly begun, and justly fought, but ending with a 
198 Fifth ‘F4’ Report (n 14) para. 782.
199 UNCC, Statement of the President of the Governing Council, S/ AC.26/ 2013/ 1, 20 November 2013.
200 UNCC Governing Council decision 258, S/ AC.26/ Dec.258, 8 December 2005; Cymie R.  Payne, 
‘Oversight of Environmental Awards and Regional Environmental Cooperation’ in Payne and Sands (n 27).
201 Governing Council decision 269, S/ AC.26/ Dec.269, 7 April 2011.
202 UNCC, Statement of the President of the Governing Council (n 199).
203 Brian Orend, ‘Preface’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 22).
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set of unjust settlement terms’.204 Therefore, he proposed that we need to consider ‘the 
termination phase of the war, in terms of the cessation of hostilities and the move back 
from war to peace’ and to identify ‘a set of just war norms or rules for what we might 
call jus post bellum: justice after war’.205 This supposes a relatively narrow definition, 
which Orend helpfully illustrated with the example of the Bosnian war that dragged on 
‘for want of a just and practicable peace settlement’.206 In contrast is Easterday, Iverson, 
and Stahn’s definition of jus post bellum as ‘the laws and norms of justice that apply 
to the process of ending war and building peace’.207 This approach includes a wider 
and more complex set of concepts that may make a crisp definition of jus post bellum 
impossible but that are capacious enough to encompass more issues of modern peace-
building scholarship and practice.
Several concerns of jus post bellum scholars are not relevant to this case study, 
and can be set aside at the outset— regime change, occupation, conflict of law, and 
gender. The choice was made not to attempt regime change in Iraq and there was no 
territorial administration of Kuwait or Iraq by external forces.208 Questions about 
distinctions between and applicability of international humanitarian law, human 
rights law, and refugee law209 were not at issue because the UN Charter prohibition 
on the use of force between states plus the doctrine of state responsibility were iden-
tified as the bases for the UNCC in its constitution. Although women participated 
as diplomats, lawyers, and scientific experts in the claims process for the claimant, 
respondent, and the UNCC, the special concerns of women were not visible as artic-
ulated elements of the programme.210 They have been evoked more recently in both 
204 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ (2000) 31(1) Journal of Social Philosophy 117, 118. Orend uses the 
example of the 1990– 1 Gulf War in this article. Orend observes that the UNCC compensation fund ‘was an 
enlightened and defensible actualization of the compensation principle’.
205 ibid. 118. 206 ibid.
207 Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus 
Post Bellum’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 22) 1.
208 Dieter Fleck, ‘Jus Post Bellum as a Partly Independent Legal Framework’ in Stahn, Easterday, and 
Iverson (n 22) 44– 51.
209 There has been very little discussion of choice of law in the environmental protection context com-
pared to the well developed discussion of conflicts between relatively permissive rules of international 
humanitarian law and more restrictive human rights law. ILC, Preliminary report on the protection of 
environment, A/ CN.4/ 674, A/ CN.4/ 674/ Corr.1, 30 May 2014, para 3 (‘Since the applicable law in relation 
to armed conflict clearly extends beyond the realm of the law of armed conflict, it is sometimes not suffi-
cient to refer to international humanitarian law as lex specialis in the hope of finding a solution to a specific 
legal problem. Other areas of international law may be applicable, such as international human rights and 
international environmental law.’); ILC, Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation 
to Armed Conflicts, A/ CN.4/ 685, 28 May 2015 (quoting from Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 136, para. 106). 
ILC Analytical Study 2006, ILC Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law. Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law; Report 
of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc. A/ 
CN.4/ L.682 and Add.1 and Corr. 1, New York: ILC, 2006.
210 UNCC commissioners did address rape committed by Iraqi soldiers in a manner that received 
positive comment in UN Division for the Advancement of Women Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response, at <http:// www.un.org/ women-
watch/ daw/ public/ w2apr98.htm> accessed 7 June 2017, referring to UNCC Governing Council decision 3, 
Personal Injury and Mental Pain and Anguish, S/ AC.26/ 1991/ 3, 23 October 1991; and UNCC, Report and 
Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part One of the Second Instalment of 
Claims for Serious Personal Injury or Death (Category “B” Claims), S/ AC.26/ 1994/ 4, 15 December 1994, 
para. 17.
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scholarship211 and UN documents,212 and in the future gender could be considered 
in the formation and analysis of claims.213
The UNCC’s reparations programme was an example of jus post bellum in the most 
literal sense. As a legal proceeding that took place in the aftermath of armed conflict 
it actualized ‘law after war’.214 It was not— unlike some jus post bellum activities such 
as repatriation of soldiers— entirely located in the post- conflict legal context because 
it hearkened back to the illegality of Iraq’s actions in beginning the war and the activi-
ties that occurred during the conflict.215 This is, of course, true for any civil or criminal 
legal proceedings, which find the basis for claims in acts committed by beginning a war 
or in the manner of fighting it. The fact that this is always a feature of such proceedings 
would seem to conclusively answer the question of whether a sharp temporal distinc-
tion can be drawn to define jus post bellum.216
Larry May provided six principles of jus post bellum: retribution, rebuilding, restitu-
tion, reparations, proportionality, and reconciliation,217 which neatly capture the chief 
concerns of the field. As May pointed out, imposing retribution by bringing individuals 
to account is one of the most difficult principles to apply, and the UN Security Council 
eschewed that approach by forgoing criminal trials. Criminal punishment of those 
responsible for Iraq’s brutal pollution of the environment would have made a strong 
and highly visible statement of the importance of environmental integrity if the judges 
so interpreted the law; it would have done nothing to restore the damage.
Clearly, requiring Iraq to pay US$ 52.4 billion in compensation imposed account-
ability for its aggression while the compensation also contributed to rebuilding and 
provided restitution and reparations for the 1.5 million successful claimants, includ-
ing the damaged environment. The UNCC’s unusual requirement that award funds 
must be used for environmental remediation and restoration, enforced by the Tracking 
211 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Dina Francesca Haynes, ‘Compatibility of Justice for Women with Jus Post 
Bellum Analysis’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 22) 160– 77; Freya Baetens, ‘Facilitating Post- Conflict 
Reconstruction: Is the UN Peacebuilding Commission Successfully Filling an Institutional Gap or Marking 
a Missed Opportunity?’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 22).
212 UNGA, Challenge of sustaining peace, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the 
Peacebuilding Architecture in UN Doc. A/ 69/ 968– S/ 2015/ 490, 30 June 2015, paras. 51– 6, 77– 82; UNGA, 
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High- Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change in UN Secretary- General, Note by the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/ 59/ 565, 17 November 
2004, para. 103.
213 Indeed, in the social context of some Middle Eastern countries women’s voices were sometimes 
entirely mute— for example, household public health assessments were hampered because of the difficulty 
of hiring qualified female investigators to interview female head- of- household informants, particularly 
given the constraints on interactions between the male programme directors and the female investigators. 
See also Christopher S. Gibson, Timothy John Feighery, Trevor M. Rajah, War Reparations and the UN 
Compensation Commission:  Designing Compensation After Conflict (New  York:  Oxford University Press, 
2015), 93, 202– 3.
214 Although one could argue that this was a war over natural resources— oil— the concerns that have 
been associated with conflict resources in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and elsewhere do 
not apply here as the State of Kuwait resumed its governance of its oil industry once the occupation ended. 
See  chapter 7 in this volume.
215 Cymie R. Payne, ‘The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict Legal Regimes’ in Stahn, 
Easterday, and Iverson (n 22) 504, 513– 15.
216 Jens Iverson, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Epilogue: Jus Post Bellum— Strategic Analysis 
and Future Directions’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 22) 546– 8.
217 Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 22) 16– 18.
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and Follow- up Programmes, emphasized the rebuilding and restitution elements for 
the environmental claims. May suggests that reparations and rebuilding may be owed 
also to the vanquished aggressor,218 which the UNCC did not address. The theory that 
underlies this view is that the people— in this case the people of Iraq— should not bear 
collective responsibility for the actions of their leaders. Under that view, the respon-
sible leaders must be held accountable personally— retribution against the responsible 
individuals must be paired with even- handed reparations and rebuilding or there is 
effectively impunity for aggression. There is a special argument in support of the even- 
handed approach to reparations and rebuilding when it concerns damage to environ-
mental integrity, something that is not just the property of one state, but that affects the 
common interests of neighbours and the international community.
May tempers his proportionality principle with a concept that he finds in Grotius’s 
writing:  ‘meionexia’— asking for less than one’s due in order to achieve the goal of 
peace.219 There is no benchmark to measure this in the context of the UNCC environ-
mental programme.220 Yet Iraq was asked to pay far less than the total cost of environ-
mental damage that it caused. Some states that suffered environmental damage chose 
not to make claims at all. Those that did make claims sometimes under- claimed— and 
sometimes over- claimed. The UNCC awarded far less than it could have by apply-
ing a stringent evidentiary standard, and taking a conservative approach with regard 
to awards for interim damages and valuation of remediation techniques.221 Without 
explicit statements from the parties, we cannot know whether this was considered 
restraint or how it contributed to reconciliation.
It is submitted that the UNCC environmental programme also made a distinctive 
contribution to reconciliation. There was evidence of reconciliation between the pri-
mary antagonists, and perhaps this tells us that as a jus post bellum proceeding that 
prioritized environmental integrity, the UNCC was a success. After the last claims 
were done, all parties engaged in efforts to rebuild the regional environment. Relations 
between Iraq and Kuwait thawed to the point that in September 2005 Iraqi diplomats 
were invited to meet in Kuwait to arrange the environmental Follow- up Programme. 
The Regional Environmental Rehabilitation Advisory Group (‘RERAG’) was created 
by Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (Iran was also invited to participate and 
became a RERAG member) at that meeting, facilitated by the UNCC, with the purpose 
218 ibid. 18. 219 ibid. 18– 22.
220 It is argued by some that the burden of reparations on Iraq’s own population was too great, raising 
questions of disproportion and human rights violations. It is submitted that the government of Iraq, docu-
mented mismanagement of the Oil for Food Program and the 2003 Gulf War, not the UNCC programme, 
were responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people. See also, Orend (n 204) 133 (‘everything that everyone 
knew about the Hussein regime indicated that the funds would be used for its own buttressing and ben-
efit . . . but the extent and depth of Iraqi civilian deprivation in the aftermath leaves one wondering whether 
the Allies could have done more to ease their suffering, without providing any comfort or succor to their 
aggressor regime’). There is a further question of so- called ‘odious debt’ and its argument that the burden 
of collective responsibility represented by reparations payments is not an appropriate sanction for armed 
conflict where the belligerent state is a dictatorship. The factual, legal, and theoretical basis for these points 
typically focuses on compensation in general and does not include detailed assessment of environmental 
damage.
221 See text at note 15 above, for comparison with the cost of the smaller 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
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of increasing regional cooperation on environmental remediation and assisting Iraq 
with remediation of its own war damage.222 It is noteworthy that RERAG collaborative 
discussions on the environment continued even in 2009 when— in a separate track— 
Iraq and Kuwait were heatedly disputing the final payment of Kuwait’s oil production 
and sales loss claim, the last remaining unpaid award.223 Eventually, Kuwait provided 
US$ 10 million for Iraq to conduct monitoring and assessment of Iraq’s environmental 
war damage.224
The RERAG participants were interested in improving the shared regional environ-
ment, which they expressed in terms of practical concerns and environmental norms 
of sustainability and concern for future generations. A valuable resource— a databank 
of environmental information related to the claimant states— had been created by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (‘UNEP’) under a contract with the UNCC 
as a source of evidence in support of the F4 panel’s claims review. Providing access to 
this information and adding information from Iraq by developing a shared databank 
was one of the RERAG projects. Iraq’s representative at the first RERAG meeting noted 
that Iraq was pleased to participate because ‘the environmental damage is not limited 
to certain countries but affects the whole region, including Iraq’.225 Saudi Arabia’s rep-
resentative said that ‘the environmental issues are the most important as they affect the 
public health of future generations and that remediation is necessary to achieve sustain-
able growth in the region’.226 Such sentiments were repeated throughout the meetings.
14.5 What Jus Post Bellum Adds to Environmental Integrity
The concept of jus post bellum did not create environmental reparations and it is not 
needed for programmes like the UNCC environmental claims to develop and expand 
in the future. What it can do is to provide an organizing category. By bringing legal 
disciplines together under the rubric of jus post bellum, it becomes possible to exam-
ine them more critically and constructively and perhaps to strengthen and improve 
them.227 Analysing the legal regimes for protection of the environment in relation to 
222 Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of the Regional Environmental Rehabilitation 
Advisory Group, in Executive Summary of Fourth Meeting on Regional Cooperation pertaining to 
Remediation of the Environmental Damage (2 May 2006) Annex III (in author’s files). The Executive Head 
of the UNCC said, at the eighth RERAG meeting, that ‘the RERAG program, while reflecting on the F4 fol-
low up program, also corrects its deficiencies for not addressing the environmental issues in Iraq’. State of 
Kuwait NFP, RERAG 8th Meeting (2009).
223 The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation’s production and sales loss claim received the largest award made 
by the UNCC, for Kuwait’s ‘inability to use the oilfields and refineries to produce and sell oil and gas during 
the period of the illegal occupation; and thereafter the inability to use such property or to use it fully, because 
of the physical damage inflicted on the oilfields and refineries’. The award was US$ 14,750,324,488, of which 
US$ 4.6 billion remains to be paid. Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners 
Concerning the Fourth Instalment of ‘E1’ Claims, UN Doc. S/ AC.26/ 2000/ 16, 29 September 2000, para. 
260, Table 15.
224 RERAG, Report on Fifth Meeting on Regional Cooperation Pertaining to Remediation of the 
Environmental Damage (22 November 2006) (in author’s files).
225 Meeting of the Claimant Countries, Iraq and the UNCC on Possible Mechanisms for the Use of 
UNCC Environmental Awards and the Creation of a Follow- Up Program (First RERAG Meeting) 
(September 2005) (in author’s files).
226 First RERAG Meeting. 227 Iverson et al. (n 216) 542.
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armed conflict is a difficult task. The common goal is to protect, create, and restore envi-
ronmental integrity, but the bodies of law do not work together smoothly. The admin-
istrative, regulatory approach that dominates peacetime environmental law seems to 
have little to do with either the minimalist rules of armed conflict or the emphasis on 
development in the peacebuilding phase.
The challenge is compounded by the lack of dialogue between experts in interna-
tional humanitarian law and in environmental and natural resource protection law. By 
focusing attention on the transitions between them and linkages that connect them, 
the study of jus post bellum may advance effective use of law and norms from all the 
relevant disciplines. As modern governments pursue the demand for justice with legal 
instruments and practice, new norms take shape, including a norm of environmental 
integrity.228 Jutta Brunnée discusses ‘the role of distinctively legal materials’ in the pro-
cess whereby ‘first, legal norms arise from social norms; second, when norm creation 
meets specific requirements of legality and, third, meets with norm application that 
also satisfies these legality requirements’, resulting in law that can be used to advance 
society’s purposes.229 Placing the UNCC environmental programme in this context, 
as a site of norm development and application, helps us to understand environmental 
integrity as part of the larger tapestry of jus post bellum. International society’s awak-
ening to our need for a healthy, resilient, and complete environment is evident. When 
environmental integrity takes its place as a norm of jus post bellum, it becomes avail-
able to enrich the work of practitioners and scholars in that larger field. As they become 
familiar, environmental norms and practices will be better integrated into peacebuild-
ing, the law of armed conflict, and the norms of just war.
14.6 Conclusion
The UNCC environmental programme, viewed as an innovative approach to justice 
after war, highlights the contribution that the environmental integrity norm can make. 
This case study describes what happened. Perhaps parts of the programme can be 
reproduced in other contexts; perhaps this was indeed a unique confluence of circum-
stances and people. However, certain elements stand out. The agreement of parties— 
Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia— to establish the Follow- up Programme 
and the RERAG illustrates the former antagonists’ willingness to cooperate for the 
improvement of regional environmental conditions. The UNCC’s role as a trusted, neu-
tral administrator for the Follow- up Programme and convenor for RERAG was surely 
built on the manner in which the F4 panel, the Secretariat, and the Governing Council 
conducted the environmental claims review. That in turn included the adjustments to 
the UNCC procedures that were agreed by all the participants to be desirable to accom-
modate the special demands of the environmental programme.
228 Payne (n 215).
229 Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Sources of International Environmental Law: Interactional Law’ in Samantha 
Besson and Jean d’Aspremont (eds.), Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (2017).
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Compensation programmes, like all international civil tribunals, are inherently 
reactive. This limits their direct influence.230 On the other hand, commissions like 
the UNCC can influence norms, they can offer procedural innovations, and they can 
reflect new developments in the law. If we look to the UNCC’s environmental reports 
for progressive development of international environmental law, we find that they are 
generally restrained in their discussions of international law principles. And yet, they 
demonstrate principles of precaution, common concern, obligations to future genera-
tions, environmental integrity, polluter pays, and the general obligation of states to pre-
vent transboundary environmental damage and damage to the environment beyond 
national jurisdiction.231
In making awards for environmental monitoring and assessment costs, the UNCC 
acknowledged the precautionary need to identify potential risks in order to plan future 
action, especially for the protection of human health, and to obtain information that 
could inform the substantive claim review. Peter Sand observed that the reference to 
public health monitoring in Governing Council decision 7, paragraph 35(d), ‘is prob-
ably the closest the UNCC ever came to endorsing the “precautionary approach” in 
international environmental law’.232
The environmental panel characterized the duty of injured states to mitigate environ-
mental damage as ‘a necessary consequence of the common concern for the protection 
and conservation of the environment, and entails obligations towards the international 
community and future generations’.233 This is a fair statement of the overarching obli-
gation on all parties that the UNCC environmental claims programme represented.
Finally, a great contribution of the UNCC environmental programme, and its suc-
cessors, will be the spotlight they shine on the often ignored devastation to the natural 
environment caused by armed conflict and its potential to lead us towards prevention 
of harm. It is easy to see, for example in Jordan where new camps for Syrian war refu-
gees are again causing damage to the Badia, that waiting until conflict ends to provide 
protection for the environment is a fool’s game.
230 Matheson (n 23) 10 (contrasting the reactive posture of international civil tribunals with the pro-
active nature of international criminal tribunals, where the prosecutor chooses cases).
231 Philippe Sands, Ruth Mackenzie, and Ruth Khalastchi, ‘Background Paper’ in Alexandre Timoshenko 
(ed.), Conclusions by the Working Group of Experts on Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage 
Arising from Military Activities, in Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage, Compilation of 
Documents (Nairobi: United Nations Environmental Programme, 1998) 35– 6.
232 Sand and Hammitt (n 168) 195.   233 Third ‘F4’ Report (n 16) para. 42.
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 Victims of Environmental Harm During Conflict
The Potential for ‘Justice’
Merryl Lawry- White*
15.1 Introduction
The priorities of jus post bellum include sustainable peace, but it is ‘not merely peace that 
is at issue, but a just peace, where mutual respect and the rule of law are key considera-
tions’.1 Achieving the desired peace requires considering the experience victims of viola-
tions during conflict, thus facilitating the (re)building of links within society, including 
fostering the trust of state institutions2 and the norms they espouse.
Reparations programmes, frequently ‘prominent elements of post- conflict legal 
responses’,3 provide an avenue through which damage and needs may be considered. 
Reparations are often ‘crucial for re- establishing trust among parties after war’s end’.4 This 
includes reparations for violations of environmental protections, an area that has often 
been under- prioritized. Failing to consider environmental harm will affect the ability of 
certain communities— and perhaps entire nations or regions— to participate in peace-
building and move forward after conflict. 
Environmental damage during conflict is often part of a broader landscape of envi-
ronmental neglect pre- and post- conflict, as well as structural inequalities in accessing 
resources. Jus post bellum is concerned not only with immediate post- conflict remedia-
tion of environmental damage, but also what is necessary for the long- term transition to 
peace, which extends to considerations of capacity, management, an appropriate norma-
tive framework, and community participation.
Reparation can play myriad roles, including deterrent,5 corrective,6 or restora-
tive7 functions. Temporally, reparations are most commonly implemented following 
* This Chapter was last updated in December 2015. At time of writing, the author was Juriste Adjointe to 
the former Vice-President, International Court of Justice.
1 Larry May and Elizabeth Edenburg (eds.), Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 1.
2 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice’ in Melissa Williams, Rosemary Nagy, and Jon Elster 
(eds.), Transitional Justice: Nomo LI (New York: NYU Press, 2012), 47.
3 Cymie Payne, ‘Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict Regimes’ in Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson, and 
Jennifer S. Easterday (eds.), Jus Post Bellum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 503.
4 May and Edenburg (n 1) 4, 6.
5 Emanuela- Chiara Gillard, ‘Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (2003) 85 
International Review of the Red Cross 529:
[des réparations] constituent un aspect important de l’application du droit et peuvent avoir un 
important effet dissuasif.
6 Lucy Reed, ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission’(2003) 306 Recueil des Cours 310.
7 For example, the Pinheiro Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and 
Displaced Persons issued by the UN Sub- Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human 
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conflict (or intense periods of conflict) and contribute to the prospective normative 
framework.8 The adjudication and enforcement of norms on a mass scale post- con-
flict can play a part in defining the extent of protection in the past and embedding 
these norms in the legal system and national consciousness to come.
The flexibility inherent in reparative responses makes them an important tool in rec-
ognizing a diverse range of harm. In her writing on transitional justice in 2000, Ruti 
Teitel claimed that ‘[b] ecause of their versatility, reparatory practices have become the 
leading response in the contemporary wave of political transformation’.9 Yet the man-
ner in which reparation is conceived and implemented is central to achieving the goals 
of jus post bellum. Reconciliation, for example, has taken ‘cent[re] stage in jus post bel-
lum debates’.10 While there is little consensus around the concept and practice of recon-
ciliation, it has been defined as ‘a process through which a society moves from a divided 
past to a shared future’ and ‘that redesigns the relationship’.11 A misconceived repa-
rations strategy may fail to support reconciliatory processes and exacerbate tensions. 
This, in turn, may undermine the cooperation required to remediate environmental 
damage and prevent further harm.
The sections of this chapter survey the various elements of a reparations strategy: pri-
mary norms, reparative principles and potential mechanisms.  It considers the patch-
work of relevant: norms drawn from different ‘subsets’ of international law, as well as 
domestic law, that target different perpetrators, implicate different thresholds, apply 
in different types of conflicts, and afford varying potential for redress. This overlap of 
norms and guidelines drawn from various fields is a feature of the various conceptions 
of jus post bellum.12 The prospective differential between ‘typologies’ of victims and the 
redress available may detract from the aims of reducing tensions, ensuring non- repeti-
tion, and creating a shared future.
Section 15.2 of this chapter looks at the importance of halting or redressing envir-
onmental damage that occurs during conflict, as part of ensuring a sustainable peace. 
Section 15.3 considers some of the norms that may be implicated in this damage 
to illustrate the potential complexity for a reparations strategy and the mechanism 
Rights (August 2005) characterize restitution, and, where restitution is unavailable, compensation, as a 
key element of restorative justice (see, for example, Principles 2 and 21). See also Christine Evans, The 
Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 119.
8 The definition and nature of jus post bellum is still subject to debate. However, this contribution pro-
ceeds on the basis that jus post bellum is concerned at a minimum with violations occurring during and after 
conflict. ‘the . . . contours of the concepts of war and peace have become blurred’. See Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post 
Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s)’ (2007) 23(2) American University International Law Review 311, 323. 
As history shows, peacebuilding and peace treaties are the context in which a cohesive reparations strategy 
is often considered in respect of violations during conflict. While (if defined temporally) certain claims will 
likely be dealt with while the conflict is ongoing (especially if it is protracted), this does not detract from 
the need to consider these claims in designing a post- conflict reparations strategy for the reasons set out in 
this chapter.
9 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 127.
10 Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia’ in Stahn, Iverson, and Easterday (n 3) 16.
11 David Bloomfield, ‘On Good terms: Clarifying Reconciliation’ (October 2006) Berghof Report No. 14, 
4 and 7.
12 See, for example, ‘Epilogue’ Stahn, Iverson, and Easterday (n 3) 548– 9.
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which follows. Section 15.4 discusses the variety of reparations principles and prac-
tices developed under different international law specialisms. The section also consid-
ers the forms that reparation may take under international law, as well as the flexible 
approach required to respond to different types of damage. Section 15.5 then moves to 
look at different mechanisms that have been employed to redress environmental dam-
age and the lessons that may be drawn from the experience. The section highlights the 
contribution of process and participation to affording reparation in a jus post bellum 
framework.
There are important caveats to any discussion about reparation in this context. 
First, as explained in Section 15.3, there are significant normative ‘gaps’ in environ-
mental protection during conflict. An examination of the consequences of breach 
might then seem rather superfluous. Second, the reality described by the International 
Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) as the ‘often irreversible character of damage to the environ-
ment’ and ‘the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type 
of damage’13 helps to explain the emphasis of international environmental norms on 
prevention14 and structures to operationalize prevention, rather than repairing what 
is often irreparable. Third, given the nature of much environmental damage, pro-
cedures to ensure cooperation and facilitate compliance are particularly important. 
This has historically resulted in some more loosely framed or aspirational obligations 
on which it may be difficult to base a claim for reparation.15 However, while recog-
nizing the limitations of reparation as a response, prevention is often superseded 
before, during, and after conflict. Reparation remains an important pillar of jus post 
bellum, both in responding to damage and performing a normative and symbolic 
function.16 Where protections are disparate, specific, and subject to high thresholds, 
reparation for those that do exist is important. Implementing accountability through 
reparation reinforces protection, including by contributing to the development of 
relevant practice.
The discussion in this chapter is necessarily general. Each conflict and post- con-
flict scenario is different; there is no cross-cutting solution. However, there are impor-
tant themes and questions when considering a reparations strategy as part of a jus post 
bellum.
15.2 The Environmental Imperative
Environmental integrity and sustainable natural resources management often have an 
important role to play in achieving a sustainable peace: ‘[e] nvironmental pressures can 
13 Gabčíkovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 7, 78.
14 Preliminary Report (to the ILC) on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, 
A/ CN.4/ 674, 30 May 2014 (‘ILC Report I’), 35.
15 UNEP Report, ‘Protecting the Environment During Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International 
Law’ 2009 (‘UNEP Study’), 38 (in a discussion of the Convention on Long- Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution).
16 See Alan Boyle, ‘Globalising Environmental Liability’ (2005) 17 Journal of Environmental Affairs 1, 3.
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lead to conflict and conflict can exacerbate environmental pressures making more dif-
ficult the restoration of peace’.17
The United Nations Environment Programme (‘UNEP’) has conducted many post- 
conflict environmental assessments, including in Sudan following the 2005 Peace 
Agreement and that in Darfur in 2006 (which has now been superseded).18 The analysis 
‘indicate[d] that there [was] a very strong link between land degradation, desertifica-
tion and conflict in Darfur’ and concluded that: ‘[l]ong- term peace [would] not be pos-
sible unless . . . underlying and closely linked environmental and livelihood issues were 
resolved’.19 Access to resources and to limited fertile land fuelled tribal, ethnic, polit-
ical, and social tensions. The conflict resulted in mass displacement and a breakdown 
in land use governance, which caused further land degradation and exacerbated the 
underlying causes of conflict. In addition, the main source of livelihood in internally 
displaced persons (‘IDP’) camps was brick- making. A 2008 UNEP Report on Darfur 
described the use of firewood in the brick kilns as the most damaging source of defor-
estation. This was one of the reasons for the enormous loss of forest cover in Darfur— a 
third between 1973 and 2006.20 Deforestation further decreased land fertility exacer-
bating the competition for resources and potential conflict. Darfur provides an import-
ant example of how grappling with environmental harm and governance affects the 
potential for a sustainable peace. Other authors throughout this volume have described 
this phenomenon in relation to other conflicts.21
Environmental damage may also be a deliberate tactic to undermine the enemy. 
The use of Agent Orange in Vietnam is a famous example. The United States sprayed 
almost 20 million gallons of the chemical over Vietnamese farmland (and some parts 
of Cambodia and Laos) between 1961 and 1972 with the intention of eliminating the 
tree cover and crops that sheltered and fed the Vietcong.22 The detrimental effects on 
the environment and the health of the population has been extensively reported and 
memorialized as a section of the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City. Further, 
specific weapons may cause massive environmental damage, even if the environment 
is not the target.
As these examples show, environmental harm and competition for natural resources 
can act as a cause, catalyst, and consequence of conflict. Environmental damage creates 
a multiplicity of victims: the environment itself, and the organisms that rely upon that 
environment, states, businesses, communities, etc. The effects will likely be felt indi-
vidually and collectively. This recognition raises questions as to how accountability and 
17 See, for example, Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘Introduction’ in Rosemary Rayfuse (ed.), War and the 
Environment. New Approaches to Protecting the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict (Leiden/ 
Boston: Brill/ Nijhoff, 2014), 5.
18 See  UNEP website, at <http:// www.unep.org/ disastersandconflicts/ Introduction/ PostCrisisEnvironmental 
Assessment/ UNEPsEnvironmentalAssessments/ tabid/ 54635/ Default.aspx> accessed April 2015.
19 See UNEP ‘Sudan— Post Conflict Assessment’ (2007), at <http:// www.unep.org/ sudan/ post- conflict/ 
PDF/ UNEP_ Sudan.pdf> accessed April 2015, 8.
20 ibid. 11. See also, UNEP Report, ‘Destitution, Destruction and Deforestation— Darfur’, November 
2008, 5.
21 See, for example,  chapter 7 in this volume.
22 Anon, ‘Agent Orange’s Long Legacy for Vietnam and Veterans’ History (11 May 2014), at < http:// www.
history.com/ topics/ vietnam- war/ agent- orange> accessed April 2015.
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reparation is to be conceived of in such scenarios (for whom, according to whom, for 
which wrongs, etc.) so as to facilitate lasting peace.
15.3 The Patchwork of Relevant Protections
Environmental damage— especially on the scale often witnessed during conflict— will 
likely implicate many different international norms, especially as damage will vary at 
different stages of a conflict or across geographical regions. These norms by perpetrator, 
victim, damage, scenario, geography, etc. The perpetrator may be an individual, cor-
poration, armed group, or occupying power bound by a regional human rights treaty. 
Wrongful acts of individuals or different groups may also be attributable to a state. Use 
of the same weapon might result in pollution of the water supply in some regions or 
destruction of land and livelihood in another. In some places the concern may be more 
for future, rather than current generations. Comparable environmental damage might 
therefore result in breach in some scenarios or not in others.
The implication of multiple bodies of norms is far from unusual in domestic or inter-
national settings and is a natural result of the intersection of different bodies of law with 
different priorities. So why does this matter? First, certain bodies of law provide for 
recourse to a particular dispute resolution mechanism (such as a regional human rights 
court), providing access for specific participants and, often, different rules regarding 
reparation. Other bodies of law provide for no such recourse, or recourse at the option 
of a state. Certain norms implicate more stringent thresholds or levels of deference 
than others— for example, even within international humanitarian law (‘IHL’) relevant 
thresholds vary. Where multiple victims are seeking redress, it could appear as if pri-
ority is afforded to some, not others. Second, if a reparations mechanism is developed 
to compensate or otherwise ‘repair’ environmental damage and its consequences, how 
would it digest a multitude of norms, standards, and different types of claimant? What 
evidentiary standards may be appropriate? What information is available? Will cer-
tain victims be excluded de jure or de facto from its mandate? Third, there may be 
calls for choices to be made, allowing certain norms or types of damage to be prior-
itized. Political forces may play more heavily in making choices, thus making it easier to 
implement a more one- sided accountability package. The perception that reparations 
are an application of victor’s justice has been a key factor undermining their utility as 
a mechanism to transition to peace.23 All of these factors could result in exacerbat-
ing tensions between groups that will detract in moving away from conflict and could 
undermine some of the key priorities of jus post bellum.
Relevant protections may include those arising from IHL, human rights, environ-
mental treaties, and customary provisions, the prohibition on the use of force, invest-
ment, and other property protections, to name a few. In the following paragraphs, a 
brief discussion follows of some of the relevant protections contained within IHL, 
international criminal law (‘ICL’), international human rights law (‘IHRL’), and inter-
national environmental law (‘IEL’). These norms have been discussed in more depth 
23 Gabriella Blum and Natalie Lockwood, ‘Earthquakes and Wars’ in May and Edenberg (n 1) 182.
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by other authors throughout this volume.24 This chapter is not intended to constitute 
a comprehensive analysis of these norms, but rather to illustrate certain variations, 
as well as uncertainty surrounding potential application that may act to undermine a 
claim for breach and reparation, or leverage as part of negotiations.
15.3.1  International humanitarian law
Under the current IHL regime, the environment finds both special (direct) protection, 
as well as general (indirect) protection as a civilian object. In practice, however, as has 
been recognized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’),25 protec-
tion of the environment is limited.
Two provisions of Additional Protocol I  to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (‘AP I’) 
have garnered much attention for their protection of the environment per se. Article 
35(3) of AP I prohibits methods or means of warfare, which are intended, or may be 
expected, to cause widespread, long- term, and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment. Article 55(1) contains similar language but adds ‘and thereby to prejudice the 
health or survival of the population’. The latter is effectively an ecocentric protection 
with an anthropocentric goal.
These provisions thus provide an absolute threshold on damage that cannot be justi-
fied by military necessity. But there are significant challenges to their application to, or 
invocation by, victims post- conflict. AP I applies only to international armed conflicts 
(‘IACs’), and therefore does not apply to many recent or current conflicts. Further, vari-
ous states and scholars have declared or stated that the provisions apply only to con-
ventional warfare and weapons.26 The status of the provisions is also unsettled. While 
not all states are parties to AP I, the Special Committee established to study NATO’s 
bombing in the Former Yugoslavia concluded that Articles 35(3) and 55(1) ‘may’ reflect 
customary international law (see also the ICRC’s formulation below).27
The cumulative conditions (widespread, long- term, and severe) set an imprecise 
and exigent threshold:  ‘[a] t least if interpreted in the light of the negotiating history, 
it seems next to impossible that the threshold could be reached by conventional war-
fare’.28 Given the difficulties associated in meeting these thresholds, a temporal ques-
tion arises. At least two states (the UK and France) have declared their understanding 
24 See, for example,  chapter 5 in this volume. See also  chapter 10 in this volume.
25 The ICRC notes that the development of IHL has not kept pace with the strengthening of IEL, ‘despite 
the serious impact of warfare on the environment’. ICRC Report, Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims 
of Armed Conflict, 31IC/ 11/ 5.1.1, October 2011, 14. See also UNEP Study (n 20) 4, noting, inter alia, a ‘legal 
vacuum’ in relation to NIAC and the aiding and abetting of civil war parties by States or corporations. 
Additionally see Payne (n 3) 506.
26 Michael Bothe et al., ‘International Law Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps 
and Opportunities’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red Cross 573. Second Report to the ILC on the 
Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, A/ CN.4/ 685, April 2015 (‘ILC Report II’), 
para. 130.
27 Final Report of the Committee to the Prosecutor (2000), at <http:// www.icty.org/ en/ press/ final- report- 
prosecutor- committee- established- review- nato- bombing- campaign- against- federal> accessed April 2015, 
para. 15. The Report noted that neither the United States nor France were signatories to API. France ratified 
API in 2001.
28 Bothe et al. (n 26) 575– 6.
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that risk of environmental damage is to be assessed objectively and based on the infor-
mation available at the time.29 However, that raises questions about damage for which 
longevity/ scope could not be predicted with sufficient certainty. On the other hand, 
it would be counterproductive (and ironic) to encourage a ‘wait and see’ approach to 
the damage before claiming the resources necessary to mitigate or repair, given that an 
early response is often linked to the extent of feasible repair/ remediation.
There are also multiple treaty protections that could indirectly protect against envi-
ronmental harm, for example, those relating to enemy property, civilian or cultural 
objects, prohibitions on attacking works or installations containing dangerous forces 
or ‘objects indispensable to the civilian population’, under, for example, the Hague 
Regulations 1907, Geneva Convention IV, AP I and Additional Protocol II.30 The natu-
ral environment, including natural resources, is generally considered civilian property, 
and thus, is protected as such until such time as it qualifies as a military objective. The 
Ethiopia– Eritrea Commission found that Ethiopia’s airstrikes on the Harsile water res-
ervoir breached Article 54 AP I, which prohibits attacks indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population— a protection that the Commission concluded reflected cus-
tomary international law.31 In the Armed Activities Case, the ICJ ordered Uganda to 
make reparation for breaches of IHL and IHRL during its military activities and occu-
pation of Ituri, including of the Hague Regulations, such as acts of looting, plundering, 
and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory.32
These treaty provisions regarding the protection of civilian property reflect the gen-
eral principles applicable in armed conflict: those of distinction, military necessity, pro-
portionality, taking precautions, and humanity. Rule 43 in the ICRC’s 2005 Report on 
customary rules of international humanitarian law specifically reflects the first three 
principles vis- à- vis the natural environment. Rule 44 talks of taking ‘all feasible pre-
cautions’ to minimize incidental damage to the environment and that, in assessing the 
extent of damage, the precautionary approach should be adopted. Rule 45 reflects the 
concern that methods and means of warfare not cause ‘widespread, long- term and 
severe damage’ to the natural environment, also prohibiting the destruction of the envi-
ronment as a weapon of war. The prohibition of damage is thus subject to an absolute, 
rather than relative, threshold. Rule 43 applies in IAC and non- international armed 
conflict (‘NIAC’) and Rules 44 and 45 during IAC, and ‘arguably’ during NIAC (their 
status during NIAC is ‘less clear’).33
Other IHL treaties directly consider the protection of the environment dur-
ing conflict. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques 1976 (‘ENMOD’) prohibits contracting par-
ties from engaging in ‘military or any other hostile use of environmental modification 
29 ILC Report II (n 26) para. 129.   30 UNEP Study (n 20) 16– 17.
31 Partial Award:  Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims— Eritrea’s Claims, 19 
December 2005, RIAA XXVI, 291, para. 98 et seq.
32 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment 
of 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 168, para. 250 (see also paras. 206– 7 for discussion of civilian life and 
property).
33 Jean- Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Volume 1: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) (‘ICRC Study’), 147– 57.
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techniques having widespread, long- lasting or severe effects as the means of destruc-
tion, damage or injury to any other State Party’. The prohibition applies even to actions 
taken in self- defence.34 It therefore constitutes a blanket prohibition on harm that 
reaches the level of an alternative, less stringent threshold ‘widespread, long- term or 
severe’ rather than the conjunctive ‘and’ contained in AP I. However, the techniques 
covered by the treaty are narrowly defined. Although it has been heralded a success 
when assessed against its specific objectives, 35 critics suggest that, in reality, ENMOD is 
not likely to curtail environmental degradation caused by war because it does not target 
conventional warfare techniques that damage the environment as a by- product.36 Like 
ENMOD, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 1980 also targets spe-
cific warfare scenarios that may result in environmental damage and direct or indirect 
harm to other victims on the ground. Following an amendment in 2001, its protection 
explicitly extends to NIAC— in contrast to many other direct IHL environmental pro-
tections. Breach of other treaties addressing the production, use, destruction, and dis-
posal of certain weapons— such as the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (‘CWC’) 
and Protocol II to the CWC addressing Landmines and Explosive Remnants— may also 
act to harm the environment and other victims as a result.
Finding a norm that covers the damage in question is the first hurdle to obtain-
ing redress. But when considering the potential for reparation, producing sufficient 
evidence to discharge the requisite burden to prove breach is likely to pose an add-
itional hurdle, particularly in a conflict scenario. This may require evidence recreat-
ing various processes, for example, the planning and precautionary measures taken 
prior to employing a specific weapon, or targeting or damaging the environment. The 
fact that relevant standards are fluid or undetermined adds another layer of com-
plexity: at what point the environment becomes a ‘military object’ and its damage or 
destruction renders ‘military advantage’ is not only controversial but also requires a 
case- by- case analysis; further, what is lawful ‘collateral’ damage is ‘difficult to deter-
mine’.37 Much depends upon the information available to the decision- makers at the 
time, a factor that changes over time with developments in weaponry and scientific 
understanding.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) Special 
Committee that examined NATO bombing of military targets noted the imprecise 
nature of what constitutes ‘excessive’ destruction. It noted that, in considering whether 
NATO had complied with relevant principles, it would be necessary to understand the 
extent of NATO’s knowledge— could NATO have reasonably anticipated the release of 
toxic chemicals? Add to this the often uncertain nature of scientific knowledge and the 
hurdles to obtaining reparation become higher: the Special Committee noted that the 
present and long- term environmental impact of the bombing campaign was ‘unknown 
34 Commentaries to the ILC Articles, ILC Ybk 2001/ II(2) (‘Commentaries’), Art. 21, para. 4.
35 UNEP Study (n 20) 12.
36 Keith McManus, ‘Civil Liability for Wartime Environmental Damage: Adapting the United Nations 
Compensation Commission for the Iraq War’ (2006) 33 Environmental Affairs 417, 427.
37 Bothe et al. (n 26) 570.
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and difficult to measure’.38 There may be a tendency for adjudicative bodies to afford 
discretion to the decision- makers where information was limited and consequences 
uncertain— a not uncommon scenario during intense conflict.
15.3.2  International criminal law
Certain breaches of IHL that provide indirect protection of the environment can con-
stitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, if combined with the requisite intent. 
Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV lists ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of 
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’ 
as a grave breach.39 There is an obligation on state parties to prosecute such crimes, 
but they may also fall within the jurisdiction ratione materiae of international crimi-
nal courts (see, e.g., Art. 2(d) of the ICTY Statute). The Statute of the ICTY and the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) also criminalize 
actions constituting breaches of the ‘laws and customs of war’, which could indirectly 
protect the environment, for example, the plunder of public and private property or the 
employment of poisonous weapons or weapons ‘calculated to cause unnecessary suffer-
ing’ (see Art. 3 of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes).
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute now criminalizes as a war crime in IAC:
[i] ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause . . . wide-
spread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated.
The ICC thus creates a permanent institutional framework to prevent and punish envi-
ronmental war crimes through the criminal justice paradigm. Commentators note 
that there is a ‘tremendous expressive value’ to the inclusion of the crime in the Rome 
Statute.40 States parties are encouraged to reflect the crimes listed in the Rome Statute 
in their domestic legislation.
However, there is limited clarity on how these crimes will be interpreted by the ICC. 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is drawn from customary and conventional IHL, but with the add-
ition of a proportionality requirement. It applies only during IAC.41 The high burden of 
proof, the stringent criteria for mens rea, and the difficulty of evidencing environmental 
harm in general, mean that the breach of the provision will be found on rare occasions. 
Mark Drumbl has concluded that ‘it’s going to be very difficult, as it rightly should be, 
to secure a conviction under this provision’.42 And no conviction means no reparation.
38 Final Report of the Committee to the Prosecutor (2000), at <http:// www.icty.org/ en/ press/ final- report- 
prosecutor- committee- established- review- nato- bombing- campaign- against- federal> accessed April 2015, 
para. 23.
39 UNEP Study (n 20) 12.
40 Mark Drumbl, Symposium on ‘International Responses to the Environmental Impact of War’ (2004– 
05) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 565 (‘Symposium’) 623.
41 See Matthew Gillett,  chapter 10 in this volume regarding the potential extension to NIAC and of other 
relevant crimes.
42 Drumbl, Symposium (n 40) 626.
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15.3.3  International human rights law
The place of IHRL during conflict is not clear- cut. However, its applicability and rel-
evance has been frequently confirmed, including by the ICJ, for example in the Armed 
Activities case:
the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed 
conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in 
article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.43
Human rights courts and bodies have also adjudicated multiple cases concerning 
alleged violations that occurred during conflict.44 In considering the environment as a 
victim in itself, human rights become (by definition) irrelevant. However, when con-
sidering reparative practices the relationship is more symbiotic: reparation for anthro-
pocentric norms may result in environmental remediation and for ecocentric norms 
will benefit individuals living in that environment.
While certain IHRL instruments contain environment- focused rights, commenta-
tors note that there is no internationally recognized right to a ‘decent, healthy or via-
ble environment’ (Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration) or a ‘general, satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development’ (Art. 24 of the Banjul Charter). Yet, envi-
ronmental harm may impinge on different human rights embodied in international 
and regional human rights treaties.45 Given the limited fora available to individuals 
to claim for breaches of international protections related to environmental damage, 
human rights bodies and relevant jurisprudence play an important part in ensuring 
redress. The approach of the regional human rights courts and the binding nature of 
their decisions render them particularly important in this regard. The European Court 
of Human Rights (‘ECHR’), for example, has played an active role in the ‘greening’ 
of human rights. Its jurisprudence identifies an obligation on states to take ‘adequate 
preventative measures’, including regulation and enforcement, against certain environ-
mental harm that may prejudice life, health, private life, or property. These duties apply 
whether or not the government is the owner or operator of the cause of the nuisance. 
The rights are not purely substantive, but have a procedural element. The decision- 
making process must afford ‘due respect for the [safeguarded] interests of the indi-
vidual’, including participation/ considering views during the decision- making process, 
access to information, and a forum to appeal.46
The Inter- American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’) has focused on environ-
mental harm largely in the context of indigenous rights and property, in scenarios 
outside of and within conflict, including cases examining the granting of conces-
sions, deforestation, or attacks that damaged the environment (such as scorched earth 
43 Armed Activities (n 32)  para. 216. See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 136, para. 106.
44 See, for example, ILC Report II (n 26) fn 153.
45 ‘Whether general international law recognizes such a right is more doubtful, but attempts have been 
made to develop one.’ See Alan Boyle, ‘Environment and Human Rights’ (2009) 23 European Journal of 
International Law 613.
46 Taşkin v. Turkey, App no. 46117/ 99 (ECtHR, 10 November 2004), para. 118.
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tactics).47 A key part of complying with a community’s rights is ensuring ‘meaningful’ 
or ‘effective’ participation when implementing changes that affect the environment.48
Article 24 of the Banjul Charter (set out above) is more explicit that other regional 
human rights treaties in terms of states’ obligations vis- à- vis the environment of indi-
viduals within their jurisdiction. The landmark Ogoniland decision issued by the 
African Commission of Human Rights noted that Article 24 of the Banjul Charter 
‘imposes clear obligations’ on a state to take measures to prevent pollution and degrad-
ation, promote conservation, and ‘secure an ecologically sustainable development and 
use of natural resources’.49
There are limits to the extent of protection offered by human rights treaties. States 
may derogate from certain applicable rights during conflict. Protection only extends 
to those whose rights are specifically affected, which does not encompass everyone 
who experiences changes to their environment. The ECHR determined that the illegal 
draining of wetlands in Kyrtatos v. Greece did not affect the rights of the applicants who 
lived nearby.50 Further, human rights adjudication involves a balancing of interests, and 
a wide margin of appreciation may be afforded to states in determining the public inter-
est (for example, in favour of economic development). In times of conflict, depending 
upon the nature and intensity of conflict, the degree of deference to state measures may 
shift even further. IHL may inform the interpretation of IHRL, as stated by the ICJ in 
its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,51 and the 
ECHR Grand Chamber in Hassan v. UK52— resulting in the imposition of a different 
standard.53
15.3.4  International environmental law
The application of IEL54 during conflict varies by source, instrument. and norm, and 
‘the extent and parameters of continued application are debated’.55 Nor is there consen-
sus on the approach to be adopted in determining applicability. Most of the commen-
tary analyses the extent of protection offered to the environment during conflict, and/ 
or the obligations and discretions afforded to military commanders. Jus post bellum is, 
of course, concerned also with compliance with obligations in the post- conflict period, 
47 See, for example, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v.  Nicaragua Judgment (Series C 
no. 79) (IACHR, 31 August 2001); Case of the Plan de Sanchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment (Series C 
no. 105) (IACHR, 29 April 2004).
48 See, for example, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment (Series C no. 172) (IACHR, 28 
November 2007), para. 129.
49 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria 
(Ogoniland), African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm 155/ 96, 27 May 2002, para. 52.
50 App no. 41666/ 98 (ECtHR, 22 May 2003), para. 52 et seq.
51 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 226, para. 25.
52 App no. 29750/ 09 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014), paras. 100– 2.
53 Lawrence Cawthorne- Hill, 16 September 2014, at <http:// www.ejiltalk.org/ the- grand- chamber- 
judgment- in- hassan- v- uk/ > accessed April 2015, describing the standard as more ‘lenient’.
54 IEL is defined in broad terms to refer to the corpus of international law that seeks to protect or regu-
late interaction with the natural environment and thus crosses many areas of international law, such as the 
law of the sea or those discussed in this chapter. See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, 
International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 2009), 2.
55 UNEP Study (n 20) 44.
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when any ‘suspension’ or limitation of obligations on the grounds of conflict would 
cease. This further complicates the picture.
The interaction of IEL with other bodies of law is also unsettled. As with IHRL, there 
is no reason to assume that IEL and IHL cannot apply alongside each other in many 
contexts. Questions have been raised as to whether or not the former or latter would 
constitute the lex specialis in case of conflict, depending on the subject matter of the 
damage.56 The ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion determined that the obli-
gations stemming from treaties relating to the protection of the environment were not 
intended to be obligations of total restraint during conflict, but that ‘[r] espect for the 
environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in con-
formity with the principles of necessity and proportionality’.57 This would suggest that 
IEL obligations would play an interpretative role.
The unsettled position of IEL during conflict poses an additional hurdle to relying 
upon these norms for redress: does the norm apply and, if so, in what role? Further, 
many environmental protections are embodied in non- binding instruments58 and/ or 
phrased in aspirational or vague terms.59 In addition, many key environmental prin-
ciples have a shaky status as legal principles rather than political concepts.60 Where 
resources are limited, will there be a tendency to focus upon adjudication and repara-
tion of protections of less disputed status?
Many IEL norms are codified in multilateral treaties.61 While some environmental 
treaties are explicit as to whether they apply during conflict, many are silent or ambigu-
ous. Subject to the agreement of the parties, the ILC’s Articles on the effects of armed 
conflicts on treaties note that the ‘existence of an armed conflict does not ipso facto 
terminate or suspend the operation of treaties’. The subject matter of certain treaties or 
provisions ‘imply’ continued operation, and an indicative list is annexed to the Articles, 
including international protection of the environment and treaties creating or regulat-
ing permanent rights or a permanent regime or status. However, the presumption of 
continuity of IEL protections is also dependent upon external factors, such as the char-
acter of the conflict, and thus requires a case- by- case assessment.62
It has been suggested that the Ramsar Convention and the World Heritage 
Convention ‘are the only two areas under IEL where the obligations are sufficiently con-
crete and clear’ to provide ‘real guidance’ on the battlefield or to be ‘enforce[able] after 
the event’.63 Both treaties focus on monitoring and prevention: the former allows par-
ties to ‘delete or restrict’ boundaries of listed wetlands due to ‘urgent national interests’ 
(which scholars suggest would include conflict);64 the latter provides that the outbreak 
56 ibid. 57 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 51) paras. 29– 31.
58 The Rio Declaration, for example, has been noted as playing an important role in the evolution of 
environmental protection. Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, Basic Documents on International Law and the 
Environment I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 9.
59 See, for example, Convention on Long- Range Transboundary Air Pollution 1979, Arts. 2 and 7.
60 ILC Report I (n 14) 33 (regarding sustainable development).
61 UNEP Training Manual, at <http:// www.unep.org/ environmentalgovernance/ Portals/ 8/ documents/ 
training_ Manual.pdf> accessed April 2015, 1.
62 ILC Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, Arts. 3– 5 and Annex.
63 Alice Bunker, ‘Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict: One Gulf Two Wars’ (2004) 23 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 201– 11.
64 ibid. 211.
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of conflict is sufficient to place a property on the ‘danger’ list. Other treaties also con-
tain guidance (some more explicit than others) on the effect of conflict on the pro-
tections contained therein. The Convention on the Law of the Non- navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses (1997), for example, reaffirms the protection offered by 
existing principles and rules of international law. It is explicit that states’ cooperation 
obligations under the treaty do not cease even where there are ‘serious obstacles to dir-
ect contacts’. Contracting states must then use indirect procedures.65
Other treaties specifically exclude or limit their application during conflict. This is 
often the case for treaties that require the civil liability of operators, for example, the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution ensures no liability where 
owners show that violations resulted from ‘war or other armed hostilities’ and the 
International Fund for Oil Pollution will not compensate for damages resulting from 
war or armed conflict. Similar provisions are found in treaties relating to civil liability 
for nuclear damage.66 The application of these treaties is thus not temporally limited to 
peacetime (‘non- military conduct’ would be caught), but excludes liability associated 
with conflict.67
While treaties have an important place in regulating state conduct in the field of envi-
ronmental protection,68 customary norms also have a role to play. Particularly important 
is the prohibition on ‘significant’ transboundary environmental harm and a state’s obli-
gation to exercise due diligence in ascertaining and addressing the risks of such harm— 
as originally formulated (as ‘serious’ harm) in the Trail Smelter Arbitration more than 
eighty years ago.69 However, the status of this protection during conflict is disputed.70 It 
is an obligation of conduct, not result, and thus proving breach requires (objective) evi-
dence of perceived risks and of the absence of sufficiently responsive actions.
This brief survey of relevant norms highlights the potentially uneven and uncertain 
picture that could apply when understanding protections for which reparations could 
be sought, both during conflict, as well as the post- conflict scenario, which is of con-
cern to jus post bellum.
15.4 The Parameters of Reparation
In a post- conflict context, claims for reparation will likely be based both on inter-
national or domestic norms (whether the latter reflects the former or otherwise). 
65 For example, to cooperate in protecting of the marine environment. See Arts. 5– 6, 8, 23, and 28– 31.
66 See, for example, Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.
67 Silja Voneky, ‘Peacetime Environmental Law as a Basis of State Responsibility for Environmental 
Damage Caused by War’ in Carl Bruch and Jay Austin (eds.), The Environmental Consequences of War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 198. See also, Art. 32 of UNCLOS, which states:
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this 
Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non- 
commercial purposes.
68 See, for example, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘International Responsibility and Liability’ in Daniel 
Bodansky, Jutta Brunée, and Ellen Heys (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1012.
69 See also, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, 2010 ICJ 
Reports 14, and Gabčíkovo- Nagymaros (n 13).
70 UNEP Study (n 20) 40.
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Bodies awarding reparation for breaches of international law rely upon the founda-
tional principle developed in a state- to- state context and famously articulated by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów Factory case:
[i] t is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obliga-
tion to make reparation in an adequate form. . . . The essential principle contained in the 
actual notion of an illegal act . . . is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re- establish the situation which would, in all probabil-
ity, have existed if that act had not been committed.71
This customary principle demonstrates that reparation is an essential part of upholding 
the rule and value of international law. Ensuring reparation for breaches of norms focused 
on environmental protection may also ultimately contribute to prevention, including, as 
mentioned earlier, by deterring future violations.
Article 31 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (‘ILC Articles’) codifies an obligation to make ‘full reparation’ for material 
or moral damage caused by the internationally wrongful act of a state. ILC Articles 34– 7 
prescribe a hierarchy in the analysis of appropriate forms of reparation: restitution in pri-
mary position, or where this is ‘impossible’ or ‘inappropriate’, compensation to the extent 
that damage is financially assessable. Satisfaction is prescribed as a residual form of repa-
ration, to remedy injury suffered as a result of the fact of a breach, which may be unquan-
tifiable in numerical terms and, as such, ‘unsuited’ to compensation. The ILC Articles thus 
envisage a degree of flexibility depending upon the nature and scope of the damage.
In the context of environmental damage, the validity of this hierarchy is question-
able. As environmental harm is often irreversible, remediation is likely to be a more 
appropriate focus than restitution. Remediation is resource- intensive and requires 
specialist expertise and equipment, necessitating a focus on compensation. However, 
environmental damage is sometimes difficult to quantify— for example, what are some-
times termed ‘nonuse values’, such as biodiversity.72 Where individuals have suffered 
as a result of environmental damage, the concept of ‘wiping out’ damage may be not 
only impossible, but insulting. Further, compensation alone might not touch individ-
ual suffering.73 Larry May notes that the ‘legal literature has focused on the concept 
of satisfaction to mark the difference between return to the status quo ante and the 
approximate form of compensation that is called for in reparations, especially when 
71 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) Merits, Claim for Indemnity, Judgment, 
PCIJ Reports (Series A No. 17, 47) 13 September 1928.
72 Commentaries (n 34) Art. 31, para. 15:  ‘In cases where compensation has been awarded or agreed 
following an internationally wrongful act that causes or threatens environmental damage, payments have 
been directed to reimbursing the injured State for expenses reasonably incurred in preventing or remedying 
pollution, or to providing compensation for a reduction in the value of polluted property. However, envi-
ronmental damage will often extend beyond that which can be readily quantified in terms of clean- up costs 
or property devaluation. Damage to such environmental values (biodiversity, amenity, etc.— sometimes 
referred to as “nonuse values”) is, as a matter of principle, no less real and compensable than damage to 
property, though it may be difficult to quantify’.
73 Pablo De Greiff, `Justice and Reparations’ in Pablo De Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 13.
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the damage done is partly psychological’.74 Individual experiences of redress demon-
strate the importance of recognition and acknowledgement of suffering (a form of sat-
isfaction).75 Full reparation suggests a wide definition of harm, and, in a post- conflict 
context, a broad definition of what constitutes reparation under international law is 
therefore welcome. Where resources are few and damage varied in nature, reparative 
avenues should be maximized to increase the chance that harm will be met with an 
appropriate remedy.
The ILC Articles apply to the responsibility of states. While they may prove instruc-
tive when considering the responsibility of non- state actors, direct parallels cannot 
simply be imposed across the board (conceptually or practically). At the level of pri-
mary norms, few bodies of law purport to bind non- state actors. IHL is one of the few, 
but practice on the obligation to make reparation is mixed.76 ICL provides a means for 
individuals to be held accountable and, in certain cases, a responsibility to make repa-
ration. IHRL imposes ‘due diligence’ obligations on state parties, requiring that states 
take certain actions to regulate interference with rights by third parties, including pro-
viding avenues of redress.77 In the context of non- state actors, IHRL or IEL continue to 
look primarily to state responsibility for a failure to regulate private action to the req-
uisite standard.
There are other questions relating to the standing of certain non- state actors to claim 
breach and request redress, depending upon the particular focus of the norm. For 
example, the ability of individuals to claim for reparation for breach of international 
norms is increasingly prevalent, but still subject to different interpretations. Barriers 
often arise in the search for a forum or in seeking enforcement. While the ILC Articles 
have been drawn largely from a state- to- state context, they are also invoked in the con-
ceptualization and realization of reparation in scenarios involving non- state actors.78 
Article 33 makes clear that the ILC Articles are without prejudice to the right of an 
entity other than a state to invoke a state’s responsibility to cease or make reparation for 
an illegal act, recognizing that rights may accrue to individuals under international law 
(inside or outside of the IHRL framework).
The focus of a particular norm will determine additional parts of the legal test that 
need to be satisfied before reparation can be awarded, such as causation and remote-
ness. The relevant rules and specific circumstances of the case will affect whether, for 
example, individuals can seek reparation for damage suffered as a result of breach of 
ecocentric norms. The ILC Articles make clear that reparation is awarded for injury 
suffered ‘as a consequence’ of the breach, without establishing a specific formula. The 
Commentary to the ILC Articles notes that various formulae that have been used to 
establish the legal tests of causation and remoteness:  ‘proximate cause’, ‘directness’, 
74 Larry May, ‘Reparations, Restitution and Transitional Justice’ in Larry May and Andrew Forcehimes 
(eds.), Morality, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 41.
75 For a more detailed explanation:  Merryl Lawry- White, ‘The Reparative Effect of Truth Seeking in 
Transitional Justice’ (2015) 64(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 141.
76 In respect of IHL, see Commentary to Rule 150, ICRC Study (n 33) 459– 550.
77 Case of Velasquez- Rodriguez v. Honduras (Series C no. 4) (IACHR, 29 July 1988), para. 172.
78 UN Study, Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2012) ST/ LEG/ 
SER B/ 25.
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‘foreseeability’, etc.79 The United Nations Claims Commission (‘UNCC’) awarded com-
pensation for ‘direct loss[es]’ suffered ‘as a result of ’ Iraq’s illegal invasion of Kuwait,80 
although, in practice, commentators notes that UNCC panels used a variety of legal 
tests in implementing this standard.81 Claimants had a duty of ‘reasonable’ mitiga-
tion.82 Procedural rules and other questions of admissibility and standing may also bar 
a claim.
The ILC Articles are ‘residual’ or default rules and are therefore subject to any applic-
able lex specialis. While the fundamental principle laid out in the Chorzów Factory case 
underpins the concept and place of reparation,83 the approach to forms and standards 
of reparation is not uniform across different areas of international law. Judicial bodies 
award reparation in line with their specific jurisdiction as determined by their constitu-
ent instruments and objectives. This creates an additional layer of complexity to the 
tapestry of applicable norms already discussed.
15.4.1   International humanitarian law and  international human 
rights law
Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), as well as Article 91 AP I, specifically 
mention an obligation to pay compensation in case of breach of norms contained in 
these instruments. But, under customary international law, and as per the Chorzów 
Factory, this obligation extends to breach of all IHL obligations in IAC and NIAC.84 
There are multiple examples of states agreeing to pay reparation for breaches of IHL as 
part of peace treaties or following proceedings, for example, before the ICJ or mixed 
commissions. The form and valuation methods have varied depending upon the agree-
ment of the parties, including restitution (usually of property), compensation, and sat-
isfaction.85 In July 2015, the ICJ resumed the proceedings in Armed Activities to decide 
upon the form and quantity of reparations. Any decision rendered in this case will 
provide more clarity on reparation for IHL breaches, including in relation to natural 
resources.
Practice regarding environmental damage flowing from breach of the IHL protec-
tions discussed in the previous section is more limited. As explained, the Ethiopia– 
Eritrea Claims Commission found that Ethiopia had breached Article 54 AP I by 
carrying out airstrikes on a water reservoir in Harsile. However, because no signifi-
cant damage had been caused to the reservoir, the Commission decided that its deci-
sion on liability constituted sufficient reparation.86 It thus relied on satisfaction as the 
appropriate form of reparation. Ethiopia’s $1 billion (plus) claim for damages to the 
natural environment and natural resources was dismissed. The Commission decided 
79 Commentaries (n 34) Art. 31, paras. 9– 10. 80 ibid. para. 10.
81 See discussion in  chapter  11 in this volume. See also, Viejo Heiskanen, ‘The United Nations 
Compensation Commission’ (2002) 296 Recueil des Cours 340.
82 See, for example,  chapter 2 in this volume.
83 See, for example, Merryl Lawry- White, ‘Universality and Cosmopolitanism: Some Insights from the 
World of Moral Damage’ (2014) 3(4) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 729 et seq.
84 ICRC Study (n 33) Rule 150. 85 ICRC Study (n 33) Commentary to Rule 150.
86 Partial Award (n 31) para. 105.
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the damage had not been caused by breach of applicable IHL, and, although theor-
etically compensable as the consequences of breach of jus ad bellum, the claim was 
unsubstantiated.87
As noted above, international law envisages reparation for non- state actors in certain 
circumstances, and practice shows that this extends to IHL violations. The Ethiopia– 
Eritrea Claims Commission awarded reparation to individuals, via the state of nation-
ality.88 The UNCC considered claims of prisoners of war for breach of IHL.89 The UN 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law90 (‘Basic Principles’) envisage ‘persons’ as victims, 
whether they have suffered harm individually or collectively as a result of acts or omis-
sions that qualify as gross violations of international human rights law, or serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law. Harm is defined broadly as including ‘physical 
or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their 
fundamental rights’. The term ‘victim’ may also include family members, dependents 
and those that have intervened to prevent or assist. The Basic Principles are not in 
themselves binding on states, but identify  ‘mechanisms, modalities, procedures, meth-
ods’ to operationalize existing obligations. They thus reflect relevant instruments, prac-
tice, and jurisprudence.91
The Basic Principles are framed in terms of ‘gross’ and ‘serious’ violations only (often 
prevalent during conflict), but ‘seek’ to rationalize through a consistent approach the 
means and methods by which victims’ rights can be addressed, thus suggesting poten-
tial for wider application.92 The Basic Principles categorize reparation into five different 
forms, which are not subject to a specific hierarchy or formula: restitution, compen-
sation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non- repetition.93 The Basic 
Principles thus also retain a degree of flexibility and recognize that multiple modalities 
may be required to remedy a breach.
Article 11 speaks of ‘adequate, effective and prompt’ reparation ‘proportional’ to 
the gravity of the violation and the harm. ‘Wiping out the consequences’ will often be 
aspirational in the case of IHRL/ IHL breaches and environmental damage. The Basic 
Principles envisage that victims of the actions of all groups receive reparation on the 
same basis: there is no distinction. Yet, practice on this point is more mixed, as is the 
perception of whether the state has an obligation (legal or otherwise) to step in where 
non- state actors do not do so.94
87 Ethiopia’s Damages, Final Award, 17 August 2009, RIAA, Vol XXVI, 631– 770, para. 425.
88 See, for example, ibid. paras. 105– 10 (in relation to rape) and paras. 127– 35 (in relation to housing— as 
civilian property).
89 Gillard (n 5) 542.
90 Basic Principles, ‘adopted and proclaimed’ by the General Assembly, GA Res 60/ 147 (16 December 
2005) Annex.
91 ibid.
92 Mahmoud Bassiouni, `International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law 
Review 203, 251.
93 Basic Principles (n 90) Art. 18.
94 ICRC Report (n 33) Commentary to Rule 150: ‘it is unclear to what extent armed opposition groups are 
under an obligation to make full reparation’. See also Cecily Rose, ‘An Emerging Norm: the Duty of States 
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The Basic Principles do not guarantee access to a body at the international level, nor a 
body implementing international law, but they have been drawn upon in different con-
texts, including by transitional justice mechanisms and the ICC in the Lubanga repara-
tions judgment (discussed below). The Sierra Leone Truth Commission, for example, 
was mandated to (inter alia) create a historical record of IHL and human rights abuses 
during the conflict.95 It considered the Basic Principles ‘indicative of the current sta-
tus of international law of the right to redress of victims of such violations’, where rem-
edies included reparation for harm suffered. The state, it declared, was under a legal 
obligation to provide reparation for harm suffered as a result of its acts or omissions, 
and those of private actors.96 It determined that the focus of a reparations programme 
should be on rehabilitation through service packages and symbolic measures (a form of 
satisfaction) to acknowledge the harm suffered: ‘compensation and restitution must be a 
unifying factor and should not be used to further divide the population’,97 thus empha-
sizing some of the concerns raised in this chapter.
Various standing IHRL mechanisms have jurisdiction to award reparation. There are 
multiple judicial/ non- judicial bodies that receive applications alleging breach of rights, 
although many only have authority to issue non- binding opinions, judgments, or com-
ments.98 The most prominent exceptions are regional human rights courts, which each 
have sui generis jurisdiction regarding reparations. The ECHR, for example, may award 
‘just satisfaction’, unless the internal law of the breaching state allows for full repara-
tion.99 The IACtHR enjoys jurisdiction to order ‘if appropriate, that the consequences 
of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be rem-
edied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party’.100
The IACtHR’s decisions on reparations are detailed and comprehensive. For 
example, in the Case of the Samaraka People v. Suriname, in which the granting of 
concessions was deemed to have damaged land and infringed indigenous rights, the 
IACtHR required legislative changes to ensure the protection of rights, measures 
of satisfaction, as well as compensation for ‘material’ ($75,000) and ‘non- material’ 
($600,000) damage, valued on an equitable basis.101 In 2012, the IACtHR considered 
the case of Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, concerning the massacre, destruction 
of property (including damage to land), and displacement of the Mayan community 
of Rio Negro during a period of internal armed conflict. The Court ordered (inter 
alia) an investigation subject to certain safeguards, compensation for pecuniary and 
non- pecuniary loss, measures of satisfaction (including symbolic reparations) and 
of rehabilitation and guarantees of non- repetition.102 The use of different forms of 
to Provide Reparations for Human Rights Violations by Non- State Actors’ (2010) 33 Hastings International 
and Comparative Law Review) 307 (focusing on IHRL).
95 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, Art. 3.
96 Sierra Leone Truth Commission Report, Vol. 2, paras. 19– 21.   97 ibid. paras. 22–4.
98 Karen Hulme describes the contribution of treaty monitoring bodies in  chapter 5 in this volume, 
Section 5.4.1.
99 Art. 41, European Convention on Human Rights.
100 Art. 63(1), American Convention on Human Rights. 101 Saramaka (n 48) paras. 194– 201.
102 Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, Judgment (Series C no. 250) (IACHR, 4 September 2012), for 
example paras. 273 et seq., 286 et seq., 309.
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reparation in the face of environmental damage, as well as collective and symbolic 
reparations, expands the potential resources available. The IACtHR’s jurisprudence 
has been cited as an important authority for, or influence on, many of the Basic 
Principles.103
As discussed in Section 15.3, a noted theme running through human rights judg-
ments relating to environmental harm is the emphasis on procedural rights and partici-
pation as an element of the right and thus the remedy. In Ogoniland, the Commission 
required substantive and procedural measures to be taken to remedy breach and reduce 
future damage, including awarding compensation to victims, ensuring environmental 
and social impact assessments for future developments and providing information and 
access to decision- making bodies for communities likely to be affected.104
15.4.2  International criminal law
ICL targets individual perpetrators, regardless of their qualification as a state or non- 
state actor. A criminal conviction can constitute a form of satisfaction.105 Whether or 
not compensation or additional forms of reparation are available depends upon the 
rules of the forum in which redress is sought.
At the international level, the ICTY and ICTR have power to order the restitution of 
‘property or proceeds’ where associated with the crime, although commentators note 
that the tribunals have been reluctant to use these powers.106 Rather, it was envisaged 
that victims would seek compensation themselves before ‘competent national authori-
ties’.107 The Rome Statute, on the other hand, envisages different forms of reparation for 
victims. Victims can make requests for reparations and participate in proceedings.108 
The ICC has jurisdiction to award a wide variety of forms of reparation that may, col-
lectively, contribute to a greater reparative effect for victims. The Trust Fund may be 
asked to administer an award against a convicted person,109 as well as raising money 
via voluntary contributions. In the case of environmental damage, accessing the Trust 
Fund increases the likelihood of tapping the extensive resources implicated in reme-
dying environmental harm and other loss, when compared with the resources of the 
convicted. However, studies drawn from a domestic law context confirm a greater ‘sat-
isfactory’ effect for victims of environmental crimes where financial resources are pro-
vided by the perpetrator, as opposed to third party or state- based contributions where 
the latter is not the perpetrator.110 Resources without accountability or an admission of 
wrongdoing are not technically ‘reparation’. 
The recent Appeals Chamber judgment in Lubanga provides insight into the param-
eters for the award of reparations for the ICC. It made clear that reparations should be 
awarded only where there was a link between liability and harm, assessed against a test 
103 See, for example, Gabriella Citroni and Karla Quitana Osuna, ‘Reparations for Indigenous Peoples in 
the Inter- American Court’ in Federico Lenzerini (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 319.
104 Ogoniland (n 49) final paragraph. 105 See Evans (n 7) 90. 106 ibid. 91.
107 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r98ter, r105, r106.
108 Art 68(3) of the Rome Statute; ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r94.
109 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r98(3).
110 Matthew Hall, Victims of Environmental Harm (New York: Routledge, 2013), 99.
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of ‘but for’ or ‘proximate cause’.111 It also clarified that the scope of liability for repara-
tions must be ‘proportionate’ to the harm caused and would depend upon ‘participa-
tion in the commission of the crimes’.112
15.4.3  International environmental law
As discussed in the previous section, many of the protections relevant to environmen-
tal protection and damage do not easily lend themselves to claims for reparation. The 
ILC’s work in developing its 2006 draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case 
of transboundary harm (‘ILC Principles’) demonstrated the difficulty of developing a 
regime of state responsibility for environmental damage.113 The ILC ultimately decided 
to focus on the civil liability of the operator, based on the polluter pays principle. They 
envisage a potential role for supplementary funding provided by states— a recognition 
of the inadequacy of a purely civil- liability based approach— but without clear delinea-
tion of a state’s obligation (if any) or role in this regard, except that they are a reflection 
of the due diligence obligations of states.114 As the regime was intended to be residual 
and general in nature, the ILC deemed it unnecessary to precisely allocate loss between 
the different actors or determine the role of the state.115 Commentators note the dearth 
of practice on state liability beyond due diligence obligations, and the role of civil liabil-
ity regimes in ‘plug[ging] the gap’, given the difficulties of holding states responsible for 
breach of environmental obligations.116
The ILC Principles also reveal the challenges in obtaining reparation for harm 
suffered during conflict. The commentaries note that civil liability regimes and 
domestic law providing for strict liability tend towards a ‘uniform’ set of excep-
tions. As observed above, these include:  ‘damage [resulting from] (a)  an act of 
armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection’.117 Given the residual role 
assigned to states, the Principles thus uncover and leave open a significant gap in 
a conflict scenario.
In spite of the focus of the ILC Principles, many IEL treaties/ customary norms focus 
on state obligations and, from a dispute resolution perspective, envisage state– state 
interaction, including contentious cases (there are, of course, exceptions aside from 
civil liability regimes, such as cases before the Seabeds Disputes Chamber). Victims 
thus rely upon their states to bring a claim to ensure reparation for environmental 
damage, or upon the international community to step in. The lack of citizen participa-
tion on the international level is noteworthy when considering the scope of reparation 
offered in the context of jus post bellum.
111 Carsten Stahn, ‘Reparative Justice after the Lubanga Appeals Judgment on Principles and Procedures 
of Reparation’, 7 April 2015, at <http:// www.ejiltalk.org/ reparative- justice- after- the- lubanga- appeals- 
judgment- on- principles- and- procedures- of- reparation/ > accessed April 2015.
112 ICC- 01/ 04- 01/ 06, 3 March 2015, para. 118.
113 See, for example, Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edn, 2012), 735 et seq.
114 Gunther Handl, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (ASIL) 105 (March 2011), 429.
115 Sands and Peel (n 113) 737. 116 Handl (n 114).
117 Commentaries to ILC Principle 4, para. 27.
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There is no specialized standing environmental court.118 However, there are perman-
ent bodies that hear environment claims that fall within their jurisdiction, for example, 
UNCLOS and the WTO. Certain environmental treaties also envisage recourse to other 
permanent or ad hoc bodies. The ICJ has heard cases involving environmental issues 
where jurisdiction is based on specific environmental treaties, or the optional dec-
larations of states.119 The rules regarding reparation will thus depend upon the spe-
cific focus of norm/ body and the rules applied by that body to reparation. The ICJ, for 
example, usually considers its decision sufficient reparation in the form of satisfaction, 
and has rarely awarded compensation.120 However, the recent judgment in the Certain 
Activities and Construction of a Road cases, envisaged both compensation and satisfac-
tion as forms of reparation for environmental damage.121
15.5 Implementation: Institutions, Considerations,  
and Precedents
There are advantages to having ‘on tap’ institutional frameworks, expertise, and, poten-
tially, a budget to consider questions of environmental harm.122 Further, a standing 
body reduces the likelihood that reparations may be under- prioritized, given the enor-
mous resources associated with remedying environmental harm, and the complex evi-
dentiary questions or uncertainty often associated.
However, while some of the relevant protections provide for recourse to a specific 
body, many of them do not. The potential for, and realization of, reparation for many 
victims will often depend upon ad hoc mechanisms put in place post- conflict. This 
allows the reparations strategy (reflected in the mechanism) to be specifically tailored 
to the context. In her discussion of civil liability schemes set up under treaties target-
ing particular types of environmental harm, Fitzmaurice notes that ‘liability regimes 
should fit structurally the activity in question’; a general model is ‘impossible’.123
There are many overlapping legal and strategic questions surrounding how best to 
respond to environmental victims. What factors would such mechanisms have to con-
sider, in light of competing demands on resources and priorities of jus post bellum— 
including a ‘just’ peace? For example:
• Which norms (or type of liability) are implicated? How is ‘harm’ or ‘damage’ 
to be defined? With what limits? Thus, who or what is a ‘victim’? The difficulty 
of developing definitions ‘lies in the apparently all- encompassing nature, and 
118 In 1993, the ICJ created an Environmental Disputes Chamber, which has never been invoked.
119 For example, Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) 
and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica) joined on 27 
April 2013, Judgment of 16 December 2015, ICJ Reports 358.
120 James Crawford, State Responsibility:  The General Part (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 518.
121 Certain Activities (n 119), for example paras. 142 and 224.
122 Carl Bruch, Symposium (n 40) 645, 649.
123 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘International Responsibility and Liability’ in Bodansky, Brunée, and Heys, 
The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (n 68) 1031.
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near- limitless scope, of such victims’.124 What happens when victimization is 
delayed (e.g. the onset of health conditions many years after the event)?
• What sort of mechanism is envisaged? Institutional design, including mandate, 
and the process by which design and implementation takes place will determine 
the degree of reparation afforded to victims.
• Are victims of all perpetrators to be subsumed within its scope? And, if so, would 
the standard of liability be the same (including, considering the implications of a 
‘due diligence’ standard)?
• Is liability pre- determined? Will another body conduct relevant investigations?
• How is causation established and what is the evidential burden to establish loss? 
How far does the duty of mitigation extend?
• Is one body mandated to examine all relevant claims? Or are there several bodies 
with overlapping mandates? For example, if transitional justice bodies are examin-
ing IHRL and IHL violations, do they take a wider view vis- à- vis environmental 
damage? What coordination mechanisms are thus in place?
• What forms of reparation are envisaged by the mechanism, and in what manifesta-
tion (individual, collective, etc.)?
When considering liability thresholds and evidentiary standards, many of the poten-
tial barriers discussed earlier in the chapter play into strategic considerations. In cer-
tain situations, there may be a lack of information, lack of scientific certainty, and/ or 
insufficient resources to undertake the intensive fact- finding and analysis necessary to 
reach these standards. Cymie Payne notes that ‘[a] major cause of failed environmental 
claims is lack of sufficient evidence of causation and quantum of damage attributable 
to the alleged illegal acts’.125 For instance, advocates highlight that a lack of data and 
scientific information hindered U.S. veterans’ claims for damage caused by depleted 
uranium in Iraq in 1991.126 In situations where breach has been established, a lack of 
baseline data will complicate how to assess and respond to the damage and thus appro-
priate reparation. Further, the circumstances of conflict, for example in the case of mass 
displacement, will often result in key evidence being lost or destroyed. Should this bear 
on the standard of proof and the reparation awarded?127
As noted, there is limited empirical evidence analysing appropriate responses to 
environmental victims’ needs and desires. While each context is different, there is thus 
value in drawing analogies and ‘best practice’ or lessons128 from both relevant domestic 
and international practice: schemes based on criminal liability, administrative schemes, 
124 Hall (n 110) 25. 125 Payne (n 3) 515.
126 Charles Sheehan- Miles, Symposium (n 40) 631.
127 For example, in Akdivar et al. v Turkey, in which the ECtHR found that the applicants’ houses were 
burnt down by the security forces, and in which the applicants claimed that there was no tradition of regis-
tering property in the area in which they lived, the ECtHR noted ‘[t] he Court also considers it appropriate 
to make an award in respect of the remaining houses. However, due to the absence of evidence which sub-
stantiates the size of these properties any calculation must inevitably involve a degree of speculation. It will 
base its award on fifty percent of the surface area claimed by the applicants at the base rate’. (Judgment, App 
no. 99/ 1995/ 605/ 693 (ECtHR,1 April 1998, paras. 16– 20).
128 Bruch, Symposium (n 40) 645.
 Merryl Lawry-White 389
civil liability schemes under treaties or based on class actions, commissions examining 
state responsibility and transitional justice mechanisms, because of their relevance to 
transitional periods. A few examples are expanded on below.
15.5.1  Criminal liability
As discussed earlier in the chapter, in considering reparation, international criminal 
courts have often conceived of the judgment as a source of satisfaction, as well as crimi-
nal proceedings as having a deterrent (non- repetition) and rehabilitating effect. In the-
ory, the ICC’s reparation mechanism would allow for other forms of reparation to be 
awarded. However, the ICC has not yet had the opportunity to consider reparation for 
breach of an environmental protection. Commentators have questioned whether the 
international criminal law paradigm is well suited to considering liability and rem-
edies for environmental damage, especially as states and corporations cannot be held 
liable. Drumbl notes that insufficient funds will limit any potential corrective function: 
‘[u] nless this criminal law apparatus is hooked into broader restorative remediation 
efforts, compensation efforts, and scientific expertise, the value of the expression will 
be limited only to symbolism and the actual hard work of improving the damage to the 
environment will not take place’.129 Further, while one of the central goals is writing a 
historical narrative, it is ‘scripted by the law of evidence’, as well as the scope of the rel-
evant protections, and results in ‘microscopic truths’.130 This does not necessarily con-
tribute to understanding the multi- causal origins of environmental harm (especially 
during conflict) that will assist actors operating within a jus post bellum paradigm to 
consider the transition to peace and longer- term management.
Domestic criminal systems may provide more relevant examples. In many civil law 
systems, victims may join and claim compensation in criminal proceedings. In certain 
common law systems, claims may be based on specific criminal statutes. Following the 
Exxon oil spill in Alaska in 1989, the United States commenced criminal proceedings 
against the company under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Refuse Act, which 
carried penalties and required restitution to injured parties. As a result of these criminal 
charges, Exxon pleaded guilty and reached a settlement involving significant payments 
to the federal government for clean- up and damage to natural resources.131 A claim may 
thus also act as a pressure point for a negotiated settlement that results in reparation for 
victims.
Studies of victims of (traditional) crime show that criminal sanctions carry a greater 
sense of condemnation of environmental crimes and are therefore likely to have a 
greater ‘satisfactory’ effect than other sanctions:
criminal sanctions  . . .  demonstrate a social disapproval of a qualitatively different 
nature compared to administrative sanctions or a compensation mechanism under 
civil law.132
129 Drumbl, Symposium (n 40) 625– 6. 130 Hall (n 110) 22– 3.
131 Nathan Richardson, ‘Deepwater Horizon and the Patchwork of Oil Spill Liability Law’ (2010) 
Resources for the Future 4.
132 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of the 
Environment through Criminal Law, C- 180- E/ 238, March 2001, para. 4.
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Yet, a scheme based in criminal law would involve a higher burden of proof, mitigat-
ing against a finding of liability. If tied to restitution orders, they might not result in the 
most appropriate form of reparation (as discussed earlier). Further, as demonstrated 
in the 1989 Exxon Oil Spill, the claims of individuals (under the Act) were effectively 
adopted by the state and thus precluded the potential for direct settlement of restitution 
claims of individuals, as well as their participation in and control over the process.133 
However, in this context, the ‘use of criminal law . . . almost certainly resulted in more 
compensation being paid than would have been forthcoming from civil or administra-
tive mechanisms’.134 ‘Clean- up funds’ may be more readily available in criminal claims 
where a corporation is convicted (and thus via domestic proceedings).
15.5.2  Civil suits
Another option would be to consider civil liability in domestic courts as a model, in 
cases brought against private or state actors. However, many national systems are not 
set up to assimilate mass victimization, which is a common consequence of envir-
onmental damage. Suits, schemes, or settlements based on civil liability raise similar 
concerns about time and cost, the scope of diligence required to meet the burden of 
proof, regarding the resources available to remedy harm, or how to measure damage/ 
harm or implement repair, as well as the political/ judicial willingness to award huge 
sums against domestic companies.135 ‘The history of transnational mass tort claims 
is hardly reassuring . . . settling claims through litigation can be time- consuming, 
expensive and ultimately inequitable. Some private lawsuits are too big for courts to 
handle’.136
15.5.3  Administrative reparations schemes
An administrative reparations scheme may ultimately prove more efficient, or even 
realistic, than linking many claims to a criminal conviction or a multitude of civil suits. 
A less strict approach may avoid injustice in practice. ‘Judicialisation is not synonym-
ous with accountability.’137 Administrative schemes (which tend to be ad hoc)138 allow 
for a greater degree of flexibility in definitions and lower standards of proof, avoiding a 
rigidity that may not always serve victims’ best interests. There may also be more flexi-
bility around the identity of the perpetrators and victims subsumed within its scope, the 
identity of the commissioners (with particular expertise), and increased potential for 
citizen participation, including in the design and appointment process. Increased par-
ticipation, and thus a stake in the process, may mitigate against the lesser ‘satisfactory’ 
effect of the process and outcome of administrative schemes when compared to a crim-
inal conviction (see below), especially if the perpetrator does not have to contribute. 
133 Richardson (n 131). 134 Hall (n 110) 135.
135 ibid. 116, 118. Jon Van Dyke, ‘Liability and Compensation for Harm caused by Nuclear Damage’ 
(2006– 2007) 35 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 13, 36– 41.
136 Handl (n 114) 430. 137 Hall (n 110) 26.
138 ibid. 115 [tend to be ad hoc and focused on a particular type of environmental harm].
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Suggestions that an ad hoc adjudicatory institution could exercise a deterrent function 
‘may be asking too much’.139
There is also a concern that a lower standard of proof will affect the willingness of 
perpetrators (including taxpayers in the case of the state) to fund the scheme. In 1988, 
the Japanese government abolished a class of payments under an administrative scheme 
designed to compensate victims of pollution in Japan’s ‘post- World War II industrial 
drive’. Victims that contracted a specific respiratory disease in areas where air pollution 
was particularly prevalent (Class I regions) were to be compensated (inter alia) via lev-
ies on companies emitting sulphur dioxide, without having to establish a ‘but for’ causal 
test. Yet, in respect of other areas (Class II regions), if a causal relationship between spe-
cific diseases and certain substances could be established, victims were compensated 
by the identified polluter.140 Corporations were unwilling to pay levies to compensate 
harms where no causal link had been established with their actions. This was an impor-
tant factor in political pressure leading to the scheme’s abolishment.141 Lin argues that 
for successful implementation of a similar scheme ‘[s] takeholders in the system must 
view it as equitable’.142
The best- known international mechanism for post- conflict environmental harm is 
the UNCC, which was established in the aftermath of the Gulf War pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 687. Resolution 687 established Iraq’s responsibility under interna-
tional law for direct loss and damage suffered as a result of its invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait, including environmental damage and depletion of natural resources. The 
UNCC was designed to perform ‘an essentially fact- finding function’— it would per-
form a quasi- judicial function only in resolving disputed claims.143 However, in rela-
tion to the claims for environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, 
which tended to be larger claims raising complex (particularly technical and eviden-
tiary) issues, Iraq was given more opportunity to participate in the proceedings.144 The 
fact that liability was pre- determined had cost and time implications: ‘[t] he resolution 
of such a significant number of claims with such a large asserted value over such a short 
period [was] unprecedented in the history of international claims resolution.’145
Compensation was financed by proceeds from Iraq’s oil sales, available as a result of 
the oil- for- food programme. The UNCC accepted claims from a diverse universe of 
victims— states, businesses, individuals, international organizations— via their govern-
ments or international organizations acting in a representative capacity. Claims were 
divided by typology and reflected in the UNCC’s institutional structure.146 Many of the 
types of claims discussed in this chapter were considered in categories separate from 
139 Peter Sand, ‘Catastrophic Environmental Damage and the Gulf War Reparation Awards:  The 
Experience of the UN Compensation Commission’ (2011) American Society of International Law and 
Procedure 430, 433.
140 David Bronston, ‘Compensating Victims of Hazardous Substance Pollution in the United States and 
Japan: A Comparative Analysis’ (1983) 7(3) Fordham International Law Journal 510– 11.
141 Albert Lin, ‘Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury’ (2005) 78 Southern 
California Law Review 1495– 6.
142 ibid. 1499. 143 Report of the Secretary- General (1991) S/ 25863, 7.
144 Julia Klee, Symposium (n 40) 615.
145 UNCC, ‘UNCC at a Glance’, at <http:// www.uncc.ch/ uncc- glance > accessed March 2015.
146 For more detail see  chapter 2 in this volume.
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environmental damage: for example, claims of individuals were reviewed in categories 
A, B, and C. Compensation was awarded based on ranges of pre-determined amounts. 
Commentators observe that the number of claimants, the urgency of many of the 
claims, and the difficulty that claimants faced in gathering sufficient evidence to dis-
charge the burden of proof made the standard of full reparation ‘difficult if not impos-
sible to realize’. Further, application of this standard would have bankrupted Iraq.147
Claims for environmental damage were presented separately and focused purely on 
environmental clean- up: ‘UNEP’s lesson . . . that . . . the environment is also a humani-
tarian concern [is] not one that was expressed in the institutional structure when [the 
UNCC categories] were organised’.148 Commentators also remind us that over 90 per 
cent of the amount awarded by the UNCC was for non- environmental claims and that 
environmental claims were dealt with as part of a ‘second wave’.149
Yet, in 2005, one leading commentator described the UNCC as ‘the only institution 
to address issues of accountability for environmental damage in a meaningful way’.150 
It has been acclaimed for its corrective function— ‘we know for a fact that the correc-
tive justice of the UNCC process has worked’151— which, in an environmental context, 
can be difficult to achieve.
The UNCC was unique from many angles, for example, the way in which it was 
financed, the number of claims that it handled, and its status and support across the 
international community. It would be a difficult initiative to repeat, but, there is much 
that can be learned from the experience, including about evidence, burdens and stand-
ards of proof, questions of causation, standards of reparation, the importance of allo-
cating funds for assessment etc. The definition of environmental damage drew upon a 
UNEP report that interpreted the term broadly as ‘impairment of the environment’.152 
It was broad enough to cover measures of prevention, monitoring and assessment of 
environmental damage and public health, past and future measures to clean and restore 
the environment, and depletion or damage to natural resources.153 The standard of 
compensation was defined by the response to the damage, as the actual costs of rea-
sonable remediation rather than the value of the loss, and the UNCC allocated funds 
to assess environmental impacts. The UNCC made extensive use of scientific expertise 
at a technical (rather than adversarial) level although the panel had to make adjust-
ments and deductions to cater for scientific uncertainty.154 A  follow- up programme 
was established to monitor the use of funds and life of funded projects, to ensure they 
retained their purpose or character. These efforts were financed by beneficiary states, 
not the Compensation Fund and thus did not constitute additional financial sanctions 
on Iraq.
147 Arif Ali and Marguerite Walter, ‘Principles of Valuation Taken from the UNCC Perspective’ in 
Timothy J. Feighery, ‎Christopher S. Gibson, and ‎Trevor M. Rajah (eds.), War Reparations and the UN 
Compensation Commission (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 83– 4.
148 Klee, Symposium (n 40) 599.
149 See, for example, McManus (n 36) 434; Handl (n 114) 430.
150 Bruch, Symposium (n 40) 647. 151 Reed (n 6) 310.
152 UNEP, Report of the Working Group of Experts on Liability and Compensation arising from Military 
Activities (UNEP, 1996), para. 45.
153 McManus (n 36) 43. 154 Klee, Symposium (n 40) 643.
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15.5.4  Transitional justice mechanisms
Transitional justice mechanisms have played an important role in delivering repara-
tion in post- conflict states. They traditionally focus on human rights and IHL viola-
tions. Whether their mandate should (on either a philosophical or practical basis) be 
extended further is debated.155 As noted above, there are limited examples or studies 
of whether/ how similar mechanisms have been employed in respect of environmental 
victims, even where caused by breach of IHL/ IHRL.
However, there are still important lessons to draw from the experience. Ruti Teitel 
draws attention to the forward- looking paradigm and concepts of transition adopted 
by transitional justice.156 Not only is returning to the status quo ante often impossible, 
long- term remediation and preventing repetition will likely require reform of the envi-
ronmental governance framework. The legislative changes required as reparation by 
the IACtHR in Suriname reflect similar concerns.
Further, reparations are a ‘crucial’ component of both transitional justice and jus post 
bellum.157 Administrative reparations schemes implemented during transition dem-
onstrate the importance of facilitating participation, and thus communication, appro-
priate claim forms and filings deadlines; of mandate and definitions (for example of 
harm and victim/ beneficiary, as discussed earlier); of the identity and appointment of 
commissioners, to highlight a few lessons learned.158 Many of these are echoed by the 
UNCC experience: for example, criticisms of the ‘too short’ six- year deadline for filing 
environmental claims.159 Where environmental harm has damaged individuals, envi-
ronmental remediation and even compensation for pecuniary loss, may not be enough. 
As mentioned earlier, there is a desire for acknowledgment. Fact- finding or truth com-
missions (as well as some reparations schemes) can, depending upon how they are 
implemented, provide a degree of satisfaction as victims’ stories are told, recognized, 
and memorialized.160
15.5.5  Facilitating participation
Victim contact and interaction with justice institutions affects perceptions of institu-
tional legitimacy and thus the ‘satisfaction’ afforded by its findings. One line of argu-
ment in the criminology literature notes the importance of ‘procedural justice’:
[V] ictims of (traditional) crime care more about how a justice system treats them, 
including its sensitivity to their concerns and needs and how it recognises the harm 
they have suffered, than about the instrumental outcomes.161
155 See, for example, Jens Iverson, ‘Jus Post Bellum Symposium: Contrasting Transitional Justice and 
Jus Post Bellum’, Opiniojuris, <http:// opiniojuris.org/ 2014/ 05/ 06/ jus- post- bellum- symposium- contrasting- 
transitional- justice- jus- post- bellum/ >, accessed 29 June 2017; ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non- Recurrence, Pablo de Greiff UN Doc. 
A/ HRC/ 24/ 42, 28 August 2013, para. 32.
156 Ruti Teitel, ‘Rethinking Jus Post Bellum in an Age of Global Transitional Justice’ (2013) 24(1) 
European Journal of International Law 335– 42.
157 May (n 10) 24. 158 Lawry- White (n 75) 159 et seq. 159 McManus (n 36) 443.
160 Lawry- White (n 75). 161 Hall (n 110) 96 (emphasis added).
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Although there is still much work to done in relation to environmental victims in particu-
lar, the suggestion is that facilitating participation and institutionalizing a way to listen to 
victims’ suggestions and needs therefore plays a role in determining the degree of repara-
tion, regardless of resources available. What is notable is that this extends beyond institu-
tional design to the sensitivity of the day- to- day execution of the strategy.
Procedural rights are phrased in mandatory terms in Article 10 of the Rio Declaration 
1992, which speaks of (inter alia) disseminating and affording access to information, par-
ticipation in decision- making processes and providing ‘effective access to . . . proceedings, 
including redress and a remedy’. The emphasis on participation mirrors the emphasis of 
human rights bodies on the procedural aspects of rights affected by environmental damage.
Given the limited evidence on how best to respond to victims of environmental 
crimes, commentators note the pitfalls of ‘presuming what victims want’.162 An import-
ant consideration in the design of these mechanisms is participation and respect of 
procedural rights. A multi- way information flow and ensuring the inclusion of affected 
communities facilitates (a) finding out how best to respond to victims’ needs and man-
aging expectations; and (b) a potential avenue for recognition and of empowerment, and 
thus of reparation in itself. In the context of limited resources, both such functions are 
important. Following the targeting and destruction of the Iraq marshlands in 1991– 7, 
which was targeted following a Shia uprising many Marsh Arabs fled. Following the 
conflict, organizations found that the Marsh Arabs liked living on the edge of the 
marshlands, partly due to a concern about access to services. Such preferences are key 
to thinking about appropriate reparation, especially where there might be a tendency 
to presume that a return to the status quo is top of victims’ agenda.163
Transitional justice experiences show the importance of employing appropriate 
techniques to facilitate the participation of traditionally marginalized groups or vul-
nerable groups post- conflict. A history of exclusion, distrust, or an inability to engage 
for logistical reasons may mitigate against interaction unless specific steps are taken. 
Criminologists report that ethnic minorities tend to fall victim to environmental 
harm,164 and that the economically disadvantaged are ‘often excluded from the envi-
ronmental decision- making processes’.165 Yet, to reduce the risk of conflict, encourage 
reconciliation, and to achieve the goals of jus post bellum, it is those that are affected 
that must be included. The themes of this chapter emphasize an inclusive approach: 
taking a wide view of applicable primary norms, of forms of reparation, of reparative 
practices, and considering a participatory process.
15.6 Conclusions
Reparation is a key pillar of the jus post bellum framework. In a post- conflict scenario, 
there are ‘high demands for post bellum justice . . . to address the security, not just of 
states, but of persons and peoples’.166 The environment is an economic, social, and 
security issue.167 Reparation plays a central role in addressing these issues: redressing 
162 ibid. 97, 101. 163 John Wilson, Symposium (n 40) 596. 164 Hall (n 110) 43.
165 Matthew Hall, Exploring Green Crime (London: Palgrave, 2015), 169. 166 Teitel (n 156).
167 John Wilson, Symposium (n 40) 597.
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the damage, reinforcing the rule of law, and creating the conditions for the sustainable 
and just peace that jus post bellum seeks.
However, in the face of various challenges creativity and ingenuity will allow repa-
ration to play this role. Post- conflict scenarios tend to focus the mind, given the scale 
of the destruction, mass victimization, and extent of suffering. The normal justice sys-
tems may be overwhelmed or may not cater for the types of breaches or suffering that 
has taken place. And there are usually limited resources. A strategy that fails to con-
sider the underlying complexities may alienate and detract from the desired nature 
of peace. Environmental protection and governance would ideally have a place in the 
newly established legal order and the design of redress mechanisms will affect how far 
that is possible.
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If trees could speak, they would cry out
that since they are not the cause of war
it is wrong for them to bear its penalties
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, 16461
16.1 Introduction: Nexus Between Peacebuilding,  
Mine Action, and the Environment
In times of armed conflict, the environment might be targeted deliberately to reach 
military or political goals.2 However, most of the environmental damage resulting 
directly or indirectly from armed conflict can be understood as collateral damage. The 
most direct damage to the environment, such as the release of toxic substances dur-
ing bombardments or the physical destruction of ecosystems, results from hostilities 
themselves.3 Contamination of land from remnants of conflict, such as mines, clus-
ter munitions, and other explosive remnants of war, is a further direct impact on the 
environment and a legacy of conflicts even long after they have ended.4 The environ-
ment can also be affected indirectly, for instance as a consequence of the loss of basic 
* Ursign Hofmann is a Policy Advisor at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. 
Pascal Rapillard is Head of External Relations and Policy Division at the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining.
1 Cited in Johan A. Cohan, ‘Modes of Warfare and Evolving Standards of Environmental Protection 
under the International Law of War’ (2003) 15 Florida Journal of International Law 481, 500.
2 The author would like to thank Dominic Eggel, Mohamed Ghalaieny, François Grünewald, and Adam 
Koniuszewski for their insightful comments on previous versions of this chapter. Special thanks also go to 
Christine Spring and Elisa Volpi Spagnolini for their contribution. Responsibility for any errors in the text 
lies entirely with the authors.
3 UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding:  The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (UNEP, 
2009), 15.
4 Ken Conca and Jennifer Wallace, ‘Environment and Peacebuilding in War- Torn Societies:  Lessons 
from the UN Environment Programme’s Experience with Post- Conflict Assessment’ in David Jensen and 
Steve Lonergan (eds.), Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (Milton 
Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Earthscan, 2012), 70; Environment Law Institute and UNEP, Assessing 
and Restoring Natural Resources in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding, Policy Brief no 2 (ELI and UNEP, 2013), 2.
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services, displaced populations, and the resulting survival strategies they adopt out of 
necessity.5
Referring to the case of Cambodia, Shimoyachi- Yuzawa found that in addition to 
the human toll, contamination from remnants of conflict is considered to be one of 
the most significant obstacles to post- conflict peacebuilding and development. It leads 
to human displacement; delays the return and resettlement of refugees and internally 
displaced persons (‘IDPs’); and blocks access to vital resources and social services, 
including farmland, water, roads, schools, or hospitals.6 In response, mine action has 
become increasingly integrated into broader national programmes of reconstruction 
and development.
Similarly, by denying access to land, water sources, and other natural resources, 
the presence of remnants of conflict can put increased pressure on the resources that 
are still available, resulting in unsustainable natural resource management practices 
by communities.7 Migration of displaced populations to available safe land or already 
fragile ecosystems may lead to overharvesting and resource degradation.8 Additionally, 
remnants of conflict may release toxic substances into the soil, leading to further envi-
ronmental damage.9
There is general recognition that durable peace cannot be achieved if the natural 
resources sustaining livelihoods and ecosystem services are damaged, degraded, or 
destroyed. On the contrary, environmental protection and the sustainable manage-
ment of resources are important pathways to consolidate peace and promote longer- 
term development.10 Mine action11 is a critical activity in the transition from conflict 
to peace, since clearance of remnants of conflict may start while conflict is still ongoing 
and last throughout the post- conflict phase and beyond. However, despite the achieve-
ments of mine action during the past decades at political, normative, and operational 
levels, remnants of conflict still affect more than sixty countries and will do so for many 
more years. In this regard, mine action can do a lot of ‘good’ to restore livelihoods and 
contribute to peacebuilding. However, its very nature and some of the methods used by 
mine action organizations also have the potential to cause unintended negative impacts 
on the environment. Mine action organizations, like all humanitarian actors, therefore 
need to consider the possible negative impacts of their operations and ensure they both 
‘do no harm’ and do not lead to longer- term vulnerability and threats to livelihoods.
Remnants of conflict and mine action can cause damage to the environment, prop-
erty, and individuals in the aftermath of armed conflict. Questions of liability for dam-
age arise ineluctably. Interestingly, attention within the mine action sector has thus far 
focused on liability for injuries or fatalities rather than for environmental degradation. 
5 UNEP (n 3) 15. In addition to a direct and indirect pathway, UNEP also identified the institutional 
impact of conflict on the environment such as the disruption of state institutions.
6 Nao Shimoyachi- Yuzawa, ‘Linking Demining to Post- Conflict Peacebuilding:  A  Case Study of 
Cambodia’ in Jensen and Lonergan (n 4) 181.
7 UNEP, Lebanon. Post- Conflict Environmental Assessment (UNEP, 2007), 155; Shawn Roberts and Jody 
Williams, After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines (Washington, DC: VVAF, 1995), 11.
8 Conca and Wallace (n 4) 63, 70– 1. 9 ibid. 70. 10 UNEP (n 3) 5, 19.
11 Mine action comprises five complementary groups of activities: Mine Risk Education; Land Release/ 
Mine Clearance; Victim Assistance; Stockpile Destruction; and Advocacy. In this chapter, we will only focus 
on mine clearance on land.
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One prominent exception relates to the serious environmental damage resulting from 
Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in the early 1990s. As part of the compensa-
tion scheme under the United Nations Compensation Commission (‘UNCC’), awards 
were granted to Kuwait to address the environmental impact of the conflict, including 
for clearance and survey of unexploded ordnance (‘UXO’) contamination. Given the 
nature of hazard of remnants of conflict, damage to individuals and property is more 
visible. Various ways are conceivable at inter- state and domestic levels for states and 
individual victims to claim for redress from the damage they experienced, including, in 
theory, by invoking violations of International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’), International 
Environmental Law (‘IEL’), human rights law, or by suing manufacturers. The respon-
sibility of armed non- state actors in non- international armed conflict (‘NIAC’) related 
to mine action poses a distinct challenge.
At the same time, it is acknowledged that residual contamination remains after the 
end of clearance operations and subsequent handover of land to the beneficiaries or the 
state. This is due to explosive devices moving onto cleared land, for instance through 
flooding, or having been missed during operations. Along with the formalization of 
the land release process in mine action in recent years, more emphasis has been put on 
determining whether and under which circumstances liability for potential damage to 
individuals and property lies with the responsible mine action organization and/ or the 
state and at which point in time liability may be transferred. Several modalities are pos-
sible, but the normative framework and good practice indicate that, unless negligence 
by the mine action organization can be proven, strict liability of the state is generally 
considered to be the easiest and most cost- effective modality.
This chapter will tackle the nexus between mine action and the environment from 
an operational viewpoint by reviewing policies and good practice for environmental 
protection in post- conflict mine action and discussing its relationship to jus post bel-
lum. In particular, it will study how legal requirements might be translated operation-
ally into norms and standards and constitute an integral part of the broader ‘do no 
harm’ approach (Section 16.2). Subsequently, the chapter will examine the negative 
environmental impact of remnants of conflict on land as well as the potential damage 
to the environment resulting from mine clearance activities (Sections 16.3 and 16.4). 
The chapter will also examine how, at an operational level, the normative framework 
and good practice guide mine action organizations to ensure their operations do not 
result in further environmental harm (Section 16.5). Finally, Section 16.6 will address 
the issue of liability for environmental degradation and damage to individuals from 
remnants of conflict and in particular from their removal. Section 16.7 will summarize 
major findings.
16.2 Normative Framework
Before analysing what international law provides for post- conflict mine action, it is 
worth recalling that its general principles require all parties to a conflict to mitigate 
environmental harm to the widest extent possible. Also, IHL contains a number of pro-
visions addressing the short- and long- term consequences of damage to the environ-
ment caused by the legacy of armed conflict.
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16.2.1  The protection of the environment during armed conflict
IEL is the branch of international law aimed at protecting and preserving the environ-
ment. According to a legal analysis by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(‘UNEP’), IEL could potentially be applied in times of armed conflicts, alongside IHL. 
The relationship between the two branches of law is, however, complicated by the fact 
that IEL is still maturing, at both domestic and international levels.12
An International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’) study details three rules 
of customary international law which apply to the protection of the environment in 
armed conflicts:
• General principles on the conduct of hostilities apply to the natural environment 
(rule 43).
• Due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural environment shall 
always be a consideration when choosing methods and means of warfare (rule 44).
• The use of methods and means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, 
to cause widespread, long- term, and severe damage to the natural environment is 
prohibited (rule 45).13
These rules have also been codified in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
in Articles 35(3) and 55(1). Along these lines, the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed 
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (also referred to as the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons— ‘CCW’) reaffirms rule 45. It can indeed 
be argued that, due to their destructive impact on the environment, mines and cluster 
munitions may well go beyond the limits and provisions of Additional Protocol I.14
Various scholars and concerned organizations have reviewed environmental pro-
tection under IHL.15 In its study on the protection of the environment during armed 
conflict, UNEP’s assessment is that ‘a number of significant gaps and difficulties remain 
to be reconciled if the protection of the environment is to be enhanced within the 
IHL framework’.16 According to some authors, these difficulties are that: (i) the thresh-
old of harm to the environment established in IHL is almost impossible to reach as it 
must meet three cumulative conditions (widespread, long- term effects, severe) and be 
assessed before launching the attack; (ii) no treaty norm explicitly addresses the issue 
of environmental damage in non- international armed conflicts; and (iii) the propor-
tionality of harm to the environment deemed to be ‘collateral damage’ is difficult to 
12 UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict. An Inventory and Analysis of International 
Law (UNEP, 2009), 34.
13 ICRC, ‘Customary IHL Database’, at <http:// www.icrc.org/ customary- ihl/ eng/ docs/ v1_ rul> accessed 
28 August 2015.
14 Handicap International, What Rights for Mine Victims? Reparation, Compensation: From Legal Analysis 
to Political Perspectives (Lyon: Handicap International, 2005), 20.
15 Michael Bothe, ‘The Protection Of The Environment In Times Of Armed Conflict’ (1991) 34 German 
Yearbook of International Law 54; Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds.), The Environmental Consequences 
of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
16 UNEP (n 12) 28.
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determine.17 The legal rules aimed to protect the environment in relation to armed 
conflict are rather a ‘blunt tool’ with parallel streams and, at times, lacking holistic 
implementation.18
16.2.2  Jus post bellum, the protection of the environment  
and mine action
Long- term consequences of mines and other remnants of conflict fall under the scope 
of the laws applicable in post- conflict settings. Jus post bellum has its most tradi-
tional roots in just war theory as a natural corollary of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.19 
According to the just war theory, it is not only the decision to resort to war and its very 
conduct which has to be just, but also the termination of war.20 Beyond this theory, jus 
post bellum recently gained attention in contexts of peacebuilding, post- conflict recon-
struction, or transitional justice.21 The concept can close a normative gap related to the 
applicable law and the possible interaction between different bodies of law in transition 
from conflict to peace. A systemic gap might also be filled between the use of force and 
post- conflict responsibilities.22 The concept has not remained unchallenged though. 
Some scholars defend that the alleged legal void seems an artificially created lacuna 
or that linking post- conflict reconstruction to the legality of an intervention may run 
against current international law.23 The concept might also be prone to politization.24 
Others argue that jus post bellum tends to primarily rectify the wrongs of war instead of 
focusing on peacebuilding.25
While some see jus post bellum as a system or body of law,26 others may rather con-
sider it as a concept. According to latter view, jus post bellum focuses on relevant laws, 
standards, and good practice applied during the transition from conflict to peace, hence 
stressing the importance of a holistic approach and the dual role of both hard law and 
17 Michael Bothe, Carl E. Bruch, Jordan Diamond, and David Jensen, ‘International Law Protecting the 
Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red 
Cross 569, 578– 9.
18 ILC, Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict, UN Doc. A/ 
CN.4/ 700, 3 June 2016, para. 266.
19 On an overview of the just war tradition from a historical perspective, see David D. Corey and J. Daryl 
Charles, The Just War Tradition (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2012).
20 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ (2000) 31 Journal of Social Philosophy 117, 117– 18.
21 Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus 
Post Bellum:  An Introduction’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds), Jus Post 
Bellum – Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1– 2.
22 Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s)’ in Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner 
(eds.), Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 
2008), 101– 2.
23 Eric De Brabandere, ‘The Responsibility for Post- Conflict Reforms: A Critical Assessment of Just Post 
Bellum as a Legal Concept’ (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 119, 149.
24 Roxana Vatanparast, ‘Waging Peace: Ambiguities, Contradictions, and Problems of a Jus Post Bellum 
Legal Framework’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 21) 155– 7.
25 Seth Lazar, ‘Skepticism about Jus Post Bellum’ in Larry Marry and Andrew T. Forcehimes (eds.), 
Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 218– 22.
26 Carsten Stahn, ‘ “ Jus Ad Bellum”, “Jus in Bello”  . . .  “ Jus Post Bellum”?— Rethinking the Conception of 
the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 921, 942.
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soft law provisions.27 This definition constitutes the underlying jus post bellum concept 
in this chapter and it will be demonstrated why such a holistic approach is indicated 
for mine action.
There are three international conventions relevant to mine action which apply post bel-
lum: the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti- Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (also referred to as the Anti- Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention— ‘APMBC’); the Convention on Cluster Munitions (‘CCM’); and 
the CCW. Interestingly, the APMBC and CCM contain substantive provisions for the 
post- conflict phase such as the clearance of remnants of conflict or assistance to victims, 
but, given that they prohibit the use of certain weapon systems, they are equally relevant to 
jus in bello. Hence, these legal instruments are a magnificent manifestation of the relevance 
of mine action when examining the transition from conflict to peace. Both of them also 
contain references to the protection of the environment.
The APMBC and the CCM require that requests for extensions to the deadlines for 
the clearance of areas contaminated by anti- personnel mines and cluster munitions 
shall specifically contain information on the environmental implications of that exten-
sion.28 Both the APMBC and the CCM further require states parties to furnish reports 
on transparency measures being taken, which shall include reference to the applicable 
safety and environmental standards to be observed.29 The CCM has an even stronger 
reference to environmental protection, contained in Article 3(2) on stockpile destruc-
tion, requiring states parties to ensure that destruction methods comply with the appli-
cable international standards for protecting public health and the environment.
Despite the introduction of these limited provisions on environmental considera-
tions, and even the stronger call for environmental protection in the CCM, the meet-
ings of the states parties to both conventions have generally not addressed the issue of 
protecting the environment. The sole exception was the Cartagena Plan of Action for 
2010– 14, adopted at the Second Review Conference of the APMBC, where Action 9 on 
stockpile destruction required states to provide a plan to ensure compliance with their 
convention obligation in conformity with relevant safety and environmental standards.
Likewise, the environmental impact of clearance activities only temporarily emerged 
in the discussions under Protocol V to the CCW on explosive remnants of war (‘ERW’) 
that aims to provide for ‘remedial measures of a generic nature in order to minim-
ise [their] risks and effects’.30 In April 2009, at the Meeting of Experts of the High 
27 Jennifer S. Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum’ in Stahn, Easterday, and 
Iverson (n 21) 382.
28 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction, adopted 18 September 1997, entered into force 1 March 1999, 2056 UNTS 
211 Art. 5(4)(c); The Convention on Cluster Munitions, adopted 30 May 2008, entered into force 1 August 
2010, 2688 UNTS 39 Art. 4(6)(h). The initial deadline for a state party to the APMBC to destroy or ensure 
the destruction of all known anti- personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control is ten 
years after entry into force of the convention for that state party. A state party to the CCM also has a maxi-
mum of ten years after entry into force of the convention for that state party to clear and destroy cluster 
munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control.
29 APMBC (n 28) Art. 7(1)(f); CCM (n 28) Art. 7(1)(f).
30 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
Indiscriminate Effects, adopted 28 November 2003, entered into force 12 November 2006, 2399 UNTS 100, 
preambular paragraph 2.
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Contracting Parties to Protocol V, the issue of environmental protection was discussed 
for the first time. During the Third and Fourth Conferences of the High Contracting 
Parties to Protocol V, in 2009 and 2010, states parties agreed to keep the potential envir-
onmental impact of ERW clearance under review.31 However, in subsequent confer-
ences, the issue of environmental protection was removed from the agenda and no 
longer discussed in this forum.
Obligations under these three conventions form the basis of the draft principle 
on remnants of war of the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission 
(‘ILC’) on the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts.32
16.2.3  The ‘do no harm’ approach and mine action
The few principles established under international law which provide for environmen-
tal protection are reflected in the policies and standards which guide the activities of 
mine action organizations on the ground. The question arises of how these policies 
and standards interpret the above- mentioned provisions and put into practice the 
‘do no harm’ approach. The ‘do no harm’ approach requires that humanitarian actors 
take steps to ensure that the assistance they provide does not make a situation worse. 
It has become a cornerstone of humanitarian assistance and development, as well as 
peacekeeping.33
Peacekeeping missions are often mandated to play a role in mine action activi-
ties34 as part of a broader set of actions that peacekeeping troops carry out with a view 
to supporting long- term recovery or post- conflict peacebuilding. The Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (‘DPKO’), in collaboration with UNEP, started to 
address environmental concerns and developed an environmental policy in 2009— 
Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions. Accordingly, peacekeeping troops have 
to abide by a series of minimum operating standards for the protection of the envir-
onment, acknowledging the fact that dealing with natural resources as part of post- 
conflict peacebuilding is of paramount importance. In accordance with this policy, 
the DPKO is now responsible for ensuring that all missions integrate environmental 
31 Third Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Final Document, UN Doc. CCW/ 
P.V/ CONF/ 2009/ 9, 23 November 2009, para. 36; Fourth Conference of the High Contracting Parties 
to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, Final Document, UN Doc. CCW/ P.V/ CONF/ 2010/ 11, 14 February 2011, para. 31.
32 Draft principle as proposed by the Special Rapporteur reads as follows: ‘1. Without delay after the ces-
sation of active hostilities, all minefields, mined areas, mines, booby- traps, explosive ordnance and other 
devices shall be cleared, removed, destroyed or maintained in accordance with obligations under interna-
tional law; 2. At all times necessary, the parties shall endeavour to reach agreement, both among themselves 
and, where appropriate, with other States and with international organizations, on the provision of technical 
and material assistance, including, in appropriate circumstances, the undertaking of joint operations neces-
sary to fulfil such responsibilities.’ ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty- eighth Session 
(2 May– 10 June and 4 July– 12 August 2016), UN Doc. A/ 71/ 10, footnote 1306.
33 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace— or War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1999).
34 UN Security Council Resolution 1925, UN Doc. S/ RES/ 1925, 28 May 2010, para. 12s.
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considerations and respect certain minimum standards. As for mine action activi-
ties carried out directly by peacekeepers, the policy highlights the challenges related 
to the disposal of stocks of chemicals, explosives, and ammunition. These have to be 
addressed in compliance with international legislation, such as the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. 
The ‘do no harm’ approach in general finds therefore its concrete application in peace-
keeping missions and is also specifically referred to in other policy and good practice 
handbooks for peacekeepers.35
The normative framework in mine action comprises a series of norms and stand-
ards, in particular the International Mine Action Standards (‘IMAS’), which are even 
enshrined in UN Security Council resolutions mandating peacekeeping missions. The 
mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (‘UNMISS’), for example, 
requires the mission to ‘support the government of South Sudan in conducting de- 
mining activities in accordance with IMAS’.36
The sector- wide IMAS are not legally binding obligations. However, they do provide 
guidance for the industry and translate the principles included in IHL treaties, basic 
human rights, and clearance requirements into practical and detailed norms. IMAS 
are developed, reviewed, and adopted by a technical committee representing the whole 
mine action sector. They have become the relevant standards implemented by mine 
action organizations, and constitute the basis of national mine action standards. IMAS 
10.70, the specific standard on environmental protection, acknowledges that
national authorities and demining organizations not only have a responsibility to 
ensure that demining operations are carried out in a safe, effective and efficient man-
ner, but also in a manner that minimizes the impact on the environment. The aim 
should be to leave the environment in a state that is similar to, or where possible better 
than, before demining operations commenced.
The standard thus includes a powerful statement of the ‘do no harm’ approach in rela-
tion to environmental considerations.
It requires, for instance, that ‘demining operations should be carried out without 
damaging property or infrastructure, in a manner that minimizes the impact on the 
environment’, and that ‘planning for demining operations shall take into account the 
effects of those operations, and any supporting activities, on the environment, and any 
possible damage to property or infrastructure, or harm to personnel’. It further details 
the responsibilities and obligations of national authorities and mine action organiza-
tions. Finally, other technical IMAS include references to environmental considera-
tions, such as IMAS 11.10 on the destruction of stockpiled anti- personnel mines and 
IMAS 11.20 on open burning and open detonation stockpile destruction operations.
In its work, the mine action sector also draws on other relevant norms, such as the 
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (‘IATG’) and the standards of the 
International Organization for Standardization (‘ISO’), a network of national standards 
bodies. Drafted by a technical panel consisting of experts from the UN, international 
35 UN DPKO and UN DFS, Civil Affairs Handbook (United Nations, 2012), 70– 1.
36 UN Security Council Resolution 1996, UN Doc. S/ RES/ 1996, 8 July 2011, para. 3c.
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organizations, NGOs, and states, the IATG are used at the logistical level and cover 
technical requirements for safe, effective, and efficient storage, processing, transport, 
and disposal of ammunition. IATG 10.10 on Demilitarization and Destruction of 
Conventional Ammunition, for example, makes reference to IEL and environmental 
considerations. Finally, ISO standards contain regulations addressing the environment. 
They are generally adopted by a wide range of countries as part of their own regulatory 
frameworks. Some of the general requirements relevant to stockpile management and 
destruction of conventional ammunition have a relevant ISO standard. Furthermore, 
ISO 14000 series standards, on environmental management, set specific standards and 
guidelines on the protection of the environment that are an additional reference for 
mine action organizations.
In summary, it can be observed that jus post bellum contains few provisions address-
ing the environmental impact of mines and other remnants of conflict and mine action 
in international treaties. However, this does not imply that regulation of these matters 
is non- existent, as a more praxis- oriented body of norms and standards is emerging as 
a response to the evolution of the mine action sector. The ability of soft law to adjust 
constantly to new practices hence fills the gap which exists in hard law. This allows the 
practical implementation of the ‘do no harm’ approach, thus ensuring that environ-
mental protection is duly taken into account. Mine action therefore emphasizes the 
importance of the dual role of hard law and soft law provisions for an adequate holistic 
jus post bellum framework.
16.3 Environmental Impact of Remnants of Conflict on Land
During armed conflict, belligerents’ rights to choose methods or means of warfare are 
limited.37 The principles surrounding the proportionality of an attack during hostili-
ties is a related key provision of jus in bello enshrined in the Geneva Conventions.38 
However, explosive items such as mines and cluster munitions not only cause unaccept-
able harm to civilians during armed conflict, but can do so long after the conflict has 
ended. As a legacy of conflict, lying in the ground, they seriously affect the environment 
in various ways in post- conflict situations.39 Given that the natural environment con-
stitutes the basis for livelihoods, the damage caused by remnants of conflict hampers 
sustainable socio- economic development.40
37 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, adopted 8 June 1977, entered into 
force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 3 Art. 35.
38 ibid. Art. 51.
39 For the positive impact of contamination on the environment, see Asmeret A. Berhe, ‘The Contribution 
Of Landmines To Land Degradation’ (2007) 18 Land Degradation & Development 1, 7; Roberts and 
Williams (n 7) 93.
40 Richard Matthew, Mark Halle, and Jason Switzer (eds.), Conserving The Peace: Resources, Livelihoods 
And Security (Winnipeg, Man.: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2002), 16; Bruce Gray, 
‘Landmines: The Most Toxic and Widespread Pollution Facing Mankind’ (Colloquium– Towards Ottawa 
and beyond:  de- mining the region, University of Sydney, 14– 17 July 1997), at <http:// www.ecn.ab.ca/ 
~puppydog/ bgray.htm> accessed 28 August 2015; Carl E. Bruch, David Jensen, Mikiyasu Nakayama, Jon 
Unruh, Rebecca Gruby, and Ross Wolfarth, ‘Post- Conflict Peace Building And Natural Resources’ (2008) 19 
Yearbook of International Environmental Law 58; GICHD and UNDP, Leaving No One Behind. Mine Action 
and the Sustainable Development Goals (Geneva: GICHD, 2017).
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The potential impact of remnants of conflict and mine clearance under water as well 
as the destruction of stockpiles and ammunition has been demonstrated and would 
warrant consideration. It should indeed be noted that one of the draft principles of the 
ILC’s Special Rapporteur on the protection of the environment in relation to armed 
conflicts addresses remnants at sea.41 For the purpose of this chapter, however, empha-
sis is put on contamination on soil and mine clearance on land due to their particularly 
significant environmental impact.
16.3.1  Access denial
The main consequence of contamination by remnants of conflict is to deprive local 
communities of access to land and natural resources. Valuable pasture can become 
inaccessible. This can, for instance, be illustrated by the impact of the cluster bomb air-
strikes in Lebanon in 2006. Yet, these findings are also valid more generally. After the 
conflict with Israel in 2006, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (‘FAO’) 
estimated that up to 26 per cent of the cultivated land was contaminated in southern 
Lebanon.42 This can potentially lead to overgrazing in accessible areas and subsequent 
habitat degradation. Land scarcity resulting from contamination has the potential to 
generate new socio- economic dynamics and set new cycles of poverty and environ-
mental degradation in motion. Faced with growing livelihood pressures, local popu-
lations are likely to resort to unsustainable practices and intensify exploitation of the 
diminished areas available in order to meet short- term needs.43
This finding is corroborated by the phenomenon of deforestation, which generally 
accelerates as an indirect consequence of contamination. Where arable land has been 
mined, selling forest and fruit trees gives way to immediate pressures to simply survive. 
Deforestation can, in turn, affect marshlands and water tables, which has an impact on 
fish and other wildlife. Thus, remnants of conflict can set in motion a chain of events 
leading to environmental harm in the form of habitat degradation or deforestation, 
possibly affecting entire species populations and altering food chains.44
16.3.2  Soil degradation and loss of productivity
The terrestrial environment can be seriously affected when remnants of conflict 
explode. Exploding munitions degrade land by damaging and disrupting the soil 
structure that, in turn, exacerbates erosion and leads to increased sediment load in the 
41 Draft principle as proposed by the Special Rapporteur reads as follows: ‘1. States and international 
organizations shall cooperate to ensure that remnants of war do not constitute a danger to the environment, 
public health or the safety of seafarers; 2. To this end States and organizations shall endeavour to survey 
maritime areas and make the information freely available.’ ILC (n 32) footnote 1306.
42 FAO, Lebanon:  Damage and Early Recovery Needs Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
(FAO, 2006), 10.
43 UNEP (n 7) 155; Roberts and Williams (n 7) 11.
44 Claudio Torres- Nachón, ‘The Environmental Impacts of Landmines’ in Kenneth Rutherford et  al. 
(eds), Landmines and Human Security. International Politics and War’s Hidden Legacy (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2004), 197; Berhe (n 39) 12– 13; Roberts and Williams (n 7) 11, 93, 197, 247.
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drainage system.45 Topsoil damage also has sustained impacts on moisture availability, 
vulnerability to water flows, erodibility, and productivity.46 Soil productivity dramatic-
ally decreases if land is contaminated, as witnessed in Vietnam with a reduction of 50 
per cent in rice production per hectare of affected land.47
16.3.3  Chemical contamination
Besides its physical hazard as remnant of conflict, ammunition can cause chemical con-
tamination, both when it functions or if it fails to function. When it explodes ammu-
nition can produce contamination due to gases and ash resulting from the chemical 
reaction. Chemical contamination of a different kind also occurs when ammunition 
fails to function as the explosive contents undergo chemical breakdown over time, 
whether loose due to the impact or still in the ammunition casing, and at a rate influ-
enced by the surrounding conditions. Any ammunition body fragments remaining in 
the environment for extended periods are subject to corrosion and weathering, subse-
quently releasing various heavy metals such as chromium, zinc, iron, and copper into 
the soil. In agricultural regions in particular these heavy metals can easily penetrate the 
soil, reach the water table, and pass into the human food chain.48
16.4 Environmental Impact of Mine Clearance on Land
Mine action includes activities aimed at reducing the social, economic, and environ-
mental impact of mines, cluster munitions, and other ERW;49 it therefore addresses 
the different impacts explained above. In this way, mine action does a lot of ‘good’ by 
restoring livelihoods and contributing to peacebuilding. However, by its very nature, 
mine action involves direct interaction with the environment, through physical activi-
ties such as clearance, and indirect interaction, for instance through the effect it has on 
land newly released to beneficiaries.
Mine action activities can have an impact on the environment similar to that of other 
humanitarian operations. The mere presence of demining personnel on the ground and 
their temporary field camps might lead to over- exploitation of local resources such as 
water, wood, or food, and produce waste which, if not properly managed, can result in 
environmental degradation persisting long after the camp has left.
Clearance can be undertaken using a variety of methods and tools, each of which has 
its own characteristics and advantages. Many factors influence the choice of method 
in a given working environment. Whereas the choice of the correct methodology and 
45 Jim Monan, Landmines and Underdevelopment: A Case Study of Quang Tri Province, Central Vietnam 
(Kowloon, Hong Kong: Oxfam Hong Kong, 1995), 13; Gray (n 40) 5.
46 Berhe (n 39) 8; UNEP, A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq- Kuwait Conflict on Terrestrial 
Ecosystems. Part II: Kuwait (UNEP, 1991); Rafaat Misak and Samira Omar, ‘Environmental Damages from 
Minefields’ (2008) 11(2) Journal of Mine Action 40, 40.
47 Monan (n 45) 13.
48 Volodymyr Kuznyetsow, ‘Some Aspects of Environmental Interactions Related to UXO’ (Unexploded 
Ordnance Detection and Mitigation Conference, II Ciocco, 20 July– 2 August 2008).
49 UNMAS, IMAS 04.10. Glossary of Mine Action Terms, Definitions and Abbreviations (UNMAS, 2nd 
edn, 2003), Art. 3.176.
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technical tool is often guided by cost- efficiency considerations, the potential impact 
on the environment needs to be taken into consideration as well. The so- called mine 
action ‘toolbox’ to clear land is made of three different assets: animal detection systems 
(‘ADS’), manual clearance, and mechanical systems. These assets can be used in con-
junction with one another depending on the specific requirements of a task.
Dogs and rats are the most commonly used mine detection animals because of their 
ability to detect specific vapours associated with the explosive or other components 
of mines and munitions. ADS cannot replace deminers, but they are powerful tools 
when used in combination with manual and mechanical systems. Once an explosive 
item has been detected, it has to be removed manually or mechanically. The use of 
animals, therefore, does not avoid per se the potential environmental impact of other 
clearance tools.
When demining manually, only locations where the metal detector has indicated 
metal contamination will be subject to manual digging. Fertile topsoil has to be 
removed, soil and root systems are likely to be disturbed and lower vegetation may have 
to be cut in order to get access to a suspected or confirmed contaminated area. Erosion 
can result from this process. Manual clearance remains the preferred tool, especially in 
areas with dense vegetation where a primary environmental concern is to conserve as 
much vegetation as possible. Nonetheless, it is time- consuming and strenuous; conse-
quently, mechanical systems can be used to speed up this process.
Whereas machines have considerable potential for increasing efficiency, they can 
have a greater impact on the soil and the ecosystem. A variety of mechanical systems is 
used (tiller systems, flails, or converted plant machinery) to process soil in the search 
for remnants of conflict. Inevitably, this disturbs and causes possible damage to soil 
conditions. Soil might often be moved to another location where it will be checked 
for explosive items or evidence of such. When using flails and tillers, the soil passes 
through those systems, even though it will remain in the same location after being pro-
cessed. The consequences of such practice could take the form of various types of ero-
sion, deforestation, changes to soil composition, and reduced soil fertility.
Mechanical systems remove or destroy vegetative cover which in turn can lead to 
increased water runoff and wind erosion. Tillage increases wind erosion rates by dehy-
drating the soil and breaking it up into smaller particles that can be picked up by the 
wind. Deforestation is closely linked to erosion. Trees may need to be taken out, caus-
ing the removal of litter that plays a crucial role in infiltration and protects soil from 
erosion and raindrop impacts. Litter also provides organic matter that is important to 
the stability of the soil structure.50 Less fertile soils are naturally associated with losses 
in agricultural production.
Soil degradation occurs when its quality decreases due to changes in its depth, or in 
its physical or chemical properties. During mechanical clearance, the organic layer is 
generally processed as well as surface soil, and the physical or chemical properties of 
the soil might be changed or damaged. This can again affect soil fertility, rooting poten-
tial, and water- holding capacity.51 Not only can mechanical mine clearance result in 
50 Berhe (n 39) 8.
51 GICHD, A Handbook of Mechanical Demining (Geneva: GICHD, 2009), 133; Berhe (n 39) 8.
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soil erosion and lead to other environmental damage, but there is also a risk of chemical 
pollution to soil and water. Contamination might be caused by detonations or destruc-
tion of explosive items in the ground or by leaking hydraulic fluids and fuel which can 
occur when refuelling demining machines.
16.5 Measures to Ensure Mine Clearance on  
Land Does No Harm to the Environment
In order not to undermine the positive contribution of mine action to people, live-
lihoods, and peacebuilding initiatives, and so as to address the potential impact of 
clearance operations such as those outlined above, mine action organizations, much 
like other humanitarian stakeholders, must ensure they ‘do no harm’ to the envi-
ronment or livelihoods, and avoid increasing the long- term vulnerability of affected 
communities. At an operational level, measures can be taken to avoid or mitigate the 
potentially negative impact of mine clearance on the environment. On the basis of 
international legal obligations, IMAS complement the normative framework relevant 
to the mine action sector. Finally, the sector has also developed a set of operational 
good practice.
The first way of mitigating the environmental impact of clearance is to limit the use 
of machines to a strict minimum. Backed by IMAS 07.11, the mine action sector has 
developed the so- called ‘land release’ approach. This consists of a process of survey 
and clearance activities aimed at providing effective, efficient, and reliable informa-
tion about which land requires attention, which does not, and how best to deploy pre-
cious technical assets. Land release promotes a system of escalating survey activities 
and only resorts to full clearance as a last option. With the land release approach, clear-
ance thus only takes place where there is confirmed contamination. Even though the 
IMAS on land release does not particularly refer to environmental considerations, it 
constitutes an effective measure to avoid the potential negative consequences of clear-
ance activities.
Based on the ISO 14000 standards, the mine action sector has developed specific 
standards for environmental protection. These do not only address air, water, and soil 
pollution or land use, but also tackle the reduction and disposal of waste and the reduc-
tion of energy consumption.52 The sector as a whole has complemented the normative 
framework through good practice at the operational level, and the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining’s (‘GICHD’) Handbook of Mechanical Demining is 
a reference tool in this regard.
One measure that can be taken to reduce the harm and negative impacts from 
clearance operations is to reseed and replant areas with indigenous grasses imme-
diately after operations. Another is to return processed soil layers to affected sites in 
the correct order so that the fertile top soil is once again the top layer. In the same 
vein, clearance should be scheduled so that the site can be cultivated as soon as pos-
sible after operations to ensure regrowth of a root system, which will, at least in part, 
52 UNMAS, IMAS 10.70. Safety & Occupational Health— Protection of the Environment (UNMAS, 2007).
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prevent erosion.53 In general, the planning of a mechanical clearance operation should 
include a comprehensive environmental assessment as well as an environmental man-
agement process with a view to discussing the risks and control measures with the 
local communities.54
IMAS also provide guidance on precautions to be taken with regards to possible chem-
ical pollution. Organizations should take all reasonable care when selecting refuelling 
sites, for example, so as to ensure that diesel spillage cannot contaminate water sources. 
Furthermore, they should have clear regulations for the replacement of fuel and lubricants, 
and the measures to be taken with waste products.55
16.6 Challenges and Ways to Address Liability 
for Environmental Degradation and Damage to Individuals 
from Remnants of Conflict and their Removal
During conflict, but especially in its aftermath, contamination from remnants of con-
flict can cause damage to the environment, individuals, and property as outlined in depth 
above. Thus, liability for such damage is very relevant as is the right for compensation 
for damaged parties and victims. Post- war justice is indeed one of the major principles 
advanced in jus post bellum.56 Likewise, with the formalization of the land release process, 
liability has become increasingly important during the removal of remnants of conflict. 
The risk that even in a cleared area an explosive item could have been missed during clear-
ance operations raises the question of who is liable for the damage such an item could or 
does cause.57 This section will review liability issues in connection with damage to the 
environment, but more importantly to individuals, borne by states, mine action organiza-
tions, and producers of explosive items. It will analyse general liability regimes and explore 
to which extent they apply, by extension, to liability for contamination and mine clearance 
operations. Special focus will be dedicated to ways to engage responsibility of armed non- 
state actors in NIAC due to their unique role in such conflicts and the relevance of mine 
action in these contexts.
16.6.1  Liability for post- conflict contamination
Liability for contamination by remnants of conflict is a complex issue. Examples 
show that it has been a recurring and topical aspect of post- conflict recovery. In the 
case of contamination from unexploded ordnance resulting from training exercises 
by the British Army in Kenya, a number of Kenyan victims, for instance, filed suit 
with the High Court in London in 2002. In an out- of- court settlement, they received 
53 ibid. Art. 6.1; GICHD (n 51) 97, 129.
54 Ursign Hofmann and Pascal Rapillard, ‘ “Do no harm” in Mine Action: Why the Environment Matters’ 
(2015) 19(1) The Journal of ERW and Mine Action 1, 7.
55 UNMAS, IMAS 09.50. Mechanical Demining (UNMAS, 2006), Art 10.1; UNMAS (n 52).
56 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective’ in Stahn and Kleffner (n 22) 31– 52.
57 GICHD, A Guide to Liability and Insurance in Mine Action (Geneva: GICHD, 2011), 8– 9.
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a compensation payment of GBP 4.5 million, even though the British government did 
not accept full liability.58
As noted in the study on the rights for mine victims by Handicap International, 
when establishing a right to reparation or compensation, this requires a breach of 
existing law. In all legal systems, actors agree multiple obligations consisting either of 
actions or omissions. If such obligations are not acted upon, the actor’s responsibil-
ity or liability may be engaged. States can have differentiated kinds of responsibility or 
liability: fault- based liability where a fault is engaged, and strict liability without a need 
to prove fault. Claims against states for using mines and cluster munitions could be 
based on the responsibility of states for wrongful acts.59 As defined by the non- binding 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ‘an inter-
nationally wrongful act of a State [is] when conduct consisting of an action or omission 
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of 
an international obligation of the State.’60 As a result, non- compliance with an interna-
tional obligation prohibiting the use of mines or cluster munitions entails the respon-
sibility of the state. In the case of the general prohibition of anti- personnel mines and 
cluster munitions, only states, but not individuals, can claim a wrongful act committed 
by another state. Such mechanism was built in the APMBC and CCM through which 
states parties can lodge a complaint for violation of the convention by a state party.61 
However, this procedure has never been activated thus far.
In relation to the environment in times of armed conflict, Additional Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions is applicable when it comes to consider responsibility for and 
redress from damage to the environment posed by remnants of conflict. Indeed, if mines 
and cluster munitions create ‘widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural 
environment’ (Art. 35(3)) and even more so ‘are intended or may be expected to cause 
such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or sur-
vival of the population’ (Art. 55(1)), then it might be argued that such means of warfare 
go beyond the tolerable limits established by IHL. In its study, Handicap International 
concludes that, having a substantive destructive impact on the environment, mines 
may well exceed these limits and provisions contained in Additional Protocol I could 
prohibit the use of mines, and arguably by extension cluster munitions, because of their 
damage to the environment.62
The APMBC and CCM do not address the issue of liability and compensation, nei-
ther for environmental damage nor for damage to property and individuals. What both 
conventions stipulate, however, is the responsibility of the state, among others, (i) to 
clear all anti- personnel mines and cluster munitions respectively on the territory under 
its jurisdiction or control within a given period of time63 and (ii) to provide assistance 
58 ‘Maasai and Samburu Win Compensation from Britain for Landmine Victims’ (Cultural Survival, 
July 2008), at <https:// www.culturalsurvival.org/ news/ maasai- and- samburu- win- compensation- britain- 
landmine- victims> accessed 28 August 2015.
59 Handicap International (n 14) 13– 14.
60 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty- third Session (23 April– 1 June and 2 July– 10 
August 2001), UN Doc. A/ 56/ 10.
61 APMBC (n 28) Art. 8; CCM (n 28) Art. 8. 62 Handicap International (n 14) 20.
63 APMBC (n 28) Art. 5; CCM (n 28) Art. 4.
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to victims.64 Both conventions therefore rely on the duty of care by the state for its 
citizens rather than on liability and right for victims to claim for redress from damage 
from the state.65 Interestingly, some scholars argue that jus post bellum should increas-
ingly consider a duty of care.66 This new normative grounding will be elaborated more 
in depth below.
From a jus post bellum perspective, it is warranted to note that the affected state bears 
the responsibility for its contamination (of mines which it may not have emplaced or 
cluster munitions which it may not have used). Thus, the international community has, 
stricto sensu, no duty to rebuild or to address damages in post- conflict setting:  ‘You 
broke it, you own it’ does not apply.67 Should decision- makers have to think about post 
bellum responsibilities, this may impact jus ad bellum considerations.68 This situation 
is not met by the APMBC and CCM. Curiously though, both conventions still take 
into account a certain degree of international duty to rebuild by encouraging states in 
a position to do so to assist affected states. However, as mentioned earlier, these instru-
ments of international law remain silent in relation to the environmental impact of 
contamination and do not address related questions of liability for such damage.
Breaches to IEL can also be a source for determining liability for damage to the 
environment from contamination from remnants of conflict. In general terms, ‘the 
breach of an obligation of environmental protection established under international 
law engages responsibility of the State [including strict responsibility of the State . . . in 
case of ultra- hazardous activities], entailing as a consequence the obligation to rees-
tablish the original position [e.g. through mine clearance] or to pay compensation’.69 
More specifically, international environmental law creates obligations for states par-
ties to relevant IEL conventions, including on the responsibility for damages caused 
to the environment. Consequently, if a link can be established between the damage to 
the environment caused by remnants of conflict and the effects of other hazardous and 
noxious substances regulated in IEL conventions, the latter could be applied by exten-
sion to the use of mines and cluster munitions and thus, establish responsibility for and 
redress from environmental damage. Since remnants of conflict have noxious effects on 
the environment, victims could therefore invoke breaches by states to their obligations 
under IEL they are bound by and claim reparations on this ground.70
A third line of argumentation dealing with determining liability of damage caused 
by contamination regards the violation of fundamental human rights. Indeed, it is 
64 APMBC (n 28) Art. 6; CCM (n 28) Arts. 5– 6.
65 Michael Polkinghorne and James Cockayne, ‘Dealing with the Risks and Responsibilities of Landmines 
and their Clearance’ (2001) 25 Fordham International Law Journal 1187, 1194– 5.
66 Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum Symposium:  Jus Post Bellum and the Ethics of Care’ (Opinio Juris, 
9 May 2014), at <http:// opiniojuris.org/ 2014/ 05/ 09/ jus- post- bellum- symposium- jus- post- bellum- ethics- 
care> accessed 28 August 2015.
67 On different approaches to the responsibility to rebuild in jus post bellum see for instance Garry J. Bass, 
‘Jus Post Bellum’ (2004) 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 384– 412; James Pattison, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the 
Responsibility to Rebuild’ (2013) 45 British Journal of Political Science 635– 61.
68 Larry Mary, After War Ends. A  Philosophical Perspective (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 168– 9.
69 International Law Institute, Responsibility and Liability under International Law for Environmental 
Damage (1997), Arts. 1 and 4.
70 Handicap International (n 14) 18– 20.
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recognized that mines or cluster munitions laid in or around populated areas and agri-
cultural land pose a substantial risk to the health of the affected population and can 
very directly affect the exercise of a number of political, economic, social, civil, and cul-
tural rights. These rights are protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and/ or the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (‘ICCPR’). As a result, victims, including those people whose land has become 
unusable due to contamination, can invoke, in principle, the violation of fundamental 
rights and claim for compensation for the harm they have experienced.
Fourthly, liability of producers of mines or cluster munitions may also be invoked in 
a claim for compensation, although rather for harm to individuals than for damage to 
the environment. Assuming that manufacturers produce such devices for profit, they 
are in no way different from producers of other articles. According to product liabil-
ity theories in US law, it could be argued that producers were negligent and breached 
their duty of care, if they failed to reduce the risk of injury to civilians by not adapt-
ing the device’s design to include available safety features (e.g. self- destruction or self- 
neutralization mechanisms). Such argument would obviously be morally problematic 
‘justifying’ the potential use of so- called smart mines. It seems, however, that these 
safety mechanisms have existed since the 1960s. Therefore, producers could be held lia-
ble for injuries from mines produced thereafter. However, such liability implies that the 
victim must have proof of both general and specific causation which might be particu-
larly challenging. Because the mine causing the injury generally explodes into pieces, 
it becomes nearly impossible for the plaintiff to determine the particular producer of 
the device.71
Also strict liability of the producer, might, in theory, be considered. Both defect-
ive product liability and liability for abnormally dangerous activity apply. Public pol-
icy interests necessary to determine defective product liability (such as the costs of 
injury to the victim in comparison to the ability to insure the risk of such injury by 
the producer) are applicable to mines and cluster munitions. Similarly, the produc-
tion of such devices might be defined as an abnormally dangerous activity in which 
case the producer would be liable for all injuries resulting therefrom. The produc-
ers of mines and cluster munitions have indeed created an enormous risk of civilian 
injury or even death, while profiting from creating such risk. With regards to invok-
ing strict liability, the challenge arises that many manufacturers only produce com-
ponent parts of the device. This makes the establishment of liability difficult. More 
generally, mine and cluster munitions are produced for the military purpose of injur-
ing people, or threatening to do so. Producers may act as the government contract 
defence with sovereign immunity potentially being extended to them.72 As a conse-
quence of the above and due to further jurisdictional, procedural, and practical dif-
ficulties, there does not seem to be any indication that a lawsuit invoking the liability 
of a producer has yet been filed.
71 Elke Schwager, Ius Bello Durante et Bello Confecto. Darstellung am Beispiel von Entschädigungsansprüchen 
der Opfer von Antipersonenminen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2008), 254; Richard R. Murray and Kelley 
L. Fabian, ‘Compensating the World’s Landmine Victims:  Legal Liability and Anti- Personnel Landmine 
Producers’ (2003) 33 Seton Hall Law Review 303, 336– 40.
72 Murray and Fabian (n 71) 342– 3, 367.
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16.6.2  Responsibilities of armed non- state actors  
in non- international conflicts
In the following section, we will explore how responsibility of armed non- state actors 
could be engaged in general. The distinction between international armed conflict and 
NIAC has blurred over time. Nowadays, not only states, but also armed groups are con-
sidered to be holders of rights and obligations in internal conflict situations.73 In fact, it 
has now become uncontroversial that armed groups are bound by customary IHL.74 In 
addition, some treaties such as the CCW have been amended to also regulate NIAC.75
Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, whose rules are part of custom-
ary IHL, for instance, prohibits ‘violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture’ with respect to persons taking no active 
part in the hostilities. It can be argued that the use of explosive devices such as mines is 
a form of violence to the life of a person. In addition to this provision, the rules regu-
lating the conduct of hostilities such as the principles of distinction and proportional-
ity are also part of customary IHL applicable to NIAC and hence to armed groups.76 
A  major drawback is, however, that IHL can only apply if the threshold conditions 
(protracted armed conflict and certain organizational capacity of the armed group) are 
fulfilled.77
In addition to IHL, the question arises whether human rights law may apply. 
Although it is difficult to establish direct legal human rights obligations of such groups 
in principle— with an exception in instances where they exercise elements of govern-
ment functions with de facto authority over a population— there seems to be a growing 
tendency to hold those groups accountable for human rights violations committed in 
the course of armed conflicts, in particular in relation to jus cogens.78
Consequently, by using mines or cluster munitions, armed groups are likely to violate 
customary IHL principles such as distinction and proportionality, or the prohibition of 
violence to life and person. Armed groups also seem to be bound by the relevant pro-
visions regarding the protection of the environment including rule 45 prohibiting the 
use of methods or means of warfare that are intended or expected to cause widespread, 
long- term, and severe damage to the environment.79 Analysis was offered above on the 
extent to which this environmental provision could apply to the use of mines.
Jus post bellum might provide an interesting ethics of care approach to responsibil-
ity, particularly relevant in the context of non- state actors. Traditionally, the ethics- 
based approach has mainly focused on the wrongdoing of the agent in relation to 
73 Kristen Boon, ‘The Application of Jus Post Bellum in Non- International Armed Conflict’ in Stahn, 
Easterday, and Iverson (n 21) 263– 4.
74 Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca, and Stuart Casey- Maslen, ‘International Law And Armed Non- State 
Actors in Afghanistan’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 47, 56.
75 Andrew Clapham, The Rights and Responsibilities of Armed Non- State Actors: The Legal Landscape & 
Issues Surrounding Engagement, at <http:// ssrn.com/ abstract=1569636> accessed 28 August 2015.
76 Bellal, Giacca, and Casey- Maslen (n 74) 62.
77 William A. Schabas, ‘Punishment of Non- State Actors in Non- International Armed Conflict’ (2002) 26 
Fordham International Law Journal 907, 915.
78 Bellal, Giacca, and Casey- Maslen (n 74) 67– 73.
79 Jean- Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law. 
Volume I: Rules (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 151.
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responsibility such as in the context of sovereignty as responsibility. The shortcomings 
of such an agent- focused approach might be overcome by the concept of ethics of care. 
It indeed shifts emphasis from the agent to the ‘other’, those impacted by the interven-
tion, while looking at empathy and concern.80
Indeed, the notion of care underpins existing humanitarian norms such as the pre-
cautionary principle. The regime governing the protection of the environment, for 
instance, comprises a duty or, for some scholars, strict liability to remedy environmen-
tal damage independently from respect of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.81 Also many 
peacebuilding activities rely on the notion of care. Mine action is a case in point in this 
jus post bellum attempt to invoke an ethics of care to armed groups. Through a deed of 
commitment, the NGO Geneva Call allows them to abide by IHL norms to ban anti- 
personnel mines and to remove the mines they have emplaced. Such regulatory instru-
ments can be an important contribution to framing the conduct of armed groups in 
terms of responsibility through ethics of care. Even more critical scholars recognize 
that care ethics can offer guidelines for ethical forms of relations among individuals, 
groups, and nations.82
Explicit recognition of specific obligations by such groups as in the case of Geneva 
Calls’ Deed of Commitment may change the debate about the groups’ responsibility 
under international law.83 Some scholars also highlight the potential advantages of 
engaging non- states actors in law- making. This would increase the sense of a norm’s 
ownership by non- state actors. The Deed of Commitment in mine action has report-
edly changed groups’ behaviour with spillover effects on other groups, but also created 
the conditions for states to sign the APMBC, for instance in Sudan.84 What remains to 
be scrutinized in further research is the question to which extent non- state actors can 
be held liable and how this liability may be enforced. Scholars examining individual 
liability for international crimes offer some inspiring views on the broader issue of non- 
state actors in NIAC.85
16.6.3  Enforcing state liability for incidents due to contamination
After having reviewed the various ways to establish liability stemming from post- 
conflict contamination, this following section will scrutinize how such liability can be 
enforced at international and domestic levels.
The only case of inter- state claims for compensation on the ground of environmen-
tal damage due to contamination from remnants of conflict recorded thus far are the 
compensations for the environmental impact from the invasion and occupation of Iraq 
granted to Kuwait and Kuwaiti individuals by the UNCC. Indeed, Security Council 
80 Stahn (n 66).
81 Douglas Lackey, ‘Postwar Environmental Damage:  A  Study in Jus Post Bellum’ in Larry Mary and 
Zachary Hoskins (eds.), International Criminal Law and Philosophy (New  York:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 144.
82 Sigal Ben- Porath, ‘Care Ethics and Dependence— Rethinking Jus Post Bellum’ (2008) 23 Hypatia 61, 65.
83 Clapham (n 75) 34.
84 Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups 
in the Creation of International Law’ (2012) 37 Yale Journal of International Law 107, 126– 31.
85 Schabas (n 77) 907– 33.
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resolution 687 states that ‘Iraq . . . is liable under international law for any direct loss, 
damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or 
injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlaw-
ful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.’86 Therefore, and bearing in mind the unprec-
edented damage to the environment, it was possible to address environmental claims. 
The UNCC87 received in total 2.69 million claims over approximately US$ 352.5 billion 
of which 1.5 million were awarded with a total of US$ 52.4 billion. About US$ 5.2 bil-
lion were awarded to F4 claims for damage to the environment.88
In recognition of the need for large- scale environmental remediation and restora-
tion, the UNCC awarded about US$ 3 billion to the State of Kuwait for six claims for 
this purpose. Four claims included UXO clearance and survey activities. Nonetheless, 
compensation for environmental damage under the mandate of the UNCC has a par-
ticular legal background, given that it is linked directly to a Security Council resolu-
tion. No liability for environmental damage was to be proven.89 Iraq violating the jus 
ad bellum, a breach to the jus in bello was generally not seen as required to claim for 
redress.90 To date, the UNCC’s compensations are a rather standalone case in which 
liability for damage to the environment due to remnants of conflict, especially UXO, 
has been established and compensated.
Physical damage to persons and property is the most visible and frequent impact of 
contamination from remnants of conflict and the evidence base for liability, and the 
inter- state redress resulting from it, has been more considered and documented than 
liability for environmental damage. In fact, the UNCC did not only file claims for the 
latter, but, under D claims (claims for damages above US$ 100,000), also for damage 
to individuals caused by mines and ERW. Being an inter- state redress mechanism, the 
claims by individuals were submitted by their governments. As mentioned above, it 
is important to bear in mind that compensation is not awarded because of the use of 
mines, but more generally on the basis of the act of aggression by Iraq.
The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) provides another means for enforcing 
liability for and redress from damage to individuals and property at inter- state level. 
Although it lacks power of compulsion, its rulings may be considered as a source of 
law. Whereas there has not been any ruling yet on the liability for damage caused by 
landmines, the Court pronounced itself on at least two cases involving naval mines.91 
In the first case, the ICJ ruled that Albania was responsible, under international law, 
for the damage of two British warships and the killing of staff. Indeed, Albania omit-
ted to inform the crew about the existence of unanchored automatic submarine mines 
(although considered to be aware thereof), therefore violating ‘elementary considera-
tions of humanity, the principle of the freedom of maritime communication, and every 
State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other States’.92 In the second case, the ICJ ruled that the United States, when 
86 UN Security Council Resolution 687, UN Doc. S/ RES/ 687, 8 April 1991, para. 16.
87 See  chapter 14 in this volume.
88 UNCC, ‘Reports and Recommendations of the Panels of Commissioners’, at <http:// www.uncc.ch/ 
reports- and- recommendations- panels- commissioners> accessed 28 August 2015.
89 Handicap International (n 14) 25. 90 Schwager (n 71) 115.
91 Handicap International (n 14) 22– 3.
92 Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania) (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 22.
416 Post-Conflict Mine Action
laying mines in Nicaraguan ports in 1984 without any public and official warning to 
international shipping, breached ‘its obligations under international customary law not 
to use force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sover-
eignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce’.93
Potentially, there are also means for international direct redress. Liability for dam-
age caused by remnants of conflict can be established and compensation paid to vic-
tims specifically when referring to a violation of human rights. For instance, should 
some rights have been violated, human rights courts such as the Inter- American Court 
of Human Rights or the European Court of Human Rights can hold states under their 
jurisdiction liable and rule the payment of reparation. Similarly, nationals of signatories 
to the ICCPR have the possibility to address claims to the Human Rights Committee 
for breach by their state to respect, for instance, their right to life, although successful 
claims would not be binding to the state. However, it does not seem that violation of 
fundamental human rights from contamination from mines or cluster munitions has 
been invoked yet to claim for redress.94
Under national law, the issue of liability and compensation involves reasons for 
action by states rather than obligations per se. For instance, obligations of states who 
agreed to be bound by the APMBC are obligations to other states parties and not neces-
sarily to their nationals. Redress from a state’s failure to discharge its convention obli-
gations must therefore be sought rather through inter- state mechanisms (see above). 
Nonetheless, a state’s constitution is likely to guarantee certain rights such as the state’s 
responsibility to protect the welfare of its citizens. Furthermore, domestic tort law 
can establish liability for the state as occupier of land for incidents occurring thereon. 
Likewise, land owners or occupiers of land may have rights against the state for inci-
dents happening on land sold or leased by the state. Of course, states may eventually 
enjoy state immunity from suit or execution.95
16.6.4  Liability during and after removal of remnants of conflict
During and after clearance operations, liability for direct environmental damage has 
not yet been invoked in lawsuits and neither studied in mine action. The consequence 
of such damage, however, often affects the physical integrity of people. As a matter of 
fact, liability for injuries of individuals during and especially post- clearance has been 
more considered.
During clearance operations, liability for accidents due to negligence, for instance 
a lack of adequate precautionary measures, or strict liability for performing danger-
ous activities even without negligence, normally falls on the mine action organization 
undertaking the task. It is required to use accredited assets and follow approved Standard 
Operating Procedures which are based on national standards. During clearance activi-
ties, the organizations are therefore liable. However, the state might sometimes also be 
93 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 
(Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 147.
94 Handicap International (n 14) 27; Polkinghorne and Cockayne (n 65) 1197– 8.
95 Schwager (n 71) 188; Polkinghorne and Cockayne (n 65) 1194– 5.
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held liable for accidents due to negligence, for instance in the form of a lack of require-
ments for safety measures to be taken by the mine action organization.96
Whereas during mine clearance and survey activities, liability is less contested, this 
issue becomes even more relevant in the post- clearance phase when clearance has ter-
minated and the cleared areas have been handed over to the beneficiary, normally 
the state. Who is liable if there is an accident on supposedly cleared land? It is recog-
nized that even after completion of clearance, residual risk and contamination remain. 
Residual risk can be defined as ‘the risk remaining following the application of all rea-
sonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ 
ERW’.97 This may result from explosive devices being moved onto the cleared land, for 
instance through flooding, because they were initially located underneath the required 
depth for clearance or simply because they have been missed by the mine action organ-
ization. States parties to the APMBC expressly acknowledge this fact when submitting 
their voluntary declaration of completion of their clearance obligations under Article 
5. In the past, uncertainties relating to liability for residual risk may have delayed states 
from efficiently meeting their international clearance obligations and led to substantive 
quality control and ‘over- clearance’ resulting in further— and eventually avoidable— 
environmental degradation.98 This is one of the driving factors for the development 
and outreach of good practice in this regard.
Following soft law in the form of IMAS and good practice, mine action organiza-
tions that strictly adhere to detailed national standards and have a well implemented 
tasking system in place should not be liable once the land has been officially handed 
over. The normative framework is unambiguous, since ‘for humanitarian operations 
no residual risk should lay with the demining organisation after the National Mine 
Action Authority (‘NMAA’) has formally accepted the cleared land. The handover of 
the cleared land shall be the mitigation of liability point for the demining organisa-
tion’.99 National standards, as outlined in Section 16.2.3, should be based on IMAS.
Therefore, NMAAs are strongly recommended to clarify liability issues, stipulating 
that mine and ERW contamination is ultimately the responsibility of the state, includ-
ing general responsibility to accept accountability towards, and liability and compen-
sation for victims, for areas which have been cleared and handed over to the national 
authority or local population. Authorities are also advised to clarify that a mine action 
organization should not bear liability for missed mines or accidents if it appears that it 
has followed the relevant land release standards and, thus, made all reasonable efforts 
to ensure that the released area was safe.100 This follows the assumption that the state 
ultimately bears a duty of care of its citizens after clearance in the same way as it does 
for pre- clearance contamination.101
96 GICHD (n 57) 37; Polkinghorne and Cockayne (n 65) 1201; Pehr Lodhammar, ‘Legal Aspects of the 
Land Release Process’ (2013) 17(1) The Journal of ERW and Mine Action 20, 20.
97 UNMAS (n 49) Art. 3.249. 98 Lodhammar (n 96) 20.
99 UNMAS, IMAS 08.30. Post- clearance Documentation (UNMAS 2nd edn, 2003), Art. 4.4; UNMAS, 
IMAS 07.11. Land Release (UNMAS, 2013), Art. 11.
100 UNMAS, IMAS 07.11. Land Release (n 99) Art. 11; GICHD (n 57) 9– 10; Lodhammar (n 96) 21.
101 Sean Moorehouse, ‘Land Release Liability’ (2014) 18(2) The Journal of ERW and Mine Action 4, 6.
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After handover, the easiest and most cost- effective way of dealing with liability issues 
is when the state assumes responsibility for the released land, including for dealing with 
residual risk and compensation claims by victims. Strict liability of the state avoids the 
often complex assessment of whether the mine action organization acted with negli-
gence. If this occurs, it would be much easier for the state to sue the organization than if 
victims need to do so by themselves. Other ways of dealing with residual liability would 
be shared liability between states and organizations or time- limited liability of the lat-
ter alone, but they have important disadvantages, especially considering insurance. 
Insurance for shared liability or liability for a given period of time after clearance is 
likely to be expensive and may discourage organizations from carrying out activities.102
On the other hand, the normative framework in mine action also stipulates that an 
organization is generally liable for damages, if the accidents stemming from missed 
mines or ERW were caused by wilful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless 
misconduct, a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the harmed indi-
vidual, or if the organization grossly deviated from an agreed land release approach.103 
The role of the organization in such scenarios is exemplified by an accident in the then 
Southern Sudan in which a UN employee was harmed. Following the accident and UN 
investigation, the victim sued the contracted mine action organization which carried 
out clearance and declared the area safe. The plaintiff ’s main claims included, among 
others, negligence, professional negligence, and negligence per se. This case was set-
tled and the UN employee compensated before the responsible court could make a 
judgment.104
In summary, it has been demonstrated that liability for environmental damage from 
both contamination and clearance has not yet been considered as substantively as lia-
bility for damage to individuals and property. With regards to liability for residual con-
tamination, the importance of the dual role of hard and soft law for a holistic jus post 
bellum framework can once more be emphasized. In fact, the mine action sector has 
tried to regulate itself through an industry- wide normative framework. Based on estab-
lished good practice and considering the various ways of dealing with residual risk 
liability, strict liability of the state is generally considered to be the easiest and most 
cost- effective pathway.105
16.7 Conclusion
Mine action provides an early entry point for positive interventions in the transition 
from conflict to peace. For instance, mine action, particularly clearance, fosters peace-
building efforts by contributing to the social reintegration of former combatants (being 
employed as deminers) or the repatriation of refugees and IDPs, and offers oppor-
tunities for promoting cooperation and dialogue and building confidence.106 More 
102 Pehr Lodhammar (n 96) 21– 2. 103 UNMAS, IMAS 07.11. Land Release (n 99) Art. 11.
104 Fantham v. RONCO (2011) 1:2011cv00762. 105 Lodhammar (n 96) 22.
106 Kristian Berg Harpviken and Rebecca Roberts, ‘Conclusions’ in Kristian Berg Harpviken and Rebecca 
Roberts (eds.), Preparing the Ground for Peace. Mine Action in Support of Peacebuilding (Oslo:  PRIO, 
2004), 55.
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importantly in this context is the fact that by reopening access to resources and liveli-
hoods, mine action contributes significantly both to basic safety and security and to 
economic revitalization— two core elements of any peacebuilding process.
Mine action can do a lot of ‘good’, but by its very nature, it involves direct and indi-
rect interaction with the environment and thus can potentially have a negative impact 
on it. Clearance of remnants of conflict can affect ecosystems and can negatively impact 
vegetation or the composition and fertility of soil. In the past, the mine action sec-
tor’s primary focus lay particularly on developing methods and tools to conduct opera-
tions safely, efficiently, and effectively. Over more than two decades, as the sector has 
matured and acquired significant expertise and experience, the environmental con-
cerns linked to mine clearance operations have received increasing attention. This is 
also related to the recognition in peacebuilding and mine action that environmen-
tal protection, alongside sustainable management of resources, is an important path-
way to promote durable peace and longer- term development. Today, more than ever, 
mine action organizations are aware of the imperative to ensure that they ‘do no harm’ 
through their activities. However, further mainstreaming of environmental considera-
tions, including their liability ramifications, and a more systematic monitoring of their 
application are critical. To do this, it is important to gather more evidence and develop 
good practice.107
This greater focus on the environment in mine action is reflected in discussions at 
policy and normative levels. Jus post bellum only provides limited hard law provisions 
with regards to post- conflict mine action. Indeed, mine action could be used as a case 
study to reinforce the growing recognition that environmental considerations in jus 
post bellum deserve a stronger legal focus. However, practice in mine action also dem-
onstrates that the importance of the dual role of hard and soft law and the particular 
relevance of standards and good practice for an adequate holistic jus post bellum frame-
work cannot be underestimated. The growing area of scholarship on jus post bellum 
increases the understanding and practical resolution of the immense challenges faced 
by societies at the end of war.108 Mine action has some interesting and practical insights 
to provide to this debate.
107 Angela de Santis and Ursin Hofmann, ‘Environmental Risks of Remnants of Conflict: How to “do no 
harm” in Mine Action’ in Marc Stal et al. (eds.), IDRC 2014. Extended Abstracts, Oral Presentations, Special 
Panels, Sessions and Workshops, 24– 28 August 2014, Davos, Switzerland (Global Risk Forum, 2014), 334.
108 Andrew T. Forcehimes and Larry Marry, ‘Conclusion’ in Marry and Forcehimes (n 25) 256.
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‘After the War is Before the War’
The Environment, Preventive Measures Under International 
Humanitarian Law, and their Post- Conflict Impact
Anne Dienelt*
17.1 Introduction
Post- conflict action is not only about restoration, compensation, and responsibility; 
it is also about prevention, especially when addressing environmental protection in 
relation to armed conflicts. Since restoration is not always possible, and compensa-
tion is not able to preserve and protect the natural environment, action is required at 
the earliest stage possible, while bearing in mind the lessons taught by previous con-
flicts, linking preventive measures under international humanitarian law (‘IHL’) with 
the post- conflict phase.1
IHL, the law mainly regulating the during- armed conflict phase, also reaches out 
to the phases before and after an armed conflict: some of its provisions contain obli-
gations that can only be implemented and executed before2 and/ or after3 an armed 
conflict, hence during peacetime. This exemplifies that the traditional dichotomy of 
peacetime and wartime law has been dissolved; there are no clear boundaries.4 In 
* Maître en droit (Aix Marseille III Université), research fellow at the Institute for International Affairs 
of the University of Hamburg Faculty of Law and doctoral candidate at the University of Göttingen Faculty 
of Law. I am grateful to the participants of the JSD programme at NYU School of Law and its visiting doc-
toral researchers 2013– 2014. I also thank the participants of the Jus Post Bellum Project’s Seminar on the 
Environment of the Hugo Grotius Center of the University of Leiden held in June 2014 for their comments, 
in particular to Dr. Dieter Fleck and the editors of this book for their remarks on this chapter. All views 
expressed and potential errors remain of course my own.
1 Cf. Marie G.  Jacobsson, Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, International Law Commission, sixty- eighth Session, , A/ CN.4/ 700, 3 June 2016, paras. 98 and 
267 stressing the connection and interlinkage between the pre- and post- conflict phase.
2 For example, the weapons review according to Art. 36 AP I  or the training of forces according to 
Arts. 47 GC I, 48 GC II, 127 GC III, 144 GC IV, 83 AP I as well as customary international law, see Jean- 
Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 1: Rules 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), rule 142.
3 For example, prisoners of war according to Arts. 33, 34, 74, 78, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91 AP I.
4 See Serena Sharma, ‘Reconsidering the Jus ad Bello/ Jus in Bellum Distinction’ in Carsten Stahn and 
Jann Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum— Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace (Leiden: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2008), 9– 30. See also Carsten Stahn, ‘ “Jus Ad Bellum”, “Jus in Bello” . . . “Jus Post Bellum”?— Rethinking 
the Conception of the Law of Armed Force’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 921– 43, 923– 
4; Carsten Stahn, ‘Just Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s)’ (2007) 32 American University International 
Law Review 322– 3. Regarding environmental protection in relation to armed conflict, the International 
Law Commission (‘ILC’) inter alia stated that there are ‘no clear- cut boundaries between the various phases’, 
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recent times, armed force has thus been conceptionalized in jus ad bellum, jus in bello, 
and jus post bellum.5
Turning to the post- conflict phase, the concept of ‘justice after war’ defines the jus post 
bellum.6 ‘Justice after war’ is based on the idea that a state of justice is reached by or after 
war.7 ‘Justice after war’, if taken seriously and in a spirit to prevent future conflicts, also 
entails an environmental post- war assessment as well as monitoring of the conduct of hos-
tilities regarding its environmental consequences. An environmental post- war assessment 
has several benefits. It allows to extract lessons learned, which can inter alia be applied to 
training curricular and military manuals. They can also be considered in the course of a 
weapons review according to Article 36 of Additonal Protocol I (‘AP I’) when comparing 
weapons and their effects in a war theatre. In addition, monitoring the first deployment 
of new weapons and means and methods of warfare can result in revising and updating 
weapons reviews and weapons instructions after a conflict, even though Article 36 AP 
I does not explicitly require so. An assessment and monitoring can also be useful when 
drafting agreements on protected zones that can include parts of the natural environment 
and environmental hotspots. In sum, such an assessment as well as monitoring can con-
tribute to justice after war. But is this legally required?
In this chapter, I analyse possible legal bases for this argument by studying preventive 
measures under IHL and their post- conflict impact.8 When using the term preventive 
measures, I refer to prevention as such as well as measures under IHL that apply during 
peacetime in preparation of an armed conflict, such as the weapons review according 
to Article 36 AP I. I will show that preventive measures regarding the environment go 
beyond precautions in an attack according to Article 57 AP I. The focus of this chap-
ter is set on the impact on the country of deployment and the environmental damage 
therein; other consequences, such as those on the troops deployed, are not addressed.9
referring to its temporal approach of the pre- conflict, during conflict, and post- conflict phase, see Report of 
the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty- eighth Session, ILC Report, A/ 71/ 10, 2 May– 10 
June and 4 July– 12 August 2016,  chapter 10, para. 147.
5 See, for example, Stahn (n 4).
6 For jus post bellum, see the recent doctrine by Gary Bass, ‘Just Post Bellum’ (2004) 32 Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 384; Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘What to Make of Jus Post Bellum: A Response to Antonia 
Chayes’ (2013) 24 European Journal of International Law 307– 13; Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and 
Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2014) Stahn (n 4). More critical Antonia Chayes, ‘Chapter VII1/ 2: Is Just Post Bellum Possible?’ 
(2013) 24 European Journal of International Law 291– 305; Ruti Teitel, ‘Rethinking Jus Post Bellum in an 
Age of Global Transitional Justice: Engaging with Michael Walzer and Larry May’ (2013) 24 European 
Journal of International Law 335– 42.
7 This relates to just war theory and is based on a moral paradigm, see, for example, Brian Orend, ‘Justice 
after War’ (2002) 16 Ethics & International Affairs 43, 117, Bass (n 6). Teitel, on the other hand, argues that 
jus post bellum should be understood in broader terms, include forward- looking aims rather than restora-
tive ex post justice, Teitel (n 6).
8 This chapter is part of a broader research project on the interplay of IHL, international environmental 
law, and human rights law in relation to environmental protection and armed conflicts.
9 For example, the consequences the US veterans from the Vietnam War are still suffering from today, 
see Clye Haberman, ‘Agent Orange’s Long Legacy, for Vietnam and Veterans’ New York Times (11 May 
2014), at <http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2014/ 05/ 12/ us/ agent- oranges- long- legacy- for- vietnam- and- veterans.
html?action %20=click&module=Search&region=searchResults&mabReward=relbias%253Ar&url=http%
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In the first section, I give an overview of preventive measures in international armed 
conflicts regarding environmental protection:  training, protected zones (e.g. demili-
tarized zones) as well as the legal review of new weapons and means and methods of 
warfare according to Article 36 AP I are examined. In the second section, I  turn to 
post- conflict scenarios and whether preventive measures under IHL play a role in the 
transition from conflict to peace. All measures discussed are de lege lata; however, they 
have not or have only rarely been used to protect the natural environment in practice. 
This chapter is aimed at giving incentives to practitioners dealing with the topic.
17.2 Preventive Measures Under IHL
The Geneva Conventions10 (‘GC’) and their Additional Protocols11 (‘AP’) contain quite 
a few provisions that address IHL obligations that apply during peacetime, either as 
preventive measures or in preparation of an armed conflict. They do not only bind bel-
ligerent states, but all states parties to the GC and AP I.12 These provisions belong to 
the body of IHL, whose application is triggered by the threshold of an armed conflict 
according to common Article 2 GC. Some of them are also applied in peacetime, out-
side the context of armed conflicts. These preventive or preparatory measures include 
the training of forces, the marking of specific sites/ zones, and the review of new weap-
ons and means and methods or warfare, which will be analysed in the following sub- 
sections with regard to their relevance for environmental protection in context of 
armed conflicts.
17.2.1  Training of forces
One of the main problems regarding environmental protection and armed conflicts 
is the low degree of awareness and knowledge regarding environmental protection 
on behalf of the parties to a conflict.13 While commanders and soldiers only think in 
253A%252F%252Fquery.nytimes.com%252Fsearch%252Fsitesearch%252F%253Faction%253Dclick%252
6region%253DMast&_ r=0> accessed 13 March 2015.
10 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field (GC I), 75 UNTS 31, entered into force 21 October 1950; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II), 75 UNTS 
85, entered into force 21 October 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(GC III), 75 UNTS 135, entered into force 21 October 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV), 75 UNTS 287, entered into force 21 October 1950.
11 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), 1125 UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1978; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non- International Armed Conflicts (AP II), 1125 UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December 1978.
12 See Arts. 6, 36, 43, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84 AP I that have been applied continuously since the entry into force 
of AP I; Arts. 18, 56, 58, 66, 79, and annexes I and II to AP I that require preparatory measures.
13 Even though states are becoming more and more interested in the topic, for example a pledge by the 
five Nordic countries during the thirty- first International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
in 2011 in which they pledged ‘[o] n the basis of recent armed conflicts, to undertake and support a con-
certed study highlighting the relevance of the existing legal framework for the protection of the natural 
environment in contemporary armed conflicts, and identifying any gaps in that context. 2. To co‐ordi-
nate and host a meeting of experts, and on this basis prepare a report, to propose, if appropriate, areas in 
which the legal protection of the natural environment may be clarified and, if necessary, reinforced.’, at 
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terms of military objectives and civilians and civilian objects,14 a distinctive dichotomy 
of IHL, they are not consciously aware of the fact that many IHL provisions already 
protect parts of the natural environment as civilian objects.15 For its basic protection, 
the natural environment is linked to the survival and protection of the civilian popu-
lation.16 Civilians depend on it during and after an armed conflict:  the environment 
nourishes them, grants them protection, serves as a source of life and a livelihood. The 
effects of armed conflicts on the environment often last longer than a war, affecting the 
population in a severe manner for decades.17 Hence, raising awareness by highlighting 
the existing legal regime and in how far it protects the natural environment as a civilian 
object in military manuals and military curricular is of outmost importance:  ‘educa-
tion was a better guarantee of respect for these rules than any sanction could ever be’.18
In the course of the training of forces the rules regulating the conduct of hostilities 
under the law of international armed conflicts are taught and included in military man-
uals.19 This obligation is twofold: first, it contains the obligation to teach IHL within 
states’ armed forces, and second it contains the obligation of commanders to also 
<http:// www.un.org/ en/ ga/ sixth/ 67/ StatProtGeneva/ Sweden_ Eng.pdf > accessed 15 April 2015. Other 
states are still reluctant and critical, see statements in the sixth Committee, by France (UN Doc. A/ C.6/ 69/ 
SR.22, para. 32), the Russian Federation (UN Doc. A/ C.6/ 69/ SR.25, para. 99), or Spain (UN Doc. A/ C.6/ 
69/ SR.26, para. 104).
14 Other actors in the field use a different terminology. Civil society, for instance, talks in drivers of con-
flicts, while the military talk in military objectives. In fact, they do relate to the same protected goods, inter 
alia parts of the natural environment.
15 Cordula Droege and Marie- Louise Tougas, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed 
Conflict— Existing Rules and Need for Further Legal Protection’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International 
Law 1. Nikolai Jorgensen, ‘Protection of Fresh Water in Armed Conflict’ (2007) 2 Journal of International 
Law and International Relations 65ff; Karen Hulme, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold 
(Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 300ff. See also draft principle I(3) of the the ILC’s 
project on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts in which the ILC confirms in 
the Commentary this dichotomy by allowing for attacks on the natural environment only in cases where it 
has become a military objective, see Text of the Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in 
Relation to Armed Conflicts provisionally adopted so far by the Commission, draft principle 9[II- 1], paras. 
12 and 13 in ILC Report, A/ 71/ 10, 2016 (n 4)  chapter 10.
16 Cf. Art. 55(1) AP I. In how far the environment is protected for the sake of itself, as a legal entity, can-
not be discussed in- depth at this point, but part of the broader research project this chapter is based upon.
17 See, for example, the consequences of the armed conflict in Vietnam. See also Jay Austone and Carl 
Bruch, The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge/ 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
18 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary to the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1986), para. 3370. See also the 
preamble to Resolution 22 of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1974– 1977, which states: ‘Convinced 
that a sound knowledge of international humanitarian law is an essential factor for its effective application, 
confident that widespread knowledge of that law will contribute to the promotion of humanitarian ideals 
and a spirit of peace among nations’, printed in ICRC, Official records of the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva 
(1974– 1977) Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian 
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva: Swiss Federal Political Dept.), Vol. I, 215. See also Michael 
Bothe, ‘Warum wird humanitäres Völkerrechts eingehalten oder verletzt? Perspektiven der Durchsetzung 
des humanitären Völkerrechts— neue Entwicklungen und kritische Bilanz’ (2015) 28 Humanitäres 
Völkerrecht— Informationsschriften/ Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict 55.
19 According to Art. 47 GC I, Art. 48 GC II, Art. 127 GC III, Art. 144 GC IV, Art. 83 AP I as well as cus-
tomary international law, see Jean- Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald- Beck (n 2) rule 142. Moreover, 
Arts. 6, 82, 87(2), 84 AP I indirectly refer to the dissemination of IHL.
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instruct the armed forces under their command accordingly.20 I will address the first 
obligation, assuming that once commanders are aware of the rules regulating environ-
mental protection, they will give instructions likewise.
A.  IHL explicitly protecting the natural environment
I will briefly address the legal framework in IHL providing for environmental pro-
tection in international armed conflicts that has to be taught during legal training.21 
Articles 35(3) and 55(1) AP I address and protect the natural environmental explicitly 
as well as the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of 
Environment Modification Techniques (‘ENMOD Convention’).22 Moreover, the natu-
ral environment is generally protected as a civilian object and via the core principles of 
IHL, representing an implicit legal protection of the environment.
Turning first to AP I, it should be kept in mind that AP I only applies to the effects of 
warfare on civilian objectives or military targets located on land, thus excluding naval 
warfare as well as air warfare.23 However, the 1994 San Remo Manual on International 
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea24 as well as the 2010 Harvard Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare25 contain both provisions on 
environmental protection for their respective fields by including a prohibition of wan-
ton destruction of the natural environment and the obligation to pay due regard to the 
natural environment.
Article 35(3) AP I limits the methods and means of warfare in order to protect the 
natural environment. It prohibits ‘methods or means of warfare which are intended or 
may be expected to cause such damage widespread, long- term and severe damage to 
the natural environment’. Article 55(1) AP I contains the same wording regarding the 
threshold, but additionally links it to the health and survival of the civilian population.26
20 Henckaerts and Doswald- Beck (n 2) rule 142 .
21 For in- depth analyses, see Droege and Tougas (n 15); Julian Wyatt, ‘Law- Making At The Intersection Of 
International Environmental, Humanitarian And Criminal Law: The Issue Of Damage To The Environment 
In International Armed Conflict’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red Cross 593; Michael Bothe et al., 
‘International Law Protecting The Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps And Opportunities’ (2010) 
92 International Review of the Red Cross 569; Dieter Fleck, ‘The Protection of the Environment in Armed 
Conflict: Legal Obligations in the Absence of Specific Rules’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 
7ff; Hulme (n 15) 71 ff.
22 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques, 1108 UNTS 151 / [1984] ATS 22, adopted on 10 December 1976, entered into force 5 
October 1978.
23 Stephanie Simonds, ‘Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International 
Legal Reform,’ (1992) 29 Stanford Journal International Law 183.
24 Rule 44, San Remo Institute, San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at 
Sea, 12 June 1994, (1995) 309 International Review of the Red Cross 583– 94.
25 Rules 88 and 89, 2009 Harvard Initiative, ‘Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile 
Warfare’, at <https:// www.google.de/ search?q=harvard+aire+warfare&rlz=1C5CHFA_ enDE667DE667
&oq=harvard+aire+warfare&aqs=chrome..69i57.5492j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF- 8> accessed 13 
March 2015.
26 Art. 55 AP I follows an anthropocentric approach, in contrast to Art. 35(3) AP I. Art. 55 AP I links 
environmental protection with the protection of civilians, it reads as follows: ‘and to prejudice the health or 
survival of the population’. In addition, Art. 55 AP I is placed in Part I Section I on the general protection 
of civilians from hostilities.
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The wording and the definitions of these provisions are disputed. Starting with ‘nat-
ural environment’, this term was not defined by the drafters of AP I.27 For the purposes 
of this chapter, I will rely on a definition that refers to ‘humans, animals, vegetation, 
water, land and the ecosystem as a whole’.28 This definition is supported by the travaux 
préparatoires of AP I: during the negotiations, the Working Group ‘Biotope’, which was 
in charge of the environment, also referred to ‘ecosystems’.29 The inclusion of ecosys-
tems only stresses the intertwined circles of nature, humans, and animals, that con-
tinuously affect each other, and also highlights the importance of the environment for 
humans.
The threshold of ‘widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment’ included in Articles 35(3) and 55(1) AP I sets a very high standard that has never 
been reached, not even during the Vietnam War or the 1991 Gulf War.30 According 
to the travaux préparatoires, the wording ‘long- term’ in the sense of AP I relates to a 
period of time measured in decades; ‘widespread’ and ‘severe’ were not defined, no 
agreement could be reached during the negotiations as to their definitions.31 All three 
conditions have to be fulfilled cumulatively and set an absolute standard, not allow-
ing any exceptions based on military necessity or proportionality.32 The travaux reveal 
that this was actually intended by the states. The practical relevance of these norms is 
almost meaningless if taken word by word.
In contrast, Article 1 ENMOD Convention, which also applies to situations of 
armed conflicts and was adopted just a few months before AP I, is aimed at protect-
ing the natural environment from being turned into a weapon itself.33 The scenar-
ios ENMOD Convention addresses resemble sci- fi movies, but geo- engineering is 
reality today.34 Nevertheless, these techniques are only rarely used in a war theatre. 
27 See Hulme (n 15).
28 Claude Pilloud et al., Commentary On The Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 (Leiden: Martin Nihoff Publishers, Leiden, 1987), Art. 35, para. 1443. Broader definitions 
of the term ‘natural environment’ also refer to human health, which, in consequence, then links to other 
provisions protecting medical personnel, hospitals etc.
29 Pilloud (n 28) Art. 35, para. 1450. However, the reference to ecosystems was eventually deleted by 
Committee III. Moreover, when looking at the other terms in this context, such as Art. 35(3) AP I, the 
Rapporteur defined ‘long- term’ as measured in decades, linking it to ecological catastrophes, thus confirm-
ing the inclusion of ecosystems in the definition of ‘natural environment’, See Pilloud (n 28) Art. 35, para. 
1455 as well as remarks in fn. 120.
30 According to the prevailing opinion, the past conflicts do not meet the prerequisites of AP I or 
ENMOD. It is difficult to imagine what exactly has to be done to qualify according to Art. 35(3) AP I, 
see Countries, ‘Report of the ILC on the Work of its Sixty- third and sixty- fifth Sessions, Chap. IX’, 4 
November 2013, 5.59.2, fn. 153; Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘International Environmental Law at 
the Beginning of the 21st Century’, (2006) 100 American Society of International Law and Procedure 303, 
para. 15; Yoram Dinstein, ‘Protection of the Environment in International Armed Conflict,’ (2001) Max 
Planck UNYB 543ff.
31 Pilloud (n 28) Art. 35, para. 1452.
32 Philippe Sands, ‘International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development’ (1995) 65 British Yearbook 
of International Law 303 on the interpretation; Hulme (n 15) 77.
33 Geo- engineering for the purposes of warfare might become more relevant in the future, since states are 
exploring the possibilities geo- engineering offers. However, a certain level of environmental protection is 
already in place under ENMOD Convention as well the principles of proportionality and military necessity. 
See, for example, Hulme (n 15) 92ff.
34 And its regulation is already discussed— see, for example, David Victor, ‘On The Regulation Of 
Geoengineering’ (2008) 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 322.
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Article 1 ENMOD Convention uses a similar wording but follows a different inten-
tion: it prohibits ‘widespread, long- lasting or severe effects’ caused by means of war-
fare. However, these conditions do not have to be fulfilled at the same time; they are 
alternating conditions.35 The definitions36 of the very similar terms of both treaties 
differ. In ENMOD Convention, ‘long- lasting’ refers to several months or a season, 
‘widespread’ ‘encompasses an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers’ 
and ‘severe’ ‘involves serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural 
economic resources or other assets’.37 Hence, even though the provisions appear to 
be very similar, they have a very different meaning. But both, in the end, lack prac-
tical relevance.
The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (‘AO on Nuclear Weapons’) addressed the envi-
ronment and armed conflict as well. The Court rephrased and summarized Articles 
35(3) and 55(1) AP I by stating:
Taken together, these provisions embody a general obligation to protect the natural 
environment against widespread, long- term and severe environmental damage; the 
prohibition of methods and means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, 
to cause such damage; and the prohibition of attacks against the natural environment 
by way of reprisals.38
The ICJ did not take the opportunity to define and clarify the provisions. Their appli-
cation to real life scenarios is still disputed and it is not clear which military operation 
might trigger the application of the threshold of these provisions.
The 2005 ICRC Study on Customary IHL and its rules 43, 44, and 45 arguably con-
firmed their customary status.39 While rule 45 refers to the wording of Article 35(3) 
AP I and confirms its customary status, the study contains two more rules address-
ing environmental protection: rule 43 stresses the application of the general rules to 
the environment, meaning inter alia the principle of distinction. Rule 44 contains the 
principle of due regard to the protection of the natural environment, a rather vague 
obligation.40
In sum, IHL protects the natural environment explicitly to some degree. It is note-
worthy that states felt the need to address this topic in AP I. This allows today, despite 
the challenging threshold, to include the topic in military curricular.
35 See the wording ‘and’ (Arts. 35(3) and 55 API) in comparison to ‘or’ (Art. 1 ENMOD).
36 See Pilloud (n 28) Art. 35, fn. 120 with further references.
37 Understanding Relating to Article I, Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, UN 
GAOR, Thirty- first Session, Supp. No. 27, UN Doc. A/ 31/ 27 (1976), 91– 2, reprinted in Dietrich Schindler 
and Jirí Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 168.
38 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Judgment of 8 July 1996, 
ICJ Reports 226. For further analysis of this Advisory Opinion, see contributions in Laurence Boisson de 
Chazourne and Philippe Sands, International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
39 Henckaerts and Doswald- Beck (n 2). 40 ibid.
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B.  Protection of the natural environment as a civilian object
Moreover, the core principles of IHL protect the environment,41 and in particular the 
principle of distinction.42 This principle requires a differentiation between civilians/ 
civilian objects and combatants/ military objectives to determine a lawful object of an 
attack.43 The environment is protected as a civilian object, unless it becomes a mili-
tary objective.44 Military objectives, according to Article 52(2) AP I and rule 8 of the 
ICRC Customary IHL Study, can be anything in a combat setting that contributes to 
a military advantage by its ‘nature, location, purpose or use’ to military action and 
whose destruction, capture, or neutralization is of military character and is consid-
ered a military objective. Rule 9 and Article 52(2) AP I state that all other objects are 
civilian and, in consequence, enjoy protection during combat. Civilian objects hence 
cannot lawfully be targeted; only in cases of proportionate attacks that lead to col-
lateral damage, civilian objects and thus the environment can be lawfully affected by 
warfare.
C.  Summary
In sum, treaty and customary law provide for legal protection of the environment in 
relation to armed conflict. This protection can be summarized in two categories: first, 
explicit protection of the environment by Articles 35(3) and 55(1) AP I and rules 43, 
44, and 45 of the 2005 ICRC Study on Customary IHL. Second, the environment is pro-
tected more generally by all provisions protecting civilian objects.
Returning to the topic of training, for states to comply with IHL, the above men-
tioned provisions need to be included and addressed in military curricula and mil-
itary manuals. In turn, environmental considerations will also be included in the 
general assessment conducted by commanders. At the same time, the awareness of 
military forces for the topic will rise. Some states already address questions of envi-
ronmental protection in their military curricular and military manuals,45 however, 
the indirect and secondary protection of the natural environment as a civilian object 
needs to be stressed as well, in particular the role the core principles of IHL play. 
41 Droege and Tougas (n 15) 21ff.
42 Cf. Marie G. Jacobsson, Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, International Law Commission, Sixty- seventh Session, A/ CN.4/ 685, 28 May 2015, paras. 147– 51.
43 Dieter Fleck and Michael Bothe, The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd edn, 2013), para. 132.
44 Droege and Tougas (n 15) 24. See also draft principle 9[II- 1] and its commentary, Text of the Draft 
Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts provisionally adopted so 
far by the Commission, paras. 12 and 13 in ILC Report, A/ 71/ 10, 2016 (n 4)  chapter 10.
45 See, for example, The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, ‘Law of 
Armed Conflict Manual— Joint Service Regulation (ZDv) 15/ 2’ (May 2013), Section 7, 343ff; UK, Ministry 
of Defence, ‘The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict’ JSP 383 (UK, 2004), paras. 5.29ff; 
United States, ‘Operational Law Handbook 2014’ in David H. Lee (ed.), International and Operational Law 
Department (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Judge Advocate General General’s Legal Centre and School, 
2014),  chapter 19; NATO, ‘NATO Legal Deskbook’ (2nd edn, 2010), Part XVII.
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Interestingly, the ILC in its work on the topic did not refer to training in its draft 
principles on the topic.46
17.2.2  Marking of protected sites and zones
While the training of the forces is aimed at guaranteeing the implementation of IHL 
during armed conflicts by the armed forces, the marking of specific sites is intended 
to protect vulnerable sites that could be destroyed in the course of combat but serve a 
higher purpose beyond winning the conflict.47 The installation of so- called demilita-
rized zones (Art. 60 AP I),48 and non- defended localities (Art. 59 AP I) can serve as a 
tool to improve the level of environmental protection during armed conflicts. Their ori-
ginal purpose was to create a refuge from combat settings49 and aimed at humanitar-
ian protection.50 These zones/ localities cannot only be used to protect civilians and the 
wounded and sick,51 they can also serve as a tool to protect sites based on their social, 
economic, or scientific value, as it has been discussed during the negotiations to AP I.52
The ILC during its sixty- seventh session53 discussed the issue of ‘protected zones’ in 
context of preventive measures and agreed on two draft principles on protected zones, 
without limiting itself to a specific type of zone.54 The choice of term used by the ILC clari-
fies its broader understanding of protected zones, not limited to Articles 59 and 60 AP I 
and including inter alia bilateral/ multilateral agreements not connected to armed conflicts 
specifically.55 Draft principle 5 is placed in Part I on general principles, while draft prin-
ciple 13 is placed in Part II of the report addressing principles applicable during armed 
conflict, stressing the correspondence between the pre- conflict and the during conflict 
phases.56 Nevertheless, since this chapter is focused on preventive measures under IHL, 
only the Geneva law and undefended localities and demilitarized zones are analysed.
A.  Undefended localities, Article 59 AP I
Article 59 AP I  as well as rule 37 of the ICRC Study on customary IHL protect 
undefended localities that are situated in a zone near the line of combat (Art. 59(2) AP I). 
46 For the provisionally adopted draft principles and the other draft principles that are still being dis-
cussed within the ILC, see ILC Report, A/ 71/ 10, 2016 (n 4)  chapter 10, paras. 135, 138, 159– 61.
47 They were intended to be used as refuge for the wounded and sick, for cultural sites, natural sites, etc.
48 This does not refer to the demilitarized zones in Korea or the Middle East, which are the result of a 
peace agreement after a conflict.
49 Pilloud (n 28) Part IV, Section I, Chapter V, para. 2259. 50 ibid. Art. 60, para. 2303.
51 Fleck and Bothe (n 43) para. 512.
52 Bothe et  al., New Rules For Victims of Armed Conflicts— Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Leiden: Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) 375.
53 Cf. Draft Principle 5, ILC Report, A/ 71/ 10, 2016 (n 4)  chapter 10, para. 189. Earlier in 2015, the Special 
Rapporteur had included a section on ‘protected zones and areas’ in her Second Report on the Protection of 
the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, Sixty- seventh Session, 2015, A/ CN.4/ 685 (n 42) part IX.
54 Text of the Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts 
Provisionally Adopted so far by the Commission in Report of the International Law Commission on the 
work of its Sixty- eighth Session, ILC Report, A/ 71/ 10, 2016,  chapter 10 (n 3) para. 189.
55 For other types of protected zones/ areas, such as nuclear- weapon- free zones or natural heritages zones, 
see Jacobsson (n 42) part IX.
56 ibid. draft principle 13, 339, para. 1.
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They are declared unilaterally and cover localities without any military presence or 
military objectives inside. The definition of the term ‘localities’ in the sense of Article 
59 AP I includes inhabited localities, which does not apply to most environmental hot-
spots. Localities are ‘wider than single buildings but narrower than a whole city or 
town’, hence referring to populated urban settings.57 An undefended locality does not 
have to be an entire city or town, it can be a distinct part within a city as well.58 With 
regards to the natural environment, undefended localities thus include only parts of the 
environment that are situated in urban settings. Environmental hotspots, usually situ-
ated in unpopulated areas, will not be accorded protection based on Article 59 AP I.
B.  Demilitarized zones, Article 60 AP I
Demilitarized zones in the sense of Article 60 AP I, on the other hand, are neither 
restricted to populated areas nor limited in their size; they can extend to any area. 
These zones are solely based on an agreement between the belligerent parties accord-
ing to Article 60(1) AP I. They are usually situated in the hinterland, far away from 
the line of combat.59 To acquire the status, a withdrawal of forces and equipment has 
to be conducted; no military objectives are allowed in a demilitarized zone.60 In turn, 
a demilitarized zone cannot be lawfully targeted anymore.61 Moreover, the protection 
also extends to the surroundings of a demilitarized zone, making the protected area 
even larger.62
During the negotiations, the German representative highlighted the idea to not only 
protect the civilian population and the wounded and sick combatants, but to use a 
demilitarized zone ‘to serve to protect the economic and cultural values, represented 
by the localities themselves’.63 The representative of Uruguay made a very similar pro-
posal, suggesting to amend Article 60 AP I to include ‘places which are inhabited or 
are of particular interest from the artistic, archeological, historical or religious point of 
view’. Poland’s delegation wanted to cover geographical areas that could be composed 
of scattered dwellings or a number of separate villages.64 Hence, it appears reasonable 
to install demilitarized zones in order to protect environmental hotspots, such as natu-
ral reserves or natural parks. These zones are also protected under customary interna-
tional law, as analysed in rule 36 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL.
However, Article 60 AP I entails some problems: chances to conclude such an agree-
ment while a conflict is ongoing are rather low.65 Hence, the negotiation of specially 
protected zones in peacetime is advisable. But this causes other difficulties: the iden-
tification of the parties to the agreement establishing the zone is quite problematic, at 
least in the pre- conflict phase. How to identify potential belligerent parties? One pos-
sible solution is to agree among neighbouring states on demilitarized zones to inter 
57 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 109.
58 ibid. 59 Bothe et al. (n 52) Art. 60, para. 2.1. 60 Pilloud (n 28) Art. 60, para. 2305.
61 Fleck and Bothe (n 43) para. 626. 62 ibid. para. 512.
63 Howard Levie, Protection Of War Victims: Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1979), 376.
64 ibid. 375. 65 Pilloud (n 28) Part IV, Section I, Chapter V, para. 2262.
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alia prevent environmental damage in cases of armed conflicts and exempt them from 
combat zones. Admittedly, the combat zone in a pre- conflict setting will still be unclear. 
Another option could be in the rise of an armed conflict, as a quid pro quo, to negotiate 
demilitarized zones for the benefit of all parties.
C.  Summary
While undefended localities (Article 59 AP I) protect parts of the natural environment 
in urban settings, states can establish demilitarized zones in terms of Article 60 AP I. The 
moment of creation of such a zone is crucial; at the same time it faces severe challenges. 
How to identify possible belligerent parties? What territory should be protected as a pro-
tected zone, without highlighting individual vulnerable points? A creation post- conflict 
in peace agreements, not based on Article 60 AP I, to restore justice and to prevent future 
damage to the environment might solve some of these aspects and will be discussed in 
detail in the second section of this chapter.
17.2.3  Weapons review, Article 36 AP I
Article 36 AP I requires the High Contracting Parties of AP I to conduct a legal review 
of their ‘new weapon, means or method of warfare’.66 It is conducted in preparation of 
an armed conflict, hence Article 36 AP I contains an obligation that applies in times of 
peace before an armed conflict takes place.67 This gives reason to discuss Article 36 AP 
I in the course of this chapter.68 The review of new weapons or means or methods of war-
fare is intended to guarantee a lawful conduct of hostilities while making sure that in the 
course of the study and development of new weapons the legal framework regulating their 
deployment is taken into account. It thus has a similar purpose as the preventive measures 
discussed above; they have in common that they intend to reduce violations of IHL during 
combat, and they apply and are implemented before an armed conflict takes place, hence 
during peacetime. The weapons review is thus considered together with the other preven-
tive measures.
Weapons that are per se illegal under IHL are supposed to be ruled out at the ear-
liest stage possible. Article 36 AP I refers to the legal background against which 
the review has to be conducted. This includes all prohibitions ‘by any other rule of 
international law applicable to the High Contracting Party’. It is agreed today that 
not only IHL, but also human rights law has to be considered during the weapons 
review.69 Moreover, the UN International Law Commission has stated that there exists 
66 In the following, I will only refer to new weapons; this, however, also includes new means and methods 
of warfare.
67 Szasz states that it should be fully applicable in pre- conflict situations while acknowledging that it can-
not be easily applied during hostilities, see Richard Grunawalt et al., Protection Of The Environment During 
Armed Conflict (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 1996), 282.
68 The ILC did not include a draft principle on Art. 36 AP I or on a weapons review in its work, even 
though it considered the issue at some point during informal consultations, in which the author participated.
69 Stuart Casey- Masley (ed.), Weapons Under International Human Rights Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 421– 8.
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a presumption that international environmental treaty law among other fields of inter-
national law continues to apply during armed conflicts.70 Thus, the body of law that has 
to be considered in the course of a weapons review according to Article 36 AP I entails 
IHL,71 human rights law, and also international environmental law.72
Moreover, apart from the legal background, the situation Article 36 AP I addresses 
is quite different than most situations addressed by IHL, allowing for a more time- 
consuming decision. Usually, IHL addresses situations in which commanders have 
to decide quickly, on the basis of very little information. The situation in which 
a legal review of new weapons is conducted is quite different, allowing for exten-
sive testing in an ideal setting, based on comparative analyses while relying on 
cooperations with various experts, such as engineers, medical, and also environ-
mental experts.73 This special situation allows for new approaches and involves a 
high potential when discussing environmental protection in the context of armed 
conflicts.
17.2.4  Summary
The training of forces, the marking of protected sites and zones as well as the weapons 
review are preventive measures under IHL that are conducted in peacetime. They can 
contribute to protect the environment in relation to armed conflict. Highlighting the 
civilian nature of the environment in training will raise awareness among the armed 
forces. Environmental hot spots can be included in demilitarized zones in the sense of 
Article 60 AP I, even though this bears some risks since they become more visible. The 
weapons review requires environmental considerations and consultations with envi-
ronmental experts contribute to a higher level of environmental protection. But in how 
far are these measure relevant to post- conflict situations and on what legal bases? Can 
they contribute to the idea of justice after war?
17.3 Preventive Measures Under IHL and  
their Post- Conflict Impact
IHL contains post- conflict provisions that continue to apply even after the termination 
of an armed conflict. They regulate certain situations and topics, such as the provisions 
70 ILC, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties (Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two: 2011), Art. 7 together with the Annex lit. g, Commentary para. 2.
71 Specifically Arts. 36 and 51(1) AP I in the context of environmental protection as well as the IHL prin-
ciples, see Section 17.2.1 A and B of this chapter.
72 A legal analysis of these different fields of law and their possible interplay is part of a broader research 
project I am conducting. It is soon to be published as a doctoral thesis.
73 ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare - Measures 
to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I  of 1977 (Geneva:  ICRC, 2006), 6,17; William Parks, 
‘Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews’ (2007) 8 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
127f; Justin McClelland, ‘The Review Of Weapons In Accordance With Article 36 Of Additional Protocol 
I’ (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 411; Isabelle Daoust et al., ‘New Wars, New Weapons? 
The Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare’ (2002) 84 International 
Review of the Red Cross 352.
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on prisoners of war.74 The transition from an armed conflict to peace, from jus in bello 
to peacetime law, is far from clear and cannot simply be addressed by referring to 
either law.75 Hence, organizing frameworks and principles that regulate a post- conflict 
phase— the transition from conflict to peace— need to be discussed. I argue that this 
debate should also include preventive measures under IHL that impact post- conflict 
settings.
Whether the above analysed provisions relating to environmental protection also 
impact the period after an armed conflict will be analysed in the following sub- sections.
17.3.1  Training and its post- conflict impact
In general, training has a ‘continued’ function, as I refer to it. States continuously train their 
armed forces, refreshing their skills, preparing them for new war theatres, new technolo-
gies and developments. These changes encourage states to update their military manuals 
and military curricular, which serve as educational tools.76 These updates are also based 
on lessons learned from previous conflicts, the reactions of other states to the conducted 
hostilities, as well as on practice by and within the UN. There is, however, no explicit legal 
obligation in the conventions to update them, but logic requires updating military manu-
als and curricular as to modifications in law, custom, and policy as well as new weapons 
and technologies. A post- conflict impact can thus be confirmed.
17.3.2  Protected zones and their post- conflict impact
In post- conflict settings, lessons learned are a valuable source for future conflicts and the 
implementation of IHL. Especially in the context of undefended localities, since they are 
based on a unilateral act, in the hands of and at the discretion of each individual state, if 
installed wisely they can improve the degree of de jure and de facto protection, also when 
it comes to the protection of the environment. Analysing their ‘success’ once a conflict has 
ended can help to analyse what is to be considered and improved in the future.
Turning to demilitarized zones, as stated above, a mutual pre- conflict agreement on 
a demilitarized zone according to Article 60 AP I can pose problems identifying its pro-
spective parties. Neighbouring states can conclude such an agreement in a pre- conflict 
setting, but the identification of such zones still poses problems. For states that do not 
share borders, it is even more difficult to determine with which state they might enter 
into an armed conflict with in the future. In a post- conflict setting, however, after hav-
ing analysed the impact of the armed conflict and vulnerable spots, the former belliger-
ent parties can agree to conclude an agreement on a demilitarized zone, detached from 
Article 60 AP I and the Geneva law.
The demilitarization of a specific zone post- conflict— perhaps the most realis-
tic option for a protected zone— can be done in the course of negotiations of peace 
74 See Arts. 33, 34, 74, 78, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91 AP I. See also Bothe et al. (n 52) Art. 3, 157. For the jus 
post bellum and prisoners of war, see Bass (n 6).
75 Stahn (n 4).
76 See ICRC Customary IHL Study, Practice Relating to Rule No. 142, Section A. III, in Henckaerts and 
Doswald- Beck (n 2).
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agreements.77 A peace agreement, however, will most certainly not be concluded on 
the basis of Article 60 AP I, but independently from the Geneva law. Outside the con-
text of Article 60 AP I, belligerent parties are free to agree on protected zones as well.78 
This kind of zone cannot only protect civilians and civilian objects; the parties can also 
decide to leave certain areas and sites out of the conduct of hostilities. The Antarctic 
and the Åland Islands, for instance, are demilitarized zones, based on international 
treaties and detached from Article 60 AP I.79 The border between North and South 
Korea is demilitarized as well, based on a mutual agreement from 1953, thus not refer-
ring to the only later adopted Article 60 AP I either. This particular protected zone at 
the Korean border has interestingly created a de facto ‘nature reserve’,80 even though 
back then the parties to the armistice agreement were not aware of, or at least did not 
intend, the environmental consequences the establishment of the zone would have.81 
Used deliberately, demilitarized zones can serve in post- conflict settings to, at least, 
restore the environment. Interestingly, the Special Rapporteur in her third report did 
not address the creation of protected zones in peace agreements, but focused on the 
role peace agreements can play in protecting and managing the environment in post- 
conflict settings,82 which is an important issue as well.
It should be borne in mind, however, that the ‘privileged’ protection granted to med-
ical personnel and their marking has made them more vulnerable than ever, as shown 
by today’s non- international armed conflicts. Attacks on medical personnel have 
increased over the past years, some non- state actors tend to hit the opponent where it 
hurts most, even if this means illegal conduct.83 This has resulted in actually not mark-
ing health care personnel anymore in the field. This risk should be kept in mind when 
discussing the marking of environmental hotspots.
17.3.3  Article 36 AP I and its post- conflict impact
Article 36 AP I has a good chance of improving the current situation if taken ser-
iously in a post- conflict setting. I argue that monitoring of new weapons and means 
77 Cf. Jacobsson (n 1) paras. 154– 60.
78 The ILC’s Special Rapporteur categorized demilitarized zone into three types, demilitarized areas 
under the sovereignty of a state, demilitarized areas place under the control of a limited group of 
states or international organs, and demilitarized areas outside national jurisdiction, see Jacobsson (n 
40) para. 214.
79 Fleck and Bothe (n 43) para. 513.
80 Hanson et  al. (n 74)  584; Machlis and Hanson (n 74)  732. Moreover, media is covering the topic 
from time to time as well, see <http:// www.theguardian.com/ environment/ 2012/ apr/ 13/ wildlife- thriving- 
korean- demilitarised- zone> accessed 6 April 2015.
81 Hanson et  al., ‘Warfare In Biodiversity Hotspots’ (2009) 23 Conservation Biology 578, 584; 
Gary Machlis and Thor Hanson, Warfare Ecology— A New Synthesis for Peace and Security (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2011), 732. Moreover, media is covering the topic from time to time as well, see 
<http:// www.theguardian.com/ environment/ 2012/ apr/ 13/ wildlife- thriving- korean- demilitarised- zone> 
accessed 6 April 2015.
82 Cf. Draft Principle III- 1, ILC Report, A/ CN.4/ 700, 2016 (n 1)  chapter 10, paras. 154– 60.
83 This problem has been addressed, inter alia, by the International Review of the Red Cross in two special 
issues on ‘Violence Against Health Care’, see, ‘Humanitarian Debate: Law, Policy, Action— Violence Against 
Health Care, Part I: The Problem and the Law’ International Review of the Red Cross (2013) and the second 
issue, ‘Humanitarian debate: Law, Policy, Action— Violence Against Health Care, Part II: The Way Forward’ 
International Review of the Red Cross (2013). The same is true for cultural heritage in armed conflicts, see 
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and methods of warfare is legally required after their first deployment and can improve 
the situation on the ground regarding the environment.
First of all, a monitoring or an observation of the environmental consequences of 
armed conflicts can be used as a means within the conduct of the weapons review. It is 
very useful in a comparitve study with already deployed weapons and their effects in 
the field when analysing the legality of new weapons and their anticipated effects.
Second, such monitoring can also be used to re- evaluate and revisit the original 
review to see whether the anticipated effects have materialized during the first deploy-
ment. In the course of the review, recommendations or instructions are issued for the 
approval of new weapons, for example, restricting it to lawful deployment only. These 
recommendations or instructions, based on the anticipated effects, might need revi-
sion. The re- evaluation, resulting from the monitoring, can thus lead to a revision of 
the original review. Moreover, new findings can also result in changes for other weap-
ons, meaning a re- evaluation and revision as well.
Third, depending on new treaty obligations or changes in policy, the deployment of 
a new weapon or means or method of warfare can be illegal, thus requiring a revision. 
In cases of modifications to existing weapons or means and methods of warfare, a new 
review is required anyway. Some authors refer to this as a ‘change of circumstances’.84 
The following sub- section of the chapter will analyse possible legal bases for such an 
assertion.
A.  Monitoring
Article 36 AP I has only rarely been implemented by states.85 The vague obliga-
tion to ‘determine’ might be the reason for this. Moreover, compliance mechanisms, 
such as reporting or monitoring, are not required by IHL,86 at least not explicitly. 
Additionally, there is no express legal obligation of the targeted nor of the attack-
ing state to conduct a post- conflict assessment either. Furthermore, assessments con-
ducted by international organizations or other states, if not with the permission or 
on invitation of the affected state, violate a state’s sovereignty and might be rejected. 
The UN Environment Programme, established by UN General Assembly’s resolution 
also ‘ISIS Extremists Bulldoze Ancient Assyrian Site Near Mozul’ The Guardian (6 March 2015), at <http:// 
www.theguardian.com/ world/ 2015/ mar/ 05/ islamic- state- isis- extremists- bulldoze- ancient- nimrud- site- 
mosul- iraq> accessed 13 March 2015, regarding ISIS and their destructions of the artefacts in Mosul. In 
consequence, the actual value of marking vulnerable sites needs to be reconsidered.
84 Without a legal analysis, but agreeing on this, Parks (n 73) 134. Others only refer to a review of the 
review, see McClelland (n 73) 413; Alan Backstrom and Ian Henderson, ‘New Capabilities in Warfare: An 
Overview of Contemporary Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues 
in Article 36 Weapons Reviews’ (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 510.
85 William H. Boothby, ‘How Will Weapons Reviews Address the Challenges Posed by New Technologies?’ 
(2013) 52 Military Law and the Law of War Review 22, 43– 8.
86 Monitoring mechanisms based on arms control laws and others will not be addressed by this chapter. 
But the ICRC in a report from 1992 to the UN General Assembly stated: ‘In addition, other international 
institutions and treaties bearing on environmental issues have their own monitoring and implementation 
mechanisms, which may be important in dealing with a wide range of cases of environmental damage.’ UN 
General Assembly, Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict— Report of the Secretary- 
General, UN Doc. A/ RES/ 47/ 37, 25 November 1992, 31.
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2997,87 has been conducting post- crisis environmental impact assessments over the 
past decades, but only on request by the affected states. I argue, however, that a moni-
toring is required by logic after the conduct of hostilities, resulting from Article 36 AP 
I together with Article 35(3) AP I.
i.  Resulting from Article 36 AP I
A plain reading of Article 36 AP I suggests that the weapons review only covers the 
pre- conflict phase, while applying the laws that govern armed conflicts. ‘Study, devel-
opment, acquisition or adoption’ are terms that relate to actions before the first deploy-
ment. The term ‘new’ weapons confirms this, since its definition relates to the time 
before the actual deployment, namely from its study up to its purchase. Once deployed 
by the state conducting the review, a weapon cannot, in any case, be regarded as new 
anymore. Hence, at first sight, IHL and Article 36 AP I do not require a monitoring of 
newly deployed weapons.
From a logical point of view, however, it appears very reasonable to have a follow- up, 
a re- evaluation of newly deployed weapons, and their prior purely hypothetical and the-
oretical anticipated effects. Since in the situation of an armed conflict there is only little 
time to consider the devastating effects a weapon can have, commanders rely on recom-
mendations that have been made during the review process. A re- evaluation based on 
actual experience in a war theatre with such weapons appears to be appropriate. There 
is, however, no legal basis in Article 36 AP I.
ii.  Based on Article 36 AP I together with Article 35(3) AP I
At second glance, Article 36 AP I, read in context with the entire Protocol, suggests that 
it has a much broader impact. The provision refers to prohibitions and restrictions of 
AP I that regulate the conduct of hostilities. This also relates to Article 35 AP I, which 
contains the basic rules governing means and methods of warfare. Article 35(3) AP I 
specifically addresses and protects the natural environment.88
I argue that Article 35(3) AP I presupposes an assessment and monitoring of the 
effects of the conduct of hostilities during past conflicts and their environmental 
consequences. This includes the deployment of new weapons or means and methods 
of warfare. This assertion is based on Article 35(3) AP I’s wording, more specifically 
on the threshold ‘widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment’. As stated above, the wording ‘long- term’ in the sense of AP I relates to a period 
of time measured in decades.89 This means that states were aware that even after 
an armed conflict, the consequences of hostilities may impact the natural environ-
ment and influence a legal classification according to Article 35(3) AP I, which can 
87 UN Doc. RES/ A/ 2997 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, following the 1972 Rio Conference on the 
Human Environment (Rio Declaration).
88 See Section 17.2.1 A and B of this chapter.
89 ICRC, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of the 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (1978), 268f, para. 27. To recall, the terms 
‘widespread’ and ‘severe’ are neither defined in the Protocol nor in the travaux préparatoires, no agreement 
could be reached during the negotiations as to their definitions, see Pilloud (n 28) Art. 35, para. 1452.
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only be analysed in the aftermath of a conflict, sometimes even decades later if the 
consequences are enduring. The only way to know whether the consequences of the 
deployment of a weapon are ‘long- term’ is to monitor its consequences in the after-
math of a conflict.
Hence, Article 36 AP I together with Article 35(3) AP I requires monitoring of envir-
onmental consequences of wars to have a solid basis for comparison in the course of 
the weapons review.
B.  Re- evaluation and revisions
This raises the issue to what extent states are obliged to revise their reviews based on 
the monitoring. Article 36 AP I only requires a review of ‘new’ weapons. The question 
to what extent the anticipated effects materialized during combat does not seem to 
be of relevance according to AP I. However, once a state is aware of unlawful conse-
quences of its weapons, it is bound by bona fide as well as its legal obligations deriving 
from IHL and other laws regulating armed conflicts to guarantee a lawful deployment. 
A re- evaluation and revision of the first issued recommendations and decisions in the 
course of the weapons review seems to be an appropriate tool to verify the lawfulness. 
But not only new findings deriving from monitoring, but also changes in law or policy 
might result in a re- evaluation and revision of a review. These are, however, not based 
on Article 36 AP I, but on the modified laws or policies and bona fide. Otherwise a 
deployment repeating the once identified unlawful effects would be unlawful and vio-
late the other laws or policies.
C.  Summary
Monitoring, if taken seriously, requires a re- evaluation and revision of the weapons 
review to guarantee a lawful deployment of means and methods of warfare accord-
ing to the laws regulating armed conflicts. The monitoring itself is not required by an 
explicit legal basis, but it is presupposed by Article 35(3) AP I and its wording ‘long- 
term’, referring to environmental damage that lasts for several decades. Article 36 AP 
I, which also relates to Article 35(3), is based inter alia on a comparative analysis with 
other weapons and their reviews. A solid basis for such a comparison only stands if all 
reviews are revised based on the actual consequences in a war theatre and not only on 
the anticipated and purely theoretical ones before their first deployment. However, a 
sound legal basis for monitoring, re- evaluation, and revision does not exist in AP I. It is 
rather a post- conflict impact based on logic and Articles 36 and 35(3) AP I. Article 36 
AP I, as a preparatory measure with preventive aspects, mainly influences peacetime 
armament rather than post- conflict peacebuilding. Nevertheless, a post- conflict assess-
ment of newly deployed weapons can be very useful.
17.4 Conclusion
Preventive measures under IHL do have some impact in post- conflict settings when 
it comes to environmental protection. They need to be included in frameworks and 
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principles regulating the transition from conflict to peace and contribute to re- install 
justice after war. The training of military forces, a continuous task, is intended to guar-
antee a lawful conduct of hostilities. It is essential to include references as to the pro-
tection the environment enjoys in this context and its explicit protection according to 
Articles 35(3) and 55(1) AP I. Additionally, the protection the natural environment 
enjoys via the principles of proportionality and military necessity as well as a civilian 
object (principle of distinction) need to be highlighted as well. Raising awareness of the 
topic and of its relevance should be the main objective. A first step is taken by including 
this in military curricula and military manuals. Furthermore, when talking about post- 
conflict settings, the updating of military manuals and military curricula is also crucial.
Protected zones, such as undefended localities in urban settings and demilitarized 
zones in the hinterland, can be used to protect parts of the environment and environ-
mental hotspots. Even though the identification of potential parties to a conflict might 
be a challenge in the uprising or aftermath of an armed conflict, agreeing on demili-
tarized zones in sense of Article 60 AP I or including zones in armistice agreements 
regarding future conflicts and vulnerable environmental sites can improve the level 
of environmental protection in the long run. However, practice, especially regarding 
medical personnel, shows that the marking of vulnerable spots might result in the con-
trary, meaning intensified attacks on these vulnerable sites.
Article 36 AP I as well as logical considerations deriving from provisions regulating 
the conduct of hostilities and arms control laws require states to conduct a weapons 
review. From an economical perspective, this review should be conducted at the earli-
est stage possible to avoid unnecessary expenditures on unlawful weapons or means 
and methods of warfare. The review is based on several methods, for example, a com-
parative analysis with other weapons. This comparative method, together with the 
threshold of Article 35(3) AP I and long- term damage which is measured in decades, 
consequently requires states to assess the deployment of their weapons and means and 
methods of warfare after a conflict is over. A monitoring has to be conducted, since only 
environmental damage that lasts for decades fulfils the threshold of Article 35(3) AP I, 
which is part of the legal background against which the weapon review is conducted. 
Once a state possesses the outcome of the assessment and is aware of the consequences 
of its warfare conduct, it is bound by bona fide and its legal obligations regulating the 
conduct of hostilities to re- evaluate the legality of its weapons and means and methods 
of warfare and revise prior recommendations.
In sum, the IHL measures addressed connect the pre- conflict with the post- con-
flict phase. IHL impacts post- conflict actions and requires states to extract lessons 
learned from past conflicts in preparation for war and in order to prevent illegal con-
duct, including the prevention of unlawful damage to the environment ‘after the war is 
before the war’.
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18.1 Introduction
The physical, chemical, and explosive remnants of armed conflicts can create lasting 
threats to communities and ecosystems. They pose immediate and long- term risks to 
human health and livelihoods, and undermine the viability of natural resources upon 
which the human population depend. How and where wars are fought, and by whom, 
are important factors in determining the impact of conflicts and their associated mili-
tary activities on the environment. The mechanization and intensification of warfare, 
increasing urbanization, and industrial development have all increased the likelihood 
that toxic hazards will be generated. During conflicts and in their wake, the collapse of 
environmental governance and management systems is commonplace, and for indus-
trializing and industrialized countries alike, this too risks contributing to lasting envi-
ronmental damage.
Since the 1990s, efforts by states, international organizations, and civil society to 
address the remnants of war have prioritized the immediate threat of the explosive 
remnants of war (‘ERW’), anti- personnel land mines, booby traps, and, increasingly, 
improvised explosive devices. These efforts have been underpinned by effective advo-
cacy framings based on the direct humanitarian consequences of these weapons. These 
framings overwrote earlier more holistic advocacy messaging on the material remnants 
of wars, which sought to simultaneously encompass environmental and humanitar-
ian risks. With renewed attention being focused on the means through which envi-
ronmental protection in relation to armed conflict may be enhanced, there has been 
a reappraisal of the remnants of war and the emergence of a new focus on the toxic 
remnants of war (‘TRW’). In 2016, this advocacy framing was strengthened after the 
International Law Commission (‘ILC’) published a draft principle that addressed the 
‘toxic and hazardous remnants of war’.
This chapter explores the context of the ILC’s work on conflict and the environment; 
it analyses the lasting impact that civil society advocacy frames have had on the percep-
tion of and response to the remnants of war; and reviews the utility of the ILC’s draft 
principles for future efforts to address TRW.
* Doug Weir manages the Toxic Remnants of War Project, Manchester, UK.
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18.2 Context
The renewed effort to tackle the lamentable state of protection for the environment 
in relation to armed conflicts can be traced back to 2009, when the United Nations 
Environment Programme (‘UNEP’) published a major study documenting the current 
gaps in protection and identifying opportunities for progress.1 Although many of these 
avenues had been identified by legal scholars and debated at length prior to 2009, in 
distilling these views, the study, and its recommendations, helped pave the way for 
what can be viewed as the third major phase of interest in the topic; the first and second 
having followed the war in SE Asia and the 1991 Gulf War respectively.
The 2009 UNEP report found that numerous bodies of law may provide protection 
at different points in the cycle of conflicts. As such, it recommended that the topic be 
adopted for study by the ILC, and that the Commission seek to make sense of the rela-
tionship between these different bodies of law. The ILC duly adopted the topic for study 
in 2011,2 and in 2013, its Nordic ILC member Dr Marie Jacobsson was appointed as its 
Special Rapporteur, beginning what would become a stocktaking of relevant law and 
norms, based on their applicability before, during, and after armed conflicts.
While the ILC is tasked by the UN General Assembly with promoting the progres-
sive development of international law and with its codification, in this case the Special 
Rapporteur elected only to propose non- binding draft principles. These were to be syn-
thesized from existing law and state practice, and presented to the ILC and govern-
ments for further consideration. In light of the vast scope of what is viewed as ‘conflict 
and the environment’, and the complexity of the interactions between the different legal 
regimes under review, the Special Rapporteur divided her research on what she termed 
the Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts (‘PERAC’) loosely along 
temporal lines. This would relate to preventative measures designed to enhance protec-
tion before conflicts; the legal framework protecting the environment during conflicts; 
and principles designed to restore and respond to environmental damage in their wake.
While the environmental conduct of states and militaries during conflicts initially 
mediates the scope and intensity of environmental degradation, it is these latter prin-
ciples covering the post- conflict phase that are of particular interest for scholars of jus 
post bellum. Also important is the approach underpinning the work of the ILC, which 
has drawn on International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’), International Environmental 
Law (‘IEL’), and Human Rights Law (‘HRL’). The PERAC work stream has also drawn 
heavily on state practice and the practice of international organizations, and no more 
so than in its work relating to the post- conflict phase. By 2016, the Special Rapporteur 
had published three reports on PERAC, a preliminary report in 2014,3 a second in 2015 
1 Elizabeth Maruma Mrema et al., Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and 
Analysis of International Law (UNEP, 2010).
2 UN Doc. A/ 66/ 10, at <http:// legal.un.org/ docs/ ?path=../ ilc/ reports/ 2011/ english/ annex.pdf&lang= 
EFSRAC> accessed 9 February 2017.
3 Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report, International Law Commission, Sixty- 
sixth Session, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ 674 (2014).
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that focused in part on conduct during conflicts,4 and a third in 2016 that considered 
the law and practice relevant to the post- conflict phase.5
The second and third reports also proposed draft principles for consideration by the 
ILC and governments. Six principles were proposed in the 2015 report— one on pre-
ventative measures prior to conflicts, and five on military conduct during conflicts.6 
The third report contained nine draft principles, seven of which related to post- conflict 
obligations, one on preventative measures to complement the principle proposed 
in 2015’s report, together with a principle on the rights of indigenous peoples.7 The 
reports, and the principles they contained, were a substantial body of work, work 
that progressed at a speed that proved uncomfortable for some members of the ILC. 
Governments contributed reports on their own practice and experiences to the Special 
Rapporteur during the process, and also debated the issues raised during annual ses-
sions of the UN General Assembly’s Sixth Committee.8
Five of the draft principles proposed by the ILC’s Special Rapporteur in 2016 had 
particular relevance for one form of environmental and humanitarian harm associated 
with both international and non- international armed conflicts, and increasingly with 
hybrid conflicts:  the TRW. Of these, the draft principle on Remnants of war was the 
most relevant. It was also subject to significant changes following its publication by the 
ILC. Notably, the revision of the draft principle by the ILC and its Drafting Committee 
reversed a process that, since the 1970s, had seen ERW become separated from other 
chemical and physical legacies of conflict.
18.3 The Historic Decoupling of the Environment 
from Mine Action
The two previous phases of international attention on the environmental impact of 
conflict, in the late 1970s and early 1990s, saw narratives anchored in the harm associ-
ated with chemicals and pollution. In the 1970s, attention focused on the widespread 
damage caused by chemical defoliants in SE Asia, the most notorious of which was 
Agent Orange. After the 1991 Gulf War, it was the national and regional consequences 
of pollution from oil fires that catalysed renewed debate on the weakness of legal pro-
tection for the environment in relation to armed conflicts.9 For SE Asia, the pernicious 
4 Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Second Report, International Law Commission, Sixty- seventh 
Session, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ 685 (2015).
5 Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Third Report, International Law Commission, Sixty- seventh 
Session, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ 700 (2016).
6 ILC Study (n 4). 7 ILC Study (n 5).
8 For coverage of the three debates by the TRW Project, and links to national statements, see: ‘Blog: Which 
States are Progressive on Conflict and the Environment?’ (28 August, 2015), at <http:// www.trwn.org/ blog- 
which- states- are- progressive- on- conflict- and- the- environment/ > accessed 9 February 2017; ‘What States 
Said on Conflict and the Environment at the UN Last Week and Why it Matters’ (16 November 2015), at 
<http:// www.trwn.org/ what- states- said- on- conflict- and- the- environment- at- the- un- last- week- and- why-  
it- matters/ > accessed 9 February 2017; ‘States Back Further Progress on Conflict and Environment in 
UN Legal Debate’ (9 November 2016), at <http:// www.trwn.org/ states- support- further- legal- work- on- 
environmental- protection- in- conflict/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
9 Glen Plant (ed.), Environmental Protection and the Law of War:  A  Fifth Geneva Convention on the 
Protection of the Environment in the Time of Armed Conflict? (John Wiley & Sons, 1992).
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legacy of the dioxin TCDD, which was present in the chemical defoliants, continues to 
affect human health; while efforts to remediate areas affected by the 1991 oil spills and 
fires are expected to continue until 2020.10
Conflict pollution would again become visible during the conflicts in the Balkans, 
particularly during the Kosovo War when NATO aircraft targeted industrial facilities 
and utilized depleted uranium ammunition.11 International concern over both forms 
of pollution during the wars helped launch UNEP’s work on conflicts, and the sub-
sequent development of their model of post- conflict environmental assessments.12 
Since then, assessments by UNEP and other international organizations have added 
considerably to our understanding of the environmental drivers and consequences 
of armed conflicts and, in this respect, it is perhaps unsurprising that that the current 
phase of interest in conflict and the environment has coincided with this expansion 
of knowledge.
The situation following the conflict in SE Asia contrasted starkly to that of today, par-
ticularly where it concerned the remnants of wars, whether toxic, explosive, or phys-
ical. Throughout much of the 1970s, there was far less distinction between post- conflict 
environmental and explosive hazards, with all forms of remnants framed in the dis-
course as the material remnants of war. And it was UNEP that was tasked by the UN 
General Assembly with studying ‘the problem of the material remnants of wars, par-
ticularly mines, and their effects on the environment’.
The UN General Assembly had first begun considering the remnants of wars in 
1975, with UNEP publishing an initial scoping report and governmental consulta-
tion in 1977.13 The environmental impacts highlighted were broad, covering loss 
of access to fishing, mineral, or agricultural resources, damage to land through 
cratering or the removal of ERW, and the effects of the chemical constituents of 
munitions on human health and the ecosystem as a whole. For a more detailed 
discussion on the environmental impact of land mines and ERW, see  chapter 16 in 
this volume.
In 1976, UNEP canvassed states on ‘the feasibility and desirability of convening an 
intergovernmental meeting on the environmental problems of the material remnants 
of wars’. A lack of government interest meant that the meeting did not take place but 
the scoping report was submitted to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation 
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 
10 Laurence Menhinick, ‘Blog: What the Environmental Legacy of the Gulf War Should Teach Us’ (18 
March 2016), at <http:// www.trwn.org/ blog- what- the- environmental- legacy- of- the- gulf- war- should- teach- 
 us/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
11 ICBUW, ‘A Question of Responsibility— the Legacy of Depleted Uranium Use in the Balkans’ (11 
October 2010), at <http:// www.bandepleteduranium.org/ en/ a- question- of- responsibility- the- legacy- of- 
deplete> accessed 9 February 2017.
12 For an overview of the development of UNEP’s post- conflict environmental assessments, see: David 
Jensen, ‘Evaluating the Impact of UNEP’s Post- Conflict Environmental Assessments’ in David Jensen 
and Steve Lonergan (eds.), Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post- Conflict Peacebuilding 
(London: Earthscan, 2012).
13 UN Doc. UNEP/ GC/ 103 1977 Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3435 (XXX): Study 
of the problem of the material remnants of wars, particularly mines, and their effects on the environment.
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and discussed within the context of Articles 35 and 55 of the 1977 Geneva Convention’s 
Additional Protocols, where it was championed by Sweden.14
The Geneva conference, and the negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament 
on the 1977 Environmental Modification (‘ENMOD’) Convention, represented the 
other two avenues whereby concerns over the environmental impact and legacy of con-
flict were being explored.15 Meanwhile, the process begun at the Lucerne conference 
resulted in the negotiation of the 1980 Convention on Certain Convention Weapons 
(‘CCW’), which established humanitarian restrictions on ‘excessively injurious’ and 
‘indiscriminate’ weapons, including landmines and incendiary weapons.16
With the negotiation of ENMOD and the CCW, the material remnants framing 
began to collapse, with the environment effectively decoupled from what would even-
tually become mine action.17 This process would accelerate during the latter part of 
the 1980s as aid workers deployed to the locations of the Cold War’s proxy conflicts 
witnessed first- hand the effects of the use of Soviet mine warfare doctrine. These aid 
workers would go on to establish the influential humanitarian demining NGOs such 
as Handicap International, the HALO Trust, and Mines Advisory Group, which would 
successfully reframe land mines and ERW as primarily a humanitarian, rather than 
environmental problem.18
18.4 The Emergence of the Toxic Remnants of War Framing
Following UNEP’s 2009 study on the state of legal protection for the environment, 
a report on strengthening legal protection for victims of armed conflicts, which 
was prepared for the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (‘ICRC’) thirty- 
first Conference, drew fresh attention to the health threats from environmental 
pollution associated with conflicts. Conflict pollution had appeared regularly in 
UNEP’s post- conflict environmental assessments up until this point but typically 
as one of a range of environmental threats. The ICRC report drew attention to the 
fact that, in spite of considerable progress in the development of legal mechanisms 
14 Official records of the diplomatic conference on the reaffirmation and development of international 
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, Geneva (1974– 1977), at <http:// www.loc.gov/ rr/ frd/ 
Military_ Law/ pdf/ RC- records_ Vol- 16.pdf>.
15 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques, 10 December 1976 (October 2012), at <https:// ihl- databases.icrc.org/ ihl/ INTRO/ 460> 
accessed 9 February 2017.
16 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Geneva, 10 October 1980, (October 
2010), at <https:// ihl- databases.icrc.org/ ihl/ INTRO/ 500?OpenDocument> accessed 9 February 2017.
17 The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) refer to mine action as ‘activities which aim to reduce 
the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and (other) ERW including cluster munitions’. 
According to the UN, mine action comprises five complementary groups of activities or ‘pillars’: Mine/ 
ERW risk education; Demining, i.e. mine/ ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance; Victim assis-
tance, including rehabilitation and reintegration; Stockpile destruction; Advocacy against the use of anti- 
personnel mines and cluster munitions.
18 Matthew Bolton and Doug Weir (2015) ‘Towards an integrated approach to the material lega-
cies of war:  landmines, explosive remnants of war and environmental contamination’, at <http:// www.
toxicremnantsofwar.info/ towards- an- integrated- approach- to- the- material- legacies- of- war/ > accessed 9 
February 2017.
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to deal with land mines and ERW, conflict pollution remained under- addressed, 
observing that:
damage to the environment due to armed conflicts may be extensive, largely exceeding 
the actual combat zone. It may also have long- term consequences that continue after 
the hostilities end. For instance, a considerable amount of environmental damage may 
emanate from chemicals and other pollutants leaking into the soil and groundwater 
as a result of military operations. These chemicals and pollutants can come from the 
destruction of power plants, chemical plants and other industrial installations but also 
from the rubble left by attacks against other types of military objectives. In some situ-
ations, hazardous substances have been abandoned by parties to armed conflict when 
leaving combat zones. For example, in Astana, a small village in Afghanistan, land on 
which the inhabitants grazed livestock was polluted for years by hazardous chemicals 
used to fire missiles, exposing the local population to high risks.
As a result, the civilian population no longer has safe access to resources that are 
indispensable to its survival. People may also suffer serious health effects. Extensive 
thought must therefore be given to possible mechanisms and procedures for address-
ing the immediate and long- term consequences of environmental damage.19
The report concluded by proposing that a new system could be introduced for address-
ing wartime environmental damage, suggesting that it be based on similar rules for 
dealing with the legacy of landmines and other ERW. Conflict and the environment 
was one of four topics proposed as focus areas for the ICRC’s work during the period 
between conferences. Of these, only two could be selected and, after consultations with 
states and national Red Cross societies, conflict and the environment was rejected in 
favour of IHL compliance and the care of detainees. Nevertheless the Nordic govern-
ments and societies pledged to continue working on the theme until the thirty- second 
conference.20
For civil society actors working on conflict pollution, such as the International 
Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (‘ICBUW’), the ICRC’s 2011 report had coincided 
with a reappraisal of how their work was framed.21 The active reframing of land mines 
and ERW as a humanitarian issue by civil society in the 1980s had ultimately created 
the field of humanitarian disarmament. This approach, which views disarmament as 
humanitarian action, is radically different to the state- centric approaches to disarma-
ment and arms control of the twentieth century.22
19 ICRC, 2011, 31IC/ 11/ 5.1.1 Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed Conflicts, at 
<http:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ assets/ files/ red- cross- crescent- movement/ 31st- international- conference/ 
31- int- conference- 5- 1- 1- report- strength- ihl- en.pdf>.
20 Pledge P1290, at <https:// rcrcconference.icrc.org/ applic/ pledges/ p31e.nsf/ pledge.xsp?action=openDo
cument&documentId=16A50358B3ED1677C1257958003CC786> accessed 9 February 2017.
21 Doug Weir, ‘Mapping the Toxic Remnants of War’ (2 February 2016), at <https:// toxicnews.org/ 2016/ 
02/ 02/ mapping- the- toxic- remnants- of- war/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
22 See, John Borrie, ‘Rethinking Multilateral Negotiations: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action’ in John 
Borrie and Vanessa Randin (eds.), Alternative Approaches in Multilateral Decision Making: Disarmament as 
Humanitarian Action (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2005), at <http:// 
www.unidir.org/ files/ medias/ pdfs/ rethinking- multilateral- negotiations- disarmament- as- humanitarian- 
action- eng- 0- 65.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
444 Reframing the Remnants of War
The tactics, vocabulary, advocacy, and communication strategies utilized for humani-
tarian disarmament seek to place those impacted by the weapons at the centre of the 
debate. This presents challenges for efforts to utilize these tools for advocacy on the vic-
tims of pollution, where harms may be subtle, cumulative, or take many years to present 
themselves. At issue was whether a framing on conflict pollution could be developed 
that merged both environmental and humanitarian considerations, and which encom-
passed the diversity of sources of conflict pollution that had hitherto been dealt with 
in isolation, if at all. In 2012, ICBUW and PAX launched the Toxic Remnants of War 
Project (‘TRW Project’) to document conflict pollution and to promote the framing as 
part of the renewed attention on conflict and the environment.23
The TRW Project defined TRW as ‘any toxic or radiological substance resulting from 
military activities that forms a hazard to humans or ecosystems’.24 The Project later 
sought to catalogue them as direct or indirect. Direct TRW might include pollutants 
from bomb damaged industrial facilities, whereas indirect TRW were pollutants that 
were generated as a result of the conditions associated with conflicts, such as infor-
mal hazardous waste dumping caused by the collapse of environmental management 
systems.25
As with post- conflict ERW responses, the Project argued that irrespective of pol-
lutant type, there were common requirements for mitigating the health and environ-
mental risks that TRW pose. These included monitoring and transparency measures, 
post- conflict environmental and health assessments, victim assistance, and environ-
mental remediation.26 In advocating for the development of these policies, the Project 
also utilized the same legal frameworks that would underpin the work of the ILC on 
PERAC— IHL, IEL, and HRL. The Project also considered peacetime environmental 
norms as a standard for the protection of human health and the environment follow-
ing conflicts.
18.5 The ILC’s Draft Principle on the Toxic and Hazardous 
Remnants of War
The ILC Special Rapporteur’s third report on PERAC, published in July 2016, focused 
predominantly on the laws, norms, and practice relating to environmental protection 
in the post- conflict phase.27 The Special Rapporteur chose to deal with remnants of war 
on land, and remnants of war at sea separately, arguing that they can be subject to very 
different legal regimes:
23 Toxic Remnants of War Project, at <http:// www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
24 TRW Project, ‘Pollution Politics: Power, Accountability and Toxic Remnants of War’ (2014), at <www.
toxicremnantsofwar.info/ report- pollution- politics- power- accountability- and- toxic- remnants- of- war> 
accessed 9 February 2017.
25 TRW Network, ‘TRW Sources’ (29 April 2015), at <http:// www.trwn.org/ trw- sources/ > accessed 9 
February 2017.
26 TRW Project, ‘Environmental Mechanics:  Reimagining Post- Conflict Environmental Assistance’   
(2015), at <http:// www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ new- report- environmental- mechanics- re- imagining- post- 
 conflict- environmental- assistance/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
27 ILC Study (n 5).
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While the affected environment may be an area under the sovereignty or control of a 
State, it can also be an area outside the exclusive jurisdiction of a State, such as the high 
seas or the international seabed.28
The Special Rapporteur also observed that, while the term ‘remnants of war’ has been 
widely used since the 1970s, there had been no attempt to legally define it. Indeed as 
discussed previously, the term had been somewhat flexible, and had been dependent to 
a large extent on the frames applied primarily by civil society organizations. The term 
‘explosive remnants of war’ was not defined until 2003,29 in a process initiated and 
driven by the ICRC and NGOs, who had recognized the need for a broader approach 
to deal with forms of unexploded and abandoned ordnance other than anti- personnel 
mines.30
The frameworks created by the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, and the protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
represent a substantial body of law and practice, and as such, provided the ILC with 
sufficient justification for a draft principle. The initial draft principle proposed in July 
2016 on Remnants of war was a conservative summary of existing norms and obliga-
tions under these regimes:
Draft principle III- 3 Remnants of war
1. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all minefields, mined areas, 
mines, booby- traps, explosive ordnance and other devices shall be cleared, removed, 
destroyed or maintained in accordance with obligations under international law.
2. At all times necessary, the parties shall endeavour to reach agreement, both among 
themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with international organ-
izations, on the provision of technical and material assistance, including, in appro-
priate circumstances, the undertaking of joint operations necessary to fulfil such 
responsibilities.
The exclusion of any reference to TRW from the principle was viewed by the TRW 
Project as problematic;31 but it was also a reflection of the historical decoupling of 
explosive remnants from the more holistic material remnants framing of the 1970s and 
1980s. Clearly the Special Rapporteur was also constrained by the sources of law and 
practice available, which were predominantly weighted towards international agree-
ments on land mines and ERW.
Nevertheless, the problem of TRW had been raised by several states during the UN 
General Assembly Sixth Committee debates on the 2015 report of the ILC. Lebanon 
had highlighted its efforts to address the 2006 Jiyeh oil spill, which was caused by Israel’s 
28 ibid.
29 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 CCW Convention), 28 November 
2003, (February 2003), at <https:// ihl- databases.icrc.org/ ihl/ INTRO/ 610> accessed 9 February 2017.
30 For an overview of the development of CCW Protocol V, see Louis Maresca, ‘A New Protocol on 
Explosive Remnants of War: The History and Negotiation of Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons’, at <https:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ assets/ files/ other/ irrc_ 856_ maresca.pdf> accessed 9 
February 2017.
31 Doug Weir, ‘Blog:  UN Legal Experts Consider Principles Guiding Environmental Protection 
After Conflicts’ (8 July 2016), at <http:// www.trwn.org/ un- legal- experts- consider- principles- guiding- 
environmental- protection- after- conflicts/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
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bombing of an oil- fired power station.32 Viet Nam had highlighted the need for obliga-
tions to clear ‘land mines, toxic chemicals and other remnants of war’,33 while Iran had 
highlighted the problems caused by the use of depleted uranium and the responsibility 
of states to rehabilitate the environment from ‘pollution caused by conventional and 
chemical weapons’.34
The views of ILC members on the proposed principle were mixed, a few argued that 
the explosive hazards cited in paragraph one were predominantly a threat to humans 
and not the environment, and therefore irrelevant for the PERAC study. A view that 
perhaps demonstrates the effectiveness of the humanitarian framings developed 
around ERW, but which is also symptomatic of wider questions about how the envi-
ronment and our place in it are defined. Several members challenged the limited scope 
of the principle, arguing that it was under- inclusive of other, non- explosive remnants 
that nevertheless posed a risk to the environment. Still others questioned the strength 
and urgency of the obligation on states. The fine detail of the debate wasn’t necessarily 
captured by the ILC’s summary records but the message on inclusivity was clear:
Another area requiring further examination concerned the types of remnants of war 
that the draft principles aimed to cover, the current wording seeming over- inclusive 
and under- inclusive at the same time. In this respect, while several members con-
sidered it important to take a broad, non- exhaustive approach, it was also observed 
that attempting to cover all remnants of war would require further study. It was also 
suggested that the type of information envisaged under paragraph 2 of draft principle 
III- 4 be further specified, possibly in the commentaries.35
In spite of some objections from ILC members, all nine principles proposed by the 
Special Rapporteur were forwarded to the ILC’s Drafting Committee, which revised 
the original draft principles based on the outcome of the plenary debate.36 Draft prin-
ciple III- 3 on Remnants of war underwent considerable revision and, significantly, its 
scope was modified to include both ERW and ‘toxic and hazardous remnants of war’. 
The principles were also renumbered for technical reasons and the revised principle 
expanded with a third paragraph:
16. Remnants of war
1. After an armed conflict, parties to the conflict shall seek to remove or render harm-
less toxic and hazardous remnants of war under their jurisdiction or control that 
32 Statement by Lebanon, Sixth Committee, 10 November 2015, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.org/ 
media2/ 7655118/ lebanon.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
33 Statement by Viet Nam, Sixth Committee, 11 November 2015, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.org/ 
media2/ 7655153/ vietnam.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
34 Statement by Iran, Sixth Committee, 10 November 2015, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.org/ 
media2/ 7655145/ iran.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
35 UN Doc. A/ 71/ 10, Chapter X, Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty- eighth Session (2 
May– 10 June and 4 July– 12 August 2016), at <http:// legal.un.org/ docs/ ?path=../ ilc/ reports/ 2016/ english/ 
chp10.pdf&lang=EFSRAC> accessed 9 February 2017.
36 Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr. Pavel Šturma, International Law 
Commission, Sixty- eighth Session, at <http:// legal.un.org/ docs/ ?path=../ ilc/ documentation/ english/ state-
ments/ 2016_ dc_ chairman_ statement_ peac_ 9august.pdf&lang=E> accessed 9 February 2017.
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are causing or risk causing damage to the environment. Such measures shall be 
taken subject to the applicable rules of international law.
2. The parties shall also endeavour to reach agreement, among themselves and, where 
appropriate, with other States and with international organizations, on technical 
and material assistance, including, in appropriate circumstances, the undertaking 
of joint operations to remove or render harmless such toxic and hazardous rem-
nants of war.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are without prejudice to any rights or obligations under inter-
national law to clear, remove, destroy or maintain minefields, mined areas, mines, 
booby- traps, explosive ordnance and other devices.
In expanding the scope on remnants, the ILC had not only recognized that TRW 
and other non- explosive hazards have remained under- addressed in recent decades, 
but also reconnected to earlier, more holistic framings around the material rem-
nants of war. However the definition of what constitute the ‘toxic and hazardous 
remnants of war’ will only be made clear in the Commentary, which at the time 
of writing has not been published. At present it is unclear whether this formula-
tion relates to the nature of the remnant, requiring it to be both toxic and posing 
a hazard— without a predetermined threshold, or whether it relates to both ‘toxic 
remnants’ and ‘hazardous remnants’ separately, with the latter including ERW and 
other explosive devices. Given the debate on inclusivity that led to the revision, it 
feels as if this should be the latter.
Other notable changes in the revised principle are the urgency and strength of 
the obligation to clear remnants. The requirement to address contamination ‘with-
out delay’— which aligns with existing obligations for ERW clearance under CCW 
Protocol V was weakened to ‘after an armed conflict’. An example of why this could 
prove problematic is the current conflict in Iraq against Islamic State. At the time or 
writing the conflict is ongoing and yet urgent ERW clearance efforts are already under-
way to secure the return of displaced people and allow safe corridors for humanitarian 
access. Similarly, oil fires started in the vicinity of the town of Qayyarah in northern 
Iraq in July 2016 are generating pollution that is impacting public health and the envi-
ronment,37 delaying work to minimize or assess these risks until such time as Islamic 
State are defeated would be unthinkable.
Of further concern is that the principle obliges states only to ‘seek to remove’ rem-
nants. As Hulme observes:
we cannot, of course, gloss over the notion that states are mandated only to ‘seek to’ 
remove, and it is unclear exactly what this obligation might entail. Clearly, one could 
envisage a situation where a state was unaware of hazardous remnants despite due dili-
gence in carrying out environmental assessments, but such remnants did in fact later 
37 Doug Weir, ‘Blog:  The Environmental Consequences of Iraq’s Oil Fires are Going Unrecorded’ (30 
November 2016), at <http:// www.trwn.org/ blog- the- environmental- consequences- of- iraqs- oil- fires- are- 
going- unrecorded/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
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cause environmental harm, or a situation where a state simply cannot afford clearance 
operations.38
Similarly while paragraph 2’s reference to the provision of international assistance is 
also welcome, absent a clear international framework to structure provision this will 
remain the preserve of bilateral agreements between states, which are inevitably more 
subject to the vagaries of political and donor interest than formalized arrangements. 
Nevertheless, the principle is a significant step forward, even if its current formula-
tion may be more progressive for environmental protection than for the protection of 
human health. It is perhaps regrettable that no way was found of balancing both the 
humanitarian and environmental risks posed by TRW in the wording of the principle. 
The Commentary will perhaps clarify how the humanitarian and environmental moti-
vations behind the principle are to be interpreted.
Because the draft principles published in 2016 relied more heavily on the practice of 
states and international organizations, and referenced a wider body of law than those 
proposed in 2015— which primarily related to IHL during conflict— it was unclear 
how they would be received by states during 2016’s UN General Assembly debate on 
the work of the ILC. This was certainly the case with the draft principle on Remnants 
of war. Austria and Portugal provided general comments on scope, with the former 
suggesting that the principle was only partly applicable in non- international armed 
conflicts, as non- state actors are unable to enter into formal agreements with states.39 
Portugal meanwhile argued that the primary focus of the principle should be on envir-
onmental protection, rather than the protection of human health.40
States were divided on the substance of the draft principle. Israel objected to the 
use of toxic and hazardous remnants, arguing that it went far beyond the definition 
used by Protocol V of the CCW, adding that they couldn’t identify any missing forms 
of remnants from the existing definition— which covers only ERW.41 The Netherlands 
objected to the use of ‘shall’, questioning whether the principle reflected an existing 
legal obligation of universal application. They too objected to the scope of ‘remnants’ 
and suggested that Additional Protocol II and Protocol V of the CCW have yet to 
achieve customary status. The United States, which provided only a limited assessment 
of the principles as it claimed it had not had sufficient time to review them fully, argued 
that the principle on Remnants of war expanded the obligations under CCW Protocol 
V to mark and clear, remove, or destroy ERW to include toxic or hazardous remnants 
of war.42
38 Karen Hulme, The ILC’s Work Stream on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflict, QIL, Zoom- in 34 (2016), 27– 41, at <http:// www.qil- qdi.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 01/ 03_ 
EnvironmentArmedConflicts_ HULME.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
39 Statement of Austria, Sixth Committee, 1 November 2016, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.org/ 
media2/ 7663524/ austria.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
40 Statement of Portugal, Sixth Committee, October/ November 2016, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.
org/ media2/ 7663560/ portugal.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
41 Statement of Israel, Sixth Committee, 2 November 2016, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.org/ 
media2/ 7663610/ israe.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
42 Statement of the United States, Sixth Committee, 1 November 2016, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.
org/ media2/ 7663603/ us.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
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However the principle was supported by El Salvador, although they cautioned that 
mitigating or treating such remnants only after a conflict has ended may be too late 
to protect the environment.43 It was also welcomed by Lebanon,44 and Micronesia,45 
with the latter proposing that the eventual definition ensure as comprehensive cover-
age as possible, and include those remnants no longer under the jurisdiction and con-
trol of belligerents but for which they retain responsibility. Micronesia also argued for 
the retention of the clause ‘remove without delay’, which had been removed by the 
Commission’s Drafting Committee.
Slovenia too welcomed the principle, arguing that its initial formulation, which 
focused only on ERW, had been too narrow.46 Ukraine proposed that the principle be 
amended to highlight that the toxic and hazardous remnants of war not only cause, or 
pose a risk of causing, damage to the environment, but also threaten human health.47 
Viet Nam thought the principle should be reconstructed so that the belligerent party 
that introduced the substances harmful to the environment should bear the legal con-
sequences of its actions.48 This included responsibility for the clearance and destruc-
tion of remnants, and responsibility to restore the environment.
It was perhaps inevitable that during the debate the views of states recently affected 
by environmental degradation wrought by conflicts would contrast so starkly with 
those of the United States, Israel, and the Netherlands. Their arguments that the pro-
posed principle goes beyond the obligations and definitions in CCW Protocol V are 
valid, and this perhaps necessitates a greater reliance for the ILC on state practice than 
on formal obligations. Two pertinent examples in this regard are the US- funded pro-
gramme to remediate dioxin contamination around Da Nang Airbase in Viet Nam— 
while accepting no liability for harm;49 and the UK’s practice on the surface clearance 
of depleted uranium in Iraq following the 2003 conflict.50 Depleted uranium does not 
fall under the scope of CCW Protocol V’s definition of ERW, yet even without a clear 
legal obligation, the UK recognized that it had a ‘moral obligation’ to conduct harm 
reduction measures. Similar surface clearance efforts were undertaken within the UK 
area of operations in Kosovo. Both the US and UK examples were driven by the recog-
nition that actions were necessary to minimize the health and environmental risks for 
TRW, even where formal obligations were absent.
43 Statement of El Salvador, Sixth Committee, 2 November 2016, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.org/ 
media2/ 7663530/ el- salvador.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
44 Statement of Lebanon, Sixth Committee, 1 November 2016, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.org/ 
media2/ 7663550/ lebanon.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
45 Statement of Micronesia, Sixth Committee, 1 November 2016, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.org/ 
media2/ 7663564/ micronesia.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
46 Slovenia’s statement is not available online.
47 Statement of Ukraine, Sixth Committee, 3 November 2016, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.org/ 
media2/ 7663687/ ukraine.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
48 Statement of Viet Nam, Sixth Committee, November 2016, at <http:// statements.unmeetings.org/ 
media2/ 7663602/ viet- nam.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
49 ‘Environmental Remediation of Dioxin Contamination at Danang Airport Project Frequently Asked 
Questions’ (16 December 2016), at <https:// www.usaid.gov/ vietnam/ environmental- remediation- dioxin- 
contamination- danang- airport- project- frequently- asked- questions> accessed 9 February 2017.
50 ICBUW, ‘Chilcot Report Highlights Lack of Obligations for Depleted Uranium Clean- Up’ (11 July 
2016), at <http:// www.bandepleteduranium.org/ en/ chilcot- highlights- lack- of- du- clearance- obligation> 
accessed 9 February 2017.
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The ILC’s draft principle on terrestrial remnants of war could eventually prove to be 
a significant step forward for global efforts to mitigate the impact of TRW on human 
and ecosystem health. So far it is just a tentative first step towards this goal, but in rec-
ognizing and highlighting the environmental and humanitarian impact of the wide 
suite of remnants of conflicts that do not present an explosive risk, the ILC has clearly 
contributed to a long overdue rapprochement between the toxic, physical, and explo-
sive remnants of war.
18.6 The ILC’s Other Post- Conflict Draft Principles that 
Intersect with Toxic Remnants of War
Five of the draft principles published in 2016 were also of relevance for the generation 
and management of TRW. The first, on preventative measures, could conceivably help 
underpin more effective mainstreaming of environmental policies in military planning 
and practice before, during, and after conflicts. In turn these could help encourage poli-
cies and practices that help minimize the generation of TRW.
4. Measures to enhance the protection of the environment
1. States shall, pursuant to their obligations under international law, take effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures to enhance the protection 
of the environment in relation to armed conflict.
2. In addition, States should take further measures, as appropriate, to enhance the 
protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict.
Limited information is currently available on the implementation of IHL obliga-
tions pertaining to the environment, while state practice is dispersed across national 
laws, military guidelines, and the interactions with IEL frameworks, such as those on 
chemicals and waste. Information on the environmental conduct of non- state actors 
is sparser still.51 In this regard, it was unsurprising that the need for better implemen-
tation of the international law relevant to the protection of the environment in rela-
tion to armed conflicts also featured in 2016’s United Nations Environment Assembly 
(‘UNEA’) resolution on the Protection of the environment in areas affected by armed 
conflict.52 Whether the ILC principle and the UNEA resolution will help catalyse more 
effective environmental mainstreaming, or indeed greater scrutiny of state practice 
and conduct, remains to be seen. The ICRC is expected to update its 1996 Guidelines 
for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times 
of Armed Conflict by the end of 2017, and this could provide one benchmark against 
which to test the conduct of states.53
51 Jonathan Somer, ‘Blog: Environmental Protection and Non- State Armed Groups: Setting a Place at 
the Table for the Elephant in the Room’ (4 December 2015), at <http:// www.trwn.org/ blog- environmental- 
protection- and- non- state- armed- groups- setting- a- place- at- the- table- for- the- elephant- in- the- room/ > 
accessed 9 February 2017.
52 Protection of the Environment in Areas Affected by Armed Conflict, UN Doc. UNEP/ EA.2/ Res.15.
53 ‘Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of 
Armed Conflict’, at <https:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ resources/ documents/ article/ other/ 57jn38.htm> accessed 9 
February 2017.
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7.  Agreements concerning the presence of military forces in relation to armed 
conflict
States and international organizations should, as appropriate, include provisions on 
environmental protection in agreements concerning the presence of military forces in 
relation to armed conflict. Such provisions may include preventive measures, impact 
assessments, restoration and clean- up measures.
The ILC’s Drafting Committee noted that the requirements in draft principle seven on 
Status of Forces Agreements (‘SOFAs’) did not stem from any obligation under inter-
national law; however they do increasingly reflect the practice of militaries. A number 
of ILC members questioned the applicability of the original principle in plenary, with 
some suggesting that basing agreements had little to do with the conduct of hostili-
ties. However, as the cases of contamination from NATO’s International Security and 
Assistance Forces facilities in Afghanistan demonstrate, the environmental footprint of 
installations can be significant before, after, and also during conflict,54 something that 
stronger environmental standards in bilateral agreements could help address. Pollution 
from foreign military bases and activities can generate serious and persistent pollution 
that can threaten the health of local communities, and affect water and agricultural 
resources. Affected states may be at the mercy of power imbalances in seeking redress 
from polluters or, where they wish to reoccupy facilities once foreign forces depart, 
may prioritize cordial relations with the polluter over community concerns. In cases 
where occupying forces reject liability for harm, this can create long- running tensions 
with the affected state and communities, as has been the case with Agent Orange and 
heavy metal contamination on US military bases on Okinawa.55
14. Peace processes
1. Parties to an armed conflict should, as part of the peace process, including where 
appropriate in peace agreements, address matters relating to the restoration and 
protection of the environment damaged by the conflict.
2. Relevant international organizations should, where appropriate, play a facilitating 
role in this regard.
As with other draft principles interpreted from the practice of states and interna-
tional organizations, draft principle 14 represents the growing trend for environmen-
tal factors— such as natural resources— to be included in peace agreements. There was 
some concern in the ILC debate and at the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee that 
not all conflicts are concluded with a formal agreement, with some states arguing that 
practice was rare.56 Paragraph 2 of the principle reflects the role that organizations such 
as UNEP can play as arbiters in such processes and the fact that parties to a conflict do 
54 Aneaka Kellay, ‘ISAF’s Environmental Legacy in Afghanistan Requires Greater Scrutiny’ (2017), at 
<http:// www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ isafs- environmental- legacy- in- afghanistan- requires- scrutiny/ > 
accessed 9 February 2017.
55 The Japan Times, ‘Agent Orange and Okinawa: The Story So Far’, at <http:// features.japantimes.co.jp/ 
agent- orange- in- okinawa/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
56 Haodan Heather Chen, ‘Prized Natural Resources are Rarely Addressed in Peace Agreements’ (New 
Security Beat, 10 February 2016), at <https:// www.newsecuritybeat.org/ 2016/ 02/ natural- resources- 
important- prize- rarely- addressed- peace- agreements/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
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not always welcome this role. However, in cases where there are threats from TRW or 
other forms of harm, or where natural resources have helped fuel conflicts, integrating 
agreements on the ownership and management of these environmental issues could 
play an important role in building and sustaining peace.
15. Post- armed conflict environmental assessments and remedial measures
Cooperation among relevant actors, including international organizations, is encour-
aged with respect to post- armed conflict environmental assessments and remedial 
measures.
UNEP, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme (‘UNDP’) 
have been undertaking post- conflict environmental assessments since the late 1990s. 
These have become a vital tool for efforts to provide scientifically robust and neutral 
data on the environmental drivers and consequences of conflicts, considering direct 
forms of harm, such as TRW, analysing systems of environmental governance with a 
view to reconstructing governmental capacity, and minimizing the risks of a return to 
conflict over particular natural resources.57 ILC members were clear that this princi-
ple should deal solely with assessments, and not cover issues of liability or reparations. 
However some states that spoke to the principle at the UN General Assembly felt that 
it should go further in terms of cooperation, with belligerents having a responsibility to 
conduct assessments and a greater focus on remedial measures.
17. Remnants of war at sea
States and relevant international organizations should cooperate to ensure that rem-
nants of war at sea do not constitute a danger to the environment.
Pollution from marine military remnants is a global issue, with wrecks and sea- dumped 
munitions posing health and environmental risks to communities across the world. 
These are often most acute for small island states, with a heavy reliance on fishing and 
tourism. They also act as a barrier to the economic development of seabed resources. 
The financial costs and legal complexity associated with addressing these hazards are 
significant, particularly where remnants may have been emplaced decades previously. 
This complexity is reflected in the principle, which merely calls for cooperation, rather 
than imposing or suggesting a strict obligation. States broadly welcomed the principle, 
although several queried why its original wording on public health risks from marine 
remnants had been removed by the ILC’s Drafting Committee.
18. Sharing and granting access to information
1. To facilitate remedial measures after an armed conflict, States and relevant interna-
tional organizations shall share and grant access to relevant information in accord-
ance with their obligations under international law.
2. Nothing in the present draft principle obliges a State or international organization 
to share or grant access to information vital to its national defence or security. 
Nevertheless, that State or international organization shall cooperate in good faith 
with a view to providing as much information as possible under the circumstances.
57 David Jensen, ‘Evaluating the Impact of UNEP’s Post- Conflict Environmental Assessments’ in Jensen 
and Lonergan (n 12).
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This principle, which is based loosely on the duty to cooperate, was heavily debated in 
the ILC’s plenary meeting. It received rather less attention at the UN General Assembly 
where it was broadly welcomed, the swift release of data on environmental hazards 
being recognized as fundamental for minimizing both risks to public health and the 
environment. The principle could have been strengthened by including non- state 
actors, be they armed groups or private military contractors— who may retain infor-
mation vital for environmental remediation efforts— but the main concern related to 
the strength of the national security exemption in paragraph 2.
One notable example in this regard relates to the refusal of the US to share targeting 
data on its use of depleted uranium weapons in Iraq in 2003.58 The data, which is cru-
cial for clearance and harm reduction measures, was not shared with UNEP, the Iraqi 
government, or civil society. As no transparency obligations are in place for depleted 
uranium weapons— unlike for ERW under CCW Protocol V— the United States was 
free to withhold the information, although it had made such data available to UN agen-
cies for other conflicts in the past. Very few forms of TRW are covered by existing inter-
national obligations and, as such, the principle perhaps risks placing too much store in 
‘good faith’.
18.7 Conclusion
The protection of the environment, human health, and livelihoods is a critical element 
of any consideration of jus post bellum. However the existing legal frameworks that 
could provide enhanced protection are underdeveloped. Nevertheless there is a broad 
consensus that there is significant potential for progress in synthesizing the disparate 
elements of IHL, IEL, HRL, state practice, and peacetime environmental norms and 
standards.
In publishing a draft principle on TRW, the ILC has helped draw attention to envi-
ronmental and human health hazards that have been largely ignored by the interna-
tional community due to an understandable focus on the immediate humanitarian 
threat posed by ERW. Remnants of war at sea are another environmental issue that has 
received insufficient attention. Both cases are a reminder of the potential and power of 
advocacy framings and of the role that civil society can play in promoting particular 
topics, even where it may be at the expense of others.
The ILC’s work stream on PERAC has made considerable and swift progress but, 
as this analysis suggests, balancing the objective of enhanced protection for both peo-
ple and their environment, with the needs and interests of state and non- state actors, 
and international organizations, is complex. The pace and ambition of the Special 
Rapporteur’s programme of work has proved uncomfortable for some governments 
and ILC members, as has her need to interpret and utilize norms and practices from 
beyond both IHL and existing international mechanisms, and it is evident from the 
debates in the UN General Assembly that this pushback may intensify. Furthermore, at 
58 Doug Weir, ‘Blog: Do the ILC’s Draft Principles on Remnants and Data Sharing Reflect State Practice?’ 
(6 October 2016), at <http:// www.trwn.org/ blog- do- the- ilcs- draft- principles- on- remnants- and- data- 
sharing- reflect- state- practice/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
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this stage it is still unclear what the eventual outcome of the ILC’s work on PERAC will 
be, draft principles, or the more meaningful draft articles.
As with other areas of jus post bellum, it is insufficient to have the legal tools at your 
disposal if you are unable to operationalize them. For conflict and the environment, 
the existing international system has proved itself largely inadequate to constrain envi-
ronmentally harmful military behaviours, to properly address environmental damage 
and civilian harm in the wake of conflicts, or to ensure effective environmental assis-
tance and restoration. The environment suffers from low prioritization across the UN 
system, and particularly in post- conflict response, where urgent humanitarian needs 
and responses take priority; and beyond UNEP, international organizations tend to 
have few staff dedicated to the environmental impact and legacy of conflicts. Recent 
conflicts have also shown that piecemeal interventions do little to address the systemic 
problems caused by the collapse in environmental governance that often accompanies 
armed conflicts and instability.
The TRW Project considered these problems in mapping a possible structure for a 
post- conflict environmental mechanism.59 In doing so, we explored how a more for-
malized system of post- conflict assistance could increase the protection of civilians and 
their environment, and help to create and strengthen norms against environmentally 
destructive military behaviours. Such a framework could help to operationalize the 
ILC’s draft principles and catalyse the merging of the disparate bodies of law relevant 
to the field, but achieving such a system would require a far greater level of state and 
civil society engagement on the environmental dimensions of armed conflict than cur-
rently exists.
Vitally, a more formalized system of post- conflict environmental assistance would 
help facilitate the mainstreaming of the environment throughout the cycle of con-
flicts. The international agreements on ERW tended to be driven from the bottom up, 
with NGOs working with international organizations and progressive states to develop 
response frameworks. NGOs brought field data and the voices or victims and survivors 
to the attention of states and the wider public, catalysing political efforts. This poses a 
problem for TRW and conflict and the environment more generally as current engage-
ment on these topics by civil society is patchy, particularly with regard to the trans-
national environmental NGOs. This indicates that those wishing to see more effective 
mainstreaming of the environment will need to consider how an international frame-
work could be developed, something that was done with the other cross- cutting issue 
of peace and security— gender. Any consideration of greater environmental main-
streaming in both the discourse on conflicts, and in how the international community 
responds to them, should prioritize more effective structural monitoring of environ-
mental risks and incidents, and more robust integration of the environment in peace-
building and humanitarian response.60
59 TRW Project (n 26).
60 UNEP/ OCHA Joint Unit, ‘Environment and Humanitarian Action— Increasing Effectiveness, 
Sustainability and Accountability’ (2014), at <https:// docs.unocha.org/ sites/ dms/ Documents/ EHA%20
Study%20webfinal.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017.
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Governments broadly welcomed the continuation of the ILC’s work on PERAC, 
suggesting that occupation, the practice of non- state actors, indigenous peoples, the 
questions of responsibility and liability, and the applicability of the precautionary prin-
ciple all be considered in future. It will be a lengthy process, and lessons should be 
learned from the previous phases of political interest in conflict and the environment 
which ultimately faltered due to a lack of engagement or allowing ownership to be 
handed to military lawyers.61 Nevertheless there are grounds for optimism. The inter-
national community has a far better understanding of the environmental dimensions 
of conflicts than it did in the 1970s and 1990s, and the passage by consensus of a wide- 
ranging resolution on the Protection of the environment in areas affected by armed con-
flict at 2016’s meeting of UNEA was undoubtedly a sign of growing interest in the topic 
among governments;62 but building on this interest, and ensuring that the environment 
is more effectively mainstreamed in all matters of peace and security, is likely to remain 
challenging.
61 Doug Weir, ‘Blog: Whatever Happened to the 5th Geneva Convention?’ (29 July 2015), at <http:// www.
trwn.org/ blog- whatever- happened- to- the- 5th- geneva- convention/ > accessed 9 February 2017.
62 UNEA- 2 resolution (n 52).
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